Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum superbia sit gravissimum peccatorum Whether pride is the most grievous of sins? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit gravissimum peccatorum. Quanto enim aliquod peccatum difficilius cavetur, tanto videtur esse levius. Sed superbia difficillime cavetur, quia sicut Augustinus dicit, in regula, cetera peccata in malis operibus exercentur, ut fiant, superbia vero bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant. Ergo superbia non est gravissimum peccatum. Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them. Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins. Praeterea, maius malum maiori bono opponitur, ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Sed humilitas, cui opponitur superbia, non est maxima virtutum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et vitia quae opponuntur maioribus virtutibus, puta infidelitas, desperatio, odium Dei, homicidium, et alia huiusmodi, sunt graviora peccata quam superbia. Obj. 2: Further, The greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 5). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are more grievous sins than pride. Praeterea, maius malum non punitur per minus malum. Sed superbia interdum punitur per alia peccata, ut patet Rom. I, ubi dicitur quod philosophi propter elationem cordis traditi sunt in reprobum sensum, ut faciant quae non conveniunt. Ergo superbia non est gravissimum peccatorum. Obj. 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom. 1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of science were delivered to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient. Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, superbi inique agebant usquequaque, dicit Glossa, maximum peccatum in homine est superbia. On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, The proud did iniquitously, says: The greatest sin in man is pride. Respondeo dicendum quod in peccato duo attenduntur, scilicet conversio ad commutabile bonum, quae materialiter se habet in peccato; et aversio a bono incommutabili, quae est formalis et completiva peccati. Ex parte autem conversionis, non habet superbia quod sit maximum peccatorum, quia celsitudo, quam superbus inordinate appetit, secundum suam rationem non habet maximam repugnantiam ad bonum virtutis. Sed ex parte aversionis, superbia habet maximam gravitatem, quia in aliis peccatis homo a Deo avertitur vel propter ignorantiam, vel propter infirmitatem, sive propter desiderium cuiuscumque alterius boni; sed superbia habet aversionem a Deo ex hoc ipso quod non vult Deo et eius regulae subiici. Unde Boetius dicit quod, cum omnia vitia fugiant a Deo, sola superbia se Deo opponit. Propter quod etiam specialiter dicitur Iac. IV, quod Deus superbis resistit. Et ideo averti a Deo et eius praeceptis, quod est quasi consequens in aliis peccatis, per se ad superbiam pertinet, cuius actus est Dei contemptus. Et quia id quod est per se, semper est potius eo quod est per aliud, consequens est quod superbia sit gravissimum peccatorum secundum suum genus, quia excedit in aversione, quae formaliter complet peccatum. I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius says that while all vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God; for which reason it is specially stated (Jas 4:6) that God resisteth the proud. Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquod peccatum difficile cavetur dupliciter. Uno modo, propter vehementiam impugnationis, sicut ira vehementer impugnat propter suum impetum. Et adhuc difficilius est resistere concupiscentiae, propter eius connaturalitatem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et talis difficultas vitandi peccatum gravitatem peccati diminuit, quia quanto aliquis minoris tentationis impetu cadit, tanto gravius peccat, ut Augustinus dicit. Reply Obj. 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and still more difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3, 9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12, 15). Alio modo difficile est vitare aliquod peccatum propter eius latentiam. Et hoc modo superbiam difficile est vitare, quia etiam ex ipsis bonis occasionem sumit, ut dictum est. Et ideo signanter Augustinus dicit quod bonis operibus insidiatur et in Psalmo dicitur, in via hac qua ambulabam, absconderunt superbi laqueum mihi. Et ideo motus superbiae occulte subrepens non habet maximam gravitatem, antequam per iudicium rationis deprehendatur. Sed postquam deprehensus fuerit per rationem, tunc facile evitatur. Tum ex consideratione propriae infirmitatis, secundum illud Eccli. X, quid superbit terra et cinis? Tum etiam ex consideratione magnitudinis divinae, secundum illud Iob XV, quid tumet contra Deum spiritus tuus? Tum etiam ex imperfectione bonorum de quibus homo superbit, secundum illud Isaiae XL, omnis caro faenum, et omnis gloria eius quasi flos agri; et infra, LXIV, quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae. Second, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A. 5, ad 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it lies in wait for good deeds; and it is written (Ps 141:4): In the way wherein I walked, the proud have hidden a snare for me. Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one’s own infirmity, according to Ecclus. 