Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum virginitas sit illicita Whether virginity is unlawful? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas sit illicita. Omne enim quod contrariatur praecepto legis naturae est illicitum. Sed sicut praeceptum legis naturae ad conservationem individui est quod tangitur Gen. II, de omni ligno quod est in Paradiso, comede; ita etiam praeceptum legis naturae est ad conservationem speciei, quod ponitur Gen. I, crescite et multiplicamini, et replete terram. Ergo, sicut peccaret qui abstineret ab omni cibo, utpote faciens contra bonum individui; ita etiam peccat qui omnino abstinet ab actu generationis, utpote faciens contra bonum speciei. Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the words of Gen. 2:16, Of every tree that is in paradise, thou shalt eat, indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gen. 1:28, Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, express a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act against the good of the species. Praeterea, omne id quod recedit a medio virtutis videtur esse vitiosum. Sed virginitas recedit a medio virtutis ab omnibus delectationibus venereis abstinens, dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod qui omni voluptate potitur, neque ab una recedit, intemperatus est; qui autem omnes fugit, agrestis est et insensibilis. Ergo virginitas est aliquid vitiosum. Obj. 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue, since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2), that he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is loutish and insensible. Therefore virginity is something sinful. Praeterea, poena non debetur nisi vitio. Sed apud antiquos puniebantur secundum leges illi qui semper caelibem vitam ducebant, ut Maximus Valerius dicit. Unde et Plato, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig., sacrificasse naturae dicitur ut perpetua eius continentia tanquam peccatum aboleretur. Ergo virginitas est peccatum. Obj. 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius Maximus asserts. Hence according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato is said to have sacrificed to nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it were a sin. Therefore virginity is a sin. Sed contra, nullum peccatum recte cadit sub consilio. Sed virginitas recte cadit sub consilio, dicitur enim I ad Cor. VII, de virginibus autem praeceptum domini non habeo, consilium autem do. Ergo virginitas non est aliquid illicitum. On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor 7:25): Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel. Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing. Respondeo dicendum quod in humanis actibus illud est vitiosum quod est praeter rationem rectam. Habet autem hoc ratio recta, ut his quae sunt ad finem utatur aliquis secundum eam mensuram quae congruit fini. Est autem triplex hominis bonum, ut dicitur in I Ethic., unum quidem quod consistit in exterioribus rebus, puta divitiis; aliud autem quod consistit in bonis corporis; tertium autem quod consistit in bonis animae, inter quae et bona contemplativae vitae sunt potiora bonis vitae activae, ut philosophus probat, in X Ethic., et dominus dicit, Lucae X, Maria optimam partem elegit. Quorum bonorum exteriora quidem ordinantur ad ea quae sunt corporis; ea vero quae sunt corporis, ad ea quae sunt animae; et ulterius ea quae sunt vitae activae, ad ea quae sunt vitae contemplativae. Pertinet igitur ad rectitudinem rationis ut aliquis utatur exterioribus bonis secundum eam mensuram quae competit corpori, et similiter de aliis. Unde si quis abstineat ab aliquibus possidendis, quae alias esset bonum possidere, ut consulat saluti corporali, vel etiam contemplationi veritatis, non esset hoc vitiosum, sed secundum rationem rectam. Et similiter si quis abstineat a delectationibus corporalibus ut liberius vacet contemplationi veritatis, pertinet hoc ad rectitudinem rationis. Ad hoc autem pia virginitas ab omni delectatione venerea abstinet, ut liberius divinae contemplationi vacet, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, mulier innupta et virgo cogitat quae domini sunt, ut sit sancta et corpore et spiritu, quae autem nupta est, cogitat quae sunt mundi, quomodo placeat viro. Unde relinquitur quod virginitas non est aliquid vitiosum, sed potius laudabile. I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man’s good is threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Luke 10:42), Mary hath chosen the better part. Of these goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the active life are directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body’s good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is not sinful, but in accord with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor 7:34): The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband. Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy of praise. