Articulus 11 Article 11 Utrum ritus infidelium sint tolerandi Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ritus infidelium non sint tolerandi. Manifestum est enim quod infideles in suis ritibus peccant eos servando. Sed peccato consentire videtur qui non prohibet cum prohibere possit, ut habetur in Glossa Rom. I, super illud, non solum qui faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus. Ergo peccant qui eorum ritus tolerant. Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: Not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them. Therefore it is a sin to tolerate their rites. Praeterea, ritus Iudaeorum idololatriae comparantur, quia super illud Gal. V, nolite iterum iugo servitutis contineri, dicit Glossa, non est levior haec legis servitus quam idololatriae. Sed non sustineretur quod idololatriae ritum aliqui exercerent, quinimmo Christiani principes templa idolorum primo claudi, et postea dirui fecerunt, ut Augustinus narrat, XVIII de Civ. Dei. Ergo etiam ritus Iudaeorum tolerari non debent. Obj. 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, Be not held again under the yoke of bondage, says: The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of idolatry. But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated. Praeterea, peccatum infidelitatis est gravissimum, ut supra dictum est. Sed alia peccata non tolerantur, sed lege puniuntur, sicut adulterium, furtum et alia huiusmodi. Ergo etiam ritus infidelium tolerandi non sunt. Obj. 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above (A. 3). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites of unbelievers to be tolerated. Sed contra est quod in Decretis, dist. XLV, Can. qui sincera, dicit Gregorius de Iudaeis, omnes festivitates suas, sicut hactenus ipsi et patres eorum per longa colentes tempora tenuerunt, liberam habeant observandi celebrandique licentiam. On the contrary, Gregory says, speaking of the Jews: They should be allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers have for ages observed them. Respondeo dicendum quod humanum regimen derivatur a divino regimine, et ipsum debet imitari. Deus autem, quamvis sit omnipotens et summe bonus, permittit tamen aliqua mala fieri in universo, quae prohibere posset, ne, eis sublatis, maiora bona tollerentur, vel etiam peiora mala sequerentur. Sic igitur et in regimine humano illi qui praesunt recte aliqua mala tolerant, ne aliqua bona impediantur, vel etiam ne aliqua mala peiora incurrantur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de ordine, aufer meretrices de rebus humanis, turbaveris omnia libidinibus. Sic igitur, quamvis infideles in suis ritibus peccent, tolerari possunt vel propter aliquod bonum quod ex eis provenit, vel propter aliquod malum quod vitatur. Ex hoc autem quod Iudaei ritus suos observant, in quibus olim praefigurabatur veritas fidei quam tenemus, hoc bonum provenit quod testimonium fidei nostrae habemus ab hostibus, et quasi in figura nobis repraesentatur quod credimus. Et ideo in suis ritibus tolerantur. I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust. Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there follows this good—that our very enemies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites. Aliorum vero infidelium ritus, qui nihil veritatis aut utilitatis afferunt, non sunt aliqualiter tolerandi, nisi forte ad aliquod malum vitandum, scilicet ad vitandum scandalum vel dissidium quod ex hoc posset provenire, vel impedimentum salutis eorum, qui paulatim, sic tolerati, convertuntur ad fidem. Propter hoc enim etiam haereticorum et Paganorum ritus aliquando Ecclesia toleravit, quando erat magna infidelium multitudo. On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g., the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Articulus 12 Article 12 Utrum pueri iudaeorum et aliorum infidelium sint baptizandi parentibus invitis Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri Iudaeorum et aliorum infidelium sint baptizandi parentibus invitis. Maius enim est vinculum matrimoniale quam ius patriae potestatis, quia ius patriae potestatis potest per hominem solvi, cum filiusfamilias emancipatur; vinculum autem matrimoniale non potest solvi per hominem, secundum illud Matth. XIX, quod Deus coniunxit homo non separet. Sed propter infidelitatem solvitur vinculum matrimoniale, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, quod si infidelis discedit, discedat, non enim servituti subiectus est frater aut soror in huiusmodi; et canon dicit quod si coniux infidelis non vult sine contumelia sui creatoris cum altero stare, quod alter coniugum non debet ei cohabitare. Ergo multo magis propter infidelitatem tollitur ius patriae potestatis in suos filios. Possunt ergo eorum filii baptizari eis invitis. Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will. For the bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be severed by man, according to Matt. 19:6: What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder. And yet the marriage bond is broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor 7:15): If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases: and a canon says that if the unbelieving partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation. Much more, therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents’ authority over their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against their parents’ will. Praeterea, magis debet homini subveniri circa periculum mortis aeternae quam circa periculum mortis temporalis. Sed si aliquis videret hominem in periculo mortis temporalis et ei non ferret auxilium, peccaret. Cum ergo filii Iudaeorum et aliorum infidelium sint in periculo mortis aeternae si parentibus relinquuntur, qui eos in sua infidelitate informant, videtur quod sint eis auferendi et baptizandi et in fidelitate instruendi. Obj. 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and instructed in the faith. Praeterea, filii servorum sunt servi et in potestate dominorum. Sed Iudaei sunt servi regum et principum. Ergo et filii eorum. Reges igitur et principes habent potestatem de filiis Iudaeorum facere quod voluerint. Nulla ergo erit iniuria si eos baptizent invitis parentibus. Obj. 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against their parents’ wishes. Praeterea, quilibet homo magis est Dei, a quo habet animam, quam patris carnalis, a quo habet corpus. Non ergo est iniustum si pueri Iudaeorum carnalibus parentibus auferantur et Deo per Baptismum consecrentur. Obj. 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism. Praeterea, Baptismus efficacior est ad salutem quam praedicatio, quia per Baptismum statim tollitur peccati macula, reatus poenae, et aperitur ianua caeli. Sed si periculum sequitur ex defectu praedicationis, imputatur ei qui non praedicavit, ut habetur Ezech. III, et XXXIII de eo qui videt gladium venientem et non insonuerit tuba. Ergo multo magis, si pueri Iudaeorum damnentur propter defectum Baptismi, imputatur ad peccatum eis qui potuerunt baptizare et non baptizaverunt. Obj. 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who sees the sword coming and sounds not the trumpet. Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not. Sed contra, nemini facienda est iniuria. Fieret autem Iudaeis iniuria si eorum filii baptizarentur eis invitis, quia amitterent ius patriae potestatis in filios iam fideles. Ergo eis invitis non sunt baptizandi. On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not be baptized against their parents’ will. Respondeo dicendum quod maximam habet auctoritatem Ecclesiae consuetudo, quae semper est in omnibus aemulanda. Quia et ipsa doctrina Catholicorum doctorum ab Ecclesia auctoritatem habet, unde magis standum est auctoritati Ecclesiae quam auctoritati vel Augustini vel Hieronymi vel cuiuscumque doctoris. Hoc autem Ecclesiae usus nunquam habuit quod Iudaeorum filii invitis parentibus baptizarentur, quamvis fuerint retroactis temporibus multi Catholici principes potentissimi, ut Constantinus, Theodosius, quibus familiares fuerunt sanctissimi episcopi, ut Sylvester Constantino et Ambrosius Theodosio, qui nullo modo hoc praetermisissent ab eis impetrare, si hoc esset consonum rationi. Et ideo periculosum videtur hanc assertionem de novo inducere, ut praeter consuetudinem in Ecclesia hactenus observatam, Iudaeorum filii invitis parentibus baptizarentur. I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against their parents’ wishes, in contradiction to the Church’s custom observed hitherto. Et huius ratio est duplex. Una quidem propter periculum fidei. Si enim pueri nondum usum rationis habentes Baptismum susciperent, postmodum, cum ad perfectam aetatem pervenirent, de facili possent a parentibus induci ut relinquerent quod ignorantes susceperunt. Quod vergeret in fidei detrimentum. There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith. Alia vero ratio est quia repugnat iustitiae naturali. Filius enim naturaliter est aliquid patris. Et primo quidem a parentibus non distinguitur secundum corpus, quandiu in matris utero continetur. Postmodum vero, postquam ab utero egreditur, antequam usum liberi arbitrii habeat, continetur sub parentum cura sicut sub quodam spirituali utero. Quandiu enim usum rationis non habet puer, non differt ab animali irrationali. Unde sicut bos vel equus est alicuius ut utatur eo cum voluerit, secundum ius civile, sicut proprio instrumento; ita de iure naturali est quod filius, antequam habeat usum rationis, sit sub cura patris. Unde contra iustitiam naturalem esset si puer, antequam habeat usum rationis, a cura parentum subtrahatur, vel de eo aliquid ordinetur invitis parentibus. Postquam autem incipit habere usum liberi arbitrii, iam incipit esse suus, et potest, quantum ad ea quae sunt iuris divini vel naturalis, sibi ipsi providere. Et tunc est inducendus ad fidem non coactione, sed persuasione; et potest etiam invitis parentibus consentire fidei et baptizari, non autem antequam