Quaestio 153 Question 153 De luxuria Lust Deinde considerandum est de vitio luxuriae, quod opponitur castitati. Et primo, de ipsa in generali; secundo, de speciebus eius. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: Primo, quid sit materia luxuriae. (1) What is the matter of lust? Secundo, utrum omnis concubitus sit illicitus. (2) Whether all copulation is unlawful? Tertio, utrum luxuria sit peccatum mortale. (3) Whether lust is a mortal sin? Quarto, utrum luxuria sit vitium capitale. (4) Whether lust is a capital vice? Quinto, de filiabus eius. (5) Concerning its daughters. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum materia luxuriae sit solum concupiscentiae et delectationes venereae Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia luxuriae non sit solum concupiscentiae et delectationes venereae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Confess., quod luxuria ad satietatem atque abundantiam se cupit vocari. Sed satietas pertinet ad cibos et potus, abundantia autem ad divitias. Ergo luxuria non est proprie circa concupiscentias et voluptates venereas. Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance. But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures. Praeterea, Prov. XX dicitur, luxuriosa res est vinum. Sed vinum pertinet ad delectationem cibi et potus. Ergo circa has maxime videtur esse luxuria. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov 20:1): Wine is a lustful thing. Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust. Praeterea, luxuria esse dicitur libidinosae voluptatis appetitus. Sed libidinosa voluptas non solum est in venereis, sed etiam in multis aliis. Ergo luxuria non solum est circa concupiscentias et voluptates venereas. Obj. 3: Further, lust is defined as the desire of wanton pleasure. But wanton pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de vera Relig., dicitur luxuriosis, qui seminat in carne, de carne metet corruptionem. Sed seminatio carnis fit per voluptates venereas. Ergo ad has pertinet luxuria. On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii): He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap corruption. Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., luxuriosus aliquis dicitur quasi solutus in voluptates. Maxime autem voluptates venereae animum hominis solvunt. Et ideo circa voluptates venereas maxime luxuria consideratur. I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), a lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures. Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a man’s mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut temperantia principaliter quidem et proprie est circa delectationes tactus, dicitur autem ex consequenti et per similitudinem quandam in quibusdam aliis materiis; ita etiam luxuria principaliter quidem est in voluptatibus venereis, quae maxime et praecipue animum hominis resolvunt; secundario aut dicitur in quibuscumque aliis ad excessum pertinentibus. Unde Galat. V, dicit Glossa quod luxuria est quaelibet superfluitas. Reply Obj. 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a man’s mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says lust is any kind of surfeit. Ad secundum dicendum quod vinum dicitur esse res luxuriosa, vel secundum hunc modum quo in qualibet materia abundantia ad luxuriam refertur. Vel inquantum superfluus usus vini incentivum voluptati venereae praebet. Reply Obj. 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure. Ad tertium dicendum quod libidinosa voluptas etsi in aliis materiis dicatur, tamen specialiter hoc nomen sibi vindicant venereae delectationes, in quibus etiam specialiter libido dicitur, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Reply Obj. 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15, 16). Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum nullus actus venereus possit esse sine peccato Whether no venereal act can be without sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus actus venereus possit esse sine peccato. Nihil enim videtur impedire virtutem nisi peccatum. Sed omnis actus venereus maxime impedit virtutem, dicit enim Augustinus, in I Soliloq., nihil esse sentio quod magis ex arce deiiciat animum virilem quam blandimenta feminae, corporumque ille contactus. Ergo nullus actus venereus videtur esse sine peccato. Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts. Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin. Praeterea, ubicumque invenitur aliquid superfluum per quod a bono rationis receditur, hoc est vitiosum, quia virtus corrumpitur per superfluum et diminutum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed in quolibet actu venereo est superfluitas delectationis, quae in tantum absorbet rationem quod impossibile est aliquid intelligere in ipsa, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., et sicut Hieronymus dicit, in illo actu spiritus prophetiae non tangebat corda prophetarum. Ergo nullus actus venereus potest esse sine peccato. Obj. 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by excess and deficiency as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that it is incompatible with the act of understanding, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin. Praeterea, causa potior est quam effectus. Sed peccatum originale in parvulis trahitur a concupiscentia, sine qua actus venereus esse non potest, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de nuptiis et Concup. Ergo nullus actus venereus potest esse sine peccato. Obj. 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., satis responsum est haereticis, si tamen capiunt, non esse peccatum quod neque contra naturam committitur, neque contra morem, neque contra praeceptum. Et loquitur de actu venereo quo antiqui patres pluribus coniugibus utebantur. Ergo non omnis actus venereus est peccatum. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment: and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum in humanis actibus est quod est contra ordinem rationis. Habet autem hoc rationis ordo, ut quaelibet convenienter ordinet in suum finem. Et ideo non est peccatum si per rationem homo utatur rebus aliquibus ad finem ad quem sunt, modo et ordine convenienti, dummodo ille finis sit aliquod vere bonum. Sicut autem est vere bonum quod conservetur corporalis natura unius individui, ita etiam est quoddam bonum excellens quod conservetur natura speciei humanae. Sicut autem ad conservationem vitae unius hominis ordinatur usus ciborum, ita etiam ad conservationem totius humani generis usus venereorum, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., quod est cibus ad salutem hominis, hoc est concubitus ad salutem generis. Et ideo, sicut usus ciborum potest esse absque peccato, si fiat debito modo et ordine, secundum quod competit saluti corporis; ita etiam et usus venereorum potest esse absque omni peccato, si fiat debito modo et ordine, secundum quod est conveniens ad finem generationis humanae. I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): What food is to a man’s well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race. Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid potest impedire virtutem dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad communem statum virtutis, et sic non impeditur virtus nisi per peccatum. Alio modo, quantum ad perfectum virtutis statum, et sic potest impediri virtus per aliquid quod non est peccatum, sed est minus bonum. Et hoc modo usus feminae deiicit animum, non a virtute, sed ab arce, idest perfectione virtutis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., sicut bonum erat quod Martha faciebat occupata circa ministerium sanctorum, sed melius quod Maria audiens verbum Dei; ita etiam bonum Susannae in castitate coniugali laudamus, sed bonum viduae Annae, et magis Mariae virginis, anteponimus. Reply Obj. 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Second, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i.e., the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna’s conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, medium virtutis non attenditur secundum quantitatem, sed secundum quod convenit rationi rectae. Et ideo abundantia delectationis quae est in actu venereo secundum rationem ordinato, non contrariatur medio virtutis. Et praeterea ad virtutem non pertinet quantum sensus exterior delectetur, quod consequitur corporis dispositionem, sed quantum appetitus interior ad huiusmodi delectationes afficiatur. Nec hoc etiam quod ratio non potest liberum actum rationis ad spiritualia consideranda simul cum illa delectatione habere, ostendit quod actus ille sit contrarius virtuti. Non enim est contrarium virtuti si rationis actus aliquando intermittatur aliquo quod secundum rationem fit, alioquin, quod aliquis se somno tradit, esset contra virtutem. Hoc tamen quod concupiscentia et delectatio venereorum non subiacet imperio et moderationi rationis, provenit ex poena primi peccati, inquantum scilicet ratio rebellis Deo meruit habere suam carnem rebellem, ut patet per Augustinum, XIII de Civ. Dei. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 152, A. 2, ad 2; I-II, Q. 64, A. 2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13). Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, quod ex concupiscentia carnis, quae regeneratis non imputatur in peccatum, tanquam ex filia peccati, proles nascitur originali obligata peccato. Unde non sequitur quod actus ille sit peccatum, sed quod in illo actu sit aliquid poenale a peccato primo derivatum. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin. Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum luxuria quae est circa actus venereos possit esse aliquod peccatum Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod luxuria quae est circa actus venereos, non possit esse aliquod peccatum. Per actum enim venereum semen emittitur, quod est superfluum alimenti, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de Generat. Animal. Sed in emissione aliarum superfluitatum non attenditur aliquod peccatum. Ergo neque circa actus venereos potest esse aliquod peccatum. Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts. Praeterea, quilibet potest licite uti ut libet, eo quod suum est. Sed in actu venereo homo non utitur nisi eo quod suum est, nisi forte in adulterio vel raptu. Ergo in usu venereo non potest esse peccatum. Et ita luxuria non erit peccatum. Obj. 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin. Praeterea, omne peccatum habet vitium oppositum. Sed luxuriae nullum vitium videtur esse oppositum. Ergo luxuria non est peccatum. Obj. 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin. Sed contra est quod causa est potior effectu. Sed vinum prohibetur propter luxuriam, secundum illud apostoli, Ephes. V, nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria. Ergo luxuria est prohibita. On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph 5:18), Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust. Therefore lust is forbidden. Praeterea, Galat. V, enumeratur inter opera carnis. Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19. Respondeo dicendum quod quanto aliquid est magis necessarium, tanto magis oportet ut circa illud rationis ordo servetur. Unde per consequens magis est vitiosum si ordo rationis praetermittatur. Usus autem venereorum, sicut dictum est, est valde necessarius ad bonum commune, quod est conservatio humani generis. Et ideo circa hoc maxime attendi debet rationis ordo. Et per consequens, si quid circa hoc fiat praeter id quod ordo rationis habet, vitiosum erit. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem luxuriae, ut ordinem et modum rationis excedat circa venerea. Et ideo absque dubio luxuria est peccatum. I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the dictate of reason’s ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.