Articulus 12
Article 12
Utrum vitium contra naturam sit maximum peccatum inter species luxuriae
Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?
Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium contra naturam non sit maximum peccatum inter species luxuriae. Tanto enim aliquod peccatum est gravius, quanto magis contrariatur caritati. Sed magis videntur contrariari caritati proximi adulterium et stuprum et raptus, quae vergunt in iniuriam proximi, quam peccata contra naturam, per quae nullus alteri iniuriatur. Ergo peccatum contra naturam non est maximum inter species luxuriae.
Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of lust.
Praeterea, illa peccata videntur esse gravissima quae contra Deum committuntur. Sed sacrilegium directe committitur contra Deum, quia vergit in iniuriam divini cultus. Ergo sacrilegium est gravius peccatum quam vitium contra naturam.
Obj. 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum videtur esse gravius, quanto exercetur in personam quam magis diligere debemus. Sed secundum ordinem caritatis magis debemus diligere personas nobis coniunctas, quae polluuntur per incestum, quam personas extraneas, quae interdum polluuntur per vitium contra naturam. Ergo incestus est gravius peccatum quam vitium contra naturam.
Obj. 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who are united to him—and such are those whom he defiles by incest—than persons who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
Praeterea, si vitium contra naturam est gravissimum, videtur quod tanto est gravius quanto est magis contra naturam. Sed maxime videtur esse contra naturam peccatum immunditiae seu mollitiei, quia hoc maxime videtur esse secundum naturam, ut alterum sit agens et alterum patiens. Ergo, secundum hoc, immunditia esset gravissimum inter vitia contra naturam. Hoc autem est falsum. Non ergo vitia contra naturam sunt gravissima inter peccata luxuriae.
Obj. 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Adulteriis coniugiis, quod omnium horum, peccatorum scilicet quae ad luxuriam pertinent, pessimum est quod contra naturam fit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug.) that of all these, namely the sins belonging to lust, that which is against nature is the worst.
Respondeo dicendum quod in quolibet genere pessima est principii corruptio, ex quo alia dependent. Principia autem rationis sunt ea quae sunt secundum naturam, nam ratio, praesuppositis his quae sunt a natura determinata, disponit alia secundum quod convenit. Et hoc apparet tam in speculativis quam in operativis. Et ideo, sicut in speculativis error circa ea quorum cognitio est homini naturaliter indita, est gravissimus et turpissimus; ita in agendis agere contra ea quae sunt secundum naturam determinata, est gravissimum et turpissimum. Quia ergo in vitiis quae sunt contra naturam transgreditur homo id quod est secundum naturam determinatum circa usum venereum, inde est quod in tali materia hoc peccatum est gravissimum. Post quod est incestus, qui, sicut dictum est, est contra naturalem reverentiam quam personis coniunctis debemus.
I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as stated above (A. 9), is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons related to us.
Per alias autem luxuriae species praeteritur solum id quod est secundum rationem rectam determinatum, ex praesuppositione tamen naturalium principiorum. Magis autem repugnat rationi quod aliquis venereis utatur non solum contra id quod convenit proli generandae, sed etiam cum iniuria alterius. Et ideo fornicatio simplex, quae committitur sine iniuria alterius personae, est minima inter species luxuriae. Maior autem iniuria est si quis abutatur muliere alterius potestati subiecta ad usum generationis, quam ad solam custodiam. Et ideo adulterium est gravius quam stuprum. Et utrumque aggravatur per violentiam. Propter quod, raptus virginis est gravius quam stuprum, et raptus uxoris quam adulterium. Et haec etiam omnia aggravantur secundum rationem sacrilegii, ut supra dictum est.
