Quaestio 174 Question 174 De divisione prophetiae The Division of Prophecy Deinde considerandum est de divisione prophetiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, de divisione prophetiae in suas species. (1) The division of prophecy into its species; Secundo, utrum sit altior prophetia quae est sine imaginaria visione. (2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without imaginative vision? Tertio, de diversitate graduum prophetiae. (3) The various degrees of prophecy; Quarto, utrum Moyses fuit eximius prophetarum. (4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets? Quinto, utrum aliquis comprehensor possit esse propheta. (5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet? Sexto, utrum prophetia creverit per temporis processum. (6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum convenienter dividatur prophetia in praedestinationem Dei, praescientiam Dei, et comminationem Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine predestination, of foreknowledge, and of denunciation? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur prophetia in Glossa super Matth. I, ecce virgo in utero habebit, ubi dicitur quod prophetia alia est ex praedestinatione Dei, quam necesse est omnibus modis evenire, ut sine nostro impleatur arbitrio, ut haec de qua hic agitur; alia est ex praescientia Dei, cui nostrum admiscetur arbitrium; alia est quae comminatio dicitur quae fit ob signum divinae animadversionis. Illud enim quod consequitur omnem prophetiam, non debet poni ut membrum dividens prophetiam. Sed omnis prophetia est secundum praescientiam divinam, quia prophetae legunt in libro praescientiae, ut dicit Glossa, Isaiae XXXVIII. Ergo videtur quod non debeat poni una species prophetiae quae est secundum praescientiam. Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided according to a gloss on Matt. 1:23, Behold a virgin shall be with child, where it is stated that one kind of prophecy proceeds from the Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished so that its fulfilment is independent of our will, for instance the one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God’s foreknowledge: and into this our will enters. And another prophecy is called denunciation, which is significative of God’s disapproval. For that which results from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge, since the prophets read in the book of foreknowledge, as a gloss says on Isa. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy. Praeterea, sicuti aliquid prophetatur secundum comminationem, ita etiam secundum promissionem, et utraque variatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. XVIII, repente loquar adversum gentem et adversum regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud, si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego poenitentiam, et hoc pertinet ad prophetiam comminationis. Et postea subdit de prophetia promissionis, subito loquar de gente et de regno, ut aedificem et plantem illud, si fecerit malum in oculis meis, poenitentiam agam super bono quod locutus sum ut facerem ei. Ergo, sicut ponitur prophetia comminationis, ita debet poni prophetia promissionis. Obj. 2: Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to alteration. For it is written (Jer 18:7, 8): I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent—and this pertains to the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer 18:9, 10): I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good that I have spoken to do unto it. Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of promise. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., prophetiae genera sunt septem. Primum genus, extasis, quod est mentis excessus, sicut vidit Petrus vas submissum de caelo cum variis animalibus. Secundum genus, visio, sicut apud Isaiam dicentem, vidi dominum sedentem, et cetera. Tertium genus est somnium, sicut Iacob scalam dormiens vidit. Quartum genus est per nubem, sicut ad Moysen loquitur Deus. Quintum genus, vox de caelo, sicut ad Abraham sonuit dicens, ne mittas manum in puerum. Sextum genus, accepta parabola, sicut apud Balaam. Septimum genus, repletio spiritus sancti, sicut pene apud omnes prophetas. Ponit etiam tria genera visionum, unum, secundum oculos corporis; alterum, secundum spiritum imaginarium; tertium, per intuitum mentis. Sed haec non exprimuntur in prius dicta divisione. Ergo est insufficiens. Obj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): There are seven kinds of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport of the mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isaias, who says (Isa 6:1): ‘I saw the Lord sitting,’ etc. The third kind is a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gen 22:11): ‘Lay not thy hand upon the boy.’ The sixth kind is taking up a parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num 23:7; 24:15). The seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Spirit, as in the case of nearly all the prophets. Further, he mentions three kinds of vision: one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul’s imagination, a third by the eyes of the mind. Now these are not included in the aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient. Sed contra est auctoritas Hieronymi, cuius dicitur esse Glossa. On the contrary, stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss above quoted is ascribed. Respondeo dicendum quod species habituum et actuum in moralibus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem prophetiae est id quod est in cognitione divina supra humanam facultatem existens. Et ideo secundum horum differentiam distinguitur prophetia in diversas species, secundum prius dictam divisionem. Dictum est autem supra quod futurum est in divina cognitione dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est in sua causa. Et sic accipitur prophetia comminationis, quae non semper impletur, sed per eam praenuntiatur ordo causae ad effectus, qui quandoque, aliis supervenientibus, impeditur. Alio modo, praecognoscit Deus aliqua in seipsis. Vel ut fienda ab ipso. Et horum est prophetia praedestinationis, quia, secundum Damascenum, Deus praedestinat ea quae non sunt in nobis. Vel ut fienda per liberum arbitrium hominis. Et sic est prophetia praescientiae. Quae potest esse bonorum et malorum, quod non contingit de prophetia praedestinationis, quae est bonorum tantum. Et quia praedestinatio sub praescientia comprehenditur, ideo in Glossa, in principio Psalterii, ponitur tantum duplex prophetiae species, scilicet secundum praescientiam, et secundum comminationem. I answer that, The species of moral habits and acts are distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy is something known by God and surpassing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is divided into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above (Q. 71, A. 6, ad 2) that the future is contained in the Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we have the prophecy of denunciation, which is not always fulfilled; but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Second, God foreknows certain things in themselves—either as to be accomplished by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of predestination, since, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), God predestines things which are not in our power—or as to be accomplished through man’s free-will, and of such is the prophecy of foreknowledge. This may regard either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards good alone. And since predestination is comprised under foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only two species to prophecy, namely of foreknowledge, and of denunciation. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praescientia proprie dicitur praecognitio futurorum eventuum prout in seipsis sunt, et secundum hoc ponitur species prophetiae. Prout autem dicitur respectu futurorum eventuum sive secundum quod in seipsis sunt sive secundum quod sunt in causis suis, communiter se habet ad omnem speciem prophetiae. Reply Obj. 1: Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a species of prophecy. But insofar as it is used in connection with future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, it is common to every species of prophecy. Ad secundum dicendum quod prophetia promissionis comprehenditur sub prophetia comminationis, quia eadem ratio est veritatis in utraque. Denominatur tamen magis a comminatione, quia Deus pronior est ad relaxandum poenam quam ad subtrahendum promissa beneficia. Reply Obj. 2: The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But it is denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised blessings. Ad tertium dicendum quod Isidorus distinguit prophetiam secundum modum prophetandi. Qui quidem potest distingui vel secundum potentias cognoscitivas in homine, quae sunt sensus, imaginatio et intellectus. Et sic sumitur triplex visio, quam ponit tam ipse quam Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Vel potest sumi secundum differentiam prophetici influxus. Qui quidem, quantum ad illustrationem intellectus, significatur per repletionem spiritus sancti, quam septimo loco ponit. Quantum vero ad impressionem formarum imaginabilium, ponit tria, scilicet somnium, quod ponit tertio loco; et visionem, quae fit in vigilando respectu quorumcumque communium, quam ponit in secundo loco; et extasim, quae fit per elevationem mentis in aliqua altiora, quam ponit primo loco. Quantum vero ad sensibilia signa, ponit tria. Quia sensibile signum aut est aliqua res corporea exterius apparens visui, sicut nubes, quam ponit quarto loco. Aut est vox exterius formata ad auditum hominis delata, quam ponit quinto loco. Aut est vox per hominem formata cum similitudine alicuius rei, quod pertinet ad parabolam, quam ponit sexto loco. Reply Obj. 3: Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying—either according to man’s cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination, and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision mentioned both by him and by Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 6, 7)—or according to the different ways in which the prophetic current is received. Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the fullness of the Holy Spirit which he mentions in the seventh place. As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions three, namely dreams, to which he gives the third place; vision, which occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind of ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and ecstasy, which results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty things, and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he reckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is—either a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as a cloud, which he mentions in the fourth place—or a voice sounding from without and conveyed to man’s hearing—this he puts in the fifth place—or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a similitude, and this pertains to the parable to which he assigns the sixth place. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum excellentior sit prophetia quae habet visionem intellectualem et imaginariam, quam ea quae habet visionem intellectualem tantum Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod excellentior sit prophetia quae habet visionem intellectualem et imaginariam, quam ea quae habet visionem intellectualem tantum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., et habetur in Glossa, I ad Cor. XIV, super illud, spiritus autem loquitur mysteria, minus est propheta qui rerum significatarum solo spiritu videt imagines; et magis est propheta qui solo earum intellectu est praeditus; sed maxime propheta est qui in utroque praecellit. Hoc autem pertinet ad prophetam qui simul habet intellectualem et imaginariam visionem. Ergo huiusmodi prophetia est altior. Objection 1: It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 9): He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but the signs representative of things, by means of the images of things corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed with the understanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who excels in both ways, and this refers to the prophet who has intellective together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of prophecy is more excellent. Praeterea, quanto virtus alicuius rei est maior, tanto ad magis distantia se extendit. Sed lumen propheticum principaliter ad mentem pertinet, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo perfectior videtur esse prophetia quae derivatur usque ad imaginationem, quam illa quae existit in solo intellectu. Obj. 2: Further, the greater a thing’s power is, the greater the distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains chiefly to the mind, as stated above (Q. 173, A. 2). Therefore apparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater than that which is confined to the intellect. Praeterea, Hieronymus, in prologo libri regum, distinguit prophetas contra Hagiographos. Omnes autem illi quos prophetas nominat, puta Isaias, Ieremias et alii huiusmodi, simul cum intellectuali visione imaginariam habuerunt, non autem illi qui dicuntur Hagiographi, sicut ex inspiratione spiritus sancti scribentes, sicut Iob, David, Salomon et huiusmodi. Ergo videtur quod magis proprie dicuntur prophetae illi qui habent simul visionem imaginariam cum intellectuali, quam illi qui habent intellectualem tantum. Obj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the prophets from the sacred writers. Now all those whom he calls prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he calls sacred writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (such as Job, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more proper to call prophets those who had intellective together with imaginative vision, than those who had intellective vision alone. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod impossibile est nobis superlucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. Sed prophetica revelatio fit per immissionem divini radii. Ergo videtur quod non possit esse absque phantasmatum velaminibus. Obj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that it is impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened round about by the many-colored sacred veils. Now the prophetic revelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore it seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms. Sed contra est quod Glossa dicit, in principio Psalterii, quod ille modus prophetiae ceteris est dignior, quando scilicet ex sola spiritus sancti inspiratione, remoto omni exteriori adminiculo facti vel dicti vel visionis vel somnii, prophetatur. On the contrary, A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by the mere inspiration of the Holy Spirit, apart from any outward assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream. Respondeo dicendum quod dignitas eorum quae sunt ad finem, praecipue consideratur ex fine. Finis autem prophetiae est manifestatio alicuius veritatis supra hominem existentis. Unde quanto huiusmodi manifestatio est potior, tanto prophetia est dignior. Manifestum est autem quod manifestatio veritatis divinae quae fit secundum nudam contemplationem ipsius veritatis, potior est quam illa quae fit sub similitudine corporalium rerum, magis enim appropinquat ad visionem patriae, secundum quam in essentia Dei veritas conspicitur. Et inde est quod prophetia per quam aliqua supernaturalis veritas conspicitur nude secundum intellectualem veritatem, est dignior quam illa in qua veritas supernaturalis manifestatur per similitudinem corporalium rerum secundum imaginariam visionem. I answer that, The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by the end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it approaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in God’s essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a supernatural truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent than that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of the similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination. Et ex hoc etiam ostenditur mens prophetae sublimior, sicut in doctrina humana auditor ostenditur esse melioris intellectus qui veritatem intelligibilem a magistro nude prolatam capere potest, quam ille qui indiget sensibilibus exemplis ad hoc manuduci. Unde in commendationem prophetiae David dicitur, II Reg. XXIII, mihi locutus est fortis Israel; et postea subdit, sicut lux aurorae, oriente sole, mane absque nubibus rutilat. Moreover the prophet’s mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even as in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp the bare intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better understanding than one who needs to be taken by the hand and helped by means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in commendation of David’s prophecy (2 Kgs 23:3): The strong one of Israel spoke to me, and further on (2 Kgs 23:4): As the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without clouds. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quando aliqua supernaturalis veritas revelanda est per similitudines corporales, tunc magis est propheta qui utrumque habet, scilicet lumen intellectuale et imaginariam visionem, quam ille qui habet alterum tantum, quia perfectior est prophetia. Et quantum ad hoc loquitur Augustinus. Sed illa prophetia in qua revelatur nude intelligibilis veritas, est omnibus potior. Reply Obj. 1: When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the intellectual light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than he that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is in this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is greater than all. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliud est iudicium de his quae propter se quaeruntur, et de his quae quaeruntur propter aliud. In his enim quae propter se quaeruntur, quanto virtus agentis ad plura et remotiora se extendit, tanto potior est, sicut medicus reputatur melior qui potest plures, et magis a sanitate distantes sanare. In his autem quae non quaeruntur nisi propter aliud, quanto agens potest ex paucioribus et propinquioribus ad suum intentum pervenire, tanto videtur esse maioris virtutis, sicut magis laudatur medicus qui per pauciora et leviora potest sanare infirmum. Visio autem imaginaria in cognitione prophetica non requiritur propter se, sed propter manifestationem intelligibilis veritatis. Et ideo tanto potior est prophetia, quanto minus ea indiget. Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment does not apply to things that are sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of something else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent’s power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if he is able to heal more people, and those who are further removed from health. On the other hand, in things sought only for the sake of something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to hand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a sick person by means of fewer and more gentle remedies. Now, in the prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own sake, but on account of the manifestation of the intelligible truth. Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it less. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter melius, quod tamen minus proprie recipit alicuius praedicationem, sicut cognitio patriae est nobilior quam cognitio viae, quae tamen magis proprie dicitur fides, eo quod nomen fidei importat imperfectionem cognitionis. Similiter autem prophetia importat quandam obscuritatem et remotionem ab intelligibili veritate. Et ideo magis proprie dicuntur prophetae qui vident per imaginariam visionem, quamvis illa prophetia sit nobilior quae est per intellectualem visionem, dum tamen sit eadem veritas utrobique revelata. Si vero lumen intellectuale alicui divinitus infundatur non ad cognoscendum aliqua supernaturalia, sed ad iudicandum secundum certitudinem veritatis divinae ea quae humana ratione cognosci possunt; sic talis prophetia intellectualis est infra illam quae est cum imaginaria visione ducente in supernaturalem veritatem; cuiusmodi prophetiam habuerunt omnes illi qui numerantur in ordine prophetarum. Qui etiam ex hoc specialiter dicuntur prophetae, quia prophetico officio fungebantur, unde et ex persona domini loquebantur, dicentes ad populum, haec dicit dominus; quod non faciebant illi qui Hagiographa conscripserunt, quorum plures loquebantur frequentius de his quae humana ratione cognosci possunt, non quasi ex persona Dei, sed ex persona propria, cum adiutorio tamen divini luminis. Reply Obj. 3: The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter from being simply better than the former: thus the knowledge of the blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer, although faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge, because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In like manner prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the more excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision, provided the same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may know some supernatural things, but that he may be able to judge, with the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human reason, such intellectual prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed by an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this kind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the ranks of the prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special reason that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence they spoke as God’s representatives, saying to the people: Thus saith the Lord: but not so the authors of the sacred writings, several of whom treated more frequently of things that can be known by human reason, not in God’s name, but in their own, yet with the assistance of the Divine light withal. Ad quartum dicendum quod illustratio divini radii in vita praesenti non fit sine velaminibus phantasmatum qualiumcumque, quia connaturale est homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ut non intelligat sine phantasmate. Quandoque tamen sufficiunt phantasmata quae communi modo a sensibus abstrahuntur, nec exigitur aliqua visio imaginaria divinitus procurata. Et sic dicitur revelatio prophetica fieri sine imaginaria visione. Reply Obj. 4: In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according to his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is said to be without imaginary vision. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum gradus prophetiae possint distingui secundum visionem imaginariam Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the imaginary vision? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod gradus prophetiae non possint distingui secundum visionem imaginariam. Gradus enim alicuius rei non attenditur secundum id quod est propter aliud, sed secundum id quod est propter se. In prophetia autem propter quaeritur visio intellectualis, propter aliud autem visio imaginaria, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod gradus prophetiae non distinguantur secundum imaginariam visionem, sed solum secundum intellectualem. Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of a thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of something else, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it would seem that the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to imaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision. Praeterea, unius prophetae videtur esse unus gradus prophetiae. Sed uni prophetae fit revelatio secundum diversas imaginarias visiones. Ergo diversitas imaginariae visionis non diversificat gradus prophetiae. Obj. 2: Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various imaginary visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does not entail a difference of prophecy.