Quaestio 180 Question 180 De vita contemplativa The Contemplative Life Deinde considerandum est de vita contemplativa. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum vita contemplativa pertineat tantum ad intellectum, an consistat etiam in affectu. (1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections? Secundo, utrum ad vitam contemplativam pertineant virtutes morales. (2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? Tertio, utrum vita contemplativa consistat solum in uno actu, aut in pluribus. (3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several? Quarto, utrum ad vitam contemplativam pertineat consideratio cuiuscumque veritatis. (4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life? Quinto, utrum vita contemplativa hominis in hoc statu possit elevari usque ad Dei visionem. (5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of God? Sexto, de motibus contemplationis quos Dionysius assignat, quarto capitulo de divinis nominibus. (6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv); Septimo, de delectatione contemplationis. (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation; Octavo, de duratione contemplationis. (8) Of the duration of contemplation. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum vita contemplativa nihil habeat in affectu, sed totum in intellectu Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains wholly to the intellect? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa nihil habeat in affectu, sed totum in intellectu. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod finis contemplationis est veritas. Veritas autem pertinet ad intellectum totaliter. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa totaliter in intellectu consistat. Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 ) that the end of contemplation is truth. Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod Rachel, quae interpretatur visum principium, vitam contemplativam significat. Sed visio principii pertinet proprie ad intellectum. Ergo vita contemplativa proprie ad intellectum pertinet. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) that Rachel, which is interpreted ‘vision of the principle’, signifies the contemplative life. Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit. Super Ezech. Quod ad vitam contemplativam pertinet ab exteriori actione quiescere. Sed vis affectiva sive appetitiva inclinat ad exteriores actiones. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa non pertineat aliquo modo ad vim appetitivam. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life to rest from external action. Now the affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the appetitive power. Sed contra est quod Gregorius ibidem dicit, quod contemplativa vita est caritatem Dei et proximi tota mente retinere, et soli desiderio conditoris inhaerere. Sed desiderium et amor ad vim affectivam sive appetitivam pertinet, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam vita contemplativa habet aliquid in vi affectiva sive appetitiva. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator. Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vita contemplativa illorum esse dicitur qui principaliter intendunt ad contemplationem veritatis. Intentio autem est actus voluntatis, ut supra habitum est, quia intentio est de fine, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Et ideo vita contemplativa, quantum ad ipsam essentiam actionis, pertinet ad intellectum, quantum autem ad id quod movet ad exercendum talem operationem, pertinet ad voluntatem, quae movet omnes alias potentias, et etiam intellectum, ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, Q. 12, A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1). Movet autem vis appetitiva ad aliquid inspiciendum, vel sensibiliter vel intelligibiliter, quandoque quidem propter amorem rei visae, quia, ut dicitur Matth. VI, ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum, quandoque autem propter amorem ipsius cognitionis quam quis ex inspectione consequitur. Et propter hoc Gregorius constituit vitam contemplativam in caritate Dei, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex dilectione Dei inardescit ad eius pulchritudinem conspiciendam. Et quia unusquisque delectatur cum adeptus fuerit id quod amat, ideo vita contemplativa terminatur ad delectationem, quae est in affectu, ex qua etiam amor intenditur. Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen because, as it is written (Matt 6:21), where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also, sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. And on account of this, Gregory makes the contemplative life to consist in the love of God, inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod veritas est finis contemplationis, habet rationem boni appetibilis et amabilis et delectantis. Et secundum hoc pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad ipsam visionem primi principii, scilicet Dei, incitat amor ipsius. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod vita contemplativa, calcatis curis omnibus, ad videndam faciem sui creatoris inardescit. Reply Obj. 2: We are urged to the vision of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator. Ad tertium dicendum quod vis appetitiva movet non solum membra corporalia ad exteriores actiones exercendas, sed etiam intellectum ad exercendum operationem contemplationis, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice the act of contemplation, as stated above. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita est caritatem quidem Dei et proximi tota mente retinere. Sed omnes virtutes morales, de quarum actibus dantur praecepta legis, reducuntur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi, quia plenitudo legis est dilectio, ut dicitur Rom. XIII. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with the whole mind. Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our neighbor, for love . . . is the fulfilling of the Law (Rom 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life. Praeterea, contemplativa vita praecipue ordinatur ad Dei contemplationem, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod, calcatis curis omnibus, ad videndum faciem sui creatoris inardescit. Sed ad hoc nullus potest pervenire nisi per munditiam, quam causat virtus moralis, dicitur enim Matth. V, beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt; et Heb. XII, pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator. Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is a result of moral virtue. For it is written: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God (Matt 5:8), and: Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God (Heb 12:14). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita speciosa est in animo unde significatur per Rachelem, de qua dicitur, Gen. XXIX, quod erat pulchra facie. Sed pulchritudo animi attenditur secundum virtutes morales, et praecipue secundum temperantiam, ut Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul, wherefore it is signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen 29:17) that she was of a beautiful countenance. Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43, 45, 46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Sed contra est quod virtutes morales ordinantur ad exteriores actiones. Sed Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod ad contemplativam vitam pertinet ab exteriori actione quiescere. Ergo virtutes morales non pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi ) that it belongs to the contemplative life to rest from external action. Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life. Respondeo dicendum quod ad vitam contemplativam potest aliquid pertinere dupliciter, uno modo, essentialiter; alio modo, dispositive. Essentialiter quidem virtutes morales non pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. Quia finis contemplativae vitae est consideratio veritatis. Ad virtutes autem morales scire quidem, quod pertinet ad considerationem veritatis, parvam potestatem habet, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Unde et ipse, in X Ethic., virtutes morales dicit pertinere ad felicitatem activam, non autem ad contemplativam. I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), knowledge, which pertains to the consideration of truth, has little influence on the moral virtues: wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness. Dispositive autem virtutes morales pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. Impeditur enim actus contemplationis, in quo essentialiter consistit vita contemplativa, et per vehementiam passionum, per quam abstrahitur intentio animae ab intelligibilibus ad sensibilia; et per tumultus exteriores. Virtutes autem morales impediunt vehementiam passionum, et sedant exteriorum occupationum tumultus. Et ideo virtutes morales dispositive ad vitam contemplativam pertinent. On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul’s intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the contemplative life. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vita contemplativa habet motivum ex parte affectus, et secundum hoc dilectio Dei et proximi requiritur ad vitam contemplativam. Causae autem moventes non intrant essentiam rei, sed disponunt et perficiunt rem. Unde non sequitur quod virtutes morales essentialiter pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the contemplative life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life. Ad secundum dicendum quod sanctimonia, idest munditia, causatur ex virtutibus quae sunt circa passiones impedientes puritatem rationis. Pax autem causatur ex iustitia, quae est circa operationes, secundum illud Isaiae XXXII, opus iustitiae pax, inquantum scilicet ille qui ab iniuriis aliorum abstinet, subtrahit litigiorum et tumultuum occasiones. Et sic virtutes morales disponunt ad vitam contemplativam, inquantum causant pacem et munditiam. Reply Obj. 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations, according to Isa. 32:17, The work of justice shall be peace: since he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart. Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione. Utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione invenitur, ad quam pertinet et lumen manifestans, et proportionem debitam in aliis ordinare. Et ideo in vita contemplativa, quae consistit in actu rationis, per se et essentialiter invenitur pulchritudo. Unde Sap. VIII de contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, amator factus sum formae illius. Reply Obj. 3: Beauty, as stated above (Q. 145, A. 2), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found rooted in the reason, to which pertains both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is written (Wis 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: I became a lover of her beauty. In virtutibus autem moralibus invenitur pulchritudo participative, inquantum scilicet participant ordinem rationis, et praecipue in temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias maxime lumen rationis obscurantes. Et inde est quod virtus castitatis maxime reddit hominem aptum ad contemplationem, inquantum delectationes venereae maxime deprimunt mentem ad sensibilia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro Soliloquiorum. On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, insofar as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10). Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum ad vitam contemplativam pertineant diversi actus Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?