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeceptum habet rationem debiti, ut supra dictum est. Dupliciter autem est aliquid debitum. Uno modo ut impleatur ab uno, et hoc debitum sine peccato praeteriri non potest. Aliud autem est debitum implendum a multitudine. Et ad tale debitum implendum non tenetur quilibet de multitudine, multa enim sunt multitudini necessaria ad quae implenda unus non sufficit, sed implentur a multitudine dum unus hoc, alius illud facit. Praeceptum igitur legis naturae homini datum de comestione, necesse est quod ab unoquoque impleatur, aliter enim individuum conservari non posset. Sed praeceptum datum de generatione respicit totam multitudinem hominum, cui necessarium est non solum quod multiplicetur corporaliter, sed etiam quod spiritualiter proficiat. Et ideo sufficienter providetur humanae multitudini si quidam carnali generationi operam dent, quidam vero, ab hac abstinentes, contemplationi divinorum vacent, ad totius humani generis pulchritudinem et salutem. Sicut etiam in exercitu quidam castra custodiunt, quidam signa deferunt, quidam gladiis decertant, quae tamen omnia debita sunt multitudini, sed per unum impleri non possunt. Reply Obj. 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above (Q. 122, A. 1). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one person. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui abstinet ab omnibus delectationibus praeter rationem rectam, quasi delectationes secundum se abhorrens, est insensibilis, sicut agricola. Virgo autem non abstinet ab omni delectatione, sed solum a delectatione venerea, et ab hac abstinet secundum rationem rectam, ut dictum est. Medium autem virtutis non secundum quantitatem, sed secundum rationem rectam determinatur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde de magnanimo dicitur, in IV Ethic., quod est magnitudine extremus, eo autem quod ut oportet, medius. Reply Obj. 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal: and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean. Ad tertium dicendum quod leges feruntur secundum ea quae ut in pluribus accidunt. Hoc autem rarum erat apud antiquos, ut aliquis amore veritatis contemplandae ab omni delectatione venerea abstineret, quod solus Plato legitur fecisse. Unde non sacrificavit quasi hoc peccatum reputaret, sed perversae opinioni civium cedens, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit. Reply Obj. 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen, as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii). Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum virginitas sit virtus Whether virginity is a virtue? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas non sit virtus. Nulla enim virtus inest nobis a natura, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Sed virginitas inest a natura, quilibet enim mox natus virgo est. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For no virtue is in us by nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. Praeterea, quicumque habet unam virtutem, habet omnes, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliqui habent alias virtutes qui non habent virginitatem, alioquin, cum sine virtute nullus ad regnum caelorum perveniat, nullus sine virginitate ad ipsum posset pervenire; quod esset matrimonium damnare. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Obj. 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Yet some have other virtues without having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. Praeterea, omnis virtus restituitur per poenitentiam. Sed virginitas non reparatur per poenitentiam, unde Hieronymus dicit, cum cetera Deus possit, non potest virginem post ruinam reparare. Ergo videtur quod virginitas non sit virtus. Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says: Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin after her downfall. Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue. Praeterea, nulla virtus perditur sine peccato. Sed virginitas perditur sine peccato, scilicet per matrimonium. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. Praeterea, virginitas condividitur viduitati et pudicitiae coniugali. Sed neutrum illorum ponitur virtus. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Obj. 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Virginit., invitat virginitatis amor ut aliquid de virginitate dicamus, ne veluti transitu quodam perstricta videatur quae principalis est virtus. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): Love of virginity moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in virginitate est sicut formale et completivum propositum perpetuo abstinendi a delectatione venerea, quod quidem propositum laudabile redditur ex fine, inquantum scilicet hoc fit ad vacandum rebus divinis. Materiale autem in virginitate est integritas carnis absque omni experimento venereae delectationis. Manifestum est autem quod ubi est specialis materia habens specialem excellentiam, ibi invenitur specialis ratio virtutis, sicut patet in magnificentia, quae est circa magnos sumptus, et ex hoc est specialis virtus a liberalitate distincta, quae communiter se habet circa omnem pecuniarum usum. Hoc autem quod est conservare se immunem ab experimento venereae voluptatis, habet quandam excellentiam laudis supra hoc quod est conservare se immunem ab inordinatione venereae voluptatis. Et ideo virginitas est quaedam specialis virtus, habens se ad castitatem sicut magnificentia ad liberalitatem. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the formal and completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a good action has a special matter through having a special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homines ex sua nativitate habent id quod est materiale in virginitate, scilicet integritatem carnis immunem ab experimento venereorum. Non tamen habent id quod est formale in virginitate, ut scilicet habeant propositum servandi huiusmodi integritatem propter Deum. Et ex hoc habet rationem virtutis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., nec nos in virginibus praedicamus quod virgines sunt, sed quod Deo dicatae pia continentia virgines. Reply Obj. 1: Men have from their birth that which is material in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God’s sake, which purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. xi): Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency. Ad secundum dicendum quod connexio virtutum accipitur secundum id quod est formale in virtutibus, idest secundum caritatem vel secundum prudentiam, ut supra habitum est, non autem secundum id quod est materiale in virtutibus. Nihil enim prohibet alicui virtuoso suppetere materiam unius virtutis, non autem materiam alterius, sicut pauper habet materiam temperantiae, non autem materiam magnificentiae. Et hoc modo alicui habenti alias virtutes deest materia virginitatis, idest praedicta integritas carnis. Tamen potest id quod est formale in virginitate habere, ut scilicet in praeparatione mentis praedictae integritatis conservandae propositum, si hoc sibi competeret. Sicut pauper potest in praeparatione animi habere propositum magnificos sumptus faciendi, si sibi competeret, et similiter ille qui est in prosperitate habet in praeparatione animi propositum adversa aequanimiter tolerandi. Et sine hac praeparatione animi non potest esse aliquis virtuosus. Reply Obj. 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous. Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus per poenitentiam reparari potest quantum ad id quod est formale in virtute, non autem quantum ad id quod est materiale in ipsa. Non enim si quis magnificus consumpsit suas divitias, per poenitentiam peccati restituuntur ei divitiae. Et similiter ille qui peccando virginitatem amisit, per poenitentiam non recuperat virginitatis materiam, sed recuperat virginitatis propositum. Reply Obj. 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity. Circa materiam autem virginitatis est aliquid quod miraculose reparari poterit divinitus, scilicet integritas membri, quam diximus accidentaliter se ad virginitatem habere. Aliud autem est quod nec miraculo reparari potest, ut scilicet qui expertus est voluptatem veneream, fiat non expertus, non enim Deus potest facere ut ea quae facta sunt non sint facta, ut in primo habitum est. As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in the First Part (Q. 25, A. 4). Ad quartum dicendum quod virginitas, secundum quod est virtus, importat propositum voto firmatum integritatis perpetuo servandae dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Virginit., quod per virginitatem integritas carnis ipsi creatori animae et carnis vovetur, consecratur, servatur. Unde virginitas, secundum quod est virtus, nunquam amittitur nisi per peccatum. Reply Obj. 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh. Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin. Ad quintum dicendum quod castitas coniugalis ex hoc solo laudem habet quod abstinet ab illicitis voluptatibus, unde non habet aliquam excellentiam supra communem castitatem. Viduitas autem addit quidem aliquid supra communem castitatem, non tamen pervenit ad id quod est perfectum in materia ista, scilicet ad omnimodam immunitatem venereae voluptatis, sed sola virginitas. Et ideo sola virginitas ponitur virtus specialis, sicut supra castitatem sicut magnificentia supra liberalitatem. Reply Obj. 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned above liberality. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum virginitas sit excellentior matrimonio Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas non sit excellentior matrimonio. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de bono coniugali, non impar meritum continentiae est in Ioanne, qui nullas expertus est nuptias, et in Abraham, qui filios generavit. Sed maioris virtutis maius est meritum. Ergo virginitas non est potior virtus quam castitas coniugalis. Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): Continence was equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot children. Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity. Praeterea, ex virtute dependet laus virtuosi. Si ergo virginitas praeferretur continentiae coniugali, videtur esse consequens quod quaelibet virgo esset laudabilior qualibet coniugata. Hoc autem est falsum. Ergo virginitas non praefertur coniugio. Obj. 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not preferable to marriage. Praeterea, bonum commune potius est bono privato, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed coniugium ordinatur ad bonum commune, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de bono coniugali, quod est cibus ad salutem hominis, hoc est concubitus ad salutem humani generis. Virginitas autem ordinatur ad bonum speciale, ut scilicet vitent tribulationem carnis, quam sustinent coniugati, sicut patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. VII. Ergo virginitas non est potior continentia coniugali. Obj. 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): What food is to a man’s wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race. On the other hand, virginity is ordered to the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the Apostle calls the tribulation of the flesh, to which married people are subject (1 Cor 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal continence. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Virginit., certa ratione, et sanctarum Scripturarum auctoritate, nec peccatum esse nuptias invenimus, nec eas bono vel virginalis continentiae, vel etiam vidualis, aequamus. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful, nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of widowhood. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet in libro Hieronymi contra Iovin., hic error fuit Ioviniani, qui posuit virginitatem non esse matrimonio praeferendam. Qui quidem error praecipue destruitur et exemplo Christi, qui et matrem virginem elegit, et ipse virginitatem servavit; et ex doctrina apostoli, qui, I ad Cor. VII, virginitatem consuluit tanquam melius bonum; et etiam ratione. Tum quia bonum divinum est potius bono humano. Tum quia bonum animae praefertur bono corporis. Tum etiam quia bonum contemplativae vitae praefertur bono activae. Virginitas autem ordinatur ad bonum animae secundum vitam contemplativam, quod est cogitare ea quae sunt Dei. Coniugium autem ordinatur ad bonum corporis, quod est corporalis multiplicatio generis humani, et pertinet ad vitam activam, quia vir et mulier in matrimonio viventes necesse habent cogitare quae sunt mundi, ut patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. VII. Unde indubitanter virginitas praeferenda est continentiae coniugali. I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor 7) counsels virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking on the things of God, whereas marriage is directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have to think on the things of the world, as the Apostle says (1 Cor 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal continence. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod meritum non solum pensatur ex genere actus, sed magis ex animo operantis. Habuit autem Abraham animum sic dispositum ut paratus esset virginitatem servare si esset tempus congruum. Ex quo meritum continentiae coniugalis in ipso aequatur merito continentiae virginalis in Ioanne respectu praemii substantialis, non autem respectu praemii accidentalis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod Ioannis caelibatus et Abrahae connubium pro temporum distributione Christo militaverunt, sed continentiam Ioannes etiam in opere, Abraham vero in solo habitu habebat. Reply Obj. 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ’s battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet virginitas sit melior quam continentia coniugalis, potest tamen coniugatus esse melior quam virgo, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, ex parte ipsius castitatis, si scilicet ille qui est coniugatus, habeat animum magis paratum ad virginitatem servandam, si oporteret, quam ille qui est virgo actu. Unde Augustinus instruit virginem, in libro de bono coniugali, ut dicat, ego non sum melior quam Abraham, sed melior est castitas caelibum quam castitas nuptiarum. Et rationem postea subdit, dicens, quod enim ego nunc ago, melius illi egissent, si tunc agendum esset, quod autem illi egerunt, sic ego non agerem, etiam si nunc agendum esset. Secundo, quia forte ille qui non est virgo, habet aliquam excellentiorem virtutem. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., unde scit virgo, quamvis sollicita quae sunt domini, ne forte, propter aliquam sibi incognitam infirmitatem, non sit matura martyrio, illa vero mulier cui se praeferre gestiebat, iam possit bibere calicem dominicae passionis? Reply Obj. 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: I am no better than Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage. Further on he gives the reason for this: For what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do it. Second, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. xliv): Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the chalice of the Lord? Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum commune potius est bono privato si sit eiusdem generis, sed potest esse quod bonum privatum sit melius secundum suum genus. Et hoc modo virginitas Deo dicata praefertur fecunditati carnali. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., quod fecunditas carnis, etiam illarum quae in hoc tempore nihil aliud in coniugio quam prolem requirunt quam mancipent Christo, pro amissa virginitate compensari non posse credenda est. Reply Obj. 3: The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. ix): It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity. Articulus 5 Article 5