De ordine caritatis
The Order of Charity
Deinde considerandum est de ordine caritatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tredecim.
We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum sit aliquis ordo in caritate.
(1) Whether there is an order in charity?
Secundo, utrum homo debeat Deum diligere plus quam proximum.
(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?
Tertio, utrum plus quam seipsum.
(3) Whether more than himself?
Quarto, utrum se plus quam proximum.
(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?
Quinto, utrum homo debeat plus diligere proximum quam corpus proprium.
(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?
Sexto, utrum unum proximum plus quam alterum.
(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?
Septimo, utrum plus proximum meliorem, vel sibi magis coniunctum.
(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who is more closely united to him?
Octavo, utrum coniunctum sibi secundum carnis affinitatem, vel secundum alias necessitudines.
(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or one who is united to him by other ties?
Nono, utrum ex caritate plus debeat diligere filium quam patrem.
(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his father?
Decimo, utrum magis debeat diligere matrem quam patrem.
(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?
Undecimo, utrum uxorem plus quam patrem vel matrem.
(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?
Duodecimo, utrum magis benefactorem quam beneficiatum.
(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those whom we are kind to?
Decimotertio, utrum ordo caritatis maneat in patria.
(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
Utrum in caritate sit ordo
Whether there is order in charity?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in caritate non sit aliquis ordo. Caritas enim quaedam virtus est. Sed in aliis virtutibus non assignatur aliquis ordo. Ergo neque in caritate aliquis ordo assignari debet.
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues. Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.
Praeterea, sicuti fidei obiectum est prima veritas, ita caritatis obiectum est summa bonitas. Sed in fide non ponitur aliquis ordo, sed omnia aequaliter creduntur. Ergo nec in caritate debet poni aliquis ordo.
Obj. 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither, therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.
Praeterea, caritas in voluntate est. Ordinare autem non est voluntatis, sed rationis. Ergo ordo non debet attribui caritati.
Obj. 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs, not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be ascribed to charity.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Cant. II, introduxit me rex in cellam vinariam; ordinavit in me caritatem.
On the contrary, It is written (Song 2:4): He brought me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., prius et posterius dicitur secundum relationem ad aliquod principium. Ordo autem includit in se aliquem modum prioris et posterioris. Unde oportet quod ubicumque est aliquod principium, sit etiam aliquis ordo. Dictum autem est supra quod dilectio caritatis tendit in Deum sicut in principium beatitudinis, in cuius communicatione amicitia caritatis fundatur. Et ideo oportet quod in his quae ex caritate diliguntur attendatur aliquis ordo, secundum relationem ad primum principium huius dilectionis, quod est Deus.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms before and after are used in reference to some principle. Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some kind. But it has been said above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25, A. 12) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is God.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas tendit in ultimum finem sub ratione finis ultimi, quod non convenit alicui alii virtuti, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem habet rationem principii in appetibilibus et in agendis, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo caritas maxime importat comparationem ad primum principium. Et ideo in ea maxime consideratur ordo secundum relationem ad primum principium.
Reply Obj. 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 6). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of appetite and action, as was shown above (Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; I-II, A. 1, ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order in reference to the First Principle.
Ad secundum dicendum quod fides pertinet ad vim cognitivam, cuius operatio est secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Caritas autem est in vi affectiva, cuius operatio consistit in hoc quod anima tendit in ipsas res. Ordo autem principalius invenitur in ipsis rebus; et ex eis derivatur ad cognitionem nostram. Et ideo ordo magis appropriatur caritati quam fidei.
Reply Obj. 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand, charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is more appropriate to charity than to faith.
Licet etiam in fide sit aliquis ordo, secundum quod principaliter est de Deo, secundario autem de aliis quae referuntur ad Deum.
And yet there is a certain order in faith, insofar as it is chiefly about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ordo pertinet ad rationem sicut ad ordinantem, sed ad vim appetitivam pertinet sicut ad ordinatam. Et hoc modo ordo in caritate ponitur.
Reply Obj. 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in this way that order is stated to be in charity.
Utrum Deus sit magis diligendus quam proximus
Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit magis diligendus quam proximus. Dicitur enim I Ioan. IV, qui non diligit fratrem suum, quem videt, Deum, quem non videt, quomodo potest diligere? Ex quo videtur quod illud sit magis diligibile quod est magis visibile, nam et visio est principium amoris, ut dicitur IX Ethic. Sed Deus est minus visibilis quam proximus. Ergo etiam est minus ex caritate diligibilis.
Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not? Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix, 5, 12. Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.
Praeterea, similitudo est causa dilectionis, secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit simile sibi. Sed maior est similitudo hominis ad proximum suum quam ad Deum. Ergo homo ex caritate magis diligit proximum quam Deum.
Obj. 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: Every beast loveth its like. Now man bears more likeness to his neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he loves God.
Praeterea, illud quod in proximo caritas diligit, Deus est; ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doct. Christ. Sed Deus non est maior in seipso quam in proximo. Ergo non est magis diligendus in seipso quam in proximo. Ergo non debet magis diligi Deus quam proximus.
Obj. 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27). Now God is not greater in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love God more than our neighbor.
Sed contra, illud magis est diligendum propter quod aliqua odio sunt habenda. Sed proximi sunt odio habendi propter Deum, si scilicet a Deo abducunt, secundum illud Luc. XIV, si quis venit ad me et non odit patrem et matrem et uxorem et filios et fratres et sorores, non potest meus esse discipulus. Ergo Deus est magis ex caritate diligendus quam proximus.
On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God’s sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke 14:26: If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be My disciple. Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor.
Respondeo dicendum quod unaquaeque amicitia respicit principaliter illud in quo principaliter invenitur illud bonum super cuius communicatione fundatur, sicut amicitia politica principalius respicit principem civitatis, a quo totum bonum commune civitatis dependet; unde et ei maxime debetur fides et obedientia a civibus. Amicitia autem caritatis fundatur super communicatione beatitudinis, quae consistit essentialiter in Deo sicut in primo principio, a quo derivatur in omnes qui sunt beatitudinis capaces.
I answer that, Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends; hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable of happiness.
Et ideo principaliter et maxime Deus est ex caritate diligendus, ipse enim diligitur sicut beatitudinis causa; proximus autem sicut beatitudinem simul nobiscum ab eo participans.
Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dupliciter est aliquid causa dilectionis. Uno modo, sicut id quod est ratio diligendi. Et hoc modo bonum est causa diligendi, quia unumquodque diligitur inquantum habet rationem boni. Alio modo, quia est via quaedam ad acquirendum dilectionem. Et hoc modo visio est causa dilectionis, non quidem ita quod ea ratione sit aliquid diligibile quia est visibile; sed quia per visionem perducimur ad dilectionem non ergo oportet quod illud quod est magis visibile sit magis diligibile, sed quod prius occurrat nobis ad diligendum. Et hoc modo argumentatur apostolus. Proximus enim, quia est nobis magis visibilis, primo occurrit nobis diligendus, ex his enim quae novit animus discit incognita amare, ut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia. Unde si aliquis proximum non diligit, argui potest quod nec Deum diligit, non propter hoc quod proximus sit magis diligibilis; sed quia prius diligendus occurrit. Deus autem est magis diligibilis propter maiorem bonitatem.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Second, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle’s argument. For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, because the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love what it knows not, as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.