Quaestio 131 Question 131 De ambitione Ambition Deinde considerandum est de ambitione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo: We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum ambitio sit peccatum. (1) Whether it is a sin? Secundo, utrum opponatur magnanimitati per excessum. (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum ambitio sit peccatum Whether ambition is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ambitio non sit peccatum. Importat enim ambitio cupiditatem honoris. Honor autem de se quoddam bonum est, et maximum inter exteriora bona, unde et illi qui de honore non curant, vituperantur. Ergo ambitio non est peccatum, sed magis aliquid laudabile, secundum quod bonum laudabiliter appetitur. Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something deserving of praise, insofar as a good is laudably desired. Praeterea, quilibet absque vitio potest appetere id quod sibi debetur pro praemio. Sed honor est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit, in I et VIII Ethic. Ergo ambitio honoris non est peccatum. Obj. 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin. Praeterea, illud per quod homo provocatur ad bonum et revocatur a malo, non est peccatum. Sed per honorem homines provocantur ad bona facienda et mala vitanda, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod fortissimi videntur esse apud quos timidi sunt inhonorati, fortes autem honorati; et Tullius dicit, in libro de Tusculan. quaest., quod honor alit artes. Ergo ambitio non est peccatum. Obj. 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in honor: and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that honor fosters the arts. Therefore ambition is not a sin. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, quod caritas non est ambitiosa, non quaerit quae sua sunt. Nihil aut repugnat caritati nisi peccatum. Ergo ambitio est peccatum. On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor 13:5) that charity is not ambitious, seeketh not her own. Now nothing is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, honor importat quandam reverentiam alicui exhibitam in testimonium excellentiae eius. Circa excellentiam autem hominis duo sunt attendenda. Primo quidem, quod id secundum quod homo excellit, non habet homo a seipso, sed est quasi quiddam divinum in eo. Et ideo ex hoc non debetur principaliter sibi honor, sed Deo. Secundo considerandum est quod id in quo homo excellit, datur homini a Deo ut ex eo aliis prosit. Unde intantum debet homini placere testimonium suae excellentiae quod ab aliis exhibetur, inquantum ex hoc paratur sibi via ad hoc quod aliis prosit. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2), honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two things have to be considered with regard to man’s honor. The first is that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him to profit others. Tripliciter ergo appetitum honoris contingit esse inordinatum. Uno modo, per hoc quod aliquis appetit testimonium de excellentia quam non habet, quod est appetere honorem supra suam proportionem. Alio modo, per hoc quod honorem sibi cupit non referendo in Deum. Tertio modo, per hoc quod appetitus eius in ipso honore quiescit, non referens honorem ad utilitatem aliorum. Ambitio autem importat inordinatum appetitum honoris. Unde manifestum est quod ambitio semper est peccatum. Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to desire more than his share of honor. Second, when a man desires honor for himself without referring it to God. Third, when a man’s appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus boni debet regulari secundum rationem, cuius regulam si transcendat, erit vitiosus. Et hoc modo vitiosum est quod aliquis honorem appetat non secundum ordinem rationis. Vituperantur autem qui non curant de honore secundum quod ratio dictat, ut scilicet vitent ea quae sunt contraria honori. Reply Obj. 1: The desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason’s dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor. Ad secundum dicendum quod honor non est praemium virtutis quoad ipsum virtuosum, ut scilicet hoc pro praemio expetere debeat, sed pro praemio expetit beatitudinem, quae est finis virtutis. Dicitur autem esse praemium virtutis ex parte aliorum, qui non habent aliquid maius quod virtuoso retribuant quam honorem, qui ex hoc ipso magnitudinem habet quod perhibet testimonium virtuti. Unde patet quod non est sufficiens praemium, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Reply Obj. 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut per appetitum honoris, quando debito modo appetitur, aliqui provocantur ad bonum et revocantur a malo; ita etiam, si inordinate appetatur, potest esse homini occasio multa mala faciendi, dum scilicet non curat qualitercumque honorem consequi possit. Unde Sallustius dicit, in Catilinario, quod gloriam, honorem et imperium bonus et ignavus aeque sibi exoptat, sed ille, scilicet bonus, vera via nititur; hic, scilicet ignavus, quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit. Et tamen illi qui solum propter honorem vel bona faciunt vel mala vitant, non sunt virtuosi, ut patet per philosophum, in III Ethic., ubi dicit quod non sunt vere fortes qui propter honorem fortia faciunt. Reply Obj. 