Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gula importat inordinatam concupiscentiam edendi. In esu autem duo considerantur, scilicet ipse cibus qui comeditur, et eius comestio. Potest ergo inordinatio concupiscentiae attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, quantum ad ipsum cibum qui sumitur. Et sic, quantum ad substantiam vel speciem cibi, quaerit aliquis cibos lautos, idest pretiosos; quantum ad qualitatem, quaerit cibos nimis accurate praeparatos, quod est studiose; quantum autem ad quantitatem, excedit in nimis edendo. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), gluttony denotes inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or species of food a man seeks sumptuous—i.e., costly food; as regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely—i.e., daintily; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating too much. Alio vero modo attenditur inordinatio concupiscentiae quantum ad ipsam sumptionem cibi, vel quia praevenit tempus debitum comedendi, quod est praepropere; vel quia non servat modum debitum in edendo, quod est ardenter. Second, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat hastily, or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating greedily. Isidorus vero comprehendit primum et secundum sub uno, dicens quod gulosus excedit in cibo secundum quid, quantum, quomodo et quando. Isidore comprises the first and second under one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in what he eats, or in how much, how or when he eats. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corruptio diversarum circumstantiarum facit diversas species gulae propter diversa motiva, ex quibus moralium species diversificantur. In eo enim qui quaerit lautos cibos, excitatur concupiscentia ex ipsa specie cibi; in eo vero qui praeoccupat tempus, deordinatur concupiscentia propter impatientiam morae; et idem patet in aliis. Reply Obj. 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth. Ad secundum dicendum quod in loco et in aliis circumstantiis non invenitur aliud differens motivum pertinens ad usum cibi, quod faciat aliam speciem gulae. Reply Obj. 2: Place and other circumstances include no special motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony. Ad tertium dicendum quod in quibuscumque aliis vitiis diversae circumstantiae habent diversa motiva, oportet accipi diversas species vitiorum secundum diversas circumstantias. Sed hoc non contingit in omnibus, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: In all other vices, whenever different circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all circumstances, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9). Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum gula sit vitium capitale Whether gluttony is a capital vice? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gula non sit vitium capitale. Vitia enim capitalia dicuntur ex quibus alia oriuntur secundum rationem causae finalis. Sed cibus, circa quem est gula, non habet rationem finis, non enim propter se quaeritur, sed propter corporis nutritionem. Ergo gula non est vitium capitale. Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause, other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but for the body’s nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice. Praeterea, vitium capitale aliquam principalitatem habere videtur in ratione peccati. Sed hoc non competit gulae, quae videtur esse secundum suum genus minimum peccatorum, utpote plus appropinquans ad id quod est secundum naturam. Ergo gula non videtur esse vitium capitale. Obj. 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what is. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice. Praeterea, peccatum contingit ex hoc quod aliquis recedit a bono honesto propter aliquid utile praesenti vitae, vel delectabile sensui. Sed circa bona quae habent rationem utilis, ponitur unum tantum vitium capitale, scilicet avaritia. Ergo et circa delectationes videtur esse ponendum unum tantum vitium capitale. Ponitur autem luxuria, quae est maius vitium quam gula, et circa maiores delectationes. Ergo gula non est vitium capitale. Obj. 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the good of virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., computat gulam inter vitia capitalia. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the capital vices. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, vitium capitale dicitur ex quo alia vitia oriuntur secundum rationem causae finalis, inquantum scilicet habet finem multum appetibilem, unde ex eius appetitu homines provocantur multipliciter ad peccandum. Ex hoc autem aliquis finis redditur multum appetibilis quod habet aliquam de conditionibus felicitatis, quae est naturaliter appetibilis. Pertinet autem ad rationem felicitatis delectatio, ut patet in I et X Ethic. Et ideo vitium gulae, quod est circa delectationes tactus, quae sunt praecipuae inter alias, convenienter ponitur inter vitia capitalia. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3), a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e., as having a most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3, 7, 8. Therefore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipse cibus ordinatur quidem ad aliquid sicut ad finem, sed quia ille finis, scilicet conservatio vitae, est maxime appetibilis, quae sine cibo conservari non potest, inde etiam est quod ipse cibus est maxime appetibilis; et ad hoc fere totus labor humanae vitae ordinatur, secundum illud Eccle. VI, omnis labor hominis in ore eius. Et tamen gula magis videtur esse circa delectationes cibi quam circa cibos. Propter quod, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quibus vilis est corporis salus, malunt vesci, in quo scilicet est delectatio, quam saturari, cum omnis finis illius voluptatis sit non sitire atque esurire. Reply Obj. 1: It is true that food itself is directed to something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil of man’s life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, All the labor of man is for his mouth. Yet gluttony seems to be about pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), with such food as is good for the worthless body, men desire to be fed, wherein namely the pleasure consists, rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire is this—not to thirst and not to hunger. Ad secundum dicendum quod finis in peccato accipitur ex parte conversionis, sed gravitas peccati accipitur ex parte aversionis. Et ideo non oportet vitium capitale, quod habet finem maxime appetibilem, habere magnam gravitatem. Reply Obj. 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity. Ad tertium dicendum quod delectabile est appetibile secundum se. Et ideo secundum eius diversitatem ponuntur duo vitia capitalia, scilicet gula et luxuria. Utile autem non habet ex se rationem appetibilis, sed secundum quod ad aliud ordinatur. Et ideo in omnibus utilibus videtur esse una ratio appetibilitatis. Et propter hoc circa huiusmodi non ponitur nisi unum vitium capitale. Reply Obj. 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such things. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum convenienter assignentur gulae quinque filiae Whether daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur gulae quinque filiae, scilicet inepta laetitia, scurrilitas, immunditia, multiloquium, hebetudo mentis circa intelligentiam. Inepta enim laetitia consequitur omne peccatum, secundum illud Prov. II, qui laetantur cum male fecerint, et exultant in rebus pessimis. Similiter etiam hebetudo mentis invenitur in omni peccato, secundum illud Prov. XIV, errant qui operantur malum. Ergo inconvenienter ponuntur filiae gulae. Objection 1: It would seem that daughters are unfittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding. For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, according to Prov. 14:22, They err that work evil. Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony. Praeterea, immunditia, quae maxime consequitur gulam, videtur ad vomitum pertinere, secundum illud Isaiae XXVIII, omnes mensae repletae sunt vomitu sordium. Sed hoc non videtur esse peccatum, sed poena, vel etiam aliquid utile sub consilio cadens, secundum illud Eccli. XXXI, si coactus fueris in edendo multum, surge e medio et vome, et refrigerabit te. Ergo non debet poni inter filias gulae. Obj. 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Isa. 28:8, All tables were full of vomit and filth. But this seems to be not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony. Praeterea, Isidorus ponit scurrilitatem filiam luxuriae. Non ergo debet poni inter filias gulae. Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., has filias gulae assignat. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to gluttony. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gula proprie consistit circa immoderatam delectationem quae est in cibis et potibus. Et ideo illa vitia inter filias gulae computantur quae ex immoderata delectatione cibi et potus consequuntur. Quae quidem possunt accipi vel ex parte animae, vel ex parte corporis. Ex parte autem animae, quadrupliciter. Primo quidem, quantum ad rationem, cuius acies hebetatur ex immoderantia cibi et potus. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur filia gulae hebetudo sensus circa intelligentiam, propter fumositates ciborum perturbantes caput. Sicut et e contrario abstinentia confert ad sapientiae perceptionem, secundum illud Eccle. II, cogitavi in corde meo abstrahere a vino carnem meam, ut animum meum transferrem ad sapientiam. Secundo, quantum ad appetitum, qui multipliciter deordinatur per immoderantiam cibi et potus, quasi sopito gubernaculo rationis. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur inepta laetitia, quia omnes aliae inordinatae passiones ad laetitiam et tristitiam ordinantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et hoc est quod dicitur III Esdrae III, quod vinum omnem mentem convertit in securitatem et iucunditatem. Tertio, quantum ad inordinatum verbum. Et sic ponitur multiloquium, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, in pastorali, nisi gulae deditos immoderata loquacitas raperet, dives ille qui epulatus quotidie splendide dicitur, in lingua gravius non arderet. Quarto, quantum ad inordinatum actum. Et sic ponitur scurrilitas, idest iocularitas quaedam proveniens ex defectu rationis, quae, sicut non potest cohibere verba, ita non potest cohibere exteriores gestus. Unde Ephes. V, super illud, aut stultiloquium aut scurrilitas, dicit Glossa, quae a stultis curialitas dicitur, idest iocularitas, quae risum movere solet. Quamvis possit utrumque horum referri ad verba. In quibus contingit peccare vel ratione superfluitatis, quod pertinet ad multiloquium, vel ratione inhonestatis, quod pertinet ad scurrilitatem. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), gluttony consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. On the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, dullness of sense in the understanding, on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. 2:3, I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in wisdom. Second, as regards the appetite, which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect unseemly joy is reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdr. 3:20, that wine . . . gives every one a confident and joyful mind. Third, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have loquaciousness, because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), unless gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue. Fourth, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have scurrility, i.e., a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, Or foolish talking or scurrility, says that fools call this geniality—i.e., jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh. Both of these, however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of excess which belongs to loquaciousness, or by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to scurrility. Ex parte autem corporis, ponitur immunditia. Quae potest attendi sive secundum inordinatam emissionem quarumcumque superfluitatum, vel specialiter quantum ad emissionem seminis. Unde super illud Ephes. V, fornicatio autem et omnis immunditia etc., dicit Glossa, idest incontinentia pertinens ad libidinem quocumque modo. On the part of the body, mention is made of uncleanness, which may refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities, or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3, But fornication and all uncleanness, says: That is, any kind of incontinence that has reference to lust. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod laetitia quae est de actu peccati vel fine, consequitur omne peccatum, maxime quod procedit ex habitu. Sed laetitia vaga incomposita, quae hic dicitur inepta, praecipue oritur ex immoderata sumptione cibi vel potus. Similiter etiam dicendum quod hebetudo sensus quantum ad eligibilia communiter invenitur in omni peccato. Sed hebetudo sensus circa speculabilia maxime procedit ex gula, ratione iam dicta. Reply Obj. 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous joy which is described as unseemly arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given above. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet utilis sit vomitus post superfluam comestionem, tamen vitiosum est quod aliquis huic necessitati se subdat per immoderantiam cibi vel potus. Potest tamen absque culpa vomitus procurari ex consilio medicinae in remedium alicuius languoris. Reply Obj. 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it. Ad tertium dicendum quod scurrilitas procedit quidem ex actu gulae, non autem ex actu luxuriae, sed ex eius voluntate. Et ideo ad utrumque vitium potest pertinere. Reply Obj. 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be referred to either vice. Quaestio 149 Question 149 De sobrietate Sobriety Deinde considerandum est de sobrietate, et vitio opposito, scilicet ebrietate. Et circa sobrietatem quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry: Primo, quae sit materia sobrietatis. (1) What is the matter of sobriety? Secundo, utrum sit specialis virtus. (2) Whether it is a special virtue? Tertio, utrum usus vini sit licitus. (3) Whether the use of wine is lawful? Quarto, quibus praecipue competat sobrietas. (4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum materia propria sobrietatis sit potus Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?