10:9, Why is earth and ashes proud? and by considering God’s greatness, according to Job 15:13, Why doth thy spirit swell against God? as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according to Isa. 40:6, All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field; and farther on (Isa 64:6), all our justices are become like the rag of a menstruous woman. Ad secundum dicendum quod oppositio vitii ad virtutem attenditur secundum obiectum, quod consideratur ex parte conversionis. Et secundum hoc superbia non habet quod sit maximum peccatorum, sicut nec humilitas quod sit maxima virtutum. Sed ex parte aversionis est maximum, utpote aliis peccatis magnitudinem praestans. Nam per hoc ipsum infidelitatis peccatum gravius redditur, si ex superbiae contemptu procedat, quam si ex ignorantia vel infirmitate proveniat. Et idem dicendum est de desperatione et aliis huiusmodi. Reply Obj. 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in syllogismis ducentibus ad impossibile quandoque aliquis convincitur per hoc quod ducitur ad inconveniens magis manifestum; ita etiam, ad convincendum superbiam hominum, Deus aliquos punit permittens eos ruere in peccata carnalia, quae, etsi sint minora, tamen manifestiorem turpitudinem continent. Unde Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, omni vitio deteriorem esse superbiam, seu propter quod a summis personis et primis assumitur; seu quod de opere iustitiae et virtutis exoritur, minusque culpa eius sentitur. Luxuria vero carnis ideo notabilis omnibus est, quoniam statim per se turpis est. Et tamen, dispensante Deo, superbia minor est, sed qui detinetur superbia et non sentit, labitur in carnis luxuriam, ut per hanc humiliatus, a confusione exurgat. Reply Obj. 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that pride is the worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. On the other hand, carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature: and yet, under God’s dispensation, it is less grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement. Ex quo etiam patet gravitas peccati superbiae. Sicut enim medicus sapiens in remedium maioris morbi patitur infirmum in leviorem morbum incidere, ita etiam peccatum superbiae gravius esse ostenditur ex hoc ipso quod pro eius remedio Deus permittit ruere hominem in alia peccata. From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall into other sins. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum superbia sit primum omnium peccatorum Whether pride is the first sin of all? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit primum omnium peccatorum. Primum enim salvatur in omnibus consequentibus. Sed non omnia peccata sunt cum superbia, nec oriuntur ex superbia, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Nat. et gratia, quod multa perperam fiunt quae non fiunt superbe. Ergo superbia non est primum omnium peccatorum. Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done amiss which are not done with pride. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all. Praeterea, Eccli. X dicitur quod initium superbiae est apostatare a Deo. Ergo apostasia a Deo est prius quam superbia. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Sir 10:14) that the beginning of . . . pride is to fall off from God. Therefore falling away from God precedes pride. Praeterea, ordo peccatorum esse videtur secundum ordinem virtutum. Sed humilitas non est prima virtutum, sed magis fides. Ergo superbia non est primum peccatorum. Obj. 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all. Praeterea, II ad Tim. III, dicitur, mali homines et seductores proficiunt in peius, et ita videtur quod principium malitiae hominis non sit a maximo peccatorum. Sed superbia est maximum peccatorum, ut dictum est. Non est igitur primum peccatum. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim 3:13): Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse; so that apparently man’s beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first sin. Praeterea, id quod est secundum apparentiam et fictionem, est posterius eo quod est secundum veritatem. Sed philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod superbus est fictor fortitudinis et audaciae. Ergo vitium audaciae est prius vitio superbiae. Obj. 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that pride apes fortitude and daring. Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. X, initium omnis peccati superbia. On the contrary, It is written (Sir 10:15): Pride is the beginning of all sin. Respondeo dicendum quod illud quod est per se, est primum in quolibet genere. Dictum est autem supra quod aversio a Deo, quae formaliter complet rationem peccati, pertinet ad superbiam per se, ad alia autem peccata ex consequenti. Et inde est quod superbia habet rationem primi; et est etiam principium omnium peccatorum, ut supra dictum est, cum de causis peccati ageretur, ex parte aversionis, quae est principalior in peccato. I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is essential. Now it has been stated above (A. 6) that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is the beginning of all sins, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 2), when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part of sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse omnis peccati initium, non quia quodlibet peccatum singulariter ex superbia oriatur, sed quia quodlibet genus peccati natum est ex superbia oriri. Reply Obj. 1: Pride is said to be the beginning of all sin, not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to arise from pride. Ad secundum dicendum quod apostatare a Deo dicitur esse superbiae humanae initium, non quasi aliquod aliud peccatum a superbia existens, sed quia est prima superbiae pars. Dictum est enim quod superbia principaliter respicit subiectionem divinam, quam contemnit, ex consequenti autem contemnit subiici creaturae propter Deum. Reply Obj. 