Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, ingratus dicitur aliquis dupliciter. Uno modo, per solam omissionem, puta quia non recognoscit, vel non laudat, vel non retribuit vices pro beneficio accepto. Et hoc non semper est peccatum mortale. Quia, ut supra dictum est, debitum gratitudinis est ut homo aliquid etiam liberaliter tribuat ad quod non tenetur, et ideo, si illud praetermittit, non peccat mortaliter. Est tamen peccatum veniale, quia hoc provenit ex negligentia quadam, aut ex aliqua indispositione hominis ad virtutem. Potest tamen contingere quod etiam talis ingratitudo sit mortale peccatum, vel propter interiorem contemptum; vel etiam propter conditionem eius quod subtrahitur, quod ex necessitate debetur benefico, sive simpliciter sive in aliquo necessitatis casu. I answer that, As appears from what we have said above (A. 2), a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6), the debt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of necessity. Alio modo dicitur aliquis ingratus, quia non solum praetermittit implere gratitudinis debitum, sed etiam contrarium agit. Et hoc etiam, secundum conditionem eius quod agitur, quandoque est peccatum mortale, quandoque veniale. Second, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes a mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done. Sciendum tamen quod ingratitudo quae provenit ex peccato mortali habet perfectam ingratitudinis rationem, illa vero quae provenit ex peccato veniali, imperfectam. It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per peccatum veniale non est aliquis ingratus Deo secundum perfectam ingratitudinis rationem. Habet tamen aliquid ingratitudinis, inquantum peccatum veniale tollit aliquem actum virtutis, per quem homo Deo obsequitur. Reply Obj. 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, insofar as it removes a virtuous act of obedience to God. Ad secundum dicendum quod ingratitudo quae est cum peccato veniali non est contraria caritati, sed est praeter ipsam, quia non tollit habitum caritatis, sed aliquem actum ipsius excludit. Reply Obj. 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity, but excludes some act thereof. Ad tertium dicendum quod idem Seneca dicit, in VII de Benefic., errat si quis aestimat, cum dicimus eum qui beneficium dedit oblivisci oportere, excutere nos illi memoriam rei, praesertim honestissimae. Cum ergo dicimus, meminisse non debet, hoc volumus intelligi, praedicare non debet, nec iactare. Reply Obj. 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): When we say that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it. Ad quartum dicendum quod ille qui ignorat beneficium non est ingratus si beneficium non recompenset, dummodo sit paratus recompensare si noscet. Est autem laudabile quandoque ut ille cui providetur beneficium ignoret, tum propter inanis gloriae vitationem, sicut beatus Nicolaus, aurum furtim in domum proiiciens, vitare voluit humanum favorem; tum etiam quia in hoc ipso amplius beneficium facit quod consulit verecundiae eius qui beneficium accipit. Reply Obj. 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the favor. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum ingratis sint beneficia subtrahenda Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ingratis sint beneficia subtrahenda. Dicitur enim Sap. XVI, ingratis spes tanquam hibernalis glacies tabescet. Non autem eius spes tabesceret si non esset ei beneficium subtrahendum. Ergo sunt subtrahenda beneficia ingratis. Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful. For it is written (Wis 16:29): The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter’s ice. But this hope would not melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from the ungrateful. Praeterea, nullus debet alteri praebere occasionem peccandi. Sed ingratus beneficium recipiens sumit ingratitudinis occasionem ergo non est ingrato beneficium dandum. Obj. 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful. Praeterea, in quo quis peccat, per hoc et torquetur, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed ille qui ingratus est beneficio accepto, peccat contra beneficium. Ergo est beneficio privandus. Obj. 3: Further, By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented (Wis 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. VI, quod altissimus benignus est super ingratos et malos. Sed eius per imitationem nos filios esse oportet, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo non debemus beneficia ingratis subtrahere. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 6:35) that the Highest . . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil. Now we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him (Luke 6:36). Therefore we should not withhold favors from the ungrateful. Respondeo dicendum quod circa ingratum duo consideranda sunt. Primo quidem, quid ipse dignus sit pati. Et sic certum est quod meretur beneficii subtractionem. Alio modo, considerandum est quid oporteat beneficum facere. Primo namque, debet non esse facilis ad ingratitudinem iudicandam, quia frequenter aliquis, ut Seneca dicit, qui non reddidit, gratus est; quia forte non occurrit ei facultas aut debita opportunitas reddendi. Secundo, debet tendere ad hoc quod de ingrato gratum faciat, quod si non potest primo beneficio facere, forte faciet secundo. Si vero ex beneficiis multiplicatis ingratitudinem augeat et peior fiat, debet a beneficiorum exhibitione cessare. I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. iii), a man is often grateful although he repays not, because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Second, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur quantum ad id quod ingratus dignus est pati. Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui ingrato beneficium exhibet non dat ei occasionem peccandi, sed magis gratitudinis et amoris. Si vero ille qui accipit ingratitudinis exinde occasionem sumat, non est danti imputandum. Reply Obj. 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui beneficium dat non statim debet se exhibere punitorem ingratitudinis, sed prius pium medicum, ut scilicet iteratis beneficiis ingratitudinem sanet. Reply Obj. 