Ad secundum dicendum quod superbia non est idem inani gloriae, sed causa eius. Nam superbia inordinate excellentiam appetit, sed inanis gloria appetit excellentiae manifestationem. Reply Obj. 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory covets the outward show of excellence. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod invidia, quae est vitium capitale, oritur ex superbia, non sequitur quod superbia sit vitium capitale, sed quod sit aliquid principalius capitalibus vitiis. Reply Obj. 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves. Quaestio 163 Question 163 De peccato primi hominis The First Man’s Sin Deinde considerandum est de peccato primi hominis, quod fuit per superbiam. Et primo, de peccato eius; secundo, de poena peccati; tertio, de tentatione qua inductus est ad peccandum. We must now consider the first man’s sin which was pride: and (1) his sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum primum peccatum hominis fuerit superbia. (1) Whether pride was the first man’s first sin? Secundo, quid primus homo peccando appetierit. (2) What the first man coveted by sinning? Tertio, utrum eius peccatum fuerit gravius omnibus aliis peccatis. (3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins? Quarto, quis plus peccaverit, utrum vir vel mulier. (4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum superbia fuerit primi hominis peccatum Whether pride was the first man’s first sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non fuerit primi hominis peccatum. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. V, quod per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi. Sed primi hominis peccatum est ex quo omnes peccatores constituti sunt originali peccato. Ergo inobedientia fuit primi hominis peccatum, et non superbia. Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man’s first sin. For the Apostle says (Rom 5:19) that by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners. Now the first man’s first sin is the one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man’s first sin. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., quod eo ordine Diabolus Christum tentavit quo primum hominem deiecit. Sed Christus primo tentatus est de gula, ut patet Matth. IV, cum ei dictum est, si filius Dei es, dic ut lapides isti panes fiant. Ergo primum peccatum primi hominis non fuit superbia, sed gula. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Luke 4:3, And the devil said to Him, that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as appears from Matt. 4:3, where it was said to Him: If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread. Therefore the first man’s first sin was not pride but gluttony. Praeterea, homo Diabolo suggerente peccavit. Sed Diabolus tentans hominem scientiam repromisit, ut patet Gen. III. Ergo prima inordinatio hominis fuit per appetitum scientiae, quod pertinet ad curiositatem. Ergo curiositas fuit peccatum primum, et non superbia. Obj. 3: Further, man sinned at the devil’s suggestion. Now the devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gen 3:5). Therefore inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the first sin. Praeterea, super illud I ad Tim. II, mulier seducta in praevaricatione fuit, dicit Glossa, hanc seductionem proprie appellavit apostolus, per quam id quod suadebatur, cum falsum esset, verum putatum est, scilicet quod Deus lignum illud ideo tangere prohibuerit, quod sciebat eos, si tetigissent, velut deos futuros; tanquam eis divinitatem invideret qui eos homines fecerat. Sed hoc credere pertinet ad infidelitatem. Ergo primum peccatum hominis fuit infidelitas, et non superbia. Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:14, The woman being seduced was in the transgression, says: The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead . . . Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore man’s first sin was unbelief and not pride. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. X, initium omnis peccati superbia. Sed peccatum primi hominis est initium omnis peccati, secundum illud Rom. V, per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit. Ergo primum peccatum hominis fuit superbia. On the contrary, It is written (Sir 10:15): Pride is the beginning of all sin. Now man’s first sin is the beginning of all sin, according to Rom. 5:12, By one man sin entered into this world. Therefore man’s first sin was pride. Respondeo dicendum quod ad unum peccatum multi motus concurrere possunt, inter quos ille habet rationem primi peccati in quo primo inordinatio invenitur. Manifestum est autem quod primo invenitur inordinatio in motu interiori animae quam in actu exteriori corporis, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Civ. Dei, non amittitur corporis sanctitas manente animae sanctitate. Inter motus autem interiores, prius movetur appetitus in finem quam in id quod quaeritur propter finem. Et ideo ibi fuit primum peccatum hominis ubi potuit esse primus appetitus inordinati finis. Sic autem homo erat in statu innocentiae institutus ut nulla esset rebellio carnis ad spiritum. Unde non potuit esse prima inordinatio appetitus humani ex hoc quod appetierit aliquod sensibile bonum, in quod carnis concupiscentia tendit praeter ordinem rationis. Relinquitur igitur quod prima inordinatio appetitus humani fuit ex hoc quod aliquod bonum spirituale inordinate appetiit. Non autem inordinate appetivisset, appetendo illud secundum suam mensuram ex divina regula praestitutam. Unde relinquitur quod primum peccatum eius fuit in hoc quod appetiit quoddam spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram. Quod pertinet ad superbiam. Unde manifestum est quod primum peccatum hominis fuit superbia. I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man’s first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man’s first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man’s first sin was pride. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod homo divino praecepto non obediret, non fuit propter se ab eo volitum, quia hoc non posset contingere nisi praesupposita inordinatione voluntatis. Relinquitur ergo quod voluerit propter aliquid aliud. Primum autem quod inordinate voluit fuit propria excellentia. Et ideo inobedientia in eo causata fuit ex superbia. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, ad Orosium, quod homo elatus superbia, suasioni serpentis obediens, praecepta Dei contempsit. Reply Obj. 1: Man’s disobedience to the Divine command was not willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros ) that man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent’s prompting, and scorned God’s commands. Ad secundum dicendum quod in peccato primorum parentum etiam gula locum habuit, dicitur enim Gen. III, vidit mulier quod lignum esset bonum ad vescendum, et pulchrum oculis, aspectuque delectabile, et tulit de fructu eius, et comedit. Non tamen ipsa bonitas et pulchritudo cibi fuit primum motivum ad peccandum, sed potius suasio serpentis, qui dixit, aperientur oculi vestri, et eritis sicut dii; quod appetendo, superbiam mulier incurrit. Et ideo peccatum gulae derivatum est ex peccato superbiae. Reply Obj. 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents. For it is written (Gen 3:6): The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat. Yet the very goodness and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gen 3:5): Your eyes shall be opened and you shall be as Gods: and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride. Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus scientiae causatus fuit in primis parentibus ex inordinato appetitu excellentiae. Unde et in verbis serpentis praemittitur, eritis sicut dii; et postea subditur, scientes bonum et malum. Reply Obj. 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began by saying: You shall be as Gods, and added: Knowing good and evil. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., verbis serpentis mulier non crederet a bona atque utili re divinitus se fuisse prohibitos, nisi iam inesset menti amor ille propriae potestatis, et quaedam de se superba praesumptio. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi superbia praecesserit suasionem serpentis, sed quia statim post suasionem serpentis, invasit mentem eius elatio, ex qua consecutum est ut crederet verum esse quod Daemon dicebat. Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xi, 30), the woman had not believed the serpent’s statement that they were debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud self-presumption. This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that she believed the demon to have spoken truly. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum superbia primi hominis fuerit in hoc quod appetierit divinam similitudinem Whether the first man’s pride consisted in his coveting God’s likeness? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia primi hominis non fuerit in hoc quod appetierit divinam similitudinem. Nullus enim peccat appetendo id quod sibi competit secundum suam naturam. Sed similitudo Dei competit homini secundum suam naturam, dicitur enim Gen. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Ergo non peccavit divinam similitudinem appetendo. Objection 1: It would seem that the first man’s pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God’s likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen 1:26): Let us make man to our image and likeness. Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. Praeterea, in hoc videtur primus homo divinam similitudinem appetiisse, ut scientia boni et mali potiretur, hoc enim ei a serpente suggerebatur, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum. Sed appetitus scientiae est homini naturalis, secundum illud philosophi, in principio Metaphys., omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Ergo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem. Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God’s likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the serpent’s suggestion: You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil. Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: All men naturally desire knowledge. Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. Praeterea, nullus sapiens eligit id quod est impossibile. Primus autem homo sapientia praeditus erat, secundum illud Eccli. XVII, disciplina intellectus replevit illos. Cum ergo omne peccatum consistat in appetitu deliberato, qui est electio, videtur quod primus homo non peccaverit appetendo aliquid impossibile. Sed impossibile est esse hominem similem Deo, secundum illud Exodi XV, quis similis tui in fortibus, domine? Ergo primus homo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem. Obj. 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, He filled them with the knowledge of understanding. Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex. 15:11, Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord? Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam, dicit Augustinus, Adam et Eva rapere voluerunt divinitatem, et perdiderunt felicitatem. On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5, Then did I restore that which I took not away, says: Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est similitudo. Una omnimodae aequiparantiae. Et hanc similitudinem ad Deum primi parentes non appetierunt, quia talis similitudo ad Deum non cadit in apprehensione, praecipue sapientis. I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality: and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man. Alia autem est similitudo imitationis, qualis possibilis est creaturae ad Deum, inquantum videlicet participat aliquid de similitudine ipsius secundum suum modum. Unde Dionysius dicit, in IX cap. de Div. Nom., eadem similia sunt Deo, et dissimilia, hoc quidem secundum contingentem imitationem; hoc autem secundum quod causata minus habent a causa. Quodlibet autem bonum in creatura existens est quaedam participata similitudo primi boni. The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in reference to God, insofar as the creature participates somewhat of God’s likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause. Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod homo appetiit aliquod spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram, ut dictum est, consequens est quod appetierit divinam similitudinem inordinate. Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he coveted God’s likeness inordinately. Considerandum tamen est quod appetitus proprie est rei non habitae. Bonum autem spirituale secundum quod creatura rationalis participat divinam similitudinem, potest secundum tria attendi. Primo quidem, secundum ipsum esse naturae. Et talis similitudo ab ipso creationis principio fuit impressa et homini, de quo dicitur, Gen. I, quod fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam; et Angelo, de quo dicitur, Ezech. XXVIII, tu signaculum similitudinis. Secundo vero, quantum ad cognitionem. Et hanc etiam similitudinem in sui creatione Angelus accepit, unde in praemissis verbis, cum dictum esset, tu signaculum similitudinis, statim subditur, plenus sapientia. Sed primus homo in sua creatione istam similitudinem nondum actu adeptus erat, sed solum in potentia. Tertio, quantum ad potestatem operandi. Et hanc similitudinem nondum erant in actu assecuti neque Angelus neque homo in ipso creationis principio, quia utrique restabat aliquid agendum quo ad beatitudinem perveniret. It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, insofar as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man—of whom it is written (Gen 1:26) that God made man to His image and likeness—and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezek 28:12): Thou wast the seal of resemblance. Second, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, Thou wast the seal of resemblance, we read: Full of wisdom. But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Third, as to the power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness. Et ideo cum uterque, scilicet Diabolus et primus homo, inordinate divinam similitudinem appetierint, neuter eorum peccavit appetendo similitudinem naturae. Sed primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, sicut serpens ei suggessit, ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum; vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum. Et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi, ut scilicet virtute propriae naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam, unde Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod menti mulieris inhaesit amor propriae potestatis. Sed Diabolus peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad potestatem, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod magis voluit sua potentia frui quam Dei. Veruntamen quantum ad aliquid uterque Deo aequiparari appetiit, inquantum scilicet uterque sibi inniti voluit, contempto divinae regulae ordine. Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God’s likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God’s likeness as regards knowledge of good and evil, according to the serpent’s instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God’s likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 30) that the woman’s mind was filled with love of her own power. On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God’s likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God’s. Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, insofar as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de similitudine naturae, ex cuius appetitu homo non peccavit, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated. Ad secundum dicendum quod appetere similitudinem Dei absolute quantum ad scientiam, non est peccatum. Sed appetere huiusmodi similitudinem inordinate, idest supra suam mensuram, peccatum est. Unde super illud Psalmi, Deus quis similis erit tibi, dicit Augustinus, qui per se vult esse Deus, perverse vult esse similis Deo, ut Diabolus, qui noluit sub eo esse; et homo, qui ut servus noluit tenere praecepta. Reply Obj. 2: It is not a sin to covet God’s likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above one’s measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:18, O God, who is like Thee? says: He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de similitudine aequiparantiae. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.