With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to another’s authority as regards the act of generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A. 10, ad 2).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ordo rationis rectae est ab homine, ita ordo naturae est ab ipso Deo. Et ideo in peccatis contra naturam, in quibus ipse ordo naturae violatur, fit iniuria ipsi Deo, ordinatori naturae. Unde Augustinus dicit, III Confess., flagitia quae sunt contra naturam, ubique ac semper detestanda atque punienda sunt, qualia Sodomitarum fuerunt, quae si omnes gentes facerent, eodem criminis reatu divina lege tenerentur, quae non sic fecit homines ut se illo uterentur modo. Violatur quippe ipsa societas quae cum Deo nobis esse debet, cum eadem natura cuius ille auctor est, libidinis perversitate polluitur.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): Those foul offenses that are against nature should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which He is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust.
Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam vitia contra naturam sunt contra Deum, ut dictum est. Et tanto sunt graviora quam sacrilegii corruptela, quanto ordo naturae humanae inditus est prior et stabilior quam quilibet alius ordo superadditus.
Reply Obj. 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any subsequently established order.
Ad tertium dicendum quod unicuique individuo magis est coniuncta natura speciei quam quodcumque aliud individuum. Et ideo peccata quae fiunt contra naturam speciei, sunt graviora.
Reply Obj. 3: The nature of the species is more intimately united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against the specific nature are more grievous.
Ad quartum dicendum quod gravitas in peccato magis attenditur ex abusu alicuius rei quam ex omissione debiti usus. Et ideo inter vitia contra naturam infimum locum tenet peccatum immunditiae, quod consistit in sola omissione concubitus ad alterum. Gravissimum autem est peccatum bestialitatis, ubi non servatur debita species. Unde super illud Gen. XXXVII, accusavit fratres suos crimine pessimo, dicit Glossa, quod cum pecoribus miscebantur. Post hoc autem est vitium sodomiticum, ubi non servatur debitus sexus. Post hoc autem est peccatum ex eo quod non servatur debitus modus concumbendi. Magis autem si non sit debitum vas, quam si sit inordinatio secundum aliqua alia pertinentia ad modum concubitus.
Reply Obj. 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gen. 37:2, He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime, says that they copulated with cattle. After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the vas than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.
Quaestio 155
Question 155
De clementia
Continence
Deinde considerandum est de partibus potentialibus temperantiae. Et primo, de continentia; secundo, de clementia; tertio, de modestia. Circa primum, considerandum est de continentia, et de incontinentia. Circa continentiam quaeruntur quatuor.
We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum continentia sit virtus.
(1) Whether continence is a virtue?
Secundo, quae sit materia eius.
(2) What is its matter?
Tertio, quid sit eius subiectum.
(3) What is its subject?
Quarto, de comparatione eius ad temperantiam.
(4) Of its comparison with temperance.
Articulus 1
Article 1
Utrum continentia sit virtus
Whether continence is a virtue?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod continentia non sit virtus. Species enim non condividitur generi. Sed continentia condividitur virtuti, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Ethic. Ergo continentia non est virtus.
Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1, 9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Praeterea, nullus utendo virtute peccat, quia secundum Augustinum, in libro de Lib. Arbit., virtus est qua nemo male utitur. Sed aliquis continendo potest peccare, puta si desideret aliquod bonum facere et ab eo se contineat. Ergo continentia non est virtus.
Obj. 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19), a virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of. Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Praeterea, nulla virtus retrahit hominem a licitis, sed solum ab illicitis. Sed continentia retrahit hominem a licitis, dicit enim Glossa Galat. V, quod per continentiam aliquis se etiam a licitis abstinet. Ergo continentia non est virtus.
Obj. 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, Faith, modesty, etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Sed contra, omnis habitus laudabilis videtur esse virtus. Sed continentia est huiusmodi, dicit enim Andronicus quod continentia est habitus invictus a delectatione. Ergo continentia est virtus.
On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says that continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure. Therefore continence is a virtue.
Respondeo dicendum quod nomen continentiae dupliciter sumitur a diversis. Quidam enim continentiam nominant per quam aliquis ab omni delectatione venerea abstinet, unde et apostolus, Galat. V, continentiam castitati coniungit. Et sic continentia perfecta principalis quidem est virginitas, secundaria vero viduitas. Unde secundum hoc, eadem ratio est de continentia quae de virginitate, quam supra diximus virtutem. Alii vero dicunt continentiam esse per quam aliquis resistit concupiscentiis pravis, quae in eo vehementes existunt. Et hoc modo accipit philosophus continentiam, VII Ethic. Et hoc etiam modo accipitur continentia in collationibus patrum. Hoc autem modo continentia habet aliquid de ratione virtutis, inquantum scilicet ratio firmata est contra passiones, ne ab eis deducatur, non tamen attingit ad perfectam rationem virtutis moralis, secundum quam etiam appetitus sensitivus subditur rationi sic ut in eo non insurgant vehementes passiones rationi contrariae. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod continentia non est virtus, sed quaedam mixta, inquantum scilicet aliquid habet de virtute et in aliquo deficit a virtute.
I answer that, The word continence is taken by various people in two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above (Q. 152, A. 3) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10, 11). In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that continence is not a virtue but a mixture, inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.
Largius tamen accipiendo nomen virtutis pro quolibet principio laudabilium operum, possumus dicere continentiam esse virtutem.
If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus condividit continentiam virtuti quantum ad hoc in quo deficit a virtute.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same division with virtue insofar as the former falls short of virtue.
Ad secundum dicendum quod homo proprie est id quod est secundum rationem. Et ideo ex hoc dicitur aliquis in seipso se tenere, quod tenet se in eo quod convenit rationi. Quod autem pertinet ad perversitatem rationis, non est conveniens rationi. Unde ille solus continens vere dicitur qui tenet se in eo quod est secundum rationem rectam, non autem in eo quod est secundum rationem perversam. Rationi autem rectae opponuntur concupiscentiae pravae, sicut et rationi perversae opponuntur concupiscentiae bonae. Et ideo proprie et vere continens est qui persistit in ratione recta abstinens a concupiscentiis pravis, non autem qui persistit in ratione perversa abstinens a concupiscentiis bonis, sed hic magis potest dici obstinatus in malo.
Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds (tenet se) to that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.
Ad tertium dicendum quod Glossa ibi loquitur de continentia secundum primum modum, secundum quem continentia nominat quandam virtutem perfectam, quae non solum abstinet ab illicitis bonis, sed etiam a quibusdam licitis minus bonis, ut totaliter intendatur perfectioribus bonis.
Reply Obj. 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.
Articulus 2
Article 2
Utrum materia continentiae sint concupiscentiae delectationum tactus
Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia continentiae non sint concupiscentiae delectationum tactus. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., quod generale decorum ita est ac si aequabilem formam atque universitatem honestatis habeat in omni actu suo continentem. Sed non omnis actus humanus pertinet ad delectationes tactus. Ergo continentia non est solum circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus.
Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained in its every action. But not every human act pertains to the delights of touch. Therefore continence is not only about the desires of the delight of touch.
Praeterea, nomen continentiae ex hoc sumitur quod aliquis tenet se in bono rationis rectae, sicut dictum est. Sed quaedam aliae passiones vehementius abducunt hominem a ratione recta quam concupiscentiae delectabilium tactus, sicut timor periculorum mortis, qui stupefacit hominem; et ira, quae est insaniae similis, ut Seneca dicit. Ergo continentia non dicitur proprie circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus.
Obj. 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for the good of right reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Now other passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks. Therefore continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.
Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in II Rhet., quod continentia est per quam cupiditas consilii gubernatione regitur. Cupiditas autem magis consuevit dici divitiarum quam delectabilium tactus, secundum illud I ad Tim. ult., radix omnium malorum cupiditas. Ergo continentia non est proprie circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus.
Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): It is continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel. Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10, Cupidity (philargyria), is the root of all evils. Therefore continence is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch.