Quaestio 175 Question 175 De raptu Rapture Deinde considerandum est de raptu. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum anima hominis rapiatur ad divina. (1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine? Secundo, utrum raptus pertineat ad vim cognoscitivam vel appetitivam. (2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive power? Tertio, utrum Paulus in raptu viderit Dei essentiam. (3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God? Quarto, utrum fuerit alienatus a sensibus. (4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses? Quinto, utrum totaliter fuerit anima a corpore separata in statu illo. (5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from his body? Sexto, quid circa hoc scivit, et quid ignoravit. (6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum anima hominis rapiatur ad divina Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima hominis non rapiatur ad divina. Definitur enim a quibusdam raptus, ab eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est supra naturam, vi superioris naturae elevatio. Est autem secundum naturam hominis ut ad divina elevetur, dicit enim Augustinus, in I Confess., fecisti nos, domine, ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. Non ergo hominis anima rapitur ad divina. Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away to things divine. For some define rapture as an uplifting by the power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature. Now it is in accordance with man’s nature that he be uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his Confessions: Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest in Thee. Therefore man’s soul is not carried away to things divine. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. de Div. Nom., quod iustitia Dei in hoc attenditur, quod omnibus rebus distribuit secundum suum modum et dignitatem. Sed quod aliquis elevetur supra id quod est secundum naturam, non pertinet ad modum hominis vel dignitatem. Ergo videtur quod non rapiatur mens hominis a Deo in divina. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that God’s justice is seen in this that He treats all things according to their mode and dignity. But it is not in accordance with man’s mode and worth that he be raised above what he is according to nature. Therefore it would seem that man’s soul is not carried away to things divine. Praeterea, raptus quandam violentiam importat. Sed Deus non regit nos per violentiam et coacte, ut Damascenus dicit. Non ergo mens hominis rapitur ad divina. Obj. 3: Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules us not by violence or force, as Damascene says. Therefore man’s soul is not carried away to things divine. Sed contra est quod, II ad Cor. XII, dicit apostolus, scio hominem in Christo raptum usque ad tertium caelum, ubi dicit Glossa, raptum, idest, contra naturam elevatum. On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor 12:2): I know a man in Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven. On which words a gloss says: Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature. Respondeo dicendum quod raptus violentiam quandam importat, ut dictum est. Violentum autem dicitur, cuius principium est extra, nil conferente eo qui vim patitur, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Confert autem unumquodque ad id in quod tendit secundum propriam inclinationem, vel voluntariam vel naturalem. Et ideo oportet quod ille qui rapitur ab aliquo exteriori, rapiatur in aliquid quod est diversum ab eo in quod eius inclinatio tendit. Quae quidem diversitas potest attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, quantum ad finem inclinationis, puta si lapis, qui naturaliter inclinatur ad hoc quod feratur deorsum, proiiciatur sursum. Alio modo, quantum ad modum tendendi, puta si lapis velocius proiiciatur deorsum quam sit motus eius naturalis. I answer that, Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above (Obj. 3); and the violent is that which has its principle without, and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all (Ethic. iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be carried to something different from that to which his inclination tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of the inclination—for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the manner of tending—for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement. Sic igitur et anima hominis dicitur rapi in id quod est praeter naturam, uno modo, quantum ad terminum raptus, puta quando rapitur ad poenas, secundum illud Psalmi, ne quando rapiat, et non sit qui eripiat. Alio modo, quantum ad modum homini connaturalem, qui est ut per sensibilia intelligat veritatem. Et ideo, quando abstrahitur a sensibilium apprehensione, dicitur rapi, etiam si elevetur ad ea ad quae naturaliter ordinatur, dum tamen hoc non fiat ex propria intentione; sicut accidit in somno, qui est secundum naturam, unde non potest proprie raptus dici. Accordingly man’s soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as regards the term of transport—as when it is carried away to punishment, according to Ps. 49:22, Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to deliver you; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be called rapture, properly speaking. Huiusmodi autem abstractio, ad quaecumque fiat, potest ex triplici causa contingere. Uno modo, ex causa corporali, sicut patet in his qui propter aliquam infirmitatem alienationem patiuntur. Secundo modo, ex virtute Daemonum, sicut patet in arreptitiis. Tertio, ex virtute divina. Et sic loquimur nunc de raptu, prout scilicet aliquis spiritu divino elevatur ad aliqua supernaturalia, cum abstractione a sensibus, secundum illud Ezech. VIII, spiritus elevavit me inter terram et caelum, et adduxit me in Ierusalem, in visionibus Dei. This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer abstraction from the senses through weakness: second, by the power of the demons, as in those who are possessed: third, by the power of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem. Sciendum tamen quod rapi quandoque dicitur aliquis non solum propter alienationem a sensibus, sed etiam propter alienationem ab his quibus intendebat, sicut cum aliquis patitur evagationem mentis praeter propositum. Sed hoc non ita proprie dicitur. It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending, as when a person’s mind wanders contrary to his purpose. But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod naturale est homini ut in divina tendat per sensibilium apprehensionem, secundum illud Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt conspiciuntur. Sed iste modus quod aliquis elevetur ad divina cum abstractione a sensibus, non est homini naturalis. Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things through the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. 1:20, The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad modum et dignitatem hominis pertinet quod ad divina elevetur, ex hoc ipso quod homo factus est ad imaginem Dei. Et quia bonum divinum in infinitum excedit humanam facultatem, indiget homo ut supernaturaliter ad illud bonum capessendum adiuvetur, quod fit per quodcumque beneficium gratiae. Unde quod sic elevetur mens a Deo per raptum, non est contra naturam, sed supra facultatem naturae. Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to man’s mode and dignity that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to God’s image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man’s mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Damasceni est intelligendum quantum ad ea quae sunt per hominem facienda. Quantum vero ad ea quae excedunt liberi arbitrii facultatem, necesse est quod homo quadam fortiori operatione elevetur. Quae quidem quantum ad aliquid potest dici coactio, si scilicet attendatur modus operationis, non autem si attendatur terminus operationis, in quem natura hominis et eius intentio ordinatur. Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to which man is directed both by nature and by his intention. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum raptus magis pertineat ad cognoscitivam quam ad vim appetitivam Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive power? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod raptus magis pertineat ad vim appetitivam quam ad cognoscitivam. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., est autem extasim faciens divinus amor. Sed amor pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Ergo et extasis sive raptus. Objection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): The Divine love causes ecstasy. Now love pertains to the appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in II Dialog., quod ille qui porcos pavit, vagatione mentis et immunditiae sub semetipso cecidit, Petrus vero, quem Angelus solvit eiusque mentem in extasi rapuit, extra se quidem, sed supra semetipsum fuit. Sed ille filius prodigus per affectum in inferiora dilapsus est. Ergo etiam et illi qui rapiuntur in superiora, per affectum hoc patiuntur. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life; whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself. Now the prodigal son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected. Praeterea, super illud Psalmi, in te, domine, speravi, non confundar in aeternum, dicit Glossa, in expositione tituli, extasis Graece, Latine dicitur excessus mentis, qui fit duobus modis, vel pavore terrenorum, vel mente rapta ad superna et inferiorum oblita. Sed pavor terrenorum ad affectum pertinet. Ergo etiam raptus mentis ad superna, qui ex opposito ponitur, pertinet ad affectum. Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded, says in explaining the title: Ekstasis in Greek signifies in Latin excessus mentis, an aberration of the mind. This happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this lower world. Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite. Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, ego dixi in excessu meo, omnis homo mendax, dicit Glossa, dicitur hic extasis, cum mens non pavore alienatur, sed aliqua inspiratione revelationis sursum assumitur. Sed revelatio pertinet ad vim intellectivam. Ergo extasis sive raptus. On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 115:2, I said in my excess: Every man is a liar, says: We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of revelation. Now revelation pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also. Respondeo dicendum quod de raptu dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno modo, quantum ad id in quod aliquis rapitur. Et sic, proprie loquendo, raptus non potest pertinere ad vim appetitivam, sed solum ad cognoscitivam. Dictum est enim quod raptus est praeter propriam inclinationem eius quod rapitur. Ipse autem motus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio in bonum appetibile. Unde, proprie loquendo, ex hoc quod homo appetit aliquid, non rapitur, sed per se movetur. I answer that, We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture cannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power. For it was stated (A. 1) that rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself. Alio modo potest considerari raptus quantum ad suam causam. Et sic potest habere causam ex parte appetitivae virtutis. Ex hoc enim ipso quod appetitus ad aliquid vehementer afficitur, potest contingere quod ex violentia affectus homo ab omnibus aliis alienetur. Habet etiam effectum in appetitiva virtute, cum scilicet aliquis delectatur in his ad quae rapitur. Unde et apostolus dixit se raptum, non solum ad tertium caelum, quod pertinet ad contemplationem intellectus, sed etiam in Paradisum, quod pertinet ad affectum. Second, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection, that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was rapt, not only to the third heaven—which pertains to the contemplation of the intellect—but also into paradise, which pertains to the appetite. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod raptus addit aliquid supra extasim. Nam extasis importat simpliciter excessum a seipso, secundum quem scilicet aliquis extra suam ordinationem ponitur, sed raptus supra hoc addit violentiam quandam. Potest igitur extasis ad vim appetitivam pertinere, puta cum alicuius appetitus tendit in ea quae extra ipsum sunt. Et secundum hoc Dionysius dicit quod divinus amor facit extasim, inquantum scilicet facit appetitum hominis tendere in res amatas. Unde postea subdit quod etiam ipse Deus, qui est omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis extra seipsum fit per providentiam ad omnia existentia. Quamvis etiam si expresse hoc diceretur de raptu, non designaretur nisi quod amor esset causa raptus. Reply Obj. 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one’s proper order; while rapture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the appetitive power, as when a man’s appetite tends to something outside him, and in this sense Dionysius says that the Divine love causes ecstasy, inasmuch as it makes man’s appetite tend to the object loved. Hence he says afterwards that even God Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His providence for all beings. But even if this were said expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause of rapture. Ad secundum dicendum quod in homine est duplex appetitus, scilicet intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, et sensitivus, qui dicitur sensualitas. Est autem proprium homini ut appetitus inferior subdatur appetitui superiori, et superior moveat inferiorem. Dupliciter ergo homo secundum appetitum potest fieri extra seipsum. Uno modo, quando appetitus intellectivus totaliter in divina tendit, praetermissis his in quae inclinat appetitus sensitivus. Et sic dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Paulus ex virtute divini amoris extasim faciente, dixit, vivo ego, iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus. Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man’s intellective appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of Divine love exclaimed: I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me. Alio modo, quando, praetermisso appetitu superiori, homo totaliter fertur in ea quae pertinent ad appetitum inferiorem. Et sic ille qui porcos pavit, sub semetipso cecidit, et iste excessus vel extasis plus appropinquat ad rationem raptus quam primus, quia scilicet appetitus superior est magis homini proprius; unde, quando homo ex violentia appetitus inferioris abstrahitur a motu appetitus superioris, magis abstrahitur ab eo quod est sibi proprium. Quia tamen non est ibi violentia, quia voluntas potest resistere passioni, deficit a vera ratione raptus, nisi forte tam vehemens sit passio quod usum rationis totaliter tollat, sicut contingit in his qui propter vehementiam irae vel amoris insaniunt. In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is thus that he who fed the swine debased himself; and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or love. Considerandum tamen quod uterque excessus secundum appetitum existens, potest causare excessum cognoscitivae virtutis vel quia mens ad quaedam intelligibilia rapiatur alienata a sensibus; vel quia rapiatur ad aliquam imaginariam visionem seu phantasticam apparitionem. It must be observed, however, that both these excesses affecting the appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut amor est motus appetitus respectu boni, ita timor motus appetitus respectu mali. Unde eadem ratione ex utroque potest causari excessus mentis, praesertim cum timor ex amore causetur, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Reply Obj. 3: Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil. Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9). Articulus 3 Article 3