Articulus 9 Article 9 Utrum sit de necessitate caritatis quod aliquis signa et effectus dilectionis inimico exhibeat Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the signs and effects of love? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod de necessitate caritatis sit quod aliquis homo signa vel effectus dilectionis inimico exhibeat. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, non diligamus verbo neque lingua, sed opere et veritate. Sed opere diligit aliquis exhibendo ad eum quem diligit signa et effectus dilectionis. Ergo de necessitate caritatis est ut aliquis huiusmodi signa et effectus inimicis exhibeat. Objection 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 John 3:18): Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth. Now a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects of love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such signs and effects of love. Praeterea, Matth. V dominus simul dicit, diligite inimicos vestros, et, benefacite his qui oderunt vos. Sed diligere inimicos est de necessitate caritatis. Ergo et benefacere inimicis. Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Matt 5:44): Love your enemies, and, Do good to them that hate you. Now charity demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we should do good to them. Praeterea, caritate amatur non solum Deus, sed etiam proximus. Sed Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, quod amor Dei non potest esse otiosus, magna enim operatur, si est; si desinit operari, amor non est. Ergo caritas quae habetur ad proximum non potest esse sine operationis effectu. Sed de necessitate caritatis est ut omnis proximus diligatur, etiam inimicus. Ergo de necessitate caritatis est ut etiam ad inimicos signa et effectus dilectionis extendamus. Obj. 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx), that love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love. Hence charity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and effects of love towards our enemies. Sed contra est quod Matth. V, super illud, benefacite his qui oderunt vos, dicit Glossa quod benefacere inimicis est cumulus perfectionis. Sed id quod pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis non est de necessitate ipsius. Ergo non est de necessitate caritatis quod aliquis signa et effectus dilectionis inimicis exhibeat. On the contrary, A gloss on Matt. 5:44, Do good to them that hate you, says: To do good to one’s enemies is the height of perfection. Now charity does not require us to do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies. Respondeo dicendum quod effectus et signa caritatis ex interiori dilectione procedunt et ei proportionantur. Dilectio autem interior ad inimicum in communi quidem est de necessitate praecepti absolute; in speciali autem non absolute, sed secundum praeparationem animi, ut supra dictum est. I answer that, The effects and signs of charity are the result of inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above (A. 8). Sic igitur dicendum est de effectu vel signo dilectionis exterius exhibendo. Sunt enim quaedam beneficia vel signa dilectionis quae exhibentur proximis in communi, puta cum aliquis orat pro omnibus fidelibus vel pro toto populo, aut cum aliquod beneficium impendit aliquis toti communitati. Et talia beneficia vel dilectionis signa inimicis exhibere est de necessitate praecepti, si enim non exhiberentur inimicis, hoc pertineret ad livorem vindictae, contra id quod dicitur Levit. XIX, non quaeres ultionem; et non eris memor iniuriae civium tuorum. Alia vero sunt beneficia vel dilectionis signa quae quis exhibet particulariter aliquibus personis. Et talia beneficia vel dilectionis signa inimicis exhibere non est de necessitate salutis nisi secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet subveniatur eis in articulo necessitatis, secundum illud Proverb. XXV, si esurierit inimicus tuus, ciba illum, si sitit, da illi potum. Sed quod praeter articulum necessitatis huiusmodi beneficia aliquis inimicis exhibeat, pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis, per quam aliquis non solum cavet vinci a malo, quod necessitatis est, sed etiam vult in bono vincere malum, quod est etiam perfectionis, dum scilicet non solum cavet propter iniuriam sibi illatam detrahi ad odium; sed etiam propter sua beneficia inimicum intendit pertrahere ad suum amorem. We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and signs of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to our neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or for a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole community: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to what is written (Lev 19:18): Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens. But there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according to Prov. 25:21: If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him . . . drink. Outside cases of urgency, to show such like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but also wish to overcome evil by good, which belongs to perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on account of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to love us on account of our kindliness. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum debeamus angelos ex caritate diligere Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelos non debeamus ex caritate diligere. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, in libro de Doct. Christ., gemina est dilectio caritatis, scilicet Dei et proximi. Sed dilectio Angelorum non continetur sub dilectione Dei, cum sint substantiae creatae, nec etiam videtur contineri sub dilectione proximi, cum non communicent nobiscum in specie. Ergo Angeli non sunt ex caritate diligendi. Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity is a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of the angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are created substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species. Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity. Praeterea, magis conveniunt nobiscum bruta animalia quam Angeli, nam nos et bruta animalia sumus in eodem genere propinquo. Sed ad bruta animalia non habemus caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam neque ad Angelos. Obj. 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do. But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (A. 3). Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels. Praeterea, nihil est ita proprium amicorum sicut convivere, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed Angeli non convivunt nobiscum, nec etiam eos videre possumus. Ergo ad eos caritatis amicitiam habere non valemus. Obj. 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give them the friendship of charity. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., iam vero si vel cui praebendum, vel a quo nobis praebendum est officium misericordiae, recte proximus dicitur; manifestum est praecepto quo iubemur diligere proximum, etiam sanctos Angelos contineri, a quibus multa nobis misericordiae impenduntur officia. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): If the name of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those who pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our neighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many merciful favors. Respondeo dicendum quod amicitia caritatis, sicut supra dictum est, fundatur super communicatione beatitudinis aeternae, in cuius participatione communicant cum Angelis homines, dicitur enim Matth. XXII quod in resurrectione erunt homines sicut Angeli in caelo. Et ideo manifestum est quod amicitia caritatis etiam ad Angelos se extendit. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in which men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Matt 22:30) that in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of God in heaven. It is therefore evident that the friendship of charity extends also to the angels. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod proximus non solum dicitur communicatione speciei, sed etiam communicatione beneficiorum pertinentium ad vitam aeternam; super qua communicatione amicitia caritatis fundatur. Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded. Ad secundum dicendum quod bruta animalia conveniunt nobiscum in genere propinquo ratione naturae sensitivae, secundum quam non sumus participes aeternae beatitudinis, sed secundum mentem rationalem; in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers of everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our rational mind wherein we associate with the angels. Ad tertium dicendum quod Angeli non convivunt nobis exteriori conversatione, quae nobis est secundum sensitivam naturam. Convivimus tamen Angelis secundum mentem, imperfecte quidem in hac vita, perfecte autem in patria, sicut et supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1). Articulus 11 Article 11 Utrum debeamus daemones ex caritate diligere Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Daemones ex caritate debeamus diligere. Angeli enim sunt nobis proximi inquantum communicamus cum eis in rationali mente. Sed etiam Daemones sic nobiscum communicant, quia data naturalia in eis manent integra, scilicet esse, vivere et intelligere, ut dicitur in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo debemus Daemones ex caritate diligere. Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their fellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in our fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and understanding, remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity. Praeterea, Daemones differunt a beatis Angelis differentia peccati, sicut et peccatores homines a iustis. Sed iusti homines ex caritate diligunt peccatores. Ergo etiam ex caritate debent diligere Daemones. Obj. 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also out of charity. Praeterea, illi a quibus beneficia nobis impenduntur debent a nobis ex caritate diligi tanquam proximi, sicut patet ex auctoritate Augustini supra inducta. Sed Daemones nobis in multis sunt utiles, dum nos tentando nobis coronas fabricant, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei. Ergo Daemones sunt ex caritate diligendi. Obj. 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the passage of Augustine quoted above (A. 9). Now the demons are useful to us in many things, for by tempting us they work crowns for us, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XXVIII, delebitur foedus vestrum cum morte, et pactum vestrum cum Inferno non stabit. Sed perfectio pacis et foederis est per caritatem. Ergo ad Daemones, qui sunt Inferni incolae et mortis procuratores, caritatem habere non debemus. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 28:18): Your league with death shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not stand. Now the perfection of a peace and covenant is through charity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who live in hell and compass death. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in peccatoribus ex caritate debemus diligere naturam, peccatum odire. In nomine autem Daemonis significatur natura peccato deformata. Et ideo Daemones ex caritate non sunt diligendi. Et si non fiat vis in nomine, et quaestio referatur ad illos spiritus qui Daemones dicuntur, utrum sint ex caritate diligendi, respondendum est, secundum praemissa, quod aliquid ex caritate diligitur dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ad quem amicitia habetur. Et sic ad illos spiritus caritatis amicitiam habere non possumus. Pertinet enim ad rationem amicitiae ut amicis nostris bonum velimus. Illud autem bonum vitae aeternae quod respicit caritas, spiritibus illis a Deo aeternaliter damnatis ex caritate velle non possumus, hoc enim repugnaret caritati Dei, per quam eius iustitiam approbamus. I answer that, As stated above (A. 6), in the sinner, we are bound, out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance with the statement made above (AA. 2, 3), that a thing may be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as the person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have the friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential part of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one’s friend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the good of everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those spirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this would be in opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His justice. Alio modo diligitur aliquid sicut quod volumus permanere ut bonum alterius, per quem modum ex caritate diligimus irrationales creaturas, inquantum volumus eas permanere ad gloriam Dei et utilitatem hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et per hunc modum et naturam Daemonum etiam ex caritate diligere possumus, inquantum scilicet volumus illos spiritus in suis naturalibus conservari ad gloriam Dei. Second, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be enduring as another’s good. In this way we love irrational creatures out of charity, inasmuch as we wish them to endure, to give glory to God and be useful to man, as stated above (A. 3): and in this way too we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, inasmuch as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, unto God’s glory. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mens Angelorum non habet impossibilitatem ad aeternam beatitudinem habendam, sicut habet mens Daemonum. Et ideo amicitia caritatis, quae fundatur super communicatione vitae aeternae magis quam super communicatione naturae, habetur ad Angelos, non autem ad Daemones. Reply Obj. 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon; consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of nature, is possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons. Ad secundum dicendum quod homines peccatores in hac vita habent possibilitatem perveniendi ad beatitudinem aeternam. Quod non habent illi qui sunt in Inferno damnati; de quibus, quantum ad hoc, est eadem ratio sicut et de Daemonibus. Reply Obj. 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons. Ad tertium dicendum quod utilitas quae nobis ex Daemonibus provenit non est ex eorum intentione, sed ex ordinatione divinae providentiae. Et ideo ex hoc non inducimur ad habendum amicitiam eorum, sed ad hoc quod simus Deo amici, qui eorum perversam intentionem convertit in nostram utilitatem. Reply Obj. 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their perverse intention to our profit. Articulus 12 Article 12 Utrum convenienter enumerentur quatuor ex caritate diligenda: scilicet Deus, proximus, corpus nostrum, et nos ipsi? Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur quatuor ex caritate diligenda, scilicet Deus, proximus, corpus nostrum et nos ipsi. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., qui non diligit Deum, nec seipsum diligit. In Dei ergo dilectione includitur dilectio sui ipsius. Non ergo est alia dilectio sui ipsius, et alia dilectio Dei. Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan. lxxxiii), he that loveth not God, loveth not himself. Hence love of oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is not distinct from the love of God. Praeterea, pars non debet dividi contra totum. Sed corpus nostrum est quaedam pars nostri. Non ergo debet dividi, quasi aliud diligibile, corpus nostrum a nobis ipsis. Obj. 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole. But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love. Praeterea, sicut nos habemus corpus, ita etiam et proximus. Sicut ergo dilectio qua quis diligit proximum, distinguitur a dilectione qua quis diligit seipsum; ita dilectio qua quis diligit corpus proximi, debet distingui a dilectione qua quis diligit corpus suum. Non ergo convenienter distinguuntur quatuor ex caritate diligenda. Obj. 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man loves his neighbor’s body, ought to be distinct from the love with which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quatuor sunt diligenda, unum quod supra nos est, scilicet Deus; alterum quod nos sumus; tertium quod iuxta nos est, scilicet proximus; quartum quod infra nos est, scilicet proprium corpus. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): There are four things to be loved; one which is above us, namely God, another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us, namely our neighbor, and a fourth which is beneath us, namely our own body.