Praeterea, nomen vitae importat motum, ut patet per Dionysium, VI cap. de Div. Nom. Sed contemplatio consistit magis in quiete, secundum illud Sap. VIII, intrans in domum meam, conquiescam cum illa. Ergo videtur quod vita non convenienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Obj. 3: Further, the word life implies movement, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in rest, according to Wis. 8:16: When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself with her. Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, super Ezech., dicit, duae sunt vitae in quibus nos omnipotens Deus per sacrum eloquium erudit, activa videlicet et contemplativa. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the active life and the contemplative. Respondeo dicendum quod illa proprie dicuntur viventia quae ex seipsis moventur seu operantur. Illud autem maxime convenit alicui secundum seipsum, quod est proprium ei, et ad quod maxime inclinatur. Et ideo unumquodque vivens ostenditur vivere ex operatione sibi maxime propria, ad quam maxime inclinatur, sicut plantarum vita dicitur in hoc consistere quod nutriuntur et generant; animalium vero in hoc quod sentiunt et moventur; hominum vero in hoc quod intelligunt et secundum rationem agunt. Unde etiam et in hominibus vita uniuscuiusque hominis videtur esse id in quo maxime delectatur, et cui maxime intendit, et in hoc praecipue vult quilibet convivere amico, ut dicitur in IX Ethic. I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish to associate with his friends (Ethic. ix, 12). Quia ergo quidam homines praecipue intendunt contemplationi veritatis, quidam principaliter intendunt exterioribus actionibus, inde est quod vita hominis convenienter dividitur per activam et contemplativam. Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external actions, it follows that man’s life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod propria forma uniuscuiusque faciens ipsum esse in actu, est principium propriae operationis ipsius. Et ideo vivere dicitur esse viventium ex eo quod viventia per hoc quod habent esse per suam formam, tali modo operantur. Reply Obj. 1: Each thing’s proper form that makes it actually to be is properly that thing’s principle of operation. Hence to live is, in living things, to be, because living things through having being from their form, act in such and such a way. Ad secundum dicendum quod vita universaliter sumpta non dividitur per activam et contemplativam, sed vita hominis, qui speciem sortitur ex hoc quod habet intellectum. Et ideo eadem est divisio intellectus et vitae humanae. Reply Obj. 2: Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and human life. Ad tertium dicendum quod contemplatio habet quidem quietem ab exterioribus motibus, nihilominus tamen ipsum contemplari est quidam motus intellectus, prout quaelibet operatio dicitur motus; secundum quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod sentire et intelligere sunt motus quidam, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti. Et hoc modo Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ponit tres motus animae contemplantis, scilicet rectum, circularem et obliquum. Reply Obj. 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the intellect, insofar as every operation is described as a movement; in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, insofar as movement is defined the act of a perfect thing. In this way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely, straight, circular, and oblique. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum vita sufficienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita non sufficienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Philosophus enim, in I Ethic. dicit quod tres sunt vitae maxime excellentes, scilicet voluptuosa, civilis, quae videtur esse eadem activae, et contemplativa. Insufficienter ergo dividitur vita per activam et contemplativam. Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of pleasure, the civil which would seem to be the same as the active, and the contemplative life. Therefore the division of life into active and contemplative would seem to be inadequate. Praeterea, Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, ponit tria vitae genera, scilicet otiosum, quod pertinet ad contemplationem; actuosum, quod pertinet ad vitam activam; et addit tertium ex utroque compositum. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter dividatur vita per activam et contemplativam. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1, 2, 3, 19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of leisure which pertains to the contemplative, the busy life which pertains to the active, and a third composed of both. Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately divided into active and contemplative. Praeterea, vita hominis diversificatur secundum quod homines diversis actionibus student. Sed plura quam duo sunt humanarum actionum studia. Ergo videtur quod vita debeat in plura membra dividi quam in activum et contemplativum. Obj. 3: Further, man’s life is diversified according to the diverse actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative. Sed contra est quod istae duae vitae significantur per duas uxores Iacob, activa quidem per Liam, contemplativa vero per Rachelem; et per duas mulieres quae dominum hospitio receperunt, contemplativa quidem per Mariam, activa vero per Martham; ut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral. Non autem esset haec congrua significatio si essent plures quam duae vitae. Ergo sufficienter dividitur vita per activam et contemplativam. On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi,
37). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active and contemplative. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, divisio ista datur de vita humana, quae quidem attenditur secundum intellectum. Intellectus autem dividitur per activum et contemplativum, quia finis intellectivae cognitionis vel est ipsa cognitio veritatis, quod pertinet ad intellectum contemplativum; vel est aliqua exterior actio, quod pertinet ad intellectum practicum sive activum. Et ideo vita etiam sufficienter dividitur per activam et contemplativam. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita voluptuosa ponit finem in delectatione corporali, quae communis est nobis et brutis. Unde, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, est vita bestialis. Propter quod, non comprehenditur sub praesenti divisione, prout vita humana dividitur in activam et contemplativam. Reply Obj. 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), it is the life of a beast. Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into active and contemplative. Ad secundum dicendum quod media conficiuntur ex extremis, et ideo virtute continentur in eis, sicut tepidum in calido et frigido, et pallidum in albo et nigro. Et similiter sub activo et contemplativo comprehenditur id quod est ex utroque compositum. Et tamen, sicut in quolibet mixto praedominatur aliquod simplicium, ita etiam in medio genere vitae superabundat quandoque quidem contemplativum, quandoque vero activum. Reply Obj. 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia studia humanarum actionum, si ordinentur ad necessitatem praesentis vitae secundum rationem rectam, pertinent ad vitam activam, quae per ordinatas actiones consulit necessitati vitae praesentis. Si autem deserviant concupiscentiae cuicumque, pertinent ad vitam voluptuosam, quae non continetur sub vita activa. Humana vero studia quae ordinantur ad considerationem veritatis, pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. Reply Obj. 3: All the occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to the contemplative life. Quaestio 180 Question 180 De vita contemplativa The Contemplative Life Deinde considerandum est de vita contemplativa. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum vita contemplativa pertineat tantum ad intellectum, an consistat etiam in affectu. (1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections? Secundo, utrum ad vitam contemplativam pertineant virtutes morales. (2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? Tertio, utrum vita contemplativa consistat solum in uno actu, aut in pluribus. (3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several? Quarto, utrum ad vitam contemplativam pertineat consideratio cuiuscumque veritatis. (4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life? Quinto, utrum vita contemplativa hominis in hoc statu possit elevari usque ad Dei visionem. (5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of God? Sexto, de motibus contemplationis quos Dionysius assignat, quarto capitulo de divinis nominibus. (6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv); Septimo, de delectatione contemplationis. (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation; Octavo, de duratione contemplationis. (8) Of the duration of contemplation. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum vita contemplativa nihil habeat in affectu, sed totum in intellectu Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains wholly to the intellect? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa nihil habeat in affectu, sed totum in intellectu. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod finis contemplationis est veritas. Veritas autem pertinet ad intellectum totaliter. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa totaliter in intellectu consistat. Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 ) that the end of contemplation is truth. Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod Rachel, quae interpretatur visum principium, vitam contemplativam significat. Sed visio principii pertinet proprie ad intellectum. Ergo vita contemplativa proprie ad intellectum pertinet. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) that Rachel, which is interpreted ‘vision of the principle’, signifies the contemplative life. Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit. Super Ezech. Quod ad vitam contemplativam pertinet ab exteriori actione quiescere. Sed vis affectiva sive appetitiva inclinat ad exteriores actiones. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa non pertineat aliquo modo ad vim appetitivam. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life to rest from external action. Now the affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the appetitive power. Sed contra est quod Gregorius ibidem dicit, quod contemplativa vita est caritatem Dei et proximi tota mente retinere, et soli desiderio conditoris inhaerere. Sed desiderium et amor ad vim affectivam sive appetitivam pertinet, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam vita contemplativa habet aliquid in vi affectiva sive appetitiva. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator. Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vita contemplativa illorum esse dicitur qui principaliter intendunt ad contemplationem veritatis. Intentio autem est actus voluntatis, ut supra habitum est, quia intentio est de fine, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Et ideo vita contemplativa, quantum ad ipsam essentiam actionis, pertinet ad intellectum, quantum autem ad id quod movet ad exercendum talem operationem, pertinet ad voluntatem, quae movet omnes alias potentias, et etiam intellectum, ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, Q. 12, A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1). Movet autem vis appetitiva ad aliquid inspiciendum, vel sensibiliter vel intelligibiliter, quandoque quidem propter amorem rei visae, quia, ut dicitur Matth. VI, ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum, quandoque autem propter amorem ipsius cognitionis quam quis ex inspectione consequitur. Et propter hoc Gregorius constituit vitam contemplativam in caritate Dei, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex dilectione Dei inardescit ad eius pulchritudinem conspiciendam. Et quia unusquisque delectatur cum adeptus fuerit id quod amat, ideo vita contemplativa terminatur ad delectationem, quae est in affectu, ex qua etiam amor intenditur. Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen because, as it is written (Matt 6:21), where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also, sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. And on account of this, Gregory makes the contemplative life to consist in the love of God, inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense.