Sed contra est quod apostolus, ad Coloss. III, cum dixisset, induite vos, sicut dilecti Dei, viscera misericordiae etc., postea subdit, super omnia, caritatem habete. Ergo misericordia non est maxima virtutum. On the contrary, The Apostle after saying (Col 3:12): Put ye on . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy, etc., adds (Col 3:14): Above all things have charity. Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues. Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua virtus potest esse maxima dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, per comparationem ad habentem. Secundum se quidem misericordia maxima est. Pertinet enim ad misericordiam quod alii effundat; et, quod plus est, quod defectus aliorum sublevet; et hoc est maxime superioris. Unde et misereri ponitur proprium Deo, et in hoc maxime dicitur eius omnipotentia manifestari. I answer that, A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways: first, in itself; second, in comparison with its subject. In itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested. Sed quoad habentem, misericordia non est maxima, nisi ille qui habet sit maximus, qui nullum supra se habeat, sed omnes sub se. Ei enim qui supra se aliquem habet maius est et melius coniungi superiori quam supplere defectum inferioris. Et ideo quantum ad hominem, qui habet Deum superiorem, caritas, per quam Deo unitur, est potior quam misericordia, per quam defectus proximorum supplet. Sed inter omnes virtutes quae ad proximum pertinent potissima est misericordia, sicut etiam est potioris actus, nam supplere defectum alterius, inquantum huiusmodi, est superioris et melioris. On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others, surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to supply the defect of that which is beneath. . Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, insofar as the latter is deficient. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deum non colimus per exteriora sacrificia aut munera propter ipsum, sed propter nos et propter proximos, non enim indiget sacrificiis nostris, sed vult ea sibi offerri propter nostram devotionem et proximorum utilitatem. Et ideo misericordia, qua subvenitur defectibus aliorum, est sacrificium ei magis acceptum, utpote propinquius utilitatem proximorum inducens, secundum illud Heb. ult., beneficentiae et communionis nolite oblivisci, talibus enim hostiis promeretur Deus. Reply Obj. 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we supply others’ defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor’s well-being, according to Heb. 13:16: Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained. Ad secundum dicendum quod summa religionis Christianae in misericordia consistit quantum ad exteriora opera. Interior tamen affectio caritatis, qua coniungimur Deo, praeponderat et dilectioni et misericordiae in proximos. Reply Obj. 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor. Ad tertium dicendum quod per caritatem assimilamur Deo tanquam ei per affectum uniti. Et ideo potior est quam misericordia, per quam assimilamur Deo secundum similitudinem operationis. Reply Obj. 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as regards similarity of works. Quaestio 31 Question 31 De beneficentia Beneficence Deinde considerandum est de exterioribus actibus vel effectibus caritatis. Et primo, de beneficentia; secundo, de eleemosyna, quae est quaedam pars beneficentiae; tertio, de correctione fraterna, quae est quaedam eleemosyna. We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum beneficentia sit actus caritatis. (1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity? Secundo, utrum sit omnibus benefaciendum. (2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all? Tertio, utrum magis coniunctis sit magis benefaciendum. (3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us? Quarto, utrum beneficentia sit virtus specialis. (4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum beneficentia sit actus caritatis Whether beneficence is an act of charity? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beneficentia non sit actus caritatis. Caritas enim maxime habetur ad Deum. Sed ad eum non possumus esse benefici, secundum illud Iob XXXV, quid dabis ei? Aut quid de manu tua accipiet? Ergo beneficentia non est actus caritatis. Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity. For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God, according to Job 35:7: What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He receive of thy hand? Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity. Praeterea, beneficentia maxime consistit in collatione donorum. Sed hoc pertinet ad liberalitatem. Ergo beneficentia non est actus caritatis, sed liberalitatis. Obj. 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of liberality and not of charity. Praeterea, omne quod quis dat, vel dat sicut debitum vel dat sicut non debitum. Sed beneficium quod impenditur tanquam debitum pertinet ad iustitiam, quod autem impenditur tanquam non debitum, gratis datur, et secundum hoc pertinet ad misericordiam. Ergo omnis beneficentia vel est actus iustitiae vel est actus misericordiae. Non est ergo actus caritatis. Obj. 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of charity. Sed contra, caritas est amicitia quaedam, ut dictum est. Sed philosophus, in IX Ethic., inter alios amicitiae actus ponit hoc unum quod est operari bonum ad amicos, quod est amicis benefacere. Ergo beneficentia est actus caritatis. On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) doing good, i.e., being beneficent, to one’s friends. Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to others. Respondeo dicendum quod beneficentia nihil aliud importat quam facere bonum alicui. Potest autem hoc bonum considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem boni. Et hoc pertinet ad communem rationem beneficentiae. Et hoc est actus amicitiae, et per consequens caritatis. Nam in actu dilectionis includitur benevolentia, per quam aliquis vult bonum amico, ut supra habitum est. Voluntas autem est effectiva eorum quae vult, si facultas adsit. Et ideo ex consequenti benefacere amico ex actu dilectionis consequitur. Et propter hoc beneficentia secundum communem rationem, est amicitiae vel caritatis actus. I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 2). Now the will carries into effect if possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or charity. Si autem bonum quod quis facit alteri accipiatur sub aliqua speciali ratione boni, sic beneficentia accipiet specialem rationem, et pertinebit ad aliquam specialem virtutem. But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special character and will belong to some special virtue. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor movet ordinata ad mutuam habitudinem, et inferiora convertit in superiora ut ab eis perficiantur, et superiora movet ad inferiorum provisionem. Et quantum ad hoc beneficentia est effectus dilectionis. Et ideo nostrum non est Deo benefacere, sed eum honorare, nos ei subiiciendo, eius autem est ex sua dilectione nobis benefacere. Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), love moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the superior to watch over the inferior: and in this respect beneficence is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to bestow good things on us. Ad secundum dicendum quod in collatione donorum duo sunt attendenda, quorum unum est exterius datum; aliud autem est interior passio quam habet quis ad divitias, in eis delectatus. Ad liberalitatem autem pertinet moderari interiorem passionem, ut scilicet aliquis non superexcedat in concupiscendo et amando divitias, ex hoc enim efficietur homo facile emissivus donorum. Unde si homo det aliquod donum magnum, et tamen cum quadam concupiscentia retinendi, datio non est liberalis. Sed ex parte exterioris dati collatio beneficii pertinet in generali ad amicitiam vel caritatem. Unde hoc non derogat amicitiae, si aliquis rem quam concupiscit retinere det alicui propter amorem; sed magis ex hoc ostenditur amicitiae perfectio. Reply Obj. 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract from a man’s friendship, if, through love, he give his friend something he would like to keep for himself; rather does this prove the perfection of his friendship. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut amicitia seu caritas respicit in beneficio collato communem rationem boni, ita iustitia respicit ibi rationem debiti. Misericordia vero respicit ibi rationem relevantis miseriam vel defectum. Reply Obj. 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of distress or defect. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum sit omnibus benefaciendum Whether we ought to do good to all? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit omnibus benefaciendum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Doct. Christ., quod omnibus prodesse non possumus. Sed virtus non inclinat ad impossibile. Ergo non oportet omnibus benefacere. Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we are unable to do good to everyone. Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all. Praeterea, Eccli. XII dicitur, da iusto, et non recipias peccatorem. Sed multi homines sunt peccatores. Non ergo omnibus est benefaciendum. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Sir 12:5) Give to the good, and receive not a sinner. But many men are sinners. Therefore we need not do good to all. Praeterea, caritas non agit perperam, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Sed benefacere quibusdam est agere perperam, puta si aliquis benefaciat inimicis reipublicae; vel si benefaciat excommunicato, quia per hoc ei communicat. Ergo, cum benefacere sit actus caritatis, non est omnibus benefaciendum. Obj. 3: Further, Charity dealeth not perversely (1 Cor 13:4). Now to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of charity, we ought not to do good to all. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal. ult., dum tempus habemus, operemur bonum ad omnes. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal 6:10): Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, beneficentia consequitur amorem ex ea parte qua movet superiora ad provisionem inferiorum. Gradus autem in hominibus non sunt immutabiles, sicut in Angelis, quia homines possunt pati multiplices defectus; unde qui est superior secundum aliquid, vel est vel potest esse inferior secundum aliud. Et ideo, cum dilectio caritatis se extendat ad omnes, etiam beneficentia se debet extendere ad omnes, pro loco tamen et tempore, omnes enim actus virtutum sunt secundum debitas circumstantias limitandi. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), beneficence is an effect of love insofar as love moves the superior to watch over the inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels, because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to all, but according as time and place require: because all acts of virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, simpliciter loquendo, non possumus omnibus benefacere in speciali, nullus tamen est de quo non possit occurrere casus in quo oporteat ei benefacere etiam in speciali. Et ideo caritas requirit ut homo, etsi non actu alicui benefaciat, habeat tamen hoc in sui animi praeparatione, ut benefaciat cuicumque si tempus adesset. Aliquod tamen beneficium est quod possumus omnibus impendere, si non in speciali saltem in generali, sicut cum oramus pro omnibus fidelibus et infidelibus. Reply Obj. 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the faithful. Ad secundum dicendum quod in peccatore duo sunt, scilicet culpa et natura. Est ergo subveniendum peccatori quantum ad sustentationem naturae, non est autem ei subveniendum ad fomentum culpae; hoc enim non esset benefacere, sed potius malefacere. Reply Obj. 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this would be to do evil rather than good. Ad tertium dicendum quod excommunicatis et reipublicae hostibus sunt beneficia subtrahenda inquantum per hoc arcentur a culpa. Si tamen immineret necessitas, ne natura deficeret, esset eis subveniendum, debito tamen modo, puta ne fame aut siti morerentur, aut aliquod huiusmodi dispendium, nisi secundum ordinem iustitiae, paterentur. Reply Obj. 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal are deprived of all beneficence, insofar as this prevents them from doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like distress, unless this be according to the order of justice. Articulus 3 Article 3