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that the good as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one, i.e., the good, go about it in the right way, whereas the other, i.e., the wicked, through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood. Yet they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum ambitio opponatur magnanimitati per excessum Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ambitio non opponatur magnanimitati per excessum. Uni enim medio non opponitur ex una parte nisi unum extremum. Sed magnanimitati per excessum opponitur praesumptio ut dictum est. Ergo non opponitur ei ambitio per excessum. Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above (Q. 130, A. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess. Praeterea, magnanimitas est circa honores. Sed ambitio videtur pertinere ad dignitates, dicitur enim II Machab. IV, quod Iason ambiebat summum sacerdotium. Ergo ambitio non opponitur magnanimitati. Obj. 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc 4:7) that Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity. Praeterea, ambitio videtur ad exteriorem apparatum pertinere, dicitur enim Act. XXV, quod Agrippa et Berenice cum multa ambitione introierunt praetorium; et II Paralip. XVI, quod super corpus Asa mortui combusserunt aromata et unguenta ambitione nimia. Sed magnanimitas non est circa exteriorem apparatum. Ergo ambitio non opponitur magnanimitati. Obj. 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is written (Acts 25:27) that Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp (ambitione) . . . had entered into the hall of audience, and (2 Chr 16:14) that when Asa died they burned spices and . . . ointments over his body with very great pomp (ambitione). But magnanimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod sicut quisque magnitudine animi excellit, ita maxime vult princeps omnium solus esse. Sed hoc pertinet ad ambitionem. Ergo ambitio pertinet ad excessum magnanimitatis. On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that the more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others. But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ambitio importat inordinatum appetitum honoris. Magnanimitas autem est circa honores, et utitur eis secundum quod oportet. Unde manifestum est quod ambitio opponitur magnanimitati sicut inordinatum ordinato. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), ambition signifies inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnanimitas ad duo respicit. Ad unum quidem sicut ad finem intentum, quod est aliquod magnum opus, quod magnanimus attentat secundum suam facultatem. Et quantum ad hoc opponitur magnanimitati per excessum praesumptio, quae attentat aliquod magnum opus supra suam facultatem. Ad aliud autem respicit magnanimitas sicut ad materiam qua debite utitur, scilicet ad honorem. Et quantum ad hoc opponitur magnanimitati per excessum ambitio. Non est autem inconveniens secundum diversa esse plures excessus unius medii. Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its end, insofar as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects. Ad secundum dicendum quod illis qui sunt in dignitate constituti, propter quandam excellentiam status, debetur honor. Et secundum hoc inordinatus appetitus dignitatum pertinet ad ambitionem. Si quis enim inordinate appeteret dignitatem non ratione honoris, sed propter debitum dignitatis usum suam facultatem excedentem, non esset ambitiosus, sed magis praesumptuosus. Reply Obj. 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity, not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but presumptuous. Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa solemnitas exterioris cultus ad quendam honorem pertinet, unde et talibus consuevit honor exhiberi. Quod significatur Iac. II, si introierit in conventum vestrum vir anulum habens aureum, in veste candida, et dixeritis ei, tu sede hic bene, et cetera. Unde ambitio non est circa exteriorem cultum nisi secundum quod pertinet ad honorem. Reply Obj. 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is signified by the words of James 2:2, 3: If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well, etc. Wherefore ambition does not regard outward worship, except insofar as this is a kind of honor. Quaestio 132 Question 132 De inani gloria Vainglory Deinde considerandum est de inani gloria. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum appetitus gloriae sit peccatum. (1) Whether desire of glory is a sin? Secundo, utrum inanis gloria magnanimitati opponatur. (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity? Tertio, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? Quarto, utrum sit vitium capitale. (4) Whether it is a capital vice? Quinto, de filiabus eius. (5) Of its daughters. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum appetitus gloriae sit peccatum Whether the desire of glory is a sin?