habeat usum rationis. Unde de pueris antiquorum patrum dicitur quod salvati sunt in fide parentum, per quod datur intelligi quod ad parentes pertinet providere filiis de sua salute, praecipue antequam habeant usum rationis. The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father’s care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents’ custody, or anything done to it against its parents’ wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its parents’ wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it is the parents’ duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in vinculo matrimoniali uterque coniugum habet usum liberi arbitrii, et uterque potest invito altero fidei assentire. Sed hoc non habet locum in puero antequam habeat usum rationis. Sed postquam habet usum rationis, tunc tenet similitudo, si converti voluerit. Reply Obj. 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other’s consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted. Ad secundum dicendum quod a morte naturali non est aliquis eripiendus contra ordinem iuris civilis, puta, si aliquis a suo iudice condemnetur ad mortem temporalem, nullus debet eum violenter eripere. Unde nec aliquis debet irrumpere ordinem iuris naturalis, quo filius est sub cura patris, ut eum liberet a periculo mortis aeternae. Reply Obj. 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of everlasting death. Ad tertium dicendum quod Iudaei sunt servi principum servitute civili, quae non excludit ordinem iuris naturalis vel divini. Reply Obj. 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law. Ad quartum dicendum quod homo ordinatur ad Deum per rationem, per quam eum cognoscere potest. Unde puer, antequam usum rationis habeat, naturali ordine ordinatur in Deum per rationem parentum, quorum curae naturaliter subiacet; et secundum eorum dispositionem sunt circa ipsum divina agenda. Reply Obj. 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents’ reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God. Ad quintum dicendum quod periculum quod sequitur de praedicatione omissa non imminet nisi eis quibus commissum est officium praedicandi, unde in Ezechiel praemittitur, speculatorem dedi te filiis Israel. Providere autem pueris infidelium de sacramentis salutis pertinet ad parentes eorum. Unde eis imminet periculum si, propter subtractionem sacramentorum, eorum parvuli detrimentum salutis patiantur. Reply Obj. 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezek 3:17): I have made thee a watchman to the children of Israel. On the other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation. Quaestio 11 Question 11 De haeresi Heresy Deinde considerandum est de haeresi. Circa quam quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum haeresis sit infidelitatis species. (1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief? Secundo, de materia eius circa quam est. (2) Of the matter about which it is; Tertio, utrum haeretici sint tolerandi. (3) Whether heretics should be tolerated? Quarto, utrum revertentes sint recipiendi. (4) Whether converts should be received? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum haeresis sit infidelitatis species Whether heresy is a species of unbelief? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haeresis non sit infidelitatis species. Infidelitas enim in intellectu est, ut supra dictum est. Sed haeresis non videtur ad intellectum pertinere, sed magis ad vim appetitivam. Dicit enim Hieronymus, et habetur in decretis, XXIV, qu. III, haeresis Graece ab electione dicitur, quod scilicet eam sibi unusquisque eligat disciplinam quam putat esse meliorem, electio autem est actus appetitivae virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo haeresis non est infidelitatis species. Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief. For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 2). Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of that school which he deems best. But choice is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief. Praeterea, vitium praecipue accipit speciem a fine, unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod ille qui moechatur ut furetur, magis est fur quam moechus. Sed finis haeresis est commodum temporale, et maxime principatus et gloria, quod pertinet ad vitium superbiae vel cupiditatis, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Util. Cred., quod haereticus est qui alicuius temporalis commodi, et maxime gloriae principatusque sui gratia, falsas ac novas opiniones vel gignit vel sequitur. Ergo haeresis non est species infidelitatis, sed magis superbiae. Obj. 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer. Now the end of heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util. Credendi i) that a heretic is one who either devises or follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that he may lord and be honored above others. Therefore heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief.