Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, illud proprie et per se pertinet ad obiectum fidei per quod homo beatitudinem consequitur. Via autem hominibus veniendi ad beatitudinem est mysterium incarnationis et passionis Christi, dicitur enim Act. IV, non est aliud nomen datum hominibus in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri. Et ideo mysterium incarnationis Christi aliqualiter oportuit omni tempore esse creditum apud omnes, diversimode tamen secundum diversitatem temporum et personarum. Nam ante statum peccati homo habuit explicitam fidem de Christi incarnatione secundum quod ordinabatur ad consummationem gloriae, non autem secundum quod ordinabatur ad liberationem a peccato per passionem et resurrectionem, quia homo non fuit praescius peccati futuri. Videtur autem incarnationis Christi praescius fuisse per hoc quod dixit, propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae, ut habetur Gen. II; et hoc apostolus, ad Ephes. V, dicit sacramentum magnum esse in Christo et Ecclesia; quod quidem sacramentum non est credibile primum hominem ignorasse. I answer that, As stated above (A. 5; Q. 1, A. 8), the object of faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written (Acts 4:12): There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved. Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation was necessary at all times and for all persons, but this belief differed according to differences of times and persons. The reason of this is that before the state of sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ’s Incarnation, insofar as it was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it was intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection, since man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however, seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the fact that he said (Gen 2:24): Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, of which the Apostle says (Eph 5:32) that this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the Church, and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about this sacrament. Post peccatum autem fuit explicite creditum mysterium Christi non solum quantum ad incarnationem, sed etiam quantum ad passionem et resurrectionem, quibus humanum genus a peccato et morte liberatur. Aliter enim non praefigurassent Christi passionem quibusdam sacrificiis et ante legem et sub lege. Quorum quidem sacrificiorum significatum explicite maiores cognoscebant, minores autem sub velamine illorum sacrificiorum, credentes ea divinitus esse disposita de Christo venturo, quodammodo habebant velatam cognitionem. Et sicut supra dictum est, ea quae ad mysteria Christi pertinent tanto distinctius cognoverunt quanto Christo propinquiores fuerunt. But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else, have foreshadowed Christ’s Passion by certain sacrifices both before and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the learned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to Christ’s coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so to speak. And, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7), the nearer they were to Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ’s mysteries. Post tempus autem gratiae revelatae tam maiores quam minores tenentur habere fidem explicitam de mysteriis Christi; praecipue quantum ad ea quae communiter in Ecclesia sollemnizantur et publice proponuntur, sicut sunt articuli incarnationis, de quibus supra dictum est. Alias autem subtiles considerationes circa incarnationis articulos tenentur aliqui magis vel minus explicite credere secundum quod convenit statui et officio uniuscuiusque. After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards those which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we have spoken above (Q. 1, A. 8). As to other minute points in reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to believe them more or less explicitly according to each one’s state and office. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angelos non omnino latuit mysterium regni Dei, sicut Augustinus dicit, V super Gen. ad Litt. Quasdam tamen rationes huius mysterii perfectius cognoverunt Christo revelante. Reply Obj. 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen ad lit. v, 19), yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ revealed them to them. Ad secundum dicendum quod Ioannes Baptista non quaesivit de adventu Christi in carnem quasi hoc ignoraret, cum ipse hoc expresse confessus fuerit, dicens, ego vidi, et testimonium perhibui quia hic est filius Dei, ut habetur Ioan. I. Unde non dixit, tu es qui venisti? Sed, tu es qui venturus es? Quaerens de futuro, non de praeterito. Similiter non est credendum quod ignoraverit eum ad passionem venturum, ipse enim dixerat, ecce agnus Dei, qui tollit peccata mundi, praenuntians eius immolationem futuram; et cum hoc prophetae alii ante praedixerint, sicut praecipue patet in Isaiae LIII. Potest igitur dici, sicut Gregorius dicit, quod inquisivit ignorans an ad Infernum esset in propria persona descensurus. Sciebat autem quod virtus passionis eius extendenda erat usque ad eos qui in Limbo detinebantur, secundum illud Zach. IX, tu quoque in sanguine testamenti tui emisisti vinctos de lacu in quo non est aqua. Nec hoc tenebatur explicite credere, antequam esset impletum, quod per seipsum deberet descendere. Reply Obj. 2: It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist inquired of Christ’s advent in the flesh, since he had clearly professed his belief therein, saying: I saw, and I gave testimony, that this is the Son of God (John 1:34). Hence he did not say: Art Thou He that hast come? but Art Thou He that art to come? thus saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be believed that he was ignorant of Christ’s future Passion, for he had already said (John 1:39): Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sins of the world, thus foretelling His future immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as may be seen especially in Isaiah 53. We may therefore say with Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into hell in His own Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of Christ’s Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo, according to Zach. 9:11: Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no water; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before its fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself. Vel potest dici, sicut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., quod non quaesivit ex dubitatione seu ignorantia, sed magis ex pietate. Vel potest dici, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, quod non quaesivit quasi ipse ignoraret, sed ut per Christum satisfieret eius discipulis. Unde et Christus ad discipulorum instructionem respondit, signa operum ostendens. It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on Luke 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, pointing to the signs of His works. Ad tertium dicendum quod multis gentilium facta fuit revelatio de Christo, ut patet per ea quae praedixerunt. Nam Iob XIX dicitur, scio quod redemptor meus vivit. Sibylla etiam praenuntiavit quaedam de Christo, ut Augustinus dicit. Invenitur etiam in historiis Romanorum quod tempore Constantini Augusti et Irenae matris eius inventum fuit quoddam sepulcrum in quo iacebat homo auream laminam habens in pectore in qua scriptum erat, Christus nascetur ex virgine et credo in eum. O sol, sub Irenae et Constantini temporibus iterum me videbis. Si qui tamen salvati fuerunt quibus revelatio non fuit facta, non fuerunt salvati absque fide mediatoris. Quia etsi non habuerunt fidem explicitam, habuerunt tamen fidem implicitam in divina providentia, credentes Deum esse liberatorem hominum secundum modos sibi placitos et secundum quod aliquibus veritatem cognoscentibus ipse revelasset, secundum illud Iob XXXV, qui docet nos super iumenta terrae. Reply Obj. 3: Many of the Gentiles received revelations of Christ, as is clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25): I know that my Redeemer liveth. The Sibyl too foretold certain things about Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a man on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: Christ shall be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again. If, however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum credere Trinitatem explicite fuerit de necessitate salutis Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod credere Trinitatem explicite non fuerit de necessitate salutis. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. XI, credere oportet accedentem ad Deum quia est, et quia inquirentibus se remunerator est. Sed hoc potest credi absque fide Trinitatis. Ergo non oportebat explicite fidem de Trinitate habere. Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb 11:6): He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. Now one can believe this without believing in the Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity. Praeterea, dominus dicit, Ioan. XVII, pater, manifestavi nomen tuum hominibus, quod exponens Augustinus dicit, non illud nomen tuum quo vocaris Deus, sed illud quo vocaris pater meus. Et postea subdit etiam, in hoc quod Deus fecit hunc mundum, notus in omnibus gentibus; in hoc quod non est cum diis falsis colendus, notus in Iudaea Deus; in hoc vero quod pater est huius Christi per quem tollit peccatum mundi, hoc nomen eius, prius occultum, nunc manifestavit eis. Ergo ante Christi adventum non erat cognitum quod in deitate esset paternitas et filiatio. Non ergo Trinitas explicite credebatur. Obj. 2: Further our Lord said (John 17:5, 6): Father, I have manifested Thy name to men, which words Augustine expounds (Tract. cvi) as follows: Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the name whereby Thou art called My Father, and further on he adds: In that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is not to be worshiped together with false gods, ‘God is known in Judea’; but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He takes away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name of His, which hitherto they knew not. Therefore before the coming of Christ it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the Godhead: and so the Trinity was not believed explicitly. Praeterea, illud tenemur explicite credere in Deo quod est beatitudinis obiectum. Sed obiectum beatitudinis est bonitas summa, quae potest intelligi in Deo etiam sine personarum distinctione. Ergo non fuit necessarium credere explicite Trinitatem. Obj. 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in God, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity. Sed contra est quod in veteri testamento multipliciter expressa est Trinitas personarum, sicut statim in principio Gen. dicitur, ad expressionem Trinitatis, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Ergo a principio de necessitate salutis fuit credere Trinitatem. On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is written in manifestation of the Trinity: Let us make man to Our image and likeness (Gen 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity. Respondeo dicendum quod mysterium Christi explicite credi non potest sine fide Trinitatis, quia in mysterio Christi hoc continetur quod filius Dei carnem assumpserit, quod per gratiam spiritus sancti mundum renovaverit, et iterum quod de spiritu sancto conceptus fuerit. Et ideo eo modo quo mysterium Christi ante Christum fuit quidem explicite creditum a maioribus, implicite autem et quasi obumbrate a minoribus, ita etiam et mysterium Trinitatis. Et ideo etiam post tempus gratiae divulgatae tenentur omnes ad explicite credendum mysterium Trinitatis. Et omnes qui renascuntur in Christo hoc adipiscuntur per invocationem Trinitatis, secundum illud Matth. ult., euntes, docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti. I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the world through the grace of the Holy Spirit; and again, that He was conceived by the Holy Spirit. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but implicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace had been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation of the Trinity, according to Matt. 28:19: Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa duo explicite credere de Deo omni tempore et quoad omnes necessarium fuit. Non tamen est sufficiens omni tempore et quoad omnes. Reply Obj. 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and for all people. Ad secundum dicendum quod ante Christi adventum fides Trinitatis erat occulta in fide maiorum. Sed per Christum manifestata est mundo per apostolos. Reply Obj. 2: Before Christ’s coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it was shown to the world. Ad tertium dicendum quod summa bonitas Dei secundum modum quo nunc intelligitur per effectus, potest intelligi absque Trinitate personarum. Sed secundum quod intelligitur in seipso, prout videtur a beatis, non potest intelligi sine Trinitate personarum. Et iterum ipsa missio personarum divinarum perducit nos in beatitudinem. Reply Obj. 3: God’s sovereign goodness as we understand it now through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of Persons: but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness. Articulus 9 Article 9 Utrum credere sit meritorium Whether to believe is meritorious? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod credere non sit meritorium. Principium enim merendi est caritas, ut supra dictum est. Sed fides est praeambula ad caritatem, sicut et natura. Ergo, sicut actus naturae non est meritorius (quia naturalibus non meremur), ita etiam nec actus fidei. Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not meritorious. For the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith. Praeterea, credere medium est inter opinari et scire vel considerare scita. Sed consideratio scientiae non est meritoria; similiter autem nec opinio. Ergo etiam neque credere est meritorium. Obj. 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious. Praeterea, ille qui assentit alicui rei credendo aut habet causam sufficienter inducentem ipsum ad credendum, aut non. Si habet sufficiens inductivum ad credendum, non videtur hoc ei esse meritorium, quia non est ei iam liberum credere et non credere. Si autem non habet sufficiens inductivum ad credendum, levitatis est credere, secundum illud Eccli. XIX, qui cito credit levis est corde, et sic non videtur esse meritorium. Ergo credere nullo modo est meritorium. Obj. 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: He that is hasty to give credit, is light of heart, so that, seemingly, he gains no merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means meritorious. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Heb. XI, quod sancti per fidem adepti sunt repromissiones. Quod non esset nisi credendo mererentur. Ergo ipsum credere est meritorium. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 11:33) that the saints by faith . . . obtained promises, which would not be the case if they did not merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus nostri sunt meritorii inquantum procedunt ex libero arbitrio moto a Deo per gratiam. Unde omnis actus humanus qui subiicitur libero arbitrio, si sit relatus in Deum, potest meritorius esse. Ipsum autem credere est actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam, et sic subiacet libero arbitrio in ordine ad Deum. Unde actus fidei potest esse meritorius. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, AA. 3, 4), our actions are meritorious insofar as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura comparatur ad caritatem, quae est merendi principium, sicut materia ad formam. Fides autem comparatur ad caritatem sicut dispositio praecedens ultimam formam. Manifestum est autem quod subiectum vel materia non potest agere in virtute formae, neque etiam dispositio praecedens, antequam forma adveniat. Sed postquam forma advenerit, tam subiectum quam dispositio praecedens agit in virtute formae, quae est principale agendi principium, sicut calor ignis agit in virtute formae substantialis. Sic ergo neque natura neque fides sine caritate possunt producere actum meritorium, sed caritate superveniente, actus fidei fit meritorius per caritatem, sicut et actus naturae et naturalis liberi arbitrii. Reply Obj. 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle of action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without charity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and a natural act of the free-will. Ad secundum dicendum quod in scientia duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipse assensus scientis ad rem scitam, et consideratio rei scitae. Assensus autem scientiae non subiicitur libero arbitrio, quia sciens cogitur ad assentiendum per efficaciam demonstrationis. Et ideo assensus scientiae non est meritorius. Sed consideratio actualis rei scitae subiacet libero arbitrio, est enim in potestate hominis considerare vel non considerare. Et ideo consideratio scientiae potest esse meritoria, si referatur ad finem caritatis, idest ad honorem Dei vel utilitatem proximi. Sed in fide utrumque subiacet libero arbitrio. Et ideo quantum ad utrumque actus fidei potest esse meritorius. Sed opinio non habet firmum assensum, est enim quoddam debile et infirmum, secundum Philosophum, in I Poster. Unde non videtur procedere ex perfecta voluntate. Et sic ex parte assensus non multum videtur habere rationem meriti. Sed ex parte considerationis actualis potest meritoria esse. Reply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely the scientist’s assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration, wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider. Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e., to the honor of God or the good of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes (Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the actual consideration. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui credit habet sufficiens inductivum ad credendum, inducitur enim auctoritate divinae doctrinae miraculis confirmatae, et, quod plus est, interiori instinctu Dei invitantis. Unde non leviter credit. Tamen non habet sufficiens inductivum ad sciendum. Et ideo non tollitur ratio meriti. Reply Obj. 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the merit. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum ratio inducta ad ea quae sunt fidei diminuat meritum fidei Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio inducta ad ea quae sunt fidei diminuat meritum fidei. Dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam homilia, quod fides non habet meritum cui humana ratio praebet experimentum. Si ergo ratio humana sufficienter experimentum praebens totaliter excludit meritum fidei, videtur quod qualiscumque ratio humana inducta ad ea quae sunt fidei diminuat meritum fidei. Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason. If, therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of believing. Praeterea, quidquid diminuit rationem virtutis diminuit rationem meriti, quia felicitas virtutis est praemium ut etiam philosophus dicit, in I Ethic. Sed ratio humana videtur diminuere rationem virtutis ipsius fidei, quia de ratione fidei est quod sit non apparentium, ut supra dictum est; quanto autem plures rationes inducuntur ad aliquid, tanto minus est non apparens. Ergo ratio humana inducta ad ea quae sunt fidei meritum fidei diminuit. Obj. 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens the amount of merit, since happiness is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Now the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the merit of faith. Praeterea, contrariorum contrariae sunt causae. Sed id quod inducitur in contrarium fidei auget meritum fidei, sive sit persecutio cogentis ad recedendum a fide, sive etiam sit ratio aliqua hoc persuadens. Ergo ratio coadiuvans fidem diminuit meritum fidei. Obj. 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so. Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith. Sed contra est quod I Petri III dicitur, parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in vobis est fide et spe. Non autem ad hoc induceret apostolus si per hoc meritum fidei diminueretur. Non ergo ratio diminuit meritum fidei. On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet 3:15): Being ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith and hope which is in you. Now the Apostle would not give this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith. Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, actus fidei potest esse meritorius inquantum subiacet voluntati non solum quantum ad usum, sed etiam quantum ad assensum. Ratio autem humana inducta ad ea quae sunt fidei dupliciter potest se habere ad voluntatem credentis. Uno quidem modo, sicut praecedens, puta cum quis aut non haberet voluntatem, aut non haberet promptam voluntatem ad credendum, nisi ratio humana induceretur. Et sic ratio humana inducta diminuit meritum fidei, sicut etiam supra dictum est quod passio praecedens electionem in virtutibus moralibus diminuit laudem virtuosi actus. Sicut enim homo actus virtutum moralium debet exercere propter iudicium rationis, non propter passionem; ita credere debet homo ea quae sunt fidei non propter rationem humanam, sed propter auctoritatem divinam. Alio modo ratio humana potest se habere ad voluntatem credentis consequenter. Cum enim homo habet promptam voluntatem ad credendum, diligit veritatem creditam, et super ea excogitat et amplectitur si quas rationes ad hoc invenire potest. Et quantum ad hoc ratio humana non excludit meritum fidei, sed est signum maioris meriti, sicut etiam passio consequens in virtutibus moralibus est signum promptioris voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. Et hoc significatur Ioan. IV, ubi Samaritani ad mulierem, per quam ratio humana figuratur, dixerunt, iam non propter tuam loquelam credimus. I answer that, As stated above (A. 9), the act of faith can be meritorious, insofar as it is subject to the will, not only as to the use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer. First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 77, A. 6, ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the Divine authority. Second, human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when a man’s will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: We now believe, not for thy saying (John 4:42). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur in casu illo quando homo non habet voluntatem credendi nisi propter rationem inductam. Quando autem homo habet voluntatem credendi ea quae sunt fidei ex sola auctoritate divina, etiam si habeat rationem demonstrativam ad aliquid eorum, puta ad hoc quod est Deum esse, non propter hoc tollitur vel minuitur meritum fidei. Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons. But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration of some of them, e.g., of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is not, for that reason, lost or diminished. Ad secundum dicendum quod rationes quae inducuntur ad auctoritatem fidei non sunt demonstrationes quae in visionem intelligibilem intellectum humanum reducere possunt. Et ideo non desinunt esse non apparentia. Sed removent impedimenta fidei, ostendendo non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur. Unde per tales rationes non diminuitur meritum fidei nec ratio fidei. Sed rationes demonstrativae inductae ad ea quae sunt fidei, praeambula tamen ad articulos, etsi diminuant rationem fidei, quia faciunt esse apparens id quod proponitur; non tamen diminuunt rationem caritatis, per quam voluntas est prompta ad ea credendum etiam si non apparerent. Et ideo non diminuitur ratio meriti. Reply Obj. 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand, though demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith, but not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is not diminished.