Articulus 8
Article 8
Utrum fides sit certior scientia et aliis virtutibus intellectualibus
Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues?
Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides non sit certior scientia et aliis virtutibus intellectualibus. Dubitatio enim opponitur certitudini, unde videtur illud esse certius quod minus potest habere de dubitatione; sicut est albius quod est nigro impermixtius. Sed intellectus et scientia, et etiam sapientia, non habent dubitationem circa ea quorum sunt, credens autem interdum potest pati motum dubitationis et dubitare de his quae sunt fidei. Ergo fides non est certior virtutibus intellectualibus.
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain, through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the intellectual virtues.
Praeterea, visio est certior auditu. Sed fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur ad Rom. X, in intellectu autem et scientia et sapientia includitur quaedam intellectualis visio. Ergo certior est scientia vel intellectus quam fides.
Obj. 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But faith is through hearing according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding, science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore science and understanding are more certain than faith.
Praeterea, quanto aliquid est perfectius in his quae ad intellectum pertinent, tanto est certius. Sed intellectus est perfectior fide, quia per fidem ad intellectum pervenitur, secundum illud Isaiae VII, nisi credideritis, non intelligetis, secundum aliam litteram. Et Augustinus dicit etiam de scientia, XIV de Trin., quod per scientiam roboratur fides. Ergo videtur quod certior sit scientia vel intellectus quam fides.
Obj. 3: Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another version of Isa. 7:9: If you will not believe, you shall not understand: and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that faith is strengthened by science. Therefore it seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.
Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Thess. II, cum accepissetis a nobis verbum auditus, scilicet per fidem, accepistis illud non ut verbum hominum, sed, sicut vere est, verbum Dei. Sed nihil certius verbo Dei. Ergo scientia non est certior fide, nec aliquid aliud.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess 2:15): When you had received of us the word of the hearing, i.e., by faith . . . you received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God. Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutum intellectualium duae sunt circa contingentia, scilicet prudentia et ars. Quibus praefertur fides in certitudine, ratione suae materiae, quia est de aeternis, quae non contingit aliter se habere. Tres autem reliquae intellectuales virtutes, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus, sunt de necessariis, ut supra dictum est. Sed sciendum est quod sapientia, scientia et intellectus dupliciter dicuntur, uno modo, secundum quod ponuntur virtutes intellectuales a philosopho, in VI Ethic.; alio modo, secundum quod ponuntur dona spiritus sancti. Primo igitur modo, dicendum est quod certitudo potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, ex causa certitudinis, et sic dicitur esse certius illud quod habet certiorem causam. Et hoc modo fides est certior tribus praedictis, quia fides innititur veritati divinae, tria autem praedicta innituntur rationi humanae. Alio modo potest considerari certitudo ex parte subiecti, et sic dicitur esse certius quod plenius consequitur intellectus hominis. Et per hunc modum, quia ea quae sunt fidei sunt supra intellectum hominis, non autem ea quae subsunt tribus praedictis, ideo ex hac parte fides est minus certa. Sed quia unumquodque iudicatur simpliciter quidem secundum causam suam; secundum autem dispositionem quae est ex parte subiecti iudicatur secundum quid, inde est quod fides est simpliciter certior, sed alia sunt certiora secundum quid, scilicet quoad nos. Similiter etiam, si accipiantur tria praedicta secundum quod sunt dona praesentis vitae, comparantur ad fidem sicut ad principium quod praesupponunt. Unde etiam secundum hoc fides est eis certior.
I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4, ad 2) two of the intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 5, ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3); second, for the gifts of the Holy Spirit. If we consider them in the first way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Second, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e., for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this present life, they are related to faith as to their principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa dubitatio non est ex parte causae fidei, sed quoad nos, inquantum non plene assequimur per intellectum ea quae sunt fidei.
Reply Obj. 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but on our side, insofar as we do not fully grasp matters of faith with our intellect.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, ceteris paribus, visio est certior auditu. Sed si ille a quo auditur multum excedit visum videntis, sic certior est auditus quam visus. Sicut aliquis parvae scientiae magis certificatur de eo quod audit ab aliquo scientissimo quam de eo quod sibi secundum suam rationem videtur. Et multo magis homo certior est de eo quod audit a Deo, qui falli non potest, quam de eo quod videt propria ratione, quae falli potest.
Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear greatly surpasses that of the seer’s sight, hearing is more certain than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.
Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectio intellectus et scientiae excedit cognitionem fidei quantum ad maiorem manifestationem, non tamen quantum ad certiorem inhaesionem. Quia tota certitudo intellectus vel scientiae secundum quod sunt dona, procedit a certitudine fidei, sicut certitudo cognitionis conclusionum procedit ex certitudine principiorum. Secundum autem quod scientia et sapientia et intellectus sunt virtutes intellectuales, innituntur naturali lumini rationis, quod deficit a certitudine verbi Dei, cui innititur fides.
Reply Obj. 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But insofar as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God’s word, on which faith is founded.
Quaestio 5
Question 5
De habentibus fidem
Those Who Have Faith
Deinde considerandum est de habentibus fidem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum Angelus aut homo in prima sui conditione habuerit fidem.
(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?
Secundo, utrum Daemones habeant fidem.
(2) Whether the demons have faith?
Tertio, utrum haeretici errantes in uno articulo fidei habeant fidem de aliis articulis.
(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in others?
Quarto, utrum fidem habentium unus alio habeat maiorem fidem.
(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?
Articulus 1
Article 1
Utrum angelus aut homo in sua prima conditione fidem habuerit
Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus aut homo in sua prima conditione fidem non habuerit. Dicit enim Hugo de sancto Victore, quia homo oculum contemplationis non habet, Deum et quae in Deo sunt videre non valet. Sed Angelus in statu primae conditionis, ante confirmationem vel lapsum, habuit oculum contemplationis, videbat enim res in verbo, ut Augustinus dicit, in II super Gen. ad Litt. Et similiter primus homo in statu innocentiae videtur habuisse oculum contemplationis apertum, dicit enim Hugo de sancto Victore, in suis sententiis, quod novit homo, in primo statu, creatorem suum non ea cognitione quae foris auditu solo percipitur, sed ea quae intus per inspirationem ministratur, non ea qua Deus modo a credentibus absens fide quaeritur, sed ea qua per praesentiam contemplationis manifestius cernebatur. Ergo homo vel Angelus in statu primae conditionis fidem non habuit.
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh of S. Victor says in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that man cannot see God or things that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation. Now the angels, in their original state, before they were either confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to contemplation, since they saw things in the Word, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that in his original state man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception of hearing, but by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him clearly present to their contemplation. Therefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original state.
Praeterea, cognitio fidei est aenigmatica et obscura, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate. Sed in statu primae conditionis non fuit aliqua obscuritas neque in homine neque in Angelo, quia tenebrositas est poena peccati. Ergo fides in statu primae conditionis esse non potuit neque in homine neque in Angelo.
Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: We see now through a glass in a dark manner. Now in their original state there was not obscurity either in the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original state.
Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Rom. X, quod fides est ex auditu. Sed hoc locum non habuit in primo statu angelicae conditionis aut humanae, non enim erat ibi auditus ab alio. Ergo fides in statu illo non erat neque in homine neque in Angelo.
Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom 10:17) that faith . . . cometh by hearing. Now this could not apply to angels and man in their original state; for then they could not hear anything from another. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man or in the angels.
Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. XI, accedentem ad Deum oportet credere. Sed Angelus et homo in sui prima conditione erant in statu accedendi ad Deum. Ergo fide indigebant.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb 11:6): He that cometh to God, must believe. Now the original state of angels and man was one of approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.
Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod in Angelis ante confirmationem et lapsum, et in homine ante peccatum, non fuit fides, propter manifestam contemplationem quae tunc erat de rebus divinis. Sed cum fides sit argumentum non apparentium, secundum apostolum; et per fidem credantur ea quae non videntur, ut Augustinus dicit, illa sola manifestatio excludit fidei rationem per quam redditur apparens vel visum id de quo principaliter est fides. Principale autem obiectum fidei est veritas prima, cuius visio beatos facit et fidei succedit. Cum igitur Angelus ante confirmationem, et homo ante peccatum, non habuit illam beatitudinem qua Deus per essentiam videtur; manifestum est quod non habuit sic manifestam cognitionem quod excluderetur ratio fidei.
I answer that, Some say that there was no faith in the angels before they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of Divine things. Since, however, faith is the evidence of things that appear not, according to the Apostle (Heb 11:2), and since by faith we believe what we see not, according to Augustine (Tract. xl in Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes faith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. Now the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of which gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as the angels before their confirmation in grace, and man before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they possessed was not such as to exclude faith.
Unde quod non habuit fidem, hoc esse non potuit nisi quod penitus ei erat ignotum illud de quo est fides. Et si homo et Angelus fuerunt creati in puris naturalibus, ut quidam dicunt, forte posset teneri quod fides non fuit in Angelo ante confirmationem nec in homine ante peccatum, cognitio enim fidei est supra naturalem cognitionem de Deo non solum hominis, sed etiam Angeli.
It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith. And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as some hold, perhaps one might hold that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses not only a man’s but even an angel’s natural knowledge about God.
Sed quia in primo iam diximus quod homo et Angelus creati sunt cum dono gratiae, ideo necesse est dicere quod per gratiam acceptam et nondum consummatam fuerit in eis inchoatio quaedam speratae beatitudinis, quae quidem inchoatur in voluntate per spem et caritatem, sed in intellectu per fidem, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod Angelus ante confirmationem habuerat fidem, et similiter homo ante peccatum. Sed tamen considerandum est quod in obiecto fidei est aliquid quasi formale, scilicet veritas prima super omnem naturalem cognitionem creaturae existens; et aliquid materiale, sicut id cui assentimus inhaerendo primae veritati. Quantum ergo ad primum horum, communiter fides est in omnibus habentibus cognitionem de Deo, futura beatitudine nondum adepta, inhaerendo primae veritati. Sed quantum ad ea quae materialiter credenda proponuntur, quaedam sunt credita ab uno quae sunt manifeste scita ab alio, etiam in statu praesenti, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc etiam potest dici quod Angelus ante confirmationem et homo ante peccatum quaedam de divinis mysteriis manifesta cognitione cognoverunt quae nunc non possumus cognoscere nisi credendo.
