Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum studiositas sit temperantiae pars Whether studiousness is a part of temperance? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod studiositas non sit temperantiae pars. Studiosus enim dicitur aliquis secundum studiositatem. Sed universaliter omnis virtuosus vocatur studiosus, ut patet per philosophum, qui frequenter sic utitur nomine studiosi. Ergo studiositas est generalis virtus, et non est pars temperantiae. Objection 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the term studious (spoudaios) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4, 8, 9). Therefore studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance. Praeterea, studiositas, sicut dictum est, ad cognitionem pertinet. Sed cognitio non pertinet ad virtutes morales, quae sunt in appetitiva animae parte, sed magis ad intellectuales, quae sunt in parte cognoscitiva, unde et sollicitudo est actus prudentiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo studiositas non est pars temperantiae. Obj. 2: Further, studiousness, as stated (A. 1), pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an act of prudence as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance. Praeterea, virtus quae ponitur pars alicuius principalis virtutis, assimilatur ei quantum ad modum. Sed studiositas non assimilatur temperantiae quantum ad modum. Quia temperantiae nomen sumitur ex quadam refrenatione, unde magis opponitur vitio quod est in excessu. Nomen autem studiositatis sumitur e contrario ex applicatione animae ad aliquid, unde magis videtur opponi vitio quod est in defectu, scilicet negligentiae studendi, quam vitio quod est in excessu, scilicet curiositati. Unde, propter horum similitudinem, dicit Isidorus, in libro Etymol., quod studiosus dicitur quasi studiis curiosus. Ergo studiositas non est pars temperantiae. Obj. 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of study, rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity. Wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a studious man is one who is curious to study. Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccle., curiosi esse prohibemur, quod magnae temperantiae munus est. Sed curiositas prohibetur per studiositatem moderatam. Ergo studiositas est pars temperantiae. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): We are forbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance bestows. Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness. Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad temperantiam pertinet moderari motum appetitus, ne superflue tendat in id quod naturaliter concupiscitur. Sicut autem naturaliter homo concupiscit delectationes ciborum et venereorum secundum naturam corporalem, ita secundum animam naturaliter desiderat cognoscere aliquid, unde et philosophus dicit, in I Metaphys., quod omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 141, AA. 3, 4, 5), it belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, 1): All men have a natural desire for knowledge. Moderatio autem huius appetitus pertinet ad virtutem studiositatis. Unde consequens est quod studiositas sit pars potentialis temperantiae, sicut virtus secundaria ei adiuncta ut principali virtuti. Et comprehenditur sub modestia, ratione superius dicta. The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia est completiva omnium virtutum moralium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Inquantum igitur cognitio prudentiae ad omnes virtutes pertinet, intantum nomen studiositatis, quae proprie circa cognitionem est, ad omnes virtutes derivatur. Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Consequently, insofar as the knowledge of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term studiousness, which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues. Ad secundum dicendum quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis imperatur a vi appetitiva, quae est motiva omnium virium, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo circa cognitionem duplex bonum potest attendi. Unum quidem, quantum ad ipsum actum cognitionis. Et tale bonum pertinet ad virtutes intellectuales, ut scilicet homo circa singula aestimet verum. Aliud autem est bonum quod pertinet ad actum appetitivae virtutis, ut scilicet homo habeat appetitum rectum applicandi vim cognoscitivam sic vel aliter, ad hoc vel ad illud. Et hoc pertinet ad virtutem studiositatis. Unde computatur inter virtutes morales. Reply Obj. 2: The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the appetitive power, and consists in man’s appetite being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of studiousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., ad hoc quod homo fiat virtuosus, oportet quod servet se ab his ad quae maxime inclinat natura. Et inde est quod, quia natura praecipue inclinat ad timendum mortis pericula et ad sectandum delectabilia carnis, quod laus virtutis fortitudinis praecipue consistit in quadam firmitate persistendi contra huiusmodi pericula, et laus virtutis temperantiae in quadam refrenatione a delectabilibus carnis. Sed quantum ad cognitionem, est in homine contraria inclinatio. Quia ex parte animae, inclinatur homo ad hoc quod cognitionem rerum desideret, et sic oportet ut homo laudabiliter huiusmodi appetitum refrenet, ne immoderate rerum cognitioni intendat. Ex parte vero naturae corporalis, homo inclinatur ad hoc ut laborem inquirendi scientiam vitet. Quantum igitur ad primum, studiositas in refrenatione consistit, et secundum hoc ponitur pars temperantiae. Sed quantum ad secundum laus huius virtutis consistit in quadam vehementia intentionis ad scientiam rerum percipiendam, et ex hoc nominatur. Primum autem est essentialius huic virtuti quam secundum. Nam appetitus cognoscendi per se respicit cognitionem, ad quam ordinatur studiositas. Sed labor addiscendi est impedimentum quoddam cognitionis, unde respicitur ab hac virtute per accidens, quasi removendo prohibens. Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle. Quaestio 167 Question 167 De curiositate Curiosity Deinde considerandum est de curiositate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum vitium curiositatis possit esse in cognitione intellectiva. (1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge? Secundo, utrum sit in cognitione sensitiva. (2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum circa cognitionem intellectivam possit esse curiositas Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa cognitionem intellectivam non possit esse curiositas. Quia secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., in his quae secundum se sunt bona vel mala, non possunt accipi medium et extrema. Sed cognitio intellectiva secundum se est bona, in hoc enim perfectio hominis videtur consistere, ut intellectus eius de potentia reducatur in actum, quod fit per cognitionem veritatis. Dionysius etiam dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum animae humanae est secundum rationem esse, cuius perfectio in cognitione veritatis consistit. Ergo circa cognitionem intellectivam non potest esse vitium curiositatis. Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: because man’s perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason, whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Praeterea, illud per quod homo similatur Deo, et quod a Deo consequitur, non potest esse malum. Sed quaecumque abundantia cognitionis a Deo est, secundum illud Eccli. I, omnis sapientia a domino Deo est. Et Sap. VII dicitur, ipse dedit mihi horum quae sunt scientiam veram, ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum et virtutes elementorum, et cetera. Per hoc etiam homo Deo assimilatur, quod veritatem cognoscit, quia omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius, ut habetur ad Heb. IV. Unde et I Reg. II dicitur quod Deus scientiarum dominus est, ergo, quantumcumque abundet cognitio veritatis, non est mala, sed bona. Appetitus autem boni non est vitiosus. Ergo circa intellectivam cognitionem veritatis non potest esse vitium curiositatis. Obj. 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, All wisdom is from the Lord God, and Wis. 7:17, He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements, etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God, since all things are naked and open to His eyes (Heb 4:13), and the Lord is a God of all knowledge (1 Kgs 2:3). Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth. Praeterea, si circa aliquam intellectivam cognitionem posset esse curiositatis vitium, praecipue esset circa philosophicas scientias. Sed eis intendere non videtur esse vitiosum, dicit enim Hieronymus, super Danielem, qui de mensa et vino regis noluerunt comedere ne polluantur, si sapientiam atque doctrinam Babyloniorum scirent esse peccatum, nunquam acquiescerent discere quod non licebat. Et Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., quod, si qua vera philosophi dixerunt, ab eis sunt, tanquam ab iniustis possessoribus, in usum nostrum vindicanda. Non ergo circa cognitionem intellectivam potest esse curiositas vitiosa. Obj. 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): Those who refused to partake of the king’s meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful: and Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that if the philosophers made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from unjust possessors. Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, nonne vobis videtur in vanitate sensus et obscuritate mentis ingredi qui diebus ac noctibus in dialectica arte torquetur, qui physicus perscrutator oculos trans caelum levat? Sed vanitas sensus et obscuritas mentis est vitiosa. Ergo circa intellectivas scientias potest esse curiositas vitiosa. On the contrary, Jerome says: Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind? Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, studiositas non est directe circa ipsam cognitionem, sed circa appetitum et studium cognitionis acquirendae. Aliter autem est iudicandum de ipsa cognitione veritatis, et aliter de appetitu et studio veritatis cognoscendae. Ipsa enim veritatis cognitio, per se loquendo, bona est. Potest autem per accidens esse mala, ratione scilicet alicuius consequentis, vel inquantum scilicet aliquis de cognitione veritatis superbit, secundum illud I ad Cor. VIII, scientia inflat; vel inquantum homo utitur cognitione veritatis ad peccandum. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 166, A. 2, ad 2) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according to 1 Cor. 8:1, Knowledge puffeth up, or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin. Sed ipse appetitus vel studium cognoscendae veritatis potest habere rectitudinem vel perversitatem. Uno quidem modo, prout aliquis tendit suo studio in cognitionem veritatis prout per accidens coniungitur ei malum, sicut illi qui student ad scientiam veritatis ut exinde superbiant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccle., sunt qui, desertis virtutibus, et nescientes quid sit Deus et quanta sit maiestas semper eodem modo manentis naturae, magnum aliquid se agere putant si universam istam corporis molem quam mundum nuncupamus, curiosissime intentissimeque perquirant. Unde etiam tanta superbia gignitur ut in ipso caelo, de quo saepe disputant, sibimet habitare videantur. Similiter etiam illi qui student addiscere aliquid ad peccandum, vitiosum studium habent, secundum illud Ierem. IX, docuerunt linguam suam loqui mendacium, ut inique agerent, laboraverunt. On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue. In like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, They have taught their tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity. Alio autem modo potest esse vitium ex ipsa inordinatione appetitus et studii addiscendi veritatem. Et hoc quadrupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum per studium minus utile retrahuntur a studio quod eis ex necessitate incumbit. Unde Hieronymus dicit, sacerdotes, dimissis Evangeliis et prophetiis, videmus comoedias legere, et amatoria bucolicorum versuum verba cantare. Alio modo, inquantum studet aliquis addiscere ab eo a quo non licet, sicut patet de his qui aliqua futura a Daemonibus perquirunt, quae est superstitiosa curiositas. De quo Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., nescio an philosophi impedirentur a fide vitio curiositatis in percunctandis Daemonibus. Second, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says: We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls. Second, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge from the demons. Tertio, quando homo appetit cognoscere veritatem circa creaturas non referendo ad debitum finem, scilicet ad cognitionem Dei. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod in consideratione creaturarum non est vana et peritura curiositas exercenda, sed gradus ad immortalia et semper manentia faciendus. Third, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that in studying creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things. Quarto modo, inquantum aliquis studet ad cognoscendam veritatem supra proprii ingenii facultatem, quia per hoc homines de facili in errores labuntur. Unde dicitur Eccli. III, altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora ne scrutatus fueris, et in pluribus operibus eius ne fueris curiosus; et postea sequitur, multos enim supplantavit suspicio eorum, et in vanitate detinuit sensus eorum. Fourth, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Sir 3:22): Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of His works be not curious, and further on (Sir 3:26), For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum hominis consistit in cognitione veri, non tamen summum hominis bonum consistit in cognitione cuiuslibet veri, sed in perfecta cognitione summae veritatis, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Et ideo potest esse vitium in cognitione aliquorum verorum, secundum quod talis appetitus non debito modo ordinatur ad cognitionem summae veritatis, in qua consistit summa felicitas. Reply Obj. 1: Man’s good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet man’s sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of certain truths, insofar as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa ostendit quod cognitio veritatis secundum se sit bona, non tamen per hoc excluditur quin possit aliquis cognitione veritatis abuti ad malum, vel etiam inordinate cognitionem veritatis appetere; quia etiam oportet appetitum boni debito modo regulatum esse. Reply Obj. 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good should be regulated in due manner. Ad tertium dicendum quod studium philosophiae secundum se est licitum et laudabile, propter veritatem quam philosophi perceperunt, Deo illis revelante, ut dicitur Rom. I. Sed quia quidam philosophi abutuntur ad fidei impugnationem, ideo apostolus dicit, ad Coloss. II, videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem scientiam, secundum traditionem hominum, et non secundum Christum. Et Dionysius dicit, in epistola ad Polycarpum, de quibusdam philosophis, quod divinis non sancte contra divina utuntur, per sapientiam Dei tentantes expellere divinam venerationem. Reply Obj. 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, the Apostle says (Col 2:8): Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and not according to Christ: and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that they make an unholy use of divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of God. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum vitium curiositatis sit circa sensitivam cognitionem Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium curiositatis non sit circa sensitivam cognitionem. Sicut enim aliqua cognoscuntur per sensum visus, ita etiam aliqua cognoscuntur per sensum tactus et gustus. Sed circa tangibilia et gustabilia non ponitur vitium curiositatis, sed magis vitium luxuriae aut gulae. Ergo videtur quod nec circa ea quae cognoscuntur per visum, sit vitium curiositatis. Objection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about things known by the sight. Praeterea, curiositas esse videtur in inspectione ludorum, unde Augustinus dicit, in VI Confess., quod, quodam pugnae casu, cum clamor ingens totius populi vehementer Alypium pulsasset, curiositate victus, aperuit oculos. Sed inspectio ludorum non videtur esse vitiosa, quia huiusmodi inspectio delectabilis redditur propter repraesentationem, in qua homo naturaliter delectatur, ut philosophus dicit, in sua poetria. Non ergo circa sensibilium cognitionem est vitium curiositatis. Obj. 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when a fall occurred in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes. But it does not seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity is not about the knowledge of sensible objects. Praeterea, ad curiositatem pertinere videtur actus proximorum perquirere, ut dicit Beda. Sed perquirere facta aliorum non videtur esse vitiosum, quia sicut dicitur Eccli. XVII, unicuique mandavit Deus de proximo suo. Ergo vitium curiositatis non est in huiusmodi particularibus sensibilibus cognoscendis. Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into our neighbor’s actions, as Bede observes. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor. Therefore the vice of curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular sensible objects. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod concupiscentia oculorum reddit homines curiosos. Ut autem dicit Beda, concupiscentia oculorum est non solum in discendis magicis artibus, sed etiam in contemplandis spectaculis, et in dignoscendis et carpendis vitiis proximorum, quae sunt quaedam particularia sensibilia. Cum ergo concupiscentia oculorum sit quoddam vitium, sicut etiam superbia vitae et concupiscentia carnis, contra quae dividitur, I Ioan. II; videtur quod vitium curiositatis sit circa sensibilium cognitionem. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious. Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1 John, 2:16) concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dispraise of our neighbor’s faults, and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eyes is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.