Alia vero ratio est quia repugnat iustitiae naturali. Filius enim naturaliter est aliquid patris. Et primo quidem a parentibus non distinguitur secundum corpus, quandiu in matris utero continetur. Postmodum vero, postquam ab utero egreditur, antequam usum liberi arbitrii habeat, continetur sub parentum cura sicut sub quodam spirituali utero. Quandiu enim usum rationis non habet puer, non differt ab animali irrationali. Unde sicut bos vel equus est alicuius ut utatur eo cum voluerit, secundum ius civile, sicut proprio instrumento; ita de iure naturali est quod filius, antequam habeat usum rationis, sit sub cura patris. Unde contra iustitiam naturalem esset si puer, antequam habeat usum rationis, a cura parentum subtrahatur, vel de eo aliquid ordinetur invitis parentibus. Postquam autem incipit habere usum liberi arbitrii, iam incipit esse suus, et potest, quantum ad ea quae sunt iuris divini vel naturalis, sibi ipsi providere. Et tunc est inducendus ad fidem non coactione, sed persuasione; et potest etiam invitis parentibus consentire fidei et baptizari, non autem antequam habeat usum rationis. Unde de pueris antiquorum patrum dicitur quod salvati sunt in fide parentum, per quod datur intelligi quod ad parentes pertinet providere filiis de sua salute, praecipue antequam habeant usum rationis. The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father’s care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents’ custody, or anything done to it against its parents’ wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its parents’ wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it is the parents’ duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in vinculo matrimoniali uterque coniugum habet usum liberi arbitrii, et uterque potest invito altero fidei assentire. Sed hoc non habet locum in puero antequam habeat usum rationis. Sed postquam habet usum rationis, tunc tenet similitudo, si converti voluerit. Reply Obj. 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other’s consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted. Ad secundum dicendum quod a morte naturali non est aliquis eripiendus contra ordinem iuris civilis, puta, si aliquis a suo iudice condemnetur ad mortem temporalem, nullus debet eum violenter eripere. Unde nec aliquis debet irrumpere ordinem iuris naturalis, quo filius est sub cura patris, ut eum liberet a periculo mortis aeternae. Reply Obj. 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of everlasting death. Ad tertium dicendum quod Iudaei sunt servi principum servitute civili, quae non excludit ordinem iuris naturalis vel divini. Reply Obj. 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law. Ad quartum dicendum quod homo ordinatur ad Deum per rationem, per quam eum cognoscere potest. Unde puer, antequam usum rationis habeat, naturali ordine ordinatur in Deum per rationem parentum, quorum curae naturaliter subiacet; et secundum eorum dispositionem sunt circa ipsum divina agenda. Reply Obj. 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents’ reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God. Ad quintum dicendum quod periculum quod sequitur de praedicatione omissa non imminet nisi eis quibus commissum est officium praedicandi, unde in Ezechiel praemittitur, speculatorem dedi te filiis Israel. Providere autem pueris infidelium de sacramentis salutis pertinet ad parentes eorum. Unde eis imminet periculum si, propter subtractionem sacramentorum, eorum parvuli detrimentum salutis patiantur. Reply Obj. 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezek 3:17): I have made thee a watchman to the children of Israel. On the other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation. Quaestio 11 Question 11 De haeresi Heresy Deinde considerandum est de haeresi. Circa quam quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum haeresis sit infidelitatis species. (1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief? Secundo, de materia eius circa quam est. (2) Of the matter about which it is; Tertio, utrum haeretici sint tolerandi. (3) Whether heretics should be tolerated? Quarto, utrum revertentes sint recipiendi. (4) Whether converts should be received? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum haeresis sit infidelitatis species Whether heresy is a species of unbelief? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haeresis non sit infidelitatis species. Infidelitas enim in intellectu est, ut supra dictum est. Sed haeresis non videtur ad intellectum pertinere, sed magis ad vim appetitivam. Dicit enim Hieronymus, et habetur in decretis, XXIV, qu. III, haeresis Graece ab electione dicitur, quod scilicet eam sibi unusquisque eligat disciplinam quam putat esse meliorem, electio autem est actus appetitivae virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo haeresis non est infidelitatis species. Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief. For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 2). Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of that school which he deems best. But choice is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief. Praeterea, vitium praecipue accipit speciem a fine, unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod ille qui moechatur ut furetur, magis est fur quam moechus. Sed finis haeresis est commodum temporale, et maxime principatus et gloria, quod pertinet ad vitium superbiae vel cupiditatis, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Util. Cred., quod haereticus est qui alicuius temporalis commodi, et maxime gloriae principatusque sui gratia, falsas ac novas opiniones vel gignit vel sequitur. Ergo haeresis non est species infidelitatis, sed magis superbiae. Obj. 