Ad tertium dicendum quod discordia quae fuit inter Paulum et Barnabam fuit per accidens et non per se, uterque enim intendebat bonum, sed uni videbatur hoc esse bonum, alii aliud. Quod ad defectum humanum pertinebat, non enim erat talis controversia in his quae sunt de necessitate salutis. Quamvis hoc ipsum fuerit ex divina providentia ordinatum, propter utilitatem inde consequentem. Reply Obj. 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine providence, on account of the good which would ensue. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum discordia sit filia inanis gloriae Whether discord is a daughter of vainglory? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod discordia non sit filia inanis gloriae. Ira enim est aliud vitium ab inani gloria. Sed discordia videtur esse filia irae, secundum illud Prov. XV, vir iracundus provocat rixas. Ergo non est filia inanis gloriae. Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord is apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: A passionate man stirreth up strifes. Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., exponens illud quod habetur Ioan. VII, nondum erat spiritus datus, livor separat, caritas iungit. Sed discordia nihil est aliud quam quaedam separatio voluntatum. Ergo discordia procedit ex livore, idest invidia, magis quam ex inani gloria. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of John 7:39, As yet the Spirit was not given, says (Tract. xxxii) Malice severs, charity unites. Now discord is merely a separation of wills. Therefore discord arises from malice, i.e., envy, rather than from vainglory. Praeterea, illud ex quo multa mala oriuntur videtur esse vitium capitale. Sed discordia est huiusmodi, quia super illud Matth. XII, omne regnum contra se divisum desolabitur, dicit Hieronymus, quo modo concordia parvae res crescunt, sic discordia maximae dilabuntur. Ergo ipsa discordia debet poni vitium capitale, magis quam filia inanis gloriae. Obj. 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on Matt. 12:25, Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate, says: Just as concord makes small things thrive, so discord brings the greatest things to ruin. Therefore discord should itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of vainglory. Sed contra est auctoritas Gregorii, XXXI Moral. On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Respondeo dicendum quod discordia importat quandam disgregationem voluntatum, inquantum scilicet voluntas unius stat in uno, et voluntas alterius stat in altero. Quod autem voluntas alicuius in proprio sistat, provenit ex hoc quod aliquis ea quae sunt sua praefert his quae sunt aliorum. Quod cum inordinate fit, pertinet ad superbiam et inanem gloriam. Et ideo discordia, per quam unusquisque sequitur quod suum est et recedit ab eo quod est alterius, ponitur filia inanis gloriae. I answer that, Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far, to wit, as one man’s will holds fast to one thing, while the other man’s will holds fast to something else. Now if a man’s will holds fast to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers what is his own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, whereby a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from that of others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod rixa non est idem quod discordia. Nam rixa consistit in exteriori opere, unde convenienter causatur ab ira, quae movet animum ad nocendum proximo. Sed discordia consistit in disiunctione motuum voluntatis, quam facit superbia vel inanis gloria, ratione iam dicta. Reply Obj. 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from anger, which incites the mind to hurt one’s neighbor; whereas discord consists in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises from pride or vainglory, for the reason given above. Ad secundum dicendum quod in discordia consideratur quidem ut terminus a quo recessus a voluntate alterius, et quantum ad hoc causatur ex invidia. Ut terminus autem ad quem, accessus ad id quod est sibi proprium, et quantum ad hoc causatur ex inani gloria. Et quia in quolibet motu terminus ad quem est potior termino a quo (finis enim est potior principio), potius ponitur discordia filia inanis gloriae quam invidiae, licet ex utraque oriri possit secundum diversas rationes, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term wherefrom, i.e., another’s will from which we recede, and in this respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is the term whither, i.e., something of our own to which we cling, and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the term whither is more important than the term wherefrom (because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from both for different reasons, as stated. Ad tertium dicendum quod ideo concordia magnae res crescunt et per discordiam dilabuntur, quia virtus quanto est magis unita, tanto est fortior, et per separationem diminuitur; ut dicitur in libro de causis. Unde patet quod hoc pertinet ad proprium effectum discordiae, quae est divisio voluntatum, non autem pertinet ad originem diversorum vitiorum a discordia, per quod habeat rationem vitii capitalis. Reply Obj. 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because the more united a force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the weaker it becomes (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills, and in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as though it were a capital vice. Quaestio 38 Question 38 De contentione Contention Deinde considerandum est de contentione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum contentio sit peccatum mortale. (1) Whether contention is a mortal sin? Secundo, utrum sit filia inanis gloriae. (2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum contentio sit peccatum mortale Whether contention is a mortal sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contentio non sit peccatum mortale. Peccatum enim mortale in viris spiritualibus non invenitur. In quibus tamen invenitur contentio, secundum illud Luc. XXII, facta est contentio inter discipulos Iesu, quis eorum esset maior. Ergo contentio non est peccatum mortale. Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be found in them, according to Luke 22:24: And there was also a strife amongst the disciples of Jesus, which of them should . . . be the greatest. Therefore contention is not a mortal sin. Praeterea, nulli bene disposito debet placere peccatum mortale in proximo. Sed dicit apostolus, ad Philipp. I, quidam ex contentione Christum annuntiant; et postea subdit, et in hoc gaudeo, sed et gaudebo. Ergo contentio non est peccatum mortale. Obj. 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil 1:17): Some out of contention preach Christ, and afterwards he says (Phil 1:18): In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice. Therefore contention is not a mortal sin. Praeterea, contingit quod aliqui vel in iudicio vel in disputatione contendunt non aliquo animo malignandi, sed potius intendentes ad bonum, sicut illi qui contra haereticos disputando contendunt. Unde super illud, I Reg. XIV, accidit quadam die etc., dicit Glossa, Catholici contra haereticos contentiones commovent, ubi prius ad certamen convocantur. Ergo contentio non est peccatum mortale. Obj. 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, It came to pass one day, etc. says: Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless they are first challenged to dispute. Therefore contention is not a mortal sin. Praeterea, Iob videtur cum Deo contendisse, secundum illud Iob XXXIX, numquid qui contendit cum Deo tam facile conquiescit? Et tamen Iob non peccavit mortaliter, quia dominus de eo dicit, non estis locuti recte coram me, sicut servus meus Iob, ut habetur Iob ult. Ergo contentio non semper est peccatum mortale. Obj. 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to Job 39:32: Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced? And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him (Job 42:7): You have not spoken the thing that is right before me, as my servant Job hath. Therefore contention is not always a mortal sin. Sed contra est quod contrariatur praecepto apostoli, qui dicit II ad Tim. II, noli verbis contendere. Et Gal. V contentio numeratur inter opera carnis, quae qui agunt, regnum Dei non possident, ut ibidem dicitur. Sed omne quod excludit a regno Dei, et quod contrariatur praecepto, est peccatum mortale. Ergo contentio est peccatum mortale. On the contrary, It is against the precept of the Apostle who says (2 Tim 2:14): Contend not in words. Moreover (Gal 5:20) contention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated there (Gal 5:21) they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a mortal sin. Respondeo dicendum quod contendere est contra aliquem tendere. Unde sicut discordia contrarietatem quandam importat in voluntate, ita contentio contrarietatem quandam importat in locutione. Et propter hoc etiam cum oratio alicuius per contraria se diffundit, vocatur contentio, quae ponitur unus color rhetoricus a Tullio, qui dicit, contentio est cum ex contrariis rebus oratio efficitur, hoc pacto, habet assentatio iucunda principia, eadem exitus amarissimos affert. I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various contrary things in a speech, this is called contentio, which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he says that it consists in developing a speech from contrary things, for instance: Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter end. Contrarietas autem locutionis potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, quantum ad intentionem contendentis; alio modo, quantum ad modum. In intentione quidem considerandum est utrum aliquis contrarietur veritati, quod est vituperabile, vel falsitati, quod est laudabile. In modo autem considerandum est utrum talis modus contrariandi conveniat et personis et negotiis, quia hoc est laudabile (unde et Tullius dicit, in III Rhet., quod contentio est oratio acris ad confirmandum et confutandum accommodata), vel excedat convenientiam personarum et negotiorum, et sic contentio est vituperabilis. Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with regard to the intention of the contentious party, second, with regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation—or whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is blameworthy. Si ergo accipiatur contentio secundum quod importat impugnationem veritatis et inordinatum modum, sic est peccatum mortale. Et hoc modo definit Ambrosius contentionem, dicens, contentio est impugnatio veritatis cum confidentia clamoris. Si autem contentio dicatur impugnatio falsitatis cum debito modo acrimoniae, sic contentio est laudabilis. Si autem accipiatur contentio secundum quod importat impugnationem falsitatis cum inordinato modo, sic potest esse peccatum veniale, nisi forte tanta inordinatio fiat in contendendo quod ex hoc generetur scandalum aliorum. Unde et apostolus, cum dixisset, II ad Tim. II, noli verbis contendere, subdit, ad nihil enim utile est, nisi ad subversionem audientium. Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose defines contention: Contention is a disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence. If, however, contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim 2:14): Contend not in words, adds, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in discipulis Christi non erat contentio cum intentione impugnandi veritatem, quia unusquisque defendebat quod sibi verum videbatur. Erat tamen in eorum contentione inordinatio, quia contendebant de quo non erat contendendum, scilicet de primatu honoris; nondum enim erant spirituales, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit. Unde et dominus eos consequenter compescuit. Reply Obj. 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and for this reason Our Lord checked them. Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui ex contentione Christum praedicabant reprehensibiles erant, quia quamvis non impugnarent veritatem fidei, sed eam praedicarent, impugnabant tamen veritatem quantum ad hoc quod putabant se suscitare pressuram apostolo veritatem fidei praedicanti. Unde apostolus non gaudebat de eorum contentione, sed de fructu qui ex hoc proveniebat, scilicet quod Christus annuntiabatur, quia ex malis etiam occasionaliter subsequuntur bona. Reply Obj. 2: Those who preached Christ out of contention, were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith, but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that they thought they would raise affliction to the Apostle who was preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that Christ would be made known—since evil is sometimes the occasion of good results. Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum completam rationem contentionis prout est peccatum mortale, ille in iudicio contendit qui impugnat veritatem iustitiae, et in disputatione contendit qui intendit impugnare veritatem doctrinae. Et secundum hoc Catholici non contendunt contra haereticos, sed potius e converso. Si autem accipiatur contentio in iudicio vel disputatione secundum imperfectam rationem, scilicet secundum quod importat quandam acrimoniam locutionis, sic non semper est peccatum mortale. Reply Obj. 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when, whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e., in respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin. Ad quartum dicendum quod contentio ibi sumitur communiter pro disputatione. Dixerat enim Iob, XIII cap., ad omnipotentem loquar, et disputare cum Deo cupio, non tamen intendens neque veritatem impugnare, sed exquirere; neque circa hanc inquisitionem aliqua inordinatione vel animi vel vocis uti. Reply Obj. 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job had said (13:3): I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to reason with God: yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be inordinate in mind or in speech. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum contentio sit filia inanis gloriae Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contentio non sit filia inanis gloriae. Contentio enim affinitatem habet ad zelum, unde dicitur I ad Cor. III, cum sit inter vos zelus et contentio, nonne carnales estis, et secundum hominem ambulatis? Zelus autem ad invidiam pertinet. Ergo contentio magis ex invidia oritur. Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1 Cor 3:3): Whereas there is among you zeal and contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men? Now zeal pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy. Praeterea, contentio cum clamore quodam est. Sed clamor ex ira oritur; ut patet per Gregorium, XXXI Moral. Ergo etiam contentio oritur ex ira. Obj. 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice. But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger. Praeterea, inter alia scientia praecipue videtur esse materia superbiae et inanis gloriae, secundum illud I ad Cor. VIII, scientia inflat. Sed contentio provenit plerumque ex defectu scientiae, per quam veritas cognoscitur, non impugnatur. Ergo contentio non est filia inanis gloriae. Obj. 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: Knowledge puffeth up. Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore contention is not a daughter of vainglory. Sed contra est auctoritas Gregorii, XXXI Moral. On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).