Quaestio 1 Question 1 De fide Faith Circa virtutes igitur theologicas primo erit considerandum de fide; secundo, de spe; tertio, de caritate. Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with faith, second we shall speak of hope, and third, of charity. Circa fidem vero quadruplex consideratio occurrit, prima quidem de ipsa fide; secunda de donis intellectus et scientiae sibi correspondentibus; tertia de vitiis oppositis; quarta de praeceptis ad hanc virtutem pertinentibus. The treatise on faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue. Circa fidem vero primo erit considerandum de eius obiecto; secundo, de eius actu; tertio, de ipso habitu fidei. About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3) the habit of faith. Circa primum quaeruntur decem. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: Primo, utrum obiectum fidei sit veritas prima. (1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth? Secundo, utrum obiectum fidei sit aliquid complexum vel incomplexum, idest res aut enuntiabile. (2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e., whether it is a thing or a proposition? Tertio, utrum fidei possit subesse falsum. (3) Whether anything false can come under faith? Quarto, utrum obiectum fidei possit esse aliquid visum. (4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen? Quinto, utrum possit esse aliquid scitum. (5) Whether it can be anything known? Sexto, utrum credibilia debeant distingui per certos articulos. (6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain number of articles? Septimo, utrum iidem articuli subsint fidei secundum omne tempus. (7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times? Octavo, de numero articulorum. (8) Of the number of articles; Nono, de modo tradendi articulos in symbolo. (9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol; Decimo, cuius sit fidei symbolum constituere. (10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum obiectum fidei sit veritas prima Whether the object of faith is the first truth? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum fidei non sit veritas prima. Illud enim videtur esse obiectum fidei quod nobis proponitur ad credendum. Sed non solum proponuntur nobis ad credendum ea quae pertinent ad divinitatem, quae est veritas prima; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad humanitatem Christi et Ecclesiae sacramenta et creaturarum conditionem. Ergo non solum veritas prima est fidei obiectum. Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e., the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also things concerning Christ’s human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth. Praeterea, fides et infidelitas sunt circa idem, cum sint opposita. Sed circa omnia quae in sacra Scriptura continentur potest esse infidelitas, quidquid enim horum homo negaverit, infidelis reputatur. Ergo etiam fides est circa omnia quae in sacra Scriptura continentur. Sed ibi multa continentur de hominibus et de aliis rebus creatis. Ergo obiectum fidei non solum est veritas prima, sed etiam veritas creata. Obj. 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth. Praeterea, fides caritati condividitur, ut supra dictum est. Sed caritate non solum diligimus Deum, qui est summa bonitas, sed etiam diligimus proximum. Ergo fidei obiectum non est solum veritas prima. Obj. 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only the First Truth. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod fides est circa simplicem et semper existentem veritatem. Haec autem est veritas prima. Ergo obiectum fidei est veritas prima. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that faith is about the simple and everlasting truth. Now this is the First Truth. Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth. Respondeo dicendum quod cuiuslibet cognoscitivi habitus obiectum duo habet, scilicet id quod materialiter cognoscitur, quod est sicut materiale obiectum; et id per quod cognoscitur, quod est formalis ratio obiecti. Sicut in scientia geometriae materialiter scita sunt conclusiones; formalis vero ratio sciendi sunt media demonstrationis, per quae conclusiones cognoscuntur. I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, second, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known. Sic igitur in fide, si consideremus formalem rationem obiecti, nihil est aliud quam veritas prima, non enim fides de qua loquimur assentit alicui nisi quia est a Deo revelatum; unde ipsi veritati divinae innititur tanquam medio. Si vero consideremus materialiter ea quibus fides assentit, non solum est ipse Deus, sed etiam multa alia. Quae tamen sub assensu fidei non cadunt nisi secundum quod habent aliquem ordinem ad Deum, prout scilicet per aliquos divinitatis effectus homo adiuvatur ad tendendum in divinam fruitionem. Et ideo etiam ex hac parte obiectum fidei est quodammodo veritas prima, inquantum nihil cadit sub fide nisi in ordine ad Deum, sicut etiam obiectum medicinae est sanitas, quia nihil medicina considerat nisi in ordine ad sanitatem. Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, inasmuch as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, inasmuch as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad humanitatem Christi et ad sacramenta Ecclesiae vel ad quascumque creaturas cadunt sub fide inquantum per haec ordinamur ad Deum. Et eis etiam assentimus propter divinam veritatem. Reply Obj. 1: Things concerning Christ’s human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, insofar as by them we are directed to God, and inasmuch as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth. Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum, de omnibus illis quae in sacra Scriptura traduntur. The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things contained in Holy Writ. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam caritas diligit proximum propter Deum; et sic obiectum eius proprie est ipse Deus, ut infra dicetur. Reply Obj. 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further on (Q. 25, A. 1). Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum obiectum fidei sit aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum fidei non sit aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis. Obiectum enim fidei est veritas prima, sicut dictum est. Sed prima veritas est aliquid incomplexum. Ergo obiectum fidei non est aliquid complexum. Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First Truth, as stated above (A. 1). Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex. Praeterea, expositio fidei in symbolo continetur. Sed in symbolo non ponuntur enuntiabilia, sed res, non enim dicitur ibi quod Deus sit omnipotens, sed, credo in Deum omnipotentem. Ergo obiectum fidei non est enuntiabile, sed res. Obj. 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: I believe in God . . . almighty. Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a thing. Praeterea, fidei succedit visio, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Sed visio patriae est de incomplexo, cum sit ipsius divinae essentiae. Ergo etiam fides viae. Obj. 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: We see now through a glass in a dark manner: but then face to face. But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also. Sed contra, fides est media inter scientiam et opinionem. Medium autem et extrema sunt eiusdem generis. Cum igitur scientia et opinio sint circa enuntiabilia, videtur quod similiter fides sit circa enuntiabilia. Et ita obiectum fidei, cum fides sit circa enuntiabilia, est aliquid complexum. On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about propositions; so that its object is something complex. Respondeo dicendum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis. Est autem modus proprius humani intellectus ut componendo et dividendo veritatem cognoscat, sicut in primo dictum est. Et ideo ea quae sunt secundum se simplicia intellectus humanus cognoscit secundum quandam complexionem, sicut e converso intellectus divinus incomplexe cognoscit ea quae sunt secundum se complexa. I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the First Part (Q. 85, A. 5). Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in themselves. Sic igitur obiectum fidei dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius rei creditae, et sic obiectum fidei est aliquid incomplexum, scilicet res ipsa de qua fides habetur. Alio modo, ex parte credentis, et secundum hoc obiectum fidei est aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis. Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith. Second, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition. Et ideo utrumque vere opinatum fuit apud antiquos, et secundum aliquid utrumque est verum. Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of truth.