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer. Now the end of heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util. Credendi i) that a heretic is one who either devises or follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that he may lord and be honored above others. Therefore heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief. Praeterea, infidelitas, cum sit in intellectu, non videtur ad carnem pertinere. Sed haeresis pertinet ad opera carnis, dicit enim apostolus, ad Gal. V, manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia; et inter cetera postmodum subdit, dissensiones, sectae, quae sunt idem quod haereses. Ergo haeresis non est infidelitatis species. Obj. 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal 5:19): The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, and among the others, he adds, dissensions, sects, which are the same as heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief. Sed contra est quod falsitas veritati opponitur. Sed haereticus est qui falsas vel novas opiniones vel gignit vel sequitur. Ergo opponitur veritati, cui fides innititur. Ergo sub infidelitate continetur. On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is one who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it is a species of unbelief. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen haeresis, sicut dictum est, electionem importat. Electio autem, ut supra dictum est, est eorum quae sunt ad finem, praesupposito fine. In credendis autem voluntas assentit alicui vero tanquam proprio bono, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde quod est principale verum habet rationem finis ultimi, quae autem secundaria sunt habent rationem eorum quae sunt ad finem. I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first objection denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3) is about things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in matters of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 3): wherefore that which is the chief truth, has the character of last end, while those which are secondary truths, have the character of being directed to the end. Quia vero quicumque credit alicuius dicto assentit, principale videtur esse, et quasi finis, in unaquaque credulitate ille cuius dicto assentitur, quasi autem secundaria sunt ea quae quis tenendo vult alicui assentire. Sic igitur qui recte fidem Christianam habet sua voluntate assentit Christo in his quae vere ad eius doctrinam pertinent. Now, whoever believes, assents to someone’s words; so that, in every form of belief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place. Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine. A rectitudine igitur fidei Christianae dupliciter aliquis potest deviare. Uno modo, quia ipsi Christo non vult assentire, et hic habet quasi malam voluntatem circa ipsum finem. Et hoc pertinet ad speciem infidelitatis Paganorum et Iudaeorum. Alio modo, per hoc quod intendit quidem Christo assentire, sed deficit in eligendo ea quibus Christo assentiat, quia non eligit ea quae sunt vere a Christo tradita, sed ea quae sibi propria mens suggerit. Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to speak, in respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in pagans and Jews. Second, because, though he intends to assent to Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the suggestions of his own mind. Et ideo haeresis est infidelitatis species pertinens ad eos qui fidem Christi profitentur, sed eius dogmata corrumpunt. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc modo electio pertinet ad infidelitatem sicut et voluntas ad fidem, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will regards faith, as stated above. Ad secundum dicendum quod vitia habent speciem ex fine proximo, sed ex fine remoto habent genus et causam. Sicut cum aliquis moechatur ut furetur, est ibi quidem species moechiae ex proprio fine et obiecto, sed ex fine ultimo ostenditur quod moechia ex furto oritur, et sub eo continetur sicut effectus sub causa vel sicut species sub genere, ut patet ex his quae supra de actibus dicta sunt in communi. Unde et similiter in proposito finis proximus haeresis est adhaerere falsae sententiae propriae, et ex hoc speciem habet. Sed ex fine remoto ostenditur causa eius, scilicet quod oritur ex superbia vel cupiditate. Reply Obj. 2: Vices take their species from their proximate end, while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts in general (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7). Wherefore, as to the case in point also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one’s own false opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut haeresis dicitur ab eligendo, ita secta a sectando, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., et ideo haeresis et secta idem sunt. Et utrumque pertinet ad opera carnis, non quidem quantum ad ipsum actum infidelitatis respectu proximi obiecti, sed ratione causae, quae est vel appetitus finis indebiti, secundum quod oritur ex superbia vel cupiditate, ut dictum est; vel etiam aliqua phantastica illusio, quae est errandi principium, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys. Phantasia autem quodammodo ad carnem pertinet, inquantum actus eius est cum organo corporali. Reply Obj. 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing, so does sect derive its name from its being a cutting off (secando), as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in which way it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to error, as the Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, inasmuch as its act is dependent on a bodily organ. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum haeresis sit proprie circa ea quae sunt fidei Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haeresis non sit proprie circa ea quae sunt fidei. Sicut enim sunt haereses et sectae in Christianis, ita etiam fuerunt in Iudaeis et Pharisaeis, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol. Sed eorum dissensiones non erant circa ea quae sunt fidei. Ergo haeresis non est circa ea quae sunt fidei sicut circa propriam materiam. Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters of faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, so were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym. viii, 3, 4, 5). Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though they were its proper matter. Praeterea, materia fidei sunt res quae creduntur. Sed haeresis non solum est circa res, sed etiam circa verba, et circa expositiones sacrae Scripturae. Dicit enim Hieronymus quod quicumque aliter Scripturam intelligit quam sensus spiritus sancti efflagitat, a quo scripta est, licet ab Ecclesia non recesserit, tamen haereticus appellari potest, et alibi dicit quod ex verbis inordinate prolatis fit haeresis. Ergo haeresis non est proprie circa materiam fidei. Obj. 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy Spirit by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he may not have left the Church: and elsewhere he says that heresies spring up from words spoken amiss. Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith. Praeterea, etiam circa ea quae ad fidem pertinent inveniuntur quandoque sacri doctores dissentire, sicut Hieronymus et Augustinus circa cessationem legalium. Et tamen hoc est absque vitio haeresis. Ergo haeresis non est proprie circa materiam fidei. Obj. 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet this was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Manichaeos, qui in Ecclesia Christi morbidum aliquid pravumque quid sapiunt, si correcti ut sanum rectumque sapiant, resistant contumaciter, suaque pestifera et mortifera dogmata emendare nolunt, sed defendere persistunt, haeretici sunt. Sed pestifera et mortifera dogmata non sunt nisi illa quae opponuntur dogmatibus fidei, per quam iustus vivit, ut dicitur Rom. I. Ergo haeresis est circa ea quae sunt fidei sicut circa propriam materiam. On the contrary, Augustine says against the Manichees: In Christ’s Church, those are heretics, who hold mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending them. Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby the just man liveth (Rom 1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its proper matter. Respondeo dicendum quod de haeresi nunc loquimur secundum quod importat corruptionem fidei Christianae. Non autem ad corruptionem fidei Christianae pertinet si aliquis habeat falsam opinionem in his quae non sunt fidei, puta in geometricalibus vel in aliis huiusmodi, quae omnino ad fidem pertinere non possunt, sed solum quando aliquis habet falsam opinionem circa ea quae ad fidem pertinent. I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption of the Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that are not of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so forth, which cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a person has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith. Ad quam aliquid pertinet dupliciter, sicut supra dictum est, uno modo, directe et principaliter, sicut articuli fidei; alio modo, indirecte et secundario, sicut ea ex quibus sequitur corruptio alicuius articuli. Et circa utraque potest esse haeresis, eo modo quo et fides. Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above (I, Q. 32, A. 4; I-II, Q. 1, A. 6, ad 1; I-II, Q. 2, A. 5), in one way, directly and principally, e.g., the articles of faith; in another way, indirectly and secondarily, e.g., those matters, the denial of which leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may be heresy in either way, even as there can be faith. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut haereses Iudaeorum et Pharisaeorum erant circa opiniones aliquas ad Iudaismum vel Pharisaeam pertinentes, ita etiam Christianorum haereses sunt circa ea quae pertinent ad fidem Christi. Reply Obj. 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille dicitur aliter exponere sacram Scripturam quam Spiritus Sanctus efflagitat qui ad hoc expositionem sacrae Scripturae intorquet quod contrariatur ei quod est per spiritum sanctum revelatum. Unde dicitur Ezech. XIII de falsis prophetis quod perseveraverunt confirmare sermonem, scilicet per falsas expositiones Scripturae. Similiter etiam per verba quae quis loquitur suam fidem profitetur, est enim confessio actus fidei, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo si sit inordinata locutio circa ea quae sunt fidei, sequi potest ex hoc corruptio fidei. Unde Leo Papa in quadam epistola ad Proterium episcopum Alexandrinum, dicit, quia inimici Christi crucis omnibus et verbis nostris insidiantur et syllabis, nullam illis vel tenuem occasionem demus qua nos Nestoriano sensui congruere mentiantur. Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense than that required by the Holy Spirit, when he so distorts the meaning of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Spirit has revealed. Hence it is written (Ezek 13:6) about the false prophets: They have persisted to confirm what they have said, viz. by false interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by the words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 1). Wherefore inordinate words about matters of faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: The enemies of Christ’s cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so that, if we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us mendaciously of agreeing with Nestorius.