Ad secundum dicendum quod non obedire praeceptis cum rebellione quadam constituit schismatis rationem. Dico autem cum rebellione, cum et pertinaciter praecepta Ecclesiae contemnit, et iudicium eius subire recusat. Hoc autem non facit quilibet peccator. Unde non omne peccatum est schisma. Reply Obj. 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously disobeying the commandments: and I say rebelliously, since a schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this, wherefore not every sin is a schism. Ad tertium dicendum quod haeresis et schisma distinguuntur secundum ea quibus utrumque per se et directe opponitur. Nam haeresis per se opponitur fidei, schisma autem per se opponitur unitati ecclesiasticae caritatis. Et ideo sicut fides et caritas sunt diversae virtutes, quamvis quicumque careat fide careat caritate; ita etiam schisma et haeresis sunt diversa vitia, quamvis quicumque est haereticus sit etiam schismaticus, sed non convertitur. Et hoc est quod Hieronymus dicit, in Epist. ad Gal., inter schisma et haeresim hoc interesse arbitror, quod haeresis perversum dogma habet, schisma ab Ecclesia separat. Et tamen sicut amissio caritatis est via ad amittendum fidem, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, a quibus quidam aberrantes, scilicet a caritate et aliis huiusmodi, conversi sunt in vaniloquium; ita etiam schisma est via ad haeresim. Unde Hieronymus ibidem subdit quod schisma a principio aliqua in parte potest intelligi diversum ab haeresi, ceterum nullum schisma est, nisi sibi aliquam haeresim confingat, ut recte ab Ecclesia recessisse videatur. Reply Obj. 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians: I consider the difference between schism and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from the Church. Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: From which things, i.e., charity and the like, some going astray, are turned aside into vain babbling, so too, schism is the road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that at the outset it is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum schisma gravius peccatum sit quam infidelitas Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod schisma gravius peccatum sit quam infidelitas. Maius enim peccatum graviori poena punitur, secundum illud Deut. XXV, pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus. Sed peccatum schismatis gravius invenitur punitum quam etiam peccatum infidelitatis sive idololatriae. Legitur enim Exod. XXXII quod propter idololatriam sunt aliqui humana manu gladio interfecti, de peccato autem schismatis legitur Num. XVI, si novam rem fecerit dominus, ut aperiens terra os suum deglutiat eos et omnia quae ad illos pertinent, descenderintque viventes in Infernum, scietis quod blasphemaverunt dominum. Decem etiam tribus, quae vitio schismatis a regno David recesserunt, sunt gravissime punitae, ut habetur IV Reg. XVII. Ergo peccatum schismatis est gravius peccato infidelitatis. Objection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Deut. 25:2: According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be. Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Exod 32:28) that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num 16:30): If the Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them down, and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God. Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from the rule of David were most severely punished (4 Kgs 17). Therefore the sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief. Praeterea, bonum multitudinis est maius et divinius quam bonum unius; ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed schisma est contra bonum multitudinis, idest contra ecclesiasticam unitatem, infidelitas autem est contra bonum particulare unius, quod est fides unius hominis singularis. Ergo videtur quod schisma sit gravius peccatum quam infidelitas. Obj. 2: Further, The good of the multitude is greater and more godlike than the good of the individual, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude, namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual. Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. Praeterea, maiori malo maius bonum opponitur; ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Sed schisma opponitur caritati, quae est maior virtus quam fides, cui opponitur infidelitas, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo schisma est gravius peccatum quam infidelitas. Obj. 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is opposed, as shown above (Q. 10, A. 2; Q. 23, A. 6). Therefore schism is a graver sin than unbelief. Sed contra, quod se habet ex additione ad alterum potius est vel in bono vel in malo. Sed haeresis se habet per additionem ad schisma, addit enim perversum dogma, ut patet ex auctoritate Hieronymi supra inducta. Ergo schisma est minus peccatum quam infidelitas. On the contrary, That which results from an addition to something else surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy results from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief. Respondeo dicendum quod gravitas peccati dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum suam speciem; alio modo, secundum circumstantias. Et quia circumstantiae particulares sunt et infinitis modis variari possunt, cum quaeritur in communi de duobus peccatis quod sit gravius, intelligenda est quaestio de gravitate quae attenditur secundum genus peccati. Genus autem seu species peccati attenditur ex obiecto; sicut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo illud peccatum quod maiori bono contrariatur est ex suo genere gravius, sicut peccatum in Deum quam peccatum in proximum. I answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways: first, according to the species of that sin, second, according to its circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways: wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity derived from the sin’s genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is taken from its object, as shown above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is, in respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed against God is graver than a sin committed against one’s neighbor. Manifestum est autem quod infidelitas est peccatum contra ipsum Deum, secundum quod in se est veritas prima, cui fides innititur. Schisma autem est contra ecclesiasticam unitatem, quae est quoddam bonum participatum, et minus quam sit ipse Deus. Unde manifestum est quod peccatum infidelitatis ex suo genere est gravius quam peccatum schismatis, licet possit contingere quod aliquis schismaticus gravius peccet quam quidam infidelis, vel propter maiorem contemptum, vel propter maius periculum quod inducit, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi. Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith is founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore it is manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either because his contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of greater danger, or for some similar reason. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod populo illi manifestum erat iam per legem susceptam quod erat unus Deus et quod non erant alii dii colendi, et hoc erat apud eos per multiplicia signa confirmatum. Et ideo non oportebat quod peccantes contra hanc fidem per idololatriam punirentur inusitata aliqua et insolita poena, sed solum communi. Sed non erat sic notum apud eos quod Moyses deberet esse semper eorum princeps. Et ideo rebellantes eius principatui oportebat miraculosa et insueta poena puniri. Reply Obj. 1: It had already been declared to that people by the law which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well known among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a miraculous and unwonted manner. Vel potest dici quod peccatum schismatis quandoque gravius est punitum in populo illo quia erat ad seditiones et schismata promptus, dicitur enim I Esdr. IV, civitas illa a diebus antiquis adversus regem rebellat, et seditiones et praelia concitantur in ea. Poena autem maior quandoque infligitur pro peccato magis consueto, ut supra habitum est, nam poenae sunt medicinae quaedam ad arcendum homines a peccato; unde ubi est maior pronitas ad peccandum, debet severior poena adhiberi. Decem autem tribus non solum fuerunt punitae pro peccato schismatis, sed etiam pro peccato idololatriae, ut ibidem dicitur. We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): This city since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and wars were raised therein. Now sometimes a more severe punishment is inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, I-II, Q. 105, A. 2, ad 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep man away from sin: so that where there is greater proneness to sin, a more severe punishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes, they were punished not only for the sin of schism, but also for that of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut bonum multitudinis est maius quam bonum unius qui est de multitudine, ita est minus quam bonum extrinsecum ad quod multitudo ordinatur, sicut bonum ordinis exercitus est minus quam bonum ducis. Et similiter bonum ecclesiasticae unitatis, cui opponitur schisma, est minus quam bonum veritatis divinae, cui opponitur infidelitas. Reply Obj. 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed. Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas habet duo obiecta, unum principale, scilicet bonitatem divinam; et aliud secundarium, scilicet bonum proximi. Schisma autem et alia peccata quae fiunt in proximum opponuntur caritati quantum ad secundarium bonum, quod est minus quam obiectum fidei, quod est ipse Deus. Et ideo ista peccata sunt minora quam infidelitas. Sed odium Dei, quod opponitur caritati quantum ad principale obiectum, non est minus. Tamen inter peccata quae sunt in proximum, peccatum schismatis videtur esse maximum, quia est contra spirituale bonum multitudinis. Reply Obj. 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal object and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is our neighbor’s good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor, are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object, is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins committed by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem to be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum schismatici habeant aliquam potestatem Whether schismatics have any power? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod schismatici habeant aliquam potestatem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro contra Donatist., sicut redeuntes ad Ecclesiam qui priusquam recederent baptizati sunt non rebaptizantur, ita redeuntes qui priusquam recederent ordinati sunt non utique rursus ordinantur. Sed ordo est potestas quaedam. Ergo schismatici habent aliquam potestatem, quia retinent ordinem. Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): Just as those who come back to the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who return after being ordained, are not ordained again. Now Order is a kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they retain their Orders. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Unic. Bapt., potest sacramentum tradere separatus, sicut potest habere separatus. Sed potestas tradendi sacramenta est maxima potestas. Ergo schismatici, qui sunt ab Ecclesia separati, habent potestatem spiritualem. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt.): One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as he can have it. But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great power. Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church, have a spiritual power. Praeterea, Urbanus Papa dicit quod ab episcopis quondam Catholice ordinatis sed in schismate a Romana Ecclesia separatis qui consecrati sunt, eos, cum ad Ecclesiae unitatem redierint, servatis propriis ordinibus, misericorditer suscipi iubemus, si eos vita et scientia commendat. Sed hoc non esset nisi spiritualis potestas apud schismaticos remaneret. Ergo schismatici habent spiritualem potestatem. Obj. 3: Further, Pope Urban II says: We command that persons consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to the Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders should be acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church, provided they be of commendable life and knowledge. But this would not be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore schismatics have spiritual power. Sed contra est quod Cyprianus dicit in quadam epistola, et habetur VII, qu. I, Can. Novatianus: qui nec unitatem, inquit, spiritus nec conventionis pacem observat, et se ab Ecclesiae vinculo atque a sacerdotum collegio separat, nec episcopi potestatem habere potest nec honorem. On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu. 1, can. Novatianus): He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power or honor. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est spiritualis potestas, una quidem sacramentalis; alia iurisdictionalis. Sacramentalis quidem potestas est quae per aliquam consecrationem confertur. Omnes autem consecrationes Ecclesiae sunt immobiles, manente re quae consecratur, sicut patet etiam in rebus inanimatis, nam altare semel consecratum non consecratur iterum nisi fuerit dissipatum. Et ideo talis potestas secundum suam essentiam remanet in homine qui per consecrationem eam est adeptus quandiu vivit, sive in schisma sive in haeresim labatur, quod patet ex hoc quod rediens ad Ecclesiam non iterum consecratur. Sed quia potestas inferior non debet exire in actum nisi secundum quod movetur a potestate superiori, ut etiam in rebus naturalibus patet; inde est quod tales usum potestatis amittunt, ita scilicet quod non liceat eis sua potestate uti. Si tamen usi fuerint, eorum potestas effectum habet in sacramentalibus, quia in his homo non operatur nisi sicut instrumentum Dei; unde effectus sacramentales non excluduntur propter culpam quamcumque conferentis sacramentum. I answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated, is not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently such a power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has received it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he come back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however, the lower power ought not to exercise its act, except insofar as it is moved by the higher power, as may be seen also in the physical order, it follows that such persons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this power has its effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts only as God’s instrument, so that sacramental effects are not precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers the sacrament. Potestas autem iurisdictionalis est quae ex simplici iniunctione hominis confertur. Et talis potestas non immobiliter adhaeret. Unde in schismaticis et haereticis non manet. Unde non possunt nec absolvere nec excommunicare nec indulgentias facere, aut aliquid huiusmodi, quod si fecerint, nihil est actum. On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not adhere to the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in heretics and schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and if they do, it is invalid. Cum ergo dicitur tales non habere potestatem spiritualem, intelligendum est vel de potestate secunda, vel, si referatur ad primam potestatem, non est referendum ad ipsam essentiam potestatis, sed ad legitimum usum eius. Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the essence of the power, but to its lawful use. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum poena schismaticorum sit conveniens ut excommunicentur Whether schismatics are rightly punished with excommunication? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poena schismaticorum non sit conveniens ut excommunicentur. Excommunicatio enim maxime separat hominem a communione sacramentorum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in libro contra Donatist., quod Baptisma potest recipi a schismatico. Ergo videtur quod excommunicatio non est conveniens poena schismatis. Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that Baptism can be received from a schismatic. Therefore it seems that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics. Praeterea, ad fideles Christi pertinet ut eos qui sunt dispersi reducant, unde contra quosdam dicitur Ezech. XXXIV, quod abiectum est non reduxistis, quod perierat non quaesistis. Sed schismatici convenientius reducuntur per aliquos qui eis communicent. Ergo videtur quod non sint excommunicandi. Obj. 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ’s faithful to lead back those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain persons (Ezek 34:4): That which was driven away you have not brought again, neither have you sought that which was lost. Now schismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be excommunicated. Praeterea, pro eodem peccato non infligitur duplex poena, secundum illud Nahum I, non iudicabit Deus bis in idipsum. Sed pro peccato schismatis aliqui poena temporali puniuntur, ut habetur XXIII, qu. V, ubi dicitur, divinae et mundanae leges statuerunt ut ab Ecclesiae unitate divisi, et eius pacem perturbantes, a saecularibus potestatibus comprimantur. Non ergo sunt puniendi per excommunicationem. Obj. 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: God will not judge the same twice. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the sin of schism, according to 23, qu. 5, where it is stated: Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who are severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be punished by the secular power. Therefore they ought not to be punished with excommunication. Sed contra est quod Num. XVI dicitur, recedite a tabernaculis hominum impiorum, qui scilicet schisma fecerant, et nolite tangere quae ad eos pertinent, ne involvamini in peccatis eorum. On the contrary, It is written (Num 16:26): Depart from the tents of these wicked men, those, to wit, who had caused the schism, and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins. Respondeo dicendum quod per quae peccat quis, per ea debet puniri, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Schismaticus autem, ut ex dictis patet, in duobus peccat. In uno quidem, quia separat se a communione membrorum Ecclesiae. Et quantum ad hoc conveniens poena schismaticorum est ut excommunicentur. In alio vero, quia subdi recusant capiti Ecclesiae. Et ideo, quia coerceri nolunt per spiritualem potestatem Ecclesiae, iustum est ut potestate temporali coerceantur. I answer that, According to Wis. 11:11, By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he should be punished. Now a schismatic, as shown above (A. 1), commits a twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Second, they refuse submission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the Church’s spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by the secular power. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Baptismum a schismaticis recipere non licet nisi in articulo necessitatis, quia melius est de hac vita cum signo Christi exire, a quocumque detur, etiam si sit Iudaeus vel Paganus, quam sine hoc signo, quod per Baptismum confertur. Reply Obj. 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic, save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that mark, which is bestowed in Baptism. Ad secundum dicendum quod per excommunicationem non interdicitur illa communicatio per quam aliquis salubribus monitis divisos reducit ad Ecclesiae unitatem. Tamen et ipsa separatio quodammodo eos reducit, dum, de sua separatione confusi, quandoque ad poenitentiam adducuntur. Reply Obj. 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their separation, they are sometimes led to do penance. Ad tertium dicendum quod poenae praesentis vitae sunt medicinales; et ideo quando una poena non sufficit ad coercendum hominem, superadditur altera, sicut et medici diversas medicinas corporales apponunt quando una non est efficax et ita Ecclesia, quando aliqui per excommunicationem non sufficienter reprimuntur, adhibet coercionem brachii saecularis. Sed si una poena sit sufficiens, non debet alia adhiberi. Reply Obj. 3: The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man, another is added: just as physicians employ several body medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices, another should not be employed. Quaestio 40 Question 40 De bello War