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors. Quaestio 108 Question 108 De vindicatione Vengeance Deinde considerandum est de vindicatione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum vindicatio sit licita. (1) Whether vengeance is lawful? Secundo, utrum sit specialis virtus. (2) Whether it is a special virtue? Tertio, de modo vindicandi. (3) Of the manner of taking vengeance; Quarto, in quos sit vindicta exercenda. (4) On whom should vengeance be taken? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum vindicatio sit licita Whether vengeance is lawful? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vindicatio non sit licita. Quicumque enim usurpat sibi quod Dei est, peccat. Sed vindicta pertinet ad Deum, dicitur enim Deut. XXXII, secundum aliam litteram, mihi vindictam, et ego retribuam. Ergo omnis vindicatio est illicita. Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps what is God’s sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written (Deut 32:35, Rom 12:19): Revenge to Me, and I will repay. Therefore all vengeance is unlawful. Praeterea, ille de quo vindicta sumitur, non toleratur. Sed mali sunt tolerandi, quia super illud Cant. II, sicut lilium inter spinas, dicit Glossa, non fuit bonus qui malos tolerare non potuit. Ergo vindicta non est sumenda de malis. Obj. 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant. 2:2, As the lily among the thorns, says: He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one. Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked. Praeterea, vindicta per poenas fit, ex quibus causatur timor servilis. Sed lex nova non est lex timoris, sed amoris, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Adamantum. Ergo, ad minus in novo testamento, vindicta fieri non debet. Obj. 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful. Praeterea, ille dicitur se vindicare qui iniurias suas ulciscitur. Sed, ut videtur, non licet etiam iudici in se delinquentes punire, dicit enim Chrysostomus, super Matth., discamus exemplo Christi nostras iniurias magnanimiter sustinere, Dei autem iniurias nec usque ad auditum sufferre. Ergo vindicatio videtur esse illicita. Obj. 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom says: Let us learn after Christ’s example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God’s wrongs, not even by listening to them. Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful. Praeterea, peccatum multitudinis magis est nocivum quam peccatum unius tantum, dicitur enim Eccli. XXVI, a tribus timuit cor meum, zelaturam civitatis, et collectionem populi. Sed de peccato multitudinis non est vindicta sumenda, quia super illud Matth. XIII, sinite utraque crescere, ne forte eradicetis triticum, dicit Glossa quod multitudo non est excommunicanda, nec princeps. Ergo nec alia vindicatio est licita. Obj. 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin of only one: for it is written (Sir 26:5–7): Of three things my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and a false calumny. But vengeance should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Matt. 13:29, 30, Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both to grow, says that a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the sovereign. Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful. Sed contra, nihil est expectandum a Deo nisi quod est bonum et licitum. Sed vindicta de hostibus est expectanda a Deo, dicitur enim Luc. XVIII, Deus non faciet vindictam electorum suorum clamantium ad se die ac nocte? Quasi diceret, immo faciet. Ergo vindicatio non est per se mala et illicita. On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for it is written (Luke 18:7): Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night? as if to say: He will indeed. Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful. Respondeo dicendum quod vindicatio fit per aliquod poenale malum inflictum peccanti. Est ergo in vindicatione considerandus vindicantis animus. Si enim eius intentio feratur principaliter in malum illius de quo vindictam sumit, et ibi quiescat, est omnino illicitum, quia delectari in malo alterius pertinet ad odium, quod caritati repugnat, qua omnes homines debemus diligere. Nec aliquis excusatur si malum intendat illius qui sibi iniuste intulit malum, sicut non excusatur aliquis per hoc quod odit se odientem. Non enim debet homo in alium peccare, propter hoc quod ille peccavit prius in ipsum, hoc enim est vinci a malo, quod apostolus prohibet, Rom. XII, dicens, noli vinci a malo, sed vince in bono malum. I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom 12:21): Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good. Si vero intentio vindicantis feratur principaliter ad aliquod bonum, ad quod pervenitur per poenam peccantis, puta ad emendationem peccantis, vel saltem ad cohibitionem eius et quietem aliorum, et ad iustitiae conservationem et Dei honorem, potest esse vindicatio licita, aliis debitis circumstantiis servatis. If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui secundum gradum sui ordinis vindictam exercet in malos, non usurpat sibi quod Dei est, sed utitur potestate sibi divinitus concessa, dicitur enim Rom. XIII, de principe terreno, quod Dei minister est, vindex in iram ei qui male agit. Si autem praeter ordinem divinae institutionis aliquis vindictam exerceat, usurpat sibi quod Dei est, et ideo peccat. Reply Obj. 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom 13:4) of the earthly prince that he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. If, however, a man takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God’s and therefore sins. Ad secundum dicendum quod mali tolerantur a bonis in hoc quod ab eis proprias iniurias patienter sustinent, secundum quod oportet, non autem tolerant eos ut sustineant iniurias Dei et proximorum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus, super Matth., in propriis iniuriis esse quempiam patientem, laudabile est, iniurias autem Dei dissimulare nimis est impium. Reply Obj. 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom says: It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God’s wrongs is most wicked.