Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum superbia primi hominis fuerit in hoc quod appetierit divinam similitudinem Whether the first man’s pride consisted in his coveting God’s likeness? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia primi hominis non fuerit in hoc quod appetierit divinam similitudinem. Nullus enim peccat appetendo id quod sibi competit secundum suam naturam. Sed similitudo Dei competit homini secundum suam naturam, dicitur enim Gen. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Ergo non peccavit divinam similitudinem appetendo. Objection 1: It would seem that the first man’s pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God’s likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen 1:26): Let us make man to our image and likeness. Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. Praeterea, in hoc videtur primus homo divinam similitudinem appetiisse, ut scientia boni et mali potiretur, hoc enim ei a serpente suggerebatur, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum. Sed appetitus scientiae est homini naturalis, secundum illud philosophi, in principio Metaphys., omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Ergo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem. Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God’s likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the serpent’s suggestion: You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil. Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: All men naturally desire knowledge. Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. Praeterea, nullus sapiens eligit id quod est impossibile. Primus autem homo sapientia praeditus erat, secundum illud Eccli. XVII, disciplina intellectus replevit illos. Cum ergo omne peccatum consistat in appetitu deliberato, qui est electio, videtur quod primus homo non peccaverit appetendo aliquid impossibile. Sed impossibile est esse hominem similem Deo, secundum illud Exodi XV, quis similis tui in fortibus, domine? Ergo primus homo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem. Obj. 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, He filled them with the knowledge of understanding. Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex. 15:11, Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord? Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam, dicit Augustinus, Adam et Eva rapere voluerunt divinitatem, et perdiderunt felicitatem. On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5, Then did I restore that which I took not away, says: Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est similitudo. Una omnimodae aequiparantiae. Et hanc similitudinem ad Deum primi parentes non appetierunt, quia talis similitudo ad Deum non cadit in apprehensione, praecipue sapientis. I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality: and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man. Alia autem est similitudo imitationis, qualis possibilis est creaturae ad Deum, inquantum videlicet participat aliquid de similitudine ipsius secundum suum modum. Unde Dionysius dicit, in IX cap. de Div. Nom., eadem similia sunt Deo, et dissimilia, hoc quidem secundum contingentem imitationem; hoc autem secundum quod causata minus habent a causa. Quodlibet autem bonum in creatura existens est quaedam participata similitudo primi boni. The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in reference to God, insofar as the creature participates somewhat of God’s likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause. Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod homo appetiit aliquod spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram, ut dictum est, consequens est quod appetierit divinam similitudinem inordinate. Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he coveted God’s likeness inordinately. Considerandum tamen est quod appetitus proprie est rei non habitae. Bonum autem spirituale secundum quod creatura rationalis participat divinam similitudinem, potest secundum tria attendi. Primo quidem, secundum ipsum esse naturae. Et talis similitudo ab ipso creationis principio fuit impressa et homini, de quo dicitur, Gen. I, quod fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam; et Angelo, de quo dicitur, Ezech. XXVIII, tu signaculum similitudinis. Secundo vero, quantum ad cognitionem. Et hanc etiam similitudinem in sui creatione Angelus accepit, unde in praemissis verbis, cum dictum esset, tu signaculum similitudinis, statim subditur, plenus sapientia. Sed primus homo in sua creatione istam similitudinem nondum actu adeptus erat, sed solum in potentia. Tertio, quantum ad potestatem operandi. Et hanc similitudinem nondum erant in actu assecuti neque Angelus neque homo in ipso creationis principio, quia utrique restabat aliquid agendum quo ad beatitudinem perveniret. It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, insofar as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man—of whom it is written (Gen 1:26) that God made man to His image and likeness—and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezek 28:12): Thou wast the seal of resemblance. Second, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, Thou wast the seal of resemblance, we read: Full of wisdom. But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Third, as to the power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness. Et ideo cum uterque, scilicet Diabolus et primus homo, inordinate divinam similitudinem appetierint, neuter eorum peccavit appetendo similitudinem naturae. Sed primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, sicut serpens ei suggessit, ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum; vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum. Et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi, ut scilicet virtute propriae naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam, unde Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod menti mulieris inhaesit amor propriae potestatis. Sed Diabolus peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad potestatem, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod magis voluit sua potentia frui quam Dei. Veruntamen quantum ad aliquid uterque Deo aequiparari appetiit, inquantum scilicet uterque sibi inniti voluit, contempto divinae regulae ordine. Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God’s likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God’s likeness as regards knowledge of good and evil, according to the serpent’s instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God’s likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 30) that the woman’s mind was filled with love of her own power. On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God’s likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God’s. Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, insofar as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de similitudine naturae, ex cuius appetitu homo non peccavit, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated. Ad secundum dicendum quod appetere similitudinem Dei absolute quantum ad scientiam, non est peccatum. Sed appetere huiusmodi similitudinem inordinate, idest supra suam mensuram, peccatum est. Unde super illud Psalmi, Deus quis similis erit tibi, dicit Augustinus, qui per se vult esse Deus, perverse vult esse similis Deo, ut Diabolus, qui noluit sub eo esse; et homo, qui ut servus noluit tenere praecepta. Reply Obj. 2: It is not a sin to covet God’s likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above one’s measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:18, O God, who is like Thee? says: He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de similitudine aequiparantiae. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum peccatum primorum parentum fuerit ceteris gravius Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum primorum parentum fuerit ceteris gravius. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, magna fuit in peccando iniquitas, ubi tanta fuit in non peccando facilitas. Sed primi parentes maximam habuerunt facilitatem ad non peccandum, quia nihil habebant intrinsecus quod eos ad peccandum impelleret. Ergo peccatum primorum parentum fuit ceteris gravius. Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15): Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin. Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. Praeterea, poena proportionatur culpae. Sed peccatum primorum parentum gravissime est punitum, quia ex ipso mors introivit in hunc mundum, ut apostolus dicit, Rom. V. Ergo peccatum illud fuit gravius aliis peccatis. Obj. 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it death entered into this world, as the Apostle says (Rom 5:12). Therefore that sin was more grievous than other sins. Praeterea, primum in quolibet genere videtur esse maximum, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Sed peccatum primorum parentum fuit primum inter alia peccata hominum. Ergo fuit maximum. Obj. 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest (Metaph. ii, 4). Now the sin of our first parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest. Sed contra est quod Origenes dicit, non arbitror quod aliquis ex his qui in summo perfectoque constiterunt gradu, ad subitum evacuetur ac decidat, sed paulatim et per partes defluere eum necesse est. Sed primi parentes in summo perfectoque gradu consistebant. Non ergo eorum primum peccatum fuit maximum omnium peccatorum. On the contrary, Origen says: I think that a man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little. Now our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade. Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex gravitas in peccato attendi potest. Una quidem, ex ipsa specie peccati, sicut dicimus adulterium esse gravius peccatum simplici fornicatione. Alia autem est gravitas peccati quae attenditur secundum aliquam circumstantiam loci, vel personae, aut temporis. Prima autem gravitas essentialior est peccato, et principalior. Unde secundum eam magis peccatum dicitur grave quam secundum aliam. Dicendum est igitur quod peccatum primi hominis non fuit gravius omnibus aliis peccatis humanis secundum speciem peccati. Etsi enim superbia secundum suum genus habeat quandam excellentiam inter alia peccata, maior tamen est superbia qua quis Deum negat vel blasphemat, quam superbia qua quis inordinate divinam similitudinem appetit, qualis fuit superbia primorum parentum, ut dictum est. I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. One results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man’s sin was not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one covets God’s likeness inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated (A. 2). Sed secundum conditionem personarum peccantium, peccatum illud habuit maximam gravitatem, propter perfectionem status ipsorum. Et ideo dicendum est quod illud peccatum fuit quidem secundum quid gravissimum, sed non simpliciter. But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de gravitate peccati ex circumstantia peccantis. Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner. Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo poenae quae consecuta est ad illud primum peccatum, non correspondet ei secundum quantitatem propriae speciei, sed inquantum fuit primum, quia ex hoc interrupta est innocentia primi status, qua subtracta, deordinata est tota natura humana. Reply Obj. 