Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum inconvenienter distinguatur actus fidei per hoc quod est credere Deo, credere Deum et credere in Deum Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in God? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguatur actus fidei per hoc quod est credere Deo, credere Deum et credere in Deum. Unius enim habitus unus est actus. Sed fides est unus habitus, cum sit una virtus. Ergo inconvenienter ponuntur plures actus eius. Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three acts of faith. Praeterea, illud quod est commune omni actui fidei non debet poni ut particularis actus fidei. Sed credere Deo invenitur communiter in quolibet actu fidei, quia fides innititur primae veritati. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter distinguatur a quibusdam aliis actibus fidei. Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now to believe God is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from certain other acts of faith. Praeterea, illud quod convenit etiam non fidelibus non potest poni fidei actus. Sed credere Deum esse convenit etiam infidelibus. Ergo non debet poni inter actus fidei. Obj. 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith. Praeterea, moveri in finem pertinet ad voluntatem, cuius obiectum est bonum et finis. Sed credere non est actus voluntatis, sed intellectus. Ergo non debet poni differentia una eius quod est credere in Deum, quod importat motum in finem. Obj. 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the will, but of the intellect. Therefore to believe in God, which implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species of that act. Sed contra est quod Augustinus hanc distinctionem ponit, in libris de Verb. Dom., et super Ioan. On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi; Tract. xxix in Joan.). Respondeo dicendum quod actus cuiuslibet potentiae vel habitus accipitur secundum ordinem potentiae vel habitus ad suum obiectum. Obiectum autem fidei potest tripliciter considerari. Cum enim credere ad intellectum pertineat prout est a voluntate motus ad assentiendum, ut dictum est, potest obiectum fidei accipi vel ex parte ipsius intellectus, vel ex parte voluntatis intellectum moventis. I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be considered in three ways. For, since to believe is an act of the intellect, insofar as the will moves it to assent, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect. Si quidem ex parte intellectus, sic in obiecto fidei duo possunt considerari, sicut supra dictum est. Quorum unum est materiale obiectum fidei. Et sic ponitur actus fidei credere Deum, quia, sicut supra dictum est, nihil proponitur nobis ad credendum nisi secundum quod ad Deum pertinet. Aliud autem est formalis ratio obiecti, quod est sicut medium propter quod tali credibili assentitur. Et sic ponitur actus fidei credere Deo, quia, sicut supra dictum est, formale obiectum fidei est veritas prima, cui inhaeret homo ut propter eam creditis assentiat. If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is to believe in a God; because, as stated above (ibid.) nothing is proposed to our belief, except inasmuch as it is referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is to believe God, since, as stated above (ibid.) the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to whatever he believes. Si vero consideretur tertio modo obiectum fidei, secundum quod intellectus est motus a voluntate, sic ponitur actus fidei credere in Deum, veritas enim prima ad voluntatem refertur secundum quod habet rationem finis. Third, if the object of faith be considered insofar as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is to believe in God. For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect of an end. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per ista tria non designantur diversi actus fidei, sed unus et idem actus habens diversam relationem ad fidei obiectum. Reply Obj. 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but one and the same act having different relations to the object of faith. Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad secundum. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. Ad tertium dicendum quod credere Deum non convenit infidelibus sub ea ratione qua ponitur actus fidei. Non enim credunt Deum esse sub his conditionibus quas fides determinat. Et ideo nec vere Deum credunt, quia, ut Philosophus dicit, IX Metaphys., in simplicibus defectus cognitionis est solum in non attingendo totaliter. Reply Obj. 3: Unbelievers cannot be said to believe in a God as we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines; hence they do not truly believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) to know simple things defectively is not to know them at all. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas movet intellectum et alias vires animae in finem. Et secundum hoc ponitur actus fidei credere in Deum. Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1) the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this respect an act of faith is to believe in God. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum credere sit necessarium ad salutem Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod credere non sit necessarium ad salutem. Ad salutem enim et perfectionem cuiuslibet rei ea sufficere videntur quae conveniunt ei secundum suam naturam. Sed ea quae sunt fidei excedunt naturalem hominis rationem, cum sint non apparentia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo credere non videtur esse necessarium ad salutem. Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith, surpass man’s natural reason, since they are things unseen as stated above (Q. 1, A. 4). Therefore to believe seems unnecessary for salvation. Praeterea, periculose homo assentit illis in quibus non potest iudicare utrum illud quod ei proponitur sit verum vel falsum, secundum illud Iob XII, nonne auris verba diiudicat? Sed tale iudicium homo habere non potest in his quae sunt fidei, quia non potest homo ea resolvere in principia prima, per quae de omnibus iudicamus. Ergo periculosum est talibus fidem adhibere. Credere ergo non est necessarium ad salutem. Obj. 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters, wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true or false, according to Job 12:11: Doth not the ear discern words? Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation. Praeterea, salus hominis in Deo consistit, secundum illud Psalm., salus autem iustorum a domino. Sed invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas, ut dicitur Rom. I. Quae autem conspiciuntur intellectu non creduntur. Ergo non est necessarium ad salutem ut homo aliqua credat. Obj. 3: Further, man’s salvation rests on God, according to Ps. 36:39: But the salvation of the just is from the Lord. Now the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity, according to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not necessary for man’s salvation, that he should believe certain things. Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. XI, sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 11:6): Without faith it is impossible to please God. Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus naturis ordinatis invenitur quod ad perfectionem naturae inferioris duo concurrunt, unum quidem quod est secundum proprium motum; aliud autem quod est secundum motum superioris naturae. Sicut aqua secundum motum proprium movetur ad centrum, secundum autem motum lunae movetur circa centrum secundum fluxum et refluxum, similiter etiam orbes planetarum moventur propriis motibus ab occidente in orientem, motu autem primi orbis ab oriente in occidentem. Sola autem natura rationalis creata habet immediatum ordinem ad Deum. Quia ceterae creaturae non attingunt ad aliquid universale, sed solum ad aliquid particulare, participantes divinam bonitatem vel in essendo tantum, sicut inanimata, vel etiam in vivendo et cognoscendo singularia, sicut plantae et animalia, natura autem rationalis, inquantum cognoscit universalem boni et entis rationem, habet immediatum ordinem ad universale essendi principium. I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one of which is in respect of that nature’s proper movement, while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the center (of the earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the center by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west. Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in being only, as inanimate things, or also in living, and in knowing singulars, as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, inasmuch as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being. Perfectio ergo rationalis creaturae non solum consistit in eo quod ei competit secundum suam naturam, sed etiam in eo quod ei attribuitur ex quadam supernaturali participatione divinae bonitatis. Unde et supra dictum est quod ultima beatitudo hominis consistit in quadam supernaturali Dei visione. Ad quam quidem visionem homo pertingere non potest nisi per modum addiscentis a Deo doctore, secundum illud Ioan. VI, omnis qui audit a patre et didicit venit ad me. Huius autem disciplinae fit homo particeps non statim, sed successive, secundum modum suae naturae. Omnis autem talis addiscens oportet quod credat, ad hoc quod ad perfectam scientiam perveniat, sicut etiam philosophus dicit quod oportet addiscentem credere. Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man’s ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to John 6:45: Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me. Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that it behooves a learner to believe. Unde ad hoc quod homo perveniat ad perfectam visionem beatitudinis praeexigitur quod credat Deo tanquam discipulus magistro docenti. Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia natura hominis dependet a superiori natura, ad eius perfectionem non sufficit cognitio naturalis, sed requiritur quaedam supernaturalis, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Since man’s nature is dependent on a higher nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut homo per naturale lumen intellectus assentit principiis, ita homo virtuosus per habitum virtutis habet rectum iudicium de his quae conveniunt virtuti illi. Et hoc modo etiam per lumen fidei divinitus infusum homini homo assentit his quae sunt fidei, non autem contrariis. Et ideo nihil periculi vel damnationis inest his qui sunt in Christo Iesu, ab ipso illuminati per fidem. Reply Obj. 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently there is no danger or condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, and whom He has enlightened by faith. Ad tertium dicendum quod invisibilia Dei altiori modo, quantum ad plura, percipit fides quam ratio naturalis ex creaturis in Deum procedens. Unde dicitur Eccli. III, plurima super sensum hominis ostensa sunt tibi. Reply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God from His creatures. Hence it is written (Sir 3:25): Many things are shown to thee above the understandings of man. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum ea quae ratione naturali probari possunt sit necessarium credere Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae ratione naturali probari possunt non sit necessarium credere. In operibus enim Dei nihil superfluum invenitur, multo minus quam in operibus naturae. Sed ad id quod per unum potest fieri superflue apponitur aliud. Ergo ea quae per naturalem rationem cognosci possunt superfluum esset per fidem accipere. Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God’s works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices. Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural reason. Praeterea, ea necesse est credere de quibus est fides. Sed non est de eodem scientia et fides, ut supra habitum est. Cum igitur scientia sit de omnibus illis quae naturali ratione cognosci possunt, videtur quod non oporteat credere ea quae per naturalem rationem probantur. Obj. 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Since therefore all things that can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason. Praeterea, omnia scibilia videntur esse unius rationis. Si igitur quaedam eorum proponuntur homini ut credenda, pari ratione omnia huiusmodi necesse esset credere. Hoc autem est falsum. Non ergo ea quae per naturalem rationem cognosci possunt necesse est credere. Obj. 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically would seem to come under one head: so that if some of them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason. Sed contra est quia necesse est Deum credere esse unum et incorporeum, quae naturali ratione a philosophis probantur. On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is one and incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason. Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium est homini accipere per modum fidei non solum ea quae sunt supra rationem, sed etiam ea quae per rationem cognosci possunt. Et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem, ut citius homo ad veritatis divinae cognitionem perveniat. Scientia enim ad quam pertinet probare Deum esse et alia huiusmodi de Deo, ultimo hominibus addiscenda proponitur, praesuppositis multis aliis scientiis. Et sic non nisi post multum tempus vitae suae homo ad Dei cognitionem perveniret. Secundo, ut cognitio Dei sit communior. Multi enim in studio scientiae proficere non possunt, vel propter hebetudinem ingenii; vel propter alias occupationes et necessitates temporalis vitae; vel etiam propter torporem addiscendi. Qui omnino a Dei cognitione fraudarentur nisi proponerentur eis divina per modum fidei. Tertio modo, propter certitudinem. Ratio enim humana in rebus divinis est multum deficiens, cuius signum est quia philosophi, de rebus humanis naturali investigatione perscrutantes, in multis erraverunt et sibi ipsis contraria senserunt. Ut ergo esset indubitata et certa cognitio apud homines de Deo, oportuit quod divina eis per modum fidei traderentur, quasi a Deo dicta, qui mentiri non potest. I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not be until late in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general. For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod investigatio naturalis rationis non sufficit humano generi ad cognitionem divinorum etiam quae ratione ostendi possunt. Et ideo non est superfluum ut talia credantur. Reply Obj. 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed. Ad secundum dicendum quod de eodem non potest esse scientia et fides apud eundem. Sed id quod est ab uno scitum potest esse ab alio creditum, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can be an object of faith for another, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5). Ad tertium dicendum quod, si omnia scibilia conveniant in ratione scientiae, non tamen conveniunt in hoc quod aequaliter ordinent ad beatitudinem. Et ideo non aequaliter omnia proponuntur ut credenda. Reply Obj. 3: Although all things that can be known by science are of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.