Ad secundum dicendum quod Gregorius convenienter assignat filias acediae. Quia enim, ut Philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., nullus diu absque delectatione potest manere cum tristitia, necesse est quod ex tristitia aliquid dupliciter oriatur, uno modo, ut homo recedat a contristantibus; alio modo, ut ad alia transeat in quibus delectatur, sicut illi qui non possunt gaudere in spiritualibus delectationibus transferunt se ad corporales, secundum Philosophum, in X Ethic. In fuga autem tristitiae talis processus attenditur quod primo homo fugit contristantia; secundo, etiam impugnat ea quae tristitiam ingerunt. Spiritualia autem bona, de quibus tristatur acedia, sunt et finis et id quod est ad finem. Fuga autem finis fit per desperationem. Fuga autem bonorum quae sunt ad finem, quantum ad ardua, quae subsunt consiliis, fit per pusillanimitatem; quantum autem ad ea quae pertinent ad communem iustitiam, fit per torporem circa praecepta. Impugnatio autem contristantium bonorum spiritualium quandoque quidem est contra homines qui ad bona spiritualia inducunt, et hoc est rancor; quandoque vero se extendit ad ipsa spiritualia bona, in quorum detestationem aliquis adducitur, et hoc proprie est malitia. Inquantum autem propter tristitiam a spiritualibus aliquis transfert se ad delectabilia exteriora, ponitur filia acediae evagatio circa illicita. Per quod patet responsio ad ea quae circa singulas filias obiiciebantur. Nam malitia non accipitur hic secundum quod est genus vitiorum, sed sicut dictum est. Rancor etiam non accipitur hic communiter pro odio, sed pro quadam indignatione, sicut dictum est. Et idem dicendum est de aliis. Reply Obj. 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5, 6) no man can be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant, it follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man shuns whatever causes sorrow; second, that he passes to other things that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and second he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of despair, while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of faint-heartedness, and in matters of common righteousness, is the effect of sluggishness about the commandments. The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is called spite; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is properly called malice. Insofar as a man has recourse to external objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called wandering after unlawful things. From this it is clear how to reply to the objections against each of the daughters: for malice does not denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be understood as explained. Nor is spite taken as synonymous with hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same applies to the others. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam Cassianus, in libro de institutis Coenob., distinguit tristitiam ab acedia, sed convenientius Gregorius acediam tristitiam nominat. Quia sicut supra dictum est, tristitia non est vitium ab aliis distinctum secundum quod aliquis recedit a gravi et laborioso opere, vel secundum quascumque alias causas aliquis tristetur, sed solum secundum quod contristatur de bono divino. Quod pertinet ad rationem acediae, quae intantum convertit ad quietem indebitam inquantum aspernatur bonum divinum. Illa autem quae Isidorus ponit oriri ex tristitia et acedia reducuntur ad ea quae Gregorius ponit. Nam amaritudo, quam ponit Isidorus oriri ex tristitia, est quidam effectus rancoris. Otiositas autem et somnolentia reducuntur ad torporem circa praecepta, circa quae est aliquis otiosus, omnino ea praetermittens et somnolentus, ea negligenter implens. Omnia autem alia quinque quae ponit ex acedia oriri pertinent ad evagationem mentis circa illicita. Quae quidem secundum quod in ipsa arce mentis residet volentis importune ad diversa se diffundere, vocatur importunitas mentis; secundum autem quod pertinet ad cognitivam, dicitur curiositas; quantum autem ad locutionem, dicitur verbositas; quantum autem ad corpus in eodem loco non manens, dicitur inquietudo corporis, quando scilicet aliquis per inordinatos motus membrorum vagationem indicat mentis; quantum autem ad diversa loca, dicitur instabilitas. Vel potest accipi instabilitas secundum mutabilitatem propositi. Reply Obj. 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given by Cassian (De Instit. Coenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly (Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated above (A. 2), sorrow is not a distinct vice, insofar as a man shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any other cause whatever, but only insofar as he is sorry on account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest insofar as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for bitterness which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect of spite. Idleness and drowsiness are reduced to sluggishness about the precepts: for some are idle and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfill them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to the wandering of the mind after unlawful things. This tendency to wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is called uneasiness of the mind, but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is called curiosity; if it affect the speech it is called loquacity; and insofar as it affects a body that changes place, it is called restlessness of the body, when, to wit, a man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to another, it is called instability; or instability may denote changeableness of purpose. Quaestio 36 Question 36 De invidia Envy Deinde considerandum est de invidia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, quid sit invidia. (1) What is envy? Secundo, utrum sit peccatum. (2) Whether it is a sin? Tertio, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? Quarto, utrum sit vitium capitale, et de filiabus eius. (4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum invidia sit tristitia Whether envy is a kind of sorrow? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod invidia non sit tristitia. Obiectum enim tristitiae est malum. Sed obiectum invidiae est bonum, dicit enim Gregorius, in V Moral., de invido loquens, tabescentem mentem sua poena sauciat, quam felicitas torquet aliena. Ergo invidia non est tristitia. Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the envious man that self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which is racked by the prosperity of another. Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow. Praeterea, similitudo non est causa tristitiae, sed magis delectationis. Sed similitudo est causa invidiae, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhet., invidebunt tales quibus sunt aliqui similes aut secundum genus, aut secundum cognationem, aut secundum staturam, aut secundum habitum, aut secundum opinionem. Ergo invidia non est tristitia. Obj. 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10): Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation. Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow. Praeterea, tristitia ex aliquo defectu causatur, unde illi qui sunt in magno defectu sunt ad tristitiam proni, ut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Sed illi quibus modicum deficit, et qui sunt amatores honoris, et qui reputantur sapientes, sunt invidi; ut patet per Philosophum, in II Rhet. Ergo invidia non est tristitia. Obj. 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (I-II, Q. 47, A. 3) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow. Praeterea, tristitia delectationi opponitur. Oppositorum autem non est eadem causa. Ergo, cum memoria bonorum habitorum sit causa delectationis, ut supra dictum est, non erit causa tristitiae. Est autem causa invidiae, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhet., quod his aliqui invident qui habent aut possederunt quae ipsis conveniebant aut quae ipsi quandoque possidebant. Ergo invidia non est tristitia. Obj. 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 32, A. 3) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that we envy those who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we possessed at some time. Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow. Sed contra est quod Damascenus, in II libro, ponit invidiam speciem tristitiae, et dicit quod invidia est tristitia in alienis bonis. On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a species of sorrow, and says that envy is sorrow for another’s good. Respondeo dicendum quod obiectum tristitiae est malum proprium. Contingit autem id quod est alienum bonum apprehendi ut malum proprium. Et secundum hoc de bono alieno potest esse tristitia. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quando quis tristatur de bono alicuius inquantum imminet sibi ex hoc periculum alicuius nocumenti, sicut cum homo tristatur de exaltatione inimici sui, timens ne eum laedat. Et talis tristitia non est invidia, sed magis timoris effectus; ut philosophus dicit, in II Rhet. I answer that, The object of a man’s sorrow is his own evil. Now it may happen that another’s good is apprehended as one’s own evil, and in this way sorrow can be about another’s good. But this happens in two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another’s good, insofar as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves for his enemy’s prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9). Alio modo bonum alterius aestimatur ut malum proprium inquantum est diminutivum propriae gloriae vel excellentiae. Et hoc modo de bono alterius tristatur invidia. Et ideo praecipue de illis bonis homines invident in quibus est gloria, et in quibus homines amant honorari et in opinione esse; ut Philosophus dicit, in II Rhet. Second, another’s good may be reckoned as being one’s own evil, insofar as it conduces to the lessening of one’s own good name or excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another’s good: and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est bonum uni apprehendi ut malum alteri. Et secundum hoc tristitia aliqua potest esse de bono, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for sorrow to be about good, as stated above. Ad secundum dicendum quod quia invidia est de gloria alterius inquantum diminuit gloriam quam quis appetit, consequens est ut ad illos tantum invidia habeatur quibus homo vult se aequare vel praeferre in gloria. Hoc autem non est respectu multum a se distantium, nullus enim, nisi insanus, studet se aequare vel praeferre in gloria his qui sunt multo eo maiores, puta plebeius homo regi; vel etiam rex plebeio, quem multum excedit. Et ideo his qui multum distant vel loco vel tempore vel statu homo non invidet, sed his qui sunt propinqui, quibus se nititur aequare vel praeferre. Nam cum illi excedunt in gloria, accidit hoc contra nostram utilitatem, et inde causatur tristitia. Similitudo autem delectationem causat inquantum concordat voluntati. Reply Obj. 2: Since envy is about another’s good name insofar as it diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner whom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our will that these should be in better repute than we are, and that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure insofar as it is in agreement with the will. Ad tertium dicendum quod nullus conatur ad ea in quibus est multum deficiens. Et ideo cum aliquis in hoc eum excedat, non invidet. Sed si modicum deficiat, videtur quod ad hoc pertingere possit, et sic ad hoc conatur. Unde si frustraretur eius conatus propter excessum gloriae alterius, tristatur. Et inde est quod amatores honoris sunt magis invidi. Et similiter etiam pusillanimes sunt invidi, quia omnia reputant magna, et quidquid boni alicui accidat, reputant se in magno superatos esse. Unde et Iob V dicitur, parvulum occidit invidia. Et dicit Gregorius, in V Moral., quod invidere non possumus nisi eis quos nobis in aliquo meliores putamus. Reply Obj. 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort; wherefore, if his effort fails through the other’s reputation surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): Envy slayeth the little one, and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that we can envy those only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves. Ad quartum dicendum quod memoria praeteritorum bonorum, inquantum fuerunt habita, delectationem causat, sed inquantum sunt amissa, causant tristitiam. Et inquantum ab aliis habentur, causant invidiam, quia hoc maxime videtur gloriae propriae derogare. Et ideo dicit philosophus, in II Rhet., quod senes invident iunioribus; et illi qui multa expenderunt ad aliquid consequendum invident his qui parvis expensis illud sunt consecuti; dolent enim de amissione suorum bonorum, et de hoc quod alii consecuti sunt bona. Reply Obj. 4: Recollection of past goods insofar as we have had them, causes pleasure; insofar as we have lost them, causes sorrow; and insofar as others have them, causes envy, because that, above all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that others have acquired goods. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum invidia sit peccatum Whether envy is a sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod invidia non sit peccatum. Dicit enim Hieronymus, ad Laetam, de Instruct. filiae, habeat socias cum quibus discat, quibus invideat, quarum laudibus mordeatur. Sed nullus est sollicitandus ad peccandum. Ergo invidia non est peccatum. Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): Let her have companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and be nettled when they are praised. But no one should be advised to commit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin. Praeterea, invidia est tristitia de alienis bonis, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed hoc quandoque laudabiliter fit, dicitur enim Prov. XXIX, cum impii sumpserint principatum, gemet populus. Ergo invidia non semper est peccatum. Objection 2: Further, Envy is sorrow for another’s good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it is written (Prov 29:2): When the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn. Therefore envy is not always a sin. Praeterea, invidia zelum quendam nominat. Sed zelus quidam est bonus, zelus domus tuae comedit me. Secundum illud Psalm., ergo invidia non semper est peccatum. Obj. 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up. Therefore envy is not always a sin. Praeterea, poena dividitur contra culpam. Sed invidia est quaedam poena, dicit enim Gregorius, V Moral., cum devictum cor livoris putredo corruperit, ipsa quoque exteriora indicant quam graviter animum vesania instigat, color quippe pallore afficitur, oculi deprimuntur, mens accenditur, membra frigescunt, fit in cogitatione rabies, in dentibus stridor. Ergo invidia non est peccatum. Obj. 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): When the foul sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed, while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is gnashing with the teeth. Therefore envy is not a sin. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Gal. V, non efficiamur inanis gloriae cupidi, invicem provocantes, invicem invidentes. On the contrary, It is written (Gal 5:26): Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, invidia est tristitia de alienis bonis. Sed haec tristitia potest contingere quatuor modis. Uno quidem modo, quando aliquis dolet de bono alicuius inquantum ex eo timetur nocumentum vel sibi ipsi vel etiam aliis bonis. Et talis tristitia non est invidia, ut dictum est; et potest esse sine peccato. Unde Gregorius, XXII Moral., ait, evenire plerumque solet ut, non amissa caritate, et inimici nos ruina laetificet, et rursum eius gloria sine invidiae culpa contristet, cum et ruente eo quosdam bene erigi credimus, et proficiente illo plerosque iniuste opprimi formidamus. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), envy is sorrow for another’s good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man grieves for another’s good, through fear that it may cause harm either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy, as stated above (A. 1), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 11): It very often happens that without charity being lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we dread lest many suffer unjustly. Alio modo potest aliquis tristari de bono alterius, non ex eo quod ipse habet bonum, sed ex eo quod nobis deest bonum illud quod ipse habet. Et hoc proprie est zelus; ut Philosophus dicit, in II Rhet. Et si iste zelus sit circa bona honesta, laudabilis est, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, aemulamini spiritualia. Si autem sit de bonis temporalibus, potest esse cum peccato, et sine peccato. Tertio modo aliquis tristatur de bono alterius inquantum ille cui accidit bonum est eo indignus. Quae quidem tristitia non potest oriri ex bonis honestis, ex quibus aliquis iustus efficitur; sed sicut Philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., est de divitiis et de talibus, quae possunt provenire dignis et indignis. Et haec tristitia, secundum ipsum, vocatur nemesis, et pertinet ad bonos mores. Sed hoc ideo dicit quia considerabat ipsa bona temporalia secundum se, prout possunt magna videri non respicientibus ad aeterna. Sed secundum doctrinam fidei, temporalia bona quae indignis proveniunt ex iusta Dei ordinatione disponuntur vel ad eorum correctionem vel ad eorum damnationem, et huiusmodi bona quasi nihil sunt in comparatione ad bona futura, quae servantur bonis. Et ideo huiusmodi tristitia prohibetur in Scriptura sacra, secundum illud Psalm., noli aemulari in malignantibus, neque zelaveris facientes iniquitatem. Et alibi, pene effusi sunt gressus mei, quia zelavi super iniquos, pacem peccatorum videns. Quarto aliquis tristatur de bonis alicuius inquantum alter excedit ipsum in bonis. Et hoc proprie est invidia. Et istud semper est pravum, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., quia dolet de eo de quo est gaudendum, scilicet de bono proximi. Second, we may grieve over another’s good, not because he has it, but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor. 14:1: Be zealous for spiritual gifts: while, if it be about temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Third, one may grieve over another’s good, because he who happens to have that good is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow nemesis, saying that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he considered temporal goods in themselves, insofar as they may seem great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are unworthy, are so disposed according to God’s just ordinance, either for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity, and elsewhere (Ps 72:2, 3): My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners. Fourth, we grieve over a man’s good, insofar as his good surpasses ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor’s good. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ibi sumitur invidia pro zelo quo quis debet incitari ad proficiendum cum melioribus. Reply Obj. 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to strive to progress with those who are better than we are. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de tristitia alienorum bonorum secundum primum modum. Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers sorrow for another’s good in the first sense given above. Ad tertium dicendum quod invidia differt a zelo, sicut dictum est. Unde zelus aliquis potest esse bonus, sed invidia semper est mala. Reply Obj. 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil. Ad quartum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquod peccatum, ratione alicuius adiuncti, poenale esse; ut supra dictum est, cum de peccatis ageretur. Reply Obj. 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as stated above (I-II, Q. 87, A. 2) when we were treating of sins. Articulus 3 Article 3