Quaestio 2 Question 2 De actu fidei The Act of Faith Deinde considerandum est de actu fidei. Et primo, de actu interiori; secundo, de actu exteriori. We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2) the external act. Circa primum quaeruntur decem. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: Primo, quid sit credere, quod est actus interior fidei. (1) What is to believe, which is the internal act of faith? Secundo, quot modis dicatur. (2) In how many ways is it expressed? Tertio, utrum credere aliquid supra rationem naturalem sit necessarium ad salutem. (3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above natural reason? Quarto, utrum credere ea ad quae ratio naturalis pervenire potest sit necessarium. (4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable by natural reason? Quinto, utrum sit necessarium ad salutem credere aliqua explicite. (5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things explicitly? Sexto, utrum ad credendum explicite omnes aequaliter teneantur. (6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith? Septimo, utrum habere explicitam fidem de Christo semper sit necessarium ad salutem. (7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation? Octavo, utrum credere Trinitatem explicite sit de necessitate salutis. (8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity explicitly? Nono, utrum actus fidei sit meritorius. (9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious? Decimo, utrum ratio humana diminuat meritum fidei. (10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum credere sit cum assensione cogitare Whether to believe is to think with assent? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod credere non sit cum assensione cogitare. Cogitatio enim importat quandam inquisitionem, dicitur enim cogitare quasi simul agitare. Sed Damascenus dicit, in IV Lib., quod fides est non inquisitus consensus. Ergo cogitare non pertinet ad actum fidei. Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with assent. Because the Latin word cogitatio implies a research, for cogitare seems to be equivalent to coagitare, i.e., to discuss together. Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that faith is an assent without research. Therefore thinking has no place in the act of faith. Praeterea, fides in ratione ponitur, ut infra dicetur. Sed cogitare est actus cogitativae potentiae, quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo cogitatio ad fidem non pertinet. Obj. 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show further on (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to cogitate is an act of the cogitative power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the First Part (Q. 78, A. 4). Therefore thought has nothing to do with faith. Praeterea, credere est actus intellectus, quia eius obiectum est verum. Sed assentire non videtur esse actus intellectus, sed voluntatis, sicut et consentire, ut supra dictum est. Ergo credere non est cum assensione cogitare. Obj. 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect, but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above (I-II, Q. 15, A. 1, ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent. In contrarium est quod Augustinus sic definit credere in libro de Praed. Sanct. On the contrary, This is how to believe is defined by Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. ii). Respondeo dicendum quod cogitare tripliciter sumi potest. Uno modo, communiter pro qualibet actuali consideratione intellectus, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., hanc nunc dico intelligentiam qua intelligimus cogitantes. Alio modo dicitur cogitare magis proprie consideratio intellectus quae est cum quadam inquisitione, antequam perveniatur ad perfectionem intellectus per certitudinem visionis. Et secundum hoc Augustinus, XV de Trin., dicit quod Dei filius non cogitatio dicitur, sed verbum Dei dicitur. Cogitatio quippe nostra proveniens ad id quod scimus atque inde formata verbum nostrum verum est. Et ideo verbum Dei sine cogitatione debet intelligi, non aliquid habens formabile, quod possit esse informe. Et secundum hoc cogitatio proprie dicitur motus animi deliberantis nondum perfecti per plenam visionem veritatis. Sed quia talis motus potest esse vel animi deliberantis circa intentiones universales, quod pertinet ad intellectivam partem; vel circa intentiones particulares, quod pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ideo cogitare secundo modo sumitur pro actu intellectus deliberantis; tertio modo, pro actu virtutis cogitativae. I answer that, To think can be taken in three ways. First, in a general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): By understanding I mean now the faculty whereby we understand when thinking. Second, to think is more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect’s arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed. In this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the sensitive part, hence it is that to think is taken second for an act of the deliberating intellect, and third for an act of the cogitative power. Si igitur cogitare sumatur communiter, secundum primum modum, sic hoc quod dicitur cum assensione cogitare non dicit totam rationem eius quod est credere, nam per hunc modum etiam qui considerat ea quae scit vel intelligit cum assensione cogitat. Si vero sumatur cogitare secundo modo, sic in hoc intelligitur tota ratio huius actus qui est credere. Actuum enim ad intellectum pertinentium quidam habent firmam assensionem absque tali cogitatione, sicut cum aliquis considerat ea quae scit vel intelligit, talis enim consideratio iam est formata. Quidam vero actus intellectus habent quidem cogitationem informem absque firma assensione, sive in neutram partem declinent, sicut accidit dubitanti; sive in unam partem magis declinent sed tenentur aliquo levi signo, sicut accidit suspicanti; sive uni parti adhaereant, tamen cum formidine alterius, quod accidit opinanti. Sed actus iste qui est credere habet firmam adhaesionem ad unam partem, in quo convenit credens cum sciente et intelligente, et tamen eius cognitio non est perfecta per manifestam visionem, in quo convenit cum dubitante, suspicante et opinante. Et sic proprium est credentis ut cum assensu cogitet, et per hoc distinguitur iste actus qui est credere ab omnibus actibus intellectus qui sunt circa verum vel falsum. Accordingly, if to think be understood broadly according to the first sense, then to think with assent, does not express completely what is meant by to believe: since, in this way, a man thinks with assent even when he considers what he knows by science, or understands. If, on the other hand, to think be understood in the second way, then this expresses completely the nature of the act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking, as when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or understands, for this consideration is already formed. But some acts of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they incline to neither side, as in one who doubts; or incline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some slight motive, as in one who suspects; or incline to one side yet with fear of the other, as in one who opines. But this act to believe, cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or the false. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fides non habet inquisitionem rationis naturalis demonstrantis id quod creditur. Habet tamen inquisitionem quandam eorum per quae inducitur homo ad credendum, puta quia sunt dicta a Deo et miraculis confirmata. Reply Obj. 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles. Ad secundum dicendum quod cogitare non sumitur hic prout est actus cogitativae virtutis, sed prout pertinet ad intellectum, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: To think is not taken here for the act of the cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above. Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus credentis determinatur ad unum non per rationem, sed per voluntatem. Et ideo assensus hic accipitur pro actu intellectus secundum quod a voluntate determinatur ad unum. Reply Obj. 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum inconvenienter distinguatur actus fidei per hoc quod est credere Deo, credere Deum et credere in Deum Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in God? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguatur actus fidei per hoc quod est credere Deo, credere Deum et credere in Deum. Unius enim habitus unus est actus. Sed fides est unus habitus, cum sit una virtus. Ergo inconvenienter ponuntur plures actus eius. Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three acts of faith. Praeterea, illud quod est commune omni actui fidei non debet poni ut particularis actus fidei. Sed credere Deo invenitur communiter in quolibet actu fidei, quia fides innititur primae veritati. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter distinguatur a quibusdam aliis actibus fidei. Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now to believe God is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from certain other acts of faith. Praeterea, illud quod convenit etiam non fidelibus non potest poni fidei actus. Sed credere Deum esse convenit etiam infidelibus. Ergo non debet poni inter actus fidei. Obj. 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith. Praeterea, moveri in finem pertinet ad voluntatem, cuius obiectum est bonum et finis. Sed credere non est actus voluntatis, sed intellectus. Ergo non debet poni differentia una eius quod est credere in Deum, quod importat motum in finem. Obj. 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the will, but of the intellect. Therefore to believe in God, which implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species of that act. Sed contra est quod Augustinus hanc distinctionem ponit, in libris de Verb. Dom., et super Ioan. On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi; Tract. xxix in Joan.). Respondeo dicendum quod actus cuiuslibet potentiae vel habitus accipitur secundum ordinem potentiae vel habitus ad suum obiectum. Obiectum autem fidei potest tripliciter considerari. Cum enim credere ad intellectum pertineat prout est a voluntate motus ad assentiendum, ut dictum est, potest obiectum fidei accipi vel ex parte ipsius intellectus, vel ex parte voluntatis intellectum moventis. I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be considered in three ways. For, since to believe is an act of the intellect, insofar as the will moves it to assent, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect. Si quidem ex parte intellectus, sic in obiecto fidei duo possunt considerari, sicut supra dictum est. Quorum unum est materiale obiectum fidei. Et sic ponitur actus fidei credere Deum, quia, sicut supra dictum est, nihil proponitur nobis ad credendum nisi secundum quod ad Deum pertinet. Aliud autem est formalis ratio obiecti, quod est sicut medium propter quod tali credibili assentitur. Et sic ponitur actus fidei credere Deo, quia, sicut supra dictum est, formale obiectum fidei est veritas prima, cui inhaeret homo ut propter eam creditis assentiat. If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is to believe in a God; because, as stated above (ibid.) nothing is proposed to our belief, except inasmuch as it is referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is to believe God, since, as stated above (ibid.) the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to whatever he believes. Si vero consideretur tertio modo obiectum fidei, secundum quod intellectus est motus a voluntate, sic ponitur actus fidei credere in Deum, veritas enim prima ad voluntatem refertur secundum quod habet rationem finis. Third, if the object of faith be considered insofar as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is to believe in God. For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect of an end. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per ista tria non designantur diversi actus fidei, sed unus et idem actus habens diversam relationem ad fidei obiectum. Reply Obj. 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but one and the same act having different relations to the object of faith.