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence brought disorder upon the whole human nature. Ad tertium dicendum quod in his quae sunt per se ordinata, oportet id quod est primum esse maximum. Talis autem ordo non attenditur in peccatis, sed unum per accidens sequitur post aliud. Unde non sequitur quod primum peccatum sit maximum. Reply Obj. 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is the greatest. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum peccatum Adae fuit gravius quam peccatum Evae Whether Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum Adae fuit gravius quam peccatum Evae. Dicitur enim I ad Tim. II, quod Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in praevaricatione fuit, et sic videtur quod peccatum mulieris fuerit ex ignorantia, peccatum autem viri ex certa scientia. Sed huiusmodi peccatum est gravius, secundum illud Luc. XII, ille servus qui cognovit voluntatem domini sui et non fecit secundum voluntatem eius, vapulabit multis, qui autem non cognovit et fecit digna plagis, vapulabit paucis. Ergo Adam gravius peccavit quam Eva. Objection 1: It would seem that Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s. For it is written (1 Tim 2:14): Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression: and so it would seem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to Luke 12:47, 48, That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. Therefore Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, si caput est vir, melius debet vivere, et praecedere in omnibus bonis factis uxorem suam, ut illa imitetur virum. Sed ille qui melius debet facere, si peccet, gravius peccat. Ergo Adam gravius peccavit quam Eva. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3): If the man is the head, he should live better, and give an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him. Now he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin. Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve. Praeterea, peccatum in spiritum sanctum videtur esse gravissimum. Sed Adam videtur in spiritum sanctum peccasse, quia peccavit cogitans de divina misericordia, quod pertinet ad peccatum praesumptionis. Ergo videtur quod Adam gravius peccavit quam Eva. Obj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Spirit would seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Spirit, because while sinning he relied on God’s mercy, and this pertains to the sin of presumption. Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve. Sed contra est quod poena respondet culpae. Sed mulier gravius est punita quam vir, ut patet Gen. III. Ergo gravius peccavit quam vir. On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gen. 3. Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gravitas peccati principalius attenditur secundum peccati speciem quam secundum personae circumstantiam. Dicendum est ergo quod, si consideremus conditionem personae utriusque, scilicet mulieris et viri, peccatum viri est gravius, quia erat perfectior muliere. I answer that, As stated (A. 3), the gravity of a sin depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these persons, the man’s sin is the more grievous, because he was more perfect than the woman. Sed quantum ad ipsum genus peccati, utriusque peccatum aequale dicitur, quia utriusque peccatum fuit superbia. Unde Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod mulier excusavit peccatum suum in impari sexu, sed pari fastu. As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 35): Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity of pride. Sed quantum ad speciem superbiae, gravius peccavit mulier, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia maior elatio fuit mulieris quam viri. Mulier enim credidit verum esse quod serpens suasit, scilicet quod Deus prohibuit ligni esum ne ad eius similitudinem pervenirent, et ita, dum per esum ligni vetiti Dei similitudinem consequi voluit, superbia eius ad hoc se erexit quod contra Dei voluntatem aliquid voluit obtinere. Sed vir non credidit hoc esse verum. Unde non voluit consequi divinam similitudinem contra Dei voluntatem, sed in hoc superbivit, quod voluit eam consequi per seipsum. Secundo, quia mulier non solum ipsa peccavit, sed etiam viro peccatum suggessit. Unde peccavit et in Deum et in proximum. Tertio, in hoc quod peccatum viri diminutum est ex hoc quod in peccatum consensit amicabili quadam benevolentia, qua plerumque fit ut offendatur Deus ne homo ex amico fiat inimicus, quod eum facere non debuisse divinae sententiae exitus indicavit, ut Augustinus dicit, XI Sup. Gen. ad litteram. But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent’s persuasive words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God’s likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against God’s will. On the other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God’s likeness against God’s will: but his pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power. Second, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Third, the man’s sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 42), he consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence. Et sic patet quod peccatum mulieris fuit gravius quam peccatum viri. It is therefore evident that the woman’s sin was more grievous than the man’s. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa seductio mulieris ex praecedenti elevatione subsecuta est. Et ideo talis ignorantia non excusat, sed aggravat peccatum, inquantum scilicet ignorando in maiorem elationem erecta est. Reply Obj. 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated her sin, insofar as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride.