Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tristitia quae est vitium causatur ex inordinato amore sui, quod non est aliquod speciale vitium, sed quaedam generalis radix vitiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo oportuit tristitias quasdam particulares ponere specialia vitia, quia non derivantur ab aliquo speciali vitio, sed a generali. Sed amor Dei ponitur specialis virtus, quae est caritas, ad quam reducitur gaudium, ut dictum est, sicut proprius actus eius. Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of the vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated above (here and A. 2). Ad secundum dicendum quod spes consequitur ex amore sicut et gaudium, sed spes addit ex parte obiecti quandam specialem rationem, scilicet arduum et possibile adipisci; et ideo ponitur specialis virtus. Sed gaudium ex parte obiecti nullam rationem specialem addit supra amorem quae possit causare specialem virtutem. Reply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz. difficult, and possible to obtain; for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue. Ad tertium dicendum quod intantum datur praeceptum legis de gaudio inquantum est actus caritatis; licet non sit primus actus eius. Reply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of charity, albeit not its first act. Quaestio 29 Question 29 De pace Peace Deinde considerandum est de pace. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider peace, under which head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum pax sit idem quod concordia. (1) Whether peace is the same as concord? Secundo, utrum omnia appetant pacem. (2) Whether all things desire peace? Tertio, utrum pax sit effectus caritatis. (3) Whether peace is an effect of charity? Quarto, utrum pax sit virtus. (4) Whether peace is a virtue? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum pax sit idem quod concordia Whether peace is the same as concord? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pax sit idem quod concordia. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod pax hominum est ordinata concordia. Sed non loquimur nunc nisi de pace hominum. Ergo pax est idem quod concordia. Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): Peace among men is well ordered concord. Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord. Praeterea, concordia est quaedam unio voluntatum. Sed ratio pacis in tali unione consistit, dicit enim Dionysius, XI cap. de Div. Nom., quod pax est omnium unitiva et consensus operativa. Ergo pax est idem quod concordia. Obj. 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as concord. Praeterea, quorum est idem oppositum, et ipsa sunt idem. Sed idem opponitur concordiae et paci, scilicet dissensio, unde dicitur, I ad Cor. XIV, non est dissensionis Deus, sed pacis. Ergo pax est idem quod concordia. Obj. 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor 16:33): God is not the God of dissension but of peace. Therefore peace is the same as concord. Sed contra est quod concordia potest esse aliquorum impiorum in malo. Sed non est pax impiis, ut dicitur Isaiae XLVIII. Ergo pax non est idem quod concordia. On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But there is no peace to the wicked (Isa 48:22). Therefore peace is not the same as concord. Respondeo dicendum quod pax includit concordiam et aliquid addit. Unde ubicumque est pax, ibi est concordia, non tamen ubicumque est concordia, est pax, si nomen pacis proprie sumatur. I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning. Concordia enim, proprie sumpta, est ad alterum, inquantum scilicet diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt. Contingit etiam unius hominis cor tendere in diversa, et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum diversas potentias appetitivas, sicut appetitus sensitivus plerumque tendit in contrarium rationalis appetitus, secundum illud ad Gal. V, caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Alio modo, inquantum una et eadem vis appetitiva in diversa appetibilia tendit quae simul assequi non potest. Unde necesse est esse repugnantiam motuum appetitus. Unio autem horum motuum est quidem de ratione pacis, non enim homo habet pacatum cor quandiu, etsi habeat aliquid quod vult, tamen adhuc restat ei aliquid volendum quod simul habere non potest. Haec autem unio non est de ratione concordiae. Unde concordia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium, pax autem, supra hanc unionem, importat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem. For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, insofar as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal. 5:17: The flesh lusteth against the spirit. Second, insofar as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man’s heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even in one man. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de pace quae est unius hominis ad alium. Et hanc pacem dicit esse concordiam, non quamlibet, sed ordinatam, ex eo scilicet quod unus homo concordat cum alio secundum illud quod utrique convenit. Si enim homo concordet cum alio non spontanea voluntate, sed quasi coactus timore alicuius mali imminentis, talis concordia non est vere pax, quia non servatur ordo utriusque concordantis, sed perturbatur ab aliquo timorem inferente. Et propter hoc praemittit quod pax est tranquillitas ordinis. Quae quidem tranquillitas consistit in hoc quod omnes motus appetitivi in uno homine conquiescunt. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both of them. For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that peace is tranquillity of order, which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si homo simul cum alio homine in idem consentiat, non tamen consensus eius est omnino unitus nisi etiam sibi invicem omnes motus appetitivi eius sint consentientes. Reply Obj. 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in agreement. Ad tertium dicendum quod paci opponitur duplex dissensio, scilicet dissensio hominis ad seipsum, et dissensio hominis ad alterum. Concordiae vero opponitur haec sola secunda dissensio. Reply Obj. 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum omnia appetant pacem Whether all things desire peace? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia appetant pacem. Pax enim, secundum Dionysium, est unitiva consensus. Sed in his quae cognitione carent non potest uniri consensus. Ergo huiusmodi pacem appetere non possunt. Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace unites consent. But there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace. Praeterea, appetitus non fertur simul ad contraria. Sed multi sunt appetentes bella et dissensiones. Ergo non omnes appetunt pacem. Obj. 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do not desire peace. Praeterea, solum bonum est appetibile. Sed quaedam pax videtur esse mala, alioquin dominus non diceret, Matth. X, non veni mittere pacem. Ergo non omnia pacem appetunt. Obj. 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matt 10:34): I came not to send peace. Therefore all things do not desire peace. Praeterea, illud quod omnia appetunt videtur esse summum bonum, quod est ultimus finis. Sed pax non est huiusmodi, quia etiam in statu viae habetur; alioquin frustra dominus mandaret, Marc. IX, pacem habete inter vos. Ergo non omnia pacem appetunt. Obj. 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command (Mark 9:49): Have peace among you. Therefore all things do not desire peace. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod omnia pacem appetunt. Et idem etiam dicit Dionysius, XI cap. de Div. Nom. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12, 14) that all things desire peace: and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi). Respondeo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod homo aliquid appetit, consequens est ipsum appetere eius quod appetit assecutionem, et per consequens remotionem eorum quae consecutionem impedire possunt. Potest autem impediri assecutio boni desiderati per contrarium appetitum vel sui ipsius vel alterius, et utrumque tollitur per pacem, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est quod omne appetens appetat pacem, inquantum scilicet omne appetens appetit tranquille et sine impedimento pervenire ad id quod appetit, in quo consistit ratio pacis, quam Augustinus definit tranquillitatem ordinis. I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, insofar as he who desires anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) the tranquillity of order. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pax importat unionem non solum appetitus intellectualis seu rationalis aut animalis, ad quos potest pertinere consensus, sed etiam appetitus naturalis. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod pax est operativa et consensus et connaturalitatis, ut in consensu importetur unio appetituum ex cognitione procedentium; per connaturalitatem vero importatur unio appetituum naturalium. Reply Obj. 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness, where consent denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and connaturalness, the union of natural appetites. Ad secundum dicendum quod illi etiam qui bella quaerunt et dissensiones non desiderant nisi pacem, quam se habere non aestimant. Ut enim dictum est, non est pax si quis cum alio concordet contra id quod ipse magis vellet. Et ideo homines quaerunt hanc concordiam rumpere bellando, tanquam defectum pacis habentem, ut ad pacem perveniant in qua nihil eorum voluntati repugnet. Et propter hoc omnes bellantes quaerunt per bella ad pacem aliquam pervenire perfectiorem quam prius haberent. Reply Obj. 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia pax consistit in quietatione et unione appetitus; sicut autem appetitus potest esse vel boni simpliciter vel boni apparentis, ita etiam et pax potest esse et vera et apparens, vera quidem pax non potest esse nisi circa appetitum veri boni; quia omne malum, etsi secundum aliquid appareat bonum, unde ex aliqua parte appetitum quietet, habet tamen multos defectus, ex quibus appetitus remanet inquietus et perturbatus. Unde pax vera non potest esse nisi in bonis et bonorum. Pax autem quae malorum est, est pax apparens et non vera. Unde dicitur Sap. XIV, in magno viventes inscientiae bello, tot et tanta mala pacem arbitrati sunt. Reply Obj. 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is written (Wis 14:22): Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace. Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum vera pax non sit nisi de bono, sicut dupliciter habetur verum bonum, scilicet perfecte et imperfecte, ita est duplex pax vera. Una quidem perfecta, quae consistit in perfecta fruitione summi boni, per quam omnes appetitus uniuntur quietati in uno. Et hic est ultimus finis creaturae rationalis, secundum illud Psalm., qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Alia vero est pax imperfecta, quae habetur in hoc mundo. Quia etsi principalis animae motus quiescat in Deo, sunt tamen aliqua repugnantia et intus et extra quae perturbant hanc pacem. Reply Obj. 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one’s desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: Who hath placed peace in thy borders. The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum pax sit proprius effectus caritatis Whether peace is the proper effect of charity? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod pax non sit proprius effectus caritatis. Caritas enim non habetur sine gratia gratum faciente. Sed pax a quibusdam habetur qui non habent gratiam gratum facientem, sicut et gentiles aliquando habent pacem. Ergo pax non est effectus caritatis. Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.