Sed contra est quod Ioan. XV dicitur, iam non dicam vos servos, sed amicos meos. Sed hoc non dicebatur eis nisi ratione caritatis. Ergo caritas est amicitia.
On the contrary, It is written (John 15:15): I will not now call you servants . . . but My friends. Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.
Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, in VIII Ethic., non quilibet amor habet rationem amicitiae, sed amor qui est cum benevolentia, quando scilicet sic amamus aliquem ut ei bonum velimus. Si autem rebus amatis non bonum velimus, sed ipsum eorum bonum velimus nobis, sicut dicimur amare vinum aut equum aut aliquid huiusmodi, non est amor amicitiae, sed cuiusdam concupiscentiae, ridiculum enim est dicere quod aliquis habeat amicitiam ad vinum vel ad equum.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2, 3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.
Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiae, sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio, quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliqua communicatione.
Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.
Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. De qua quidem communicatione dicitur I ad Cor. I, fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem filii eius. Amor autem super hac communicatione fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum.
Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor 1:9): God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son. The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est hominis vita. Una quidem exterior secundum naturam sensibilem et corporalem, et secundum hanc vitam non est nobis communicatio vel conversatio cum Deo et Angelis.
Reply Obj. 1: Man’s life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels.
Alia autem est vita hominis spiritualis secundum mentem. Et secundum hanc vitam est nobis conversatio et cum Deo et cum Angelis. In praesenti quidem statu imperfecte, unde dicitur Philipp. III, nostra conversatio in caelis est. Sed ista conversatio perficietur in patria, quando servi eius servient Deo et videbunt faciem eius, ut dicitur Apoc. ult. Et ideo hic est caritas imperfecta, sed perficietur in patria.
The other is man’s spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written (Phil 3:20): Our conversation is in heaven. But this conversation will be perfected in heaven, when His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face (Rev 22:3, 4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.
Ad secundum dicendum quod amicitia se extendit ad aliquem dupliciter. Uno modo, respectu sui ipsius, et sic amicitia nunquam est nisi ad amicum. Alio modo se extendit ad aliquem respectu alterius personae, sicut, si aliquis habet amicitiam ad aliquem hominem, ratione eius diligit omnes ad illum hominem pertinentes, sive filios sive servos sive qualitercumque ei attinentes.
Reply Obj. 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one’s friends: second, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way.
Et tanta potest esse dilectio amici quod propter amicum amantur hi qui ad ipsum pertinent etiam si nos offendant vel odiant. Et hoc modo amicitia caritatis se extendit etiam ad inimicos, quos diligimus ex caritate in ordine ad Deum, ad quem principaliter habetur amicitia caritatis.
Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.
Ad tertium dicendum quod amicitia honesti non habetur nisi ad virtuosum sicut ad principalem personam, sed eius intuitu diliguntur ad eum attinentes etiam si non sint virtuosi. Et hoc modo caritas, quae maxime est amicitia honesti, se extendit ad peccatores, quos ex caritate diligimus propter Deum.
Reply Obj. 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God’s sake.
Utrum caritas sit aliquid creatum in anima
Whether charity is something created in the soul?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit aliquid creatum in anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in VIII de Trin., qui proximum diligit, consequens est ut ipsam dilectionem diligat. Deus autem dilectio est. Consequens est ergo ut praecipue Deum diligat. Et in XV de Trin. dicit, ita dictum est, Deus caritas est, sicut dictum est, Deus spiritus est. Ergo caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima, sed est ipse Deus.
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself. Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17): It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.
Praeterea, Deus est spiritualiter vita animae, sicut anima vita corporis, secundum illud Deut. XXX, ipse est vita tua. Sed anima vivificat corpus per seipsam. Ergo Deus vivificat animam per seipsum. Vivificat autem eam per caritatem, secundum illud I Ioan. III, nos scimus quoniam translati sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam diligimus fratres. Ergo Deus est ipsa caritas.
Obj. 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul is the life of the body, according to Deut. 30:20: He is thy life. Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 John 3:14: We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. Therefore God is charity itself.
Praeterea, nihil creatum est infinitae virtutis, sed magis omnis creatura est vanitas. Caritas autem non est vanitas, sed magis vanitati repugnat, et est infinitae virtutis, quia animam hominis ad bonum infinitum perducit. Ergo caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima.