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being the first part of pride. For it has been said above (A. 5) that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God’s sake. Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet esse eundem ordinem virtutum et vitiorum. Nam vitium est corruptivum virtutis. Id autem quod est primum in generatione, est postremum in corruptione. Et ideo, sicut fides est prima virtutum, ita infidelitas est ultimum peccatorum, ad quam homo quandoque per alia peccata perducitur. Super illud Psalmi, exinanite, exinanite usque ad fundamentum in ea, dicit Glossa quod coacervatione vitiorum subrepit diffidentia. Et apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, quod quidam, repellentes conscientiam bonam, circa fidem naufragaverunt. Reply Obj. 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7, Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof, says that by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief, and the Apostle says (1 Tim 1:19) that some rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith. Ad quartum dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse gravissimum peccatum ex eo quod per se competit peccato, ex quo attenditur gravitas in peccato. Et ideo superbia causat gravitatem aliorum peccatorum. Contingit ergo ante superbiam esse aliqua peccata leviora, quae scilicet ex ignorantia vel infirmitate committuntur. Sed inter gravia peccata primum est superbia, sicut causa per quam alia peccata aggravantur. Et quia id quod est primum in causando, est etiam ultimum in recedendo; ideo super illud Psalmi, emundabor a delicto maximo, dicit Glossa, hoc est, a delicto superbiae, quod est ultimum redeuntibus ad Deum, et primum recedentibus. Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin, says: Namely from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw from God. Ad quintum dicendum quod philosophus ponit superbiam circa fictionem fortitudinis, non quia solum in hoc consistat, sed quia per hoc homo maxime reputat se posse excellentiam apud homines consequi, si audax vel fortis videatur. Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum superbia debeat poni vitium capitale Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia debeat poni vitium capitale. Isidorus enim, et etiam Cassianus, enumerant superbiam inter vitia capitalia. Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital vice, since Isidore and Cassian number pride among the capital vices. Praeterea, superbia videtur esse idem inani gloriae, quia utraque excellentiam quaerit. Sed inanis gloria ponitur vitium capitale. Ergo etiam superbia debet poni vitium capitale. Obj. 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice. Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., quod superbia invidiam parit, nec unquam est sine tali comite. Sed invidia ponitur vitium capitale, ut supra habitum est. Ergo multo magis superbia. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that pride begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion. Now envy is reckoned a capital vice, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4). Much more therefore is pride a capital vice. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., non enumerat superbiam inter vitia capitalia. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among the capital vices. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, superbia dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum se, prout scilicet est quoddam speciale peccatum; alio modo, secundum quod habet quandam universalem influentiam in omnia peccata. Vitia autem capitalia ponuntur esse quaedam specialia peccata, ex quibus multa genera peccatorum oriuntur. Et ideo quidam, considerantes superbiam secundum quod est quoddam speciale peccatum, connumeraverunt eam aliis vitiis capitalibus. Gregorius vero, considerans universalem eius influentiam quam habet in omnia vitia, ut dictum est, non connumeravit eam aliis capitalibus vitiis, sed posuit eam reginam omnium vitiorum et matrem. Unde Gregorius dicit, in XXXI Moral., ipsa vitiorum regina superbia, cum devictum plene cor ceperit, mox illud septem principalibus vitiis, quasi quibusdam suis ducibus, devastandum tradit, ex quibus vitiorum multitudines oriuntur. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 5, ad 1) pride may be considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin; second, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all vices, as explained above (A. 2, Obj. 3), did not place it among the capital vices, but held it to be the queen and mother of all the vices. Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): Pride, the queen of vices, when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Ad secundum dicendum quod superbia non est idem inani gloriae, sed causa eius. Nam superbia inordinate excellentiam appetit, sed inanis gloria appetit excellentiae manifestationem. Reply Obj. 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory covets the outward show of excellence. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod invidia, quae est vitium capitale, oritur ex superbia, non sequitur quod superbia sit vitium capitale, sed quod sit aliquid principalius capitalibus vitiis. Reply Obj. 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.