Since, however, we stated in the First Part (Q. 62, A. 3; Q. 95, A. 1) that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 7). Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe that in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were, namely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a creature, and something material, namely, the thing to which we assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former, before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another, even in the present state, as we have shown above (Q. 1, A. 5; Q. 2, A. 4, ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels before being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we cannot know except by believing them.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis dicta Hugonis de sancto Victore magistralia sint et robur auctoritatis non habeant, tamen potest dici quod contemplatio quae tollit necessitatem fidei est contemplatio patriae, qua supernaturalis veritas per essentiam videtur. Hanc autem contemplationem non habuit Angelus ante confirmationem nec homo ante peccatum. Sed eorum contemplatio erat altior quam nostra, per quam, magis de propinquo accedentes ad Deum, plura manifeste cognoscere poterant de divinis effectibus et mysteriis quam nos possumus. Unde non inerat eis fides qua ita quaereretur Deus absens sicut a nobis quaeritur. Erat enim eis magis praesens per lumen sapientiae quam sit nobis, licet nec eis esset ita praesens sicut est beatis per lumen gloriae.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the words of Hugh of S. Victor are those of a master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence. Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was of a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer to God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light of wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He was not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of glory.
Ad secundum dicendum quod in statu primae conditionis hominis vel Angeli non erat obscuritas culpae vel poenae. Inerat tamen intellectui hominis et Angeli quaedam obscuritas naturalis, secundum quod omnis creatura tenebra est comparata immensitati divini luminis. Et talis obscuritas sufficit ad fidei rationem.
Reply Obj. 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, insofar as every creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in statu primae conditionis non erat auditus ab homine exterius loquente, sed a Deo interius inspirante, sicut et prophetae audiebant, secundum illud Psalm., audiam quid loquatur in me dominus Deus.
Reply Obj. 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9: I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.
Articulus 2
Article 2
Utrum in daemonibus sit fides
Whether in the demons there is faith?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus non sit fides. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Praed. Sanct., quod fides consistit in credentium voluntate. Haec autem voluntas bona est qua quis vult credere Deo. Cum igitur in Daemonibus non sit aliqua voluntas deliberata bona, ut in primo dictum est, videtur quod in Daemonibus non sit fides.
Objection 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that faith depends on the believer’s will: and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to believe in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is no faith.
Praeterea, fides est quoddam donum divinae gratiae, secundum illud Ephes. II, gratia estis salvati per fidem, donum enim Dei est. Sed Daemones dona gratuita amiserunt per peccatum, ut dicitur in Glossa, super illud Osee III, ipsi respiciunt ad deos alienos, et diligunt vinacia uvarum. Ergo fides in Daemonibus post peccatum non remansit.
Obj. 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Eph. 2:8: By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift of God. Now, according to a gloss on Hosea 3:1, They look to strange gods, and love the husks of the grapes, the demons lost their gifts of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons after they sinned.
Praeterea, infidelitas videtur esse gravius inter peccata, ut patet per Augustinum, super illud Ioan. XV, si non venissem, et locutus eis non fuissem, peccatum non haberent, nunc autem excusationem non habent de peccato suo. Sed in quibusdam hominibus est peccatum infidelitatis. Si igitur fides esset in Daemonibus, aliquorum hominum peccatum esset gravius peccato Daemonum. Quod videtur esse inconveniens. Non ergo fides est in Daemonibus.
Obj. 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on John 15:22, If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin. Now the sin of unbelief is in some men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in the demons there is no faith.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Iac. II, Daemones credunt et contremiscunt.
On the contrary, It is written (Jas 2:19): The devils . . . believe and tremble.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, intellectus credentis assentit rei creditae non quia ipsam videat vel secundum se vel per resolutionem ad prima principia per se visa, sed propter imperium voluntatis. Quod autem voluntas moveat intellectum ad assentiendum potest contingere ex duobus. Uno modo, ex ordine voluntatis ad bonum, et sic credere est actus laudabilis. Alio modo, quia intellectus convincitur ad hoc quod iudicet esse credendum his quae dicuntur, licet non convincatur per evidentiam rei. Sicut si aliquis propheta praenuntiaret in sermone domini aliquid futurum, et adhiberet signum mortuum suscitando, ex hoc signo convinceretur intellectus videntis ut cognosceret manifeste hoc dici a Deo, qui non mentitur; licet illud futurum quod praedicitur in se evidens non esset, unde ratio fidei non tolleretur.
I answer that, As stated above (Q. 1, A. 4; Q. 2, A. 1), the believer’s intellect assents to that which he believes, not because he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent. Now, that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in this way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Second, because the intellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something, and were to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently the essence of faith would not be removed.