Obj. 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Doct. Christ., caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum. Sed motus animi est aliquid creatum in anima. Ergo et caritas est aliquid creatum in anima.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His own sake. But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.
Respondeo dicendum quod Magister perscrutatur hanc quaestionem in XVII dist. I Lib. Sent., et ponit quod caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima, sed est ipse Spiritus Sanctus mentem inhabitans. Nec est sua intentio quod iste motus dilectionis quo Deum diligimus sit ipse Spiritus Sanctus, sed quod iste motus dilectionis est a spiritu sancto non mediante aliquo habitu, sicut a spiritu sancto sunt alii actus virtuosi mediantibus habitibus aliarum virtutum, puta habitu spei aut fidei aut alicuius alterius virtutis. Et hoc dicebat propter excellentiam caritatis.
I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q. 17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Spirit Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Spirit Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Spirit without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Spirit by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the excellence of charity.
Sed si quis recte consideret, hoc magis redundat in caritatis detrimentum. Non enim motus caritatis ita procedit a spiritu sancto movente humanam mentem quod humana mens sit mota tantum et nullo modo sit principium huius motus, sicut cum aliquod corpus movetur ab aliquo exteriori movente. Hoc enim est contra rationem voluntarii, cuius oportet principium in ipso esse, sicut supra dictum est. Unde sequeretur quod diligere non esset voluntarium. Quod implicat contradictionem, cum amor de sui ratione importet quod sit actus voluntatis.
But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Spirit moves the human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 6, A. 1): so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.
Similiter etiam non potest dici quod sic moveat Spiritus Sanctus voluntatem ad actum diligendi sicut movetur instrumentum quod, etsi sit principium actus, non tamen est in ipso agere vel non agere. Sic enim etiam tolleretur ratio voluntarii, et excluderetur ratio meriti, cum tamen supra habitum sit quod dilectio caritatis est radix merendi. Sed oportet quod sic voluntas moveatur a spiritu sancto ad diligendum quod etiam ipsa sit efficiens hunc actum.
Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Spirit moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy Spirit to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act.
Nullus autem actus perfecte producitur ab aliqua potentia activa nisi sit ei connaturalis per aliquam formam quae sit principium actionis. Unde Deus, qui omnia movet ad debitos fines, singulis rebus indidit formas per quas inclinantur ad fines sibi praestitutos a Deo, et secundum hoc disponit omnia suaviter, ut dicitur Sap. VIII. Manifestum est autem quod actus caritatis excedit naturam potentiae voluntatis. Nisi ergo aliqua forma superadderetur naturali potentiae per quam inclinaretur ad dilectionis actum, secundum hoc esset actus iste imperfectior actibus naturalibus et actibus aliarum virtutum, nec esset facilis et delectabilis. Quod patet esse falsum, quia nulla virtus habet tantam inclinationem ad suum actum sicut caritas, nec aliqua ita delectabiliter operatur. Unde maxime necesse est quod ad actum caritatis existat in nobis aliqua habitualis forma superaddita potentiae naturali, inclinans ipsam ad caritatis actum, et faciens eam prompte et delectabiliter operari.
Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power by reason of some form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He ordereth all things sweetly (Wis 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipsa essentia divina caritas est, sicut et sapientia est, et sicut bonitas est. Unde sicut dicimur boni bonitate quae Deus est, et sapientes sapientia quae Deus est, quia bonitas qua formaliter boni sumus est participatio quaedam divinae bonitatis, et sapientia qua formaliter sapientes sumus est participatio quaedam divinae sapientiae; ita etiam caritas qua formaliter diligimus proximum est quaedam participatio divinae caritatis. Hic enim modus loquendi consuetus est apud Platonicos, quorum doctrinis Augustinus fuit imbutus. Quod quidam non advertentes ex verbis eius sumpserunt occasionem errandi.
Reply Obj. 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus est vita effective et animae per caritatem et corporis per animam, sed formaliter caritas est vita animae, sicut et anima corporis. Unde per hoc potest concludi quod, sicut anima immediate unitur corpori, ita caritas animae.
Reply Obj. 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.
Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas operatur formaliter. Efficacia autem formae est secundum virtutem agentis qui inducit formam. Et ideo quod caritas non est vanitas, sed facit effectum infinitum dum coniungit animam Deo iustificando ipsam, hoc demonstrat infinitatem virtutis divinae, quae est caritatis auctor.
Reply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.
Utrum caritas sit virtus
Whether charity is a virtue?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit virtus. Caritas enim est amicitia quaedam. Sed amicitia a philosophis non ponitur virtus, ut in libro Ethic. patet, neque enim connumeratur inter virtutes morales neque inter intellectuales. Ergo etiam neque caritas est virtus.
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a virtue, as may be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.
Praeterea, virtus est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed caritas non est ultimum; sed magis gaudium et pax. Ergo videtur quod caritas non sit virtus; sed magis gaudium et pax.
Obj. 2: Further, virtue is the ultimate limit of power (De Caelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
Praeterea, omnis virtus est quidam habitus accidentalis. Sed caritas non est habitus accidentalis, cum sit nobilior ipsa anima; nullum autem accidens est nobilius subiecto. Ergo caritas non est virtus.
Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., caritas est virtus quae, cum nostra rectissima affectio est, coniungit nos Deo, qua eum diligimus.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love Him.
Respondeo dicendum quod humani actus bonitatem habent secundum quod regulantur debita regula et mensura, et ideo humana virtus, quae est principium omnium bonorum actuum hominis, consistit in attingendo regulam humanorum actuum. Quae quidem est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet humana ratio, et ipse Deus.
I answer that, Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle of all man’s good acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz. human reason and God.
Unde sicut virtus moralis definitur per hoc quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut patet in II Ethic., ita etiam attingere Deum constituit rationem virtutis, sicut etiam supra dictum est de fide et spe. Unde, cum caritas attingit Deum, quia coniungit nos Deo, ut patet per auctoritatem Augustini inductam; consequens est caritatem esse virtutem.
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being in accord with right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to faith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Ethic. non negat amicitiam esse virtutem, sed dicit quod est virtus vel cum virtute. Posset enim dici quod est virtus moralis circa operationes quae sunt ad alium, sub alia tamen ratione quam iustitia. Nam iustitia est circa operationes quae sunt ad alium sub ratione debiti legalis, amicitia autem sub ratione cuiusdam debiti amicabilis et moralis, vel magis sub ratione beneficii gratuiti, ut patet per Philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Potest tamen dici quod non est virtus per se ab aliis distincta. Non enim habet rationem laudabilis et honesti nisi ex obiecto, secundum scilicet quod fundatur super honestate virtutum, quod patet ex hoc quod non quaelibet amicitia habet rationem laudabilis et honesti, sicut patet in amicitia delectabilis et utilis. Unde amicitia virtuosa magis est aliquid consequens ad virtutes quam sit virtus. Nec est simile de caritate, quae non fundatur principaliter super virtute humana, sed super bonitate divina.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is either a virtue or with a virtue. For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, insofar, to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.
Ad secundum dicendum quod eiusdem virtutis est diligere aliquem et gaudere de illo, nam gaudium amorem consequitur, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo magis ponitur virtus amor quam gaudium, quod est amoris effectus. Ultimum autem quod ponitur in ratione virtutis non importat ordinem effectus, sed magis ordinem superexcessus cuiusdam, sicut centum librae excedunt sexaginta.
Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love. And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
Ad tertium dicendum quod omne accidens secundum suum esse est inferius substantia, quia substantia est ens per se, accidens autem in alio. Sed secundum rationem suae speciei, accidens quidem quod causatur ex principiis subiecti est indignius subiecto, sicut effectus causa. Accidens autem quod causatur ex participatione alicuius superioris naturae est dignius subiecto, inquantum est similitudo superioris naturae, sicut lux diaphano. Et hoc modo caritas est dignior anima, inquantum est participatio quaedam spiritus sancti.
Reply Obj. 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is superior to its subject, insofar as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way charity is superior to the soul, inasmuch as it is a participation of the Holy Spirit.
Utrum caritas sit virtus specialis
Whether charity is a special virtue?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit virtus specialis. Dicit enim Hieronymus, ut breviter omnem virtutis definitionem complectar, virtus est caritas, qua diligitur Deus et proximus. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod virtus est ordo amoris. Sed nulla virtus specialis ponitur in definitione virtutis communis. Ergo caritas non est specialis virtus.
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome says: Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby we love God: and Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that virtue is the order of love. Now no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.