Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus non prohibet simpliciter vocare amicos aut consanguineos ad convivium, sed vocare eos ea intentione quod te ipsi reinvitent. Hoc enim non erit caritatis, sed cupiditatis. Potest tamen contingere quod extranei sint magis invitandi in aliquo casu, propter maiorem indigentiam. Intelligendum est enim quod magis coniunctis magis est, ceteris paribus, benefaciendum. Si autem duorum unus sit magis coniunctus et alter magis indigens, non potest universali regula determinari cui sit magis subveniendum, quia sunt diversi gradus et indigentiae et propinquitatis, sed hoc requirit prudentis iudicium. Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want as well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a prudent man. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum commune multorum divinius est quam bonum unius. Unde pro bono communi reipublicae vel spiritualis vel temporalis virtuosum est quod aliquis etiam propriam vitam exponat periculo. Et ideo, cum communicatio in bellicis ordinetur ad conservationem reipublicae, in hoc miles impendens commilitoni auxilium, non impendit ei tanquam privatae personae, sed sicut totam rempublicam iuvans. Et ideo non est mirum si in hoc praefertur extraneus coniuncto secundum carnem. Reply Obj. 2: The common good of many is more godlike than the good of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as a private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country as a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be preferred to one who is a blood relation. Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est debitum. Unum quidem quod non est numerandum in bonis eius qui debet, sed potius in bonis eius cui debetur. Puta si aliquis habet pecuniam aut rem aliam alterius vel furto sublatam vel mutuo acceptam sive depositam, vel aliquo alio simili modo, quantum ad hoc plus debet homo reddere debitum quam ex eo benefacere coniunctis. Nisi forte esset tantae necessitatis articulus in quo etiam liceret rem alienam accipere ad subveniendum necessitatem patienti. Nisi forte et ille cui res debetur in simili necessitate esset. In quo tamen casu pensanda esset utriusque conditio secundum alias conditiones, prudentis iudicio, quia in talibus non potest universalis regula dari, propter varietatem singulorum casuum, ut Philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic. Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may have another’s goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take another’s property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet, again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would take into consideration, because, on account of the different particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down a general rule. Aliud autem est debitum quod computatur in bonis eius qui debet, et non eius cui debetur, puta si debeatur non ex necessitate iustitiae, sed ex quadam morali aequitate, ut contingit in beneficiis gratis susceptis. Nullius autem benefactoris beneficium est tantum sicut parentum, et ideo parentes in recompensandis beneficiis sunt omnibus aliis praeferendi; nisi necessitas ex alia parte praeponderaret, vel aliqua alia conditio, puta communis utilitas Ecclesiae vel reipublicae. In aliis autem est aestimatio habenda et coniunctionis et beneficii suscepti. Quae similiter non potest communi regula determinari. The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the other side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit received; and here again no general rule can laid down. Ad quartum dicendum quod parentes sunt sicut superiores, et ideo amor parentum est ad benefaciendum, amor autem filiorum ad honorandum parentes. Et tamen in necessitatis extremae articulo magis liceret deserere filios quam parentes; quos nullo modo deserere licet, propter obligationem beneficiorum susceptorum; ut patet per Philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Reply Obj. 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent’s love tends to conferring benefits, while the children’s love tends to honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it would be lawful to abandon one’s children rather than one’s parents, to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14). Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum beneficentia sit specialis virtus Whether beneficence is a special virtue? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beneficentia sit specialis virtus. Praecepta enim ad virtutes ordinantur, quia legislatores intendunt facere homines virtuosos, sicut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed seorsum datur praeceptum de beneficentia et de dilectione, dicitur enim Matth. V, diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite his qui oderunt vos. Ergo beneficentia est virtus distincta a caritate. Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men virtuous (Ethic. i 9, 13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Matt 5:44): Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you. Therefore beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity. Praeterea, vitia virtutibus opponuntur. Sed beneficentiae opponuntur aliqua specialia vitia, per quae nocumentum proximo infertur, puta rapina, furtum et alia huiusmodi. Ergo beneficentia est specialis virtus. Obj. 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore beneficence is a special virtue. Praeterea, caritas non distinguitur in multas species. Sed beneficentia videtur distingui in multas species, secundum diversas beneficiorum species. Ergo beneficentia est alia virtus a caritate. Obj. 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according to the various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue from charity. Sed contra est quod actus interior et exterior non requirunt diversas virtutes. Sed beneficentia et benevolentia non differunt nisi sicut actus exterior et interior, quia beneficentia est executio benevolentiae. Ergo, sicut benevolentia non est alia virtus a caritate, ita nec beneficentia. On the contrary, The internal and the external act do not require different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as external and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of goodwill. Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from charity, so neither is beneficence. Respondeo dicendum quod virtutes diversificantur secundum diversas rationes obiecti. Eadem autem est ratio formalis obiecti caritatis et beneficentiae, nam utraque respicit communem rationem boni, ut ex praedictis patet. Unde beneficentia non est alia virtus a caritate, sed nominat quendam caritatis actum. I answer that, Virtues differ according to the different aspects of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect of good, as explained above (A. 1). Wherefore beneficence is not a distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praecepta non dantur de habitibus virtutum, sed de actibus. Et ideo diversitas praeceptorum non significat diversos habitus virtutum, sed diversos actus. Reply Obj. 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not of habits, but of acts. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut omnia beneficia proximo exhibita, inquantum considerantur sub communi ratione boni, reducuntur ad amorem; ita omnia nocumenta, inquantum considerantur secundum communem rationem mali, reducuntur ad odium. Prout autem considerantur secundum aliquas speciales rationes vel boni vel mali, reducuntur ad aliquas speciales virtutes vel vitia. Et secundum hoc etiam sunt diversae beneficiorum species. Reply Obj. 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are various kinds of benefits. Unde patet responsio ad tertium. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Quaestio 32 Question 32 De eleemosyna Almsgiving Deinde considerandum est de eleemosyna. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. We must now consider almsgiving, under which head there are ten points of inquiry: Primo, utrum eleemosynae largitio sit actus caritatis. (1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity? Secundo, de distinctione eleemosynarum. (2) Of the different kinds of alms; Tertio, quae sint potiores eleemosynae, utrum spirituales vel corporales. (3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal? Quarto, utrum corporales eleemosynae habeant effectum spiritualem. (4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect? Quinto, utrum dare eleemosynas sit in praecepto. (5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept? Sexto, utrum corporalis eleemosyna sit danda de necessario. (6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need? Septimo, utrum sit danda de iniuste acquisito. (7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods? Octavo, quorum sit dare eleemosynam. (8) Who can give alms? Nono, quibus sit danda. (9) To whom should we give alms? Decimo, de modo dandi eleemosynas. (10) How should alms be given? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum dare eleemosynam sit actus caritatis Whether almsgiving is an act of charity? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dare eleemosynam non sit actus caritatis. Actus enim caritatis non potest esse sine caritate. Sed largitio eleemosynarum potest esse sine caritate, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, si distribuero in cibos pauperum omnes facultates meas, caritatem autem non habuero. Ergo dare eleemosynam non est actus caritatis. Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity. For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity. Praeterea, eleemosyna computatur inter opera satisfactionis, secundum illud Dan. IV, peccata tua eleemosynis redime. Sed satisfactio est actus iustitiae. Ergo dare eleemosynam non est actus caritatis, sed iustitiae. Obj. 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction, according to Dan. 4:24: Redeem thou thy sins with alms. Now satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of justice and not of charity. Praeterea, offerre hostiam Deo est actus latriae. Sed dare eleemosynam est offerre hostiam Deo, secundum illud ad Heb. ult., beneficentiae et communionis nolite oblivisci, talibus enim hostiis promeretur Deus. Ergo caritatis non est actus dare eleemosynam, sed magis latriae. Obj. 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to Heb. 13:16: Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity, but of religion. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod dare aliquid propter bonum est actus liberalitatis. Sed hoc maxime fit in largitione eleemosynarum. Ergo dare eleemosynam non est actus caritatis. Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that to give for a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, qui habuerit substantiam huius mundi, et viderit fratrem suum necessitatem patientem, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo, quomodo caritas Dei manet in illo? On the contrary, It is written 2 John 3:17: He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him? Respondeo dicendum quod exteriores actus ad illam virtutem referuntur ad quam pertinet id quod est motivum ad agendum huiusmodi actus. Motivum autem ad dandum eleemosynas est ut subveniatur necessitatem patienti, unde quidam, definientes eleemosynam, dicunt quod eleemosyna est opus quo datur aliquid indigenti ex compassione propter Deum. Quod quidem motivum pertinet ad misericordiam, ut supra dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod dare eleemosynam proprie est actus misericordiae. Et hoc apparet ex ipso nomine, nam in Graeco a misericordia derivatur, sicut in Latino miseratio. Et quia misericordia est effectus caritatis, ut supra ostensum est, ex consequenti dare eleemosynam est actus caritatis, misericordia mediante. I answer that, External acts belong to that virtue which regards the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion and for God’s sake, which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above (Q. 30, AA. 1, 2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in Greek (eleemosyne) it is derived from having mercy (eleein) even as the Latin miseratio is. And since mercy is an effect of charity, as shown above (Q. 30, A. 2, A. 3, Obj. 3), it follows that almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.