Quaestio 186 Question 186 De his in quibus principaliter consistit religionis status Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad statum religionis. Circa quod occurrit quadruplex consideratio, quarum prima est de his in quibus principaliter consistit religionis status; secunda, de his quae religiosis licite convenire possunt; tertia, de distinctione religionum; quarta, de religionis ingressu. We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; second, those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; third, the different kinds of religious orders; fourth, the entrance into the religious state. Circa primum quaeruntur decem. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: Primo, utrum religiosorum status sit perfectus. (1) Whether the religious state is perfect? Secundo, utrum religiosi teneantur ad omnia consilia. (2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels? Tertio, utrum voluntaria paupertas requiratur ad religionem. (3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state? Quarto, utrum requiratur continentia. (4) Whether continency is necessary? Quinto, utrum requiratur obedientia. (5) Whether obedience is necessary? Sexto, utrum requiratur quod haec cadant sub voto. (6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow? Septimo, de sufficientia horum votorum. (7) Of the sufficiency of these vows; Octavo, de comparatione eorum ad invicem. (8) Of their comparison one with another; Nono, utrum religiosus semper mortaliter peccet quando transgreditur statutum suae regulae. (9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a statute of his rule? Decimo, utrum, ceteris paribus, in eodem genere peccati plus peccet religiosus quam saecularis. (10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum religio importet statum perfectionis Whether religion implies a state of perfection? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non importet statum perfectionis. Illud enim quod est de necessitate salutis, non videtur ad statum perfectionis pertinere. Sed religio est de necessitate salutis, quia per eam uni vero Deo religamur, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig.; vel religio dicitur ex eo quod Deum reeligimus, quem amiseramus negligentes, ut Augustinus dicit in X de Civ. Dei. Ergo videtur quod religio non nominet perfectionis statum. Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for salvation, whether because thereby we are bound (religamur) to the one almighty God, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because it takes its name from our returning (religimus) to God Whom we had lost by neglecting Him, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection. Praeterea, religio, secundum Tullium, est quae naturae divinae cultum et caeremoniam affert. Sed afferre Deo cultum et caeremoniam magis videtur pertinere ad ministeria sacrorum ordinum quam ad diversitatem statuum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo videtur quod religio non nominet perfectionis statum. Obj. 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) is that which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature. Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 2; Q. 183, A. 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection. Praeterea, status perfectionis distinguitur contra statum incipientium et proficientium. Sed etiam in religione sunt aliqui incipientes et aliqui proficientes. Ergo religio non nominat perfectionis statum. Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does not denote the state of perfection. Praeterea, religio videtur esse poenitentiae locus, dicitur enim in decretis, VII, qu. I, praecipit sancta synodus ut quicumque de pontificali dignitate ad monachorum vitam et poenitentiae descenderit locum, nunquam ad pontificatum resurgat. Sed locus poenitentiae opponitur statui perfectionis, unde Dionysius, VI cap. Eccles. Hier., ponit poenitentes in infimo loco, scilicet inter purgandos. Ergo videtur quod religio non sit status perfectionis. Obj. 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): The holy synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the episcopate. Now a place of repentance is opposed to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of perfection. Sed contra est quod in collationibus patrum, dicit abbas Moyses, de religiosis loquens, ieiuniorum inediam, vigilias, labores, corporis nuditatem, lectionem, ceterasque virtutes debere nos suscipere noverimus, ut ad perfectionem caritatis istis gradibus possimus conscendere. Sed ea quae ad humanos actus pertinent, ab intentione finis speciem et nomen recipiunt. Ergo religiosi pertinent ad statum perfectionis. On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7) abbot Moses speaking of religious says: We must recognize that we have to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation, reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount to the perfection of charity. Now things pertaining to human acts are specified and denominated from the intention of the end. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection. Dionysius etiam, VI cap. Eccles. Hier., dicit eos qui nominantur Dei famuli, ex Dei puro servitio et famulatu uniri ad amabilem perfectionem. Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, id quod communiter multis convenit, antonomastice attribuitur ei cui per excellentiam convenit, sicut nomen fortitudinis vindicat sibi illa virtus quae circa difficillima firmitatem animi servat, et temperantiae nomen vindicat sibi illa virtus quae temperat maximas delectationes. Religio autem, ut supra habitum est, est quaedam virtus per quam aliquis ad Dei servitium et cultum aliquid exhibet. Et ideo antonomastice religiosi dicuntur illi qui se totaliter mancipant divino servitio, quasi holocaustum Deo offerentes. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., sunt quidam qui nihil sibimetipsis reservant, sed sensum, linguam, vitam atque substantiam quam perceperunt, omnipotenti Deo immolant. In hoc autem perfectio hominis consistit quod totaliter Deo inhaereat, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Et secundum hoc, religio perfectionis statum nominat. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 141, A. 2) that which is applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of fortitude is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of temperance, by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. Now religion as stated above (Q. 81, A. 2; A. 3, ad 2) is a virtue whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God. Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): Some there are who keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess. Now the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 2), and in this sense religion denotes the state of perfection. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod exhibere aliqua ad cultum Dei est de necessitate salutis, sed quod aliquis totaliter se et sua divino cultui deputet, ad perfectionem pertinet. Reply Obj. 1: To offer something to the worship of God is necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one’s possessions to the worship of God belongs to perfection. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de virtute religionis ageretur, ad religionem pertinent non solum oblationes sacrificiorum, et alia huiusmodi quae sunt religioni propria, sed etiam actus omnium virtutum, secundum quod referuntur ad Dei servitium et honorem, efficiuntur actus religionis. Et secundum hoc, si aliquis totam vitam suam divino servitio deputet, tota vita sua ad religionem pertinebit. Et secundum hoc, ex vita religiosa quam ducunt, religiosi dicuntur qui sunt in statu perfectionis. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1, 2; Q. 85, A. 3) when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the virtues which insofar as these are referred to God’s service and honor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they lead, those who are in the state of perfection are called religious. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, religio nominat statum perfectionis ex intentione finis. Unde non oportet quod quicumque est in religione, iam sit perfectus, sed quod ad perfectionem tendat. Unde super illud Matth. XIX, si vis perfectus esse etc., dicit Origenes quod ille qui mutavit pro divitiis paupertatem ut fiat perfectus, non in ipso tempore quo tradiderit bona sua pauperibus, fiet omnino perfectus, sed ex illa die incipiet speculatio Dei adducere eum ad omnes virtutes. Et hoc modo in religione non omnes sunt perfecti, sed quidam incipientes, quidam proficientes. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, AA. 4, 6), religion denotes the state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it does not follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect, but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Matt. 19:21, If thou wilt be perfect, etc., says (Tract. viii in Matth.) that he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will begin to lead him to all the virtues. Thus all are not perfect in religion, but some are beginners, some proficient. Ad quartum dicendum quod religionis status principaliter est institutus ad perfectionem adipiscendam per quaedam exercitia quibus tolluntur impedimenta perfectae caritatis. Sublatis autem impedimentis perfectae caritatis, multo magis exciduntur occasiones peccati, per quod totaliter tollitur caritas. Unde, cum ad poenitentem pertineat causas peccatorum excidere, ex consequenti status religionis est convenientissimus poenitentiae locus. Unde in decretis, XXXIII, qu. II, cap. admonere, consulitur cuidam qui uxorem occiderat, ut potius monasterium ingrediatur, quod dicit esse melius et levius, quam poenitentiam publicam agat remanendo in saeculo. Reply Obj. 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, qu. ii, cap. Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to enter a monastery which is described as better and lighter, rather than to do public penance while remaining in the world. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum quilibet religiosus teneatur ad omnia consilia Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quilibet religiosus teneatur ad omnia consilia. Quicumque enim profitetur statum aliquem, tenetur ad ea quae illi statui conveniunt. Sed quilibet religiosus profitetur statum perfectionis. Ergo quilibet religiosus tenetur ad omnia consilia, quae ad perfectionis statum pertinent. Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound to observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious professes the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod ille qui praesens saeculum deserit et agit bona quae valet, quasi iam Aegypto derelicto, sacrificium praebet in eremo. Sed deserere saeculum specialiter pertinet ad religiosos. Ergo etiam eorum est agere omnia bona quae valent. Et ita videtur quod quilibet eorum teneatur ad omnia consilia implenda. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that he who renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness. Now it belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it belongs to them also to do all the good they can; and so it would seem that each of them is bound to fulfill all the counsels. Praeterea, si non requiritur ad statum perfectionis quod aliquis omnia consilia impleat, sufficiens esse videtur si quaedam consilia impleat. Sed hoc falsum est, quia multi in saeculari vita existentes aliqua consilia implent, ut patet de his qui continentiam servant. Ergo videtur quod quilibet religiosus, qui est in statu perfectionis, teneatur ad omnia quae sunt perfectionis. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnia consilia. Obj. 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of perfection to fulfill all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfill some of them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life fulfill some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence. Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of perfection is bound to fulfill whatever pertains to perfection: and such are the counsels. Sed contra, ad ea quae sunt supererogationis non tenetur aliquis nisi ex propria obligatione. Sed quilibet religiosus obligat se ad aliqua determinata, quidam ad haec, quidam ad illa. Non ergo omnes tenentur ad omnia. On the contrary, one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do works of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to keep all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some, others to others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them. Respondeo dicendum quod ad perfectionem aliquid pertinet tripliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter. Et sic, sicut supra dictum est, ad perfectionem pertinet perfecta observantia praeceptorum caritatis. Alio modo ad perfectionem pertinet aliquid consequenter sicut illa quae consequuntur ex perfectione caritatis, puta quod aliquis maledicenti benedicat et alia huiusmodi impleat, quae, etsi secundum praeparationem animi sint in praecepto, ut scilicet impleantur quando necessitas requirit, tamen ex superabundantia caritatis procedit quod etiam extra necessitatem quandoque talia impleantur. Tertio modo pertinet aliquid ad perfectionem instrumentaliter et dispositive, sicut paupertas, continentia, abstinentia et alia huiusmodi. I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First, essentially, and thus, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3) the perfect observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection. Second, a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those things that result from the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that curse you (Luke 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like kind, which though they be binding as regards the preparedness of the mind, so that one has to fulfill them when necessity requires, yet are sometimes fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through superabundance of charity. Third, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the like. Dictum est autem quod ipsa perfectio caritatis est finis status religionis, status autem religionis est quaedam disciplina vel exercitium ad perfectionem perveniendi. Ad quam quidem aliqui pervenire nituntur exercitiis diversis, sicut etiam medicus ad sanandum uti potest diversis medicamentis. Manifestum est autem quod illi qui operatur ad finem, non ex necessitate convenit quod iam assecutus sit finem, sed requiritur quod per aliquam viam tendat in finem. Et ideo ille qui statum religionis assumit, non tenetur habere perfectam caritatem, sed tenetur ad hoc tendere et operam dare ut habeat caritatem perfectam. Now it has been stated (A. 1) that the perfection of charity is the end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach by various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but he is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect charity. Et eadem ratione, non tenetur ad hoc quod illa impleat quae perfectionem caritatis consequuntur, tenetur autem ut ad ea implenda intendat. Contra quod facit contemnens. Unde non peccat si ea praetermittat, sed si ea contemnat. For the same reason he is not bound to fulfill those things that result from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend to fulfill them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them, wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.