Sed contra est quod Hieronymus, exponens illud quod habetur Matth. XV, scis quia Pharisaei, audito hoc verbo, etc., dicit, quando legimus, quicumque scandalizaverit, hoc intelligimus, qui dicto vel facto occasionem ruinae dederit. On the contrary, Jerome in expounding Matt. 15:12, Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, etc. says: When we read ‘Whosoever shall scandalize,’ the sense is ‘Whosoever shall, by deed or word, occasion another’s spiritual downfall.’ Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus ibidem dicit, quod Graece scandalon dicitur, nos offensionem vel ruinam et impactionem pedis possumus dicere. Contingit enim quod quandoque aliquis obex ponitur alicui in via corporali, cui impingens disponitur ad ruinam, et talis obex dicitur scandalum. I answer that, As Jerome observes, the Greek skandalon may be rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For when a body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle is a skandalon. Et similiter in processu viae spiritualis contingit aliquem disponi ad ruinam spiritualem per dictum vel factum alterius, inquantum scilicet aliquis sua admonitione vel inductione aut exemplo alterum trahit ad peccandum. Et hoc proprie dicitur scandalum. In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by another’s word or deed, in so far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called. Nihil autem secundum propriam rationem disponit ad spiritualem ruinam nisi quod habet aliquem defectum rectitudinis, quia id quod est perfecte rectum magis munit hominem contra casum quam ad ruinam inducat. Et ideo convenienter dicitur quod dictum vel factum minus rectum praebens occasionem ruinae sit scandalum. Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall, except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as something less rightly done or said, that occasions another’s spiritual downfall. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cogitatio vel concupiscentia mali latet in corde, unde non proponitur alteri ut obex disponens ad ruinam. Et propter hoc non potest habere scandali rationem. Reply Obj. 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart, wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the head of scandal. Ad secundum dicendum quod minus rectum hic non dicitur quod ab aliquo alio superatur in rectitudine, sed quod habet aliquem rectitudinis defectum, vel quia est secundum se malum, sicut peccata; vel quia habet speciem mali, sicut cum aliquis recumbit in idolio. Quamvis enim hoc secundum se non sit peccatum, si aliquis hoc non corrupta intentione faciat; tamen quia habet quandam speciem vel similitudinem venerationis idoli, potest alteri praebere occasionem ruinae. Et ideo apostolus monet, I ad Thess. V, ab omni specie mala abstinete vos. Et ideo convenienter dicitur minus rectum, ut comprehendantur tam illa quae sunt secundum se peccata, quam illa quae habent speciem mali. Reply Obj. 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because something else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were to sit at meat in the idol’s temple (1 Cor 8:10), though this is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man’s spiritual downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess 5:22): From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves. Scandal is therefore fittingly described as something done less rightly, so as to comprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all that has an appearance of evil. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, nihil potest esse homini sufficiens causa peccati, quod est spiritualis ruina, nisi propria voluntas. Et ideo dicta vel facta alterius hominis possunt esse solum causa imperfecta, aliqualiter inducens ad ruinam. Et propter hoc non dicitur, dans causam ruinae, sed, dans occasionem, quod significat causam imperfectam, et non semper causam per accidens. Et tamen nihil prohibet in quibusdam definitionibus poni id quod est per accidens, quia id quod est secundum accidens uni potest per se alteri convenire, sicut in definitione fortunae ponitur causa per accidens, in II Physic. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; I-II, Q. 80, A. 1), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man’s spiritual downfall, which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man’s words or deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5). Ad quartum dicendum quod dictum vel factum alterius potest esse alteri causa peccandi dupliciter, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem, quando aliquis suo malo verbo vel facto intendit alium ad peccandum inducere; vel, etiam si ipse hoc non intendat, ipsum factum est tale quod de sui ratione habet ut sit inductivum ad peccandum, puta quod aliquis publice facit peccatum vel quod habet similitudinem peccati. Et tunc ille qui huiusmodi actum facit proprie dat occasionem ruinae, unde vocatur scandalum activum. Per accidens autem aliquod verbum vel factum unius est alteri causa peccandi, quando etiam praeter intentionem operantis, et praeter conditionem operis, aliquis male dispositus ex huiusmodi opere inducitur ad peccandum, puta cum aliquis invidet bonis aliorum. Et tunc ille qui facit huiusmodi actum rectum non dat occasionem, quantum in se est, sed alius sumit occasionem, secundum illud ad Rom. VII, occasione autem accepta, et cetera. Et ideo hoc est scandalum passivum sine activo, quia ille qui recte agit, quantum est de se, non dat occasionem ruinae quam alter patitur. Quandoque ergo contingit quod et sit simul scandalum activum in uno et passivum in altero, puta cum ad inductionem unius alius peccat. Quandoque vero est scandalum activum sine passivo, puta cum aliquis inducit verbo vel facto alium ad peccandum, et ille non consentit. Quandoque vero est scandalum passivum sine activo, sicut iam dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: Another’s words or deed may be the cause of another’s sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly commits a sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In this case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of another’s spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called active scandal. One man’s word or deed is the accidental cause of another’s sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one, through being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy of another’s good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other’s downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according to Rom. 7:8: Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. Wherefore this is passive, without active scandal, since he that acts rightly does not, for his own part, afford the occasion of the other’s downfall. Sometimes therefore it happens that there is active scandal in the one together with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being induced thereto by another; sometimes there is active without passive scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we have already said. Ad quintum dicendum quod infirmitas nominat promptitudinem ad scandalum; offensio autem nominat indignationem alicuius contra eum qui peccat, quae potest esse quandoque sine ruina; scandalum autem importat ipsam impactionem ad ruinam. Reply Obj. 5: Weakness denotes proneness to scandal; while offense signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin, which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and scandal is the stumbling that results in downfall. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum scandalum sit peccatum Whether scandal is a sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scandalum non sit peccatum. Peccata enim non eveniunt ex necessitate, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium, ut supra habitum est. Sed Matth. XVIII dicitur, necesse est ut veniant scandala. Ergo scandalum non est peccatum. Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Now it is written (Matt 18:7): It must needs be that scandals come. Therefore scandal is not a sin. Praeterea, nullum peccatum procedit ex pietatis affectu, quia non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, ut dicitur Matth. VII. Sed aliquod scandalum est ex pietatis affectu, dicit enim dominus Petro, Matth. XVI, scandalum mihi es; ubi dicit Hieronymus quod error apostoli, de pietatis affectu veniens, nunquam incentivum videtur esse Diaboli. Ergo non omne scandalum est peccatum. Obj. 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness, because a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit (Matt 7:18). But scandal may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter (Matt 16:23): Thou art a scandal unto Me, in reference to which words Jerome says that the Apostle’s error was due to his sense of dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil. Therefore scandal is not always a sin. Praeterea, scandalum impactionem quandam importat. Sed non quicumque impingit, cadit. Ergo scandalum potest esse sine peccato, quod est spiritualis casus. Obj. 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall, can be without sin. Sed contra est quod scandalum est dictum vel factum minus rectum. Ex hoc autem habet aliquid rationem peccati quod a rectitudine deficit. Ergo scandalum semper est cum peccato. On the contrary, Scandal is something less rightly said or done. Now anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is always with sin. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam supra dictum est, duplex est scandalum, scilicet passivum, in eo qui scandalizatur; et activum, in eo qui scandalizat, dans occasionem ruinae. Scandalum igitur passivum semper est peccatum in eo qui scandalizatur, non enim scandalizatur nisi inquantum aliqualiter ruit spirituali ruina, quae est peccatum. I answer that, As already said (A. 1, ad 4), scandal is of two kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal in the person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual downfall. Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person scandalized; for he is not scandalized except insofar as he succumbs to a spiritual downfall, and that is a sin. Potest tamen esse scandalum passivum sine peccato eius ex cuius facto aliquis scandalizatur, sicut cum aliquis scandalizatur de his quae alius bene facit. Similiter etiam scandalum activum semper est peccatum in eo qui scandalizat. Quia vel ipsum opus quod facit est peccatum, vel etiam, si habeat speciem peccati, dimittendum est semper propter proximi caritatem, ex qua unusquisque conatur saluti proximi providere; et sic qui non dimittit contra caritatem agit. Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the person whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when a person is scandalized at another’s good deed. In like manner active scandal is always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it should always be left undone out of that love for our neighbor which binds each one to be solicitous for his neighbor’s spiritual welfare; so that if he persist in doing it he acts against charity. Potest tamen esse scandalum activum sine peccato alterius qui scandalizatur, sicut supra dictum est. Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person scandalized, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur, necesse est ut veniant scandala, non est intelligendum de necessitate absoluta, sed de necessitate conditionali, qua scilicet necesse est praescita vel praenuntiata a Deo evenire, si tamen coniunctim accipiatur, ut in primo libro dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: These words, It must needs be that scandals come, are to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the conditional necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13, ad 3; Q. 23, A. 6, ad 2). Vel necesse est evenire scandala necessitate finis, quia utilia sunt ad hoc quod qui probati sunt manifesti fiant. Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity of end, because they are useful in order that they . . . who are reproved may be made manifest (1 Cor 11:19). Vel necesse est evenire scandala secundum conditionem hominum, qui sibi a peccatis non cavent. Sicut si aliquis medicus, videns aliquos indebita diaeta utentes, dicat, necesse est tales infirmari, quod intelligendum est sub hac conditione, si diaetam non mutent. Et similiter necesse est evenire scandala si homines conversationem malam non mutent. Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails to shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man partaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs injure his health, which is to be understood on the condition that he does not change his diet. In like manner it must needs be that scandals come, so long as men fail to change their evil mode of living. Ad secundum dicendum quod scandalum ibi large ponitur pro quolibet impedimento. Volebat enim Petrus Christi passionem impedire, quodam pietatis affectu ad Christum. Reply Obj. 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of hindrance: for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord’s Passion out of a sense of dutifulness towards Christ. Ad tertium dicendum quod nullus impingit spiritualiter nisi retardetur aliqualiter a processu in via Dei, quod fit saltem per peccatum veniale. Reply Obj. 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept back somewhat from advancing in God’s way, and that is at least a venial sin. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum scandalum sit speciale peccatum Whether scandal is a special sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scandalum non sit speciale peccatum. Scandalum enim est dictum vel factum minus rectum. Sed omne peccatum est huiusmodi. Ergo omne peccatum est scandalum. Non ergo scandalum est speciale peccatum. Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For scandal is something said or done less rightly. But this applies to every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and consequently, scandal is not a special sin. Praeterea, omne speciale peccatum, sive omnis specialis iniustitia, invenitur separatim ab aliis; ut dicitur in V Ethic. Sed scandalum non invenitur separatim ab aliis peccatis. Ergo scandalum non est speciale peccatum. Obj. 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind of injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in Ethic. v, 3, 5. But scandal is not to be found separately from other sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin. Praeterea, omne speciale peccatum constituitur secundum aliquid quod dat speciem morali actui. Sed ratio scandali constituitur per hoc quod coram aliis peccatur. In manifesto autem peccare, etsi sit circumstantia aggravans, non videtur constituere peccati speciem. Ergo scandalum non est speciale peccatum. Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something which specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in its being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a sin being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance, does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal is not a special sin. Sed contra, speciali virtuti speciale peccatum opponitur. Sed scandalum opponitur speciali virtuti, scilicet caritati, dicitur enim Rom. XIV, si propter cibum frater tuus contristatur, iam non secundum caritatem ambulas. Ergo scandalum est speciale peccatum. On the contrary, A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it. But scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is written (Rom 14:15): If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity. Therefore scandal is a special sin. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est scandalum, activum scilicet, et passivum. Passivum quidem scandalum non potest esse speciale peccatum, quia ex dicto vel facto alterius aliquem ruere contingit secundum quodcumque genus peccati; nec hoc ipsum quod est occasionem peccandi sumere ex dicto vel facto alterius specialem rationem peccati constituit, quia non importat specialem deformitatem speciali virtuti oppositam. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), scandal is twofold, active and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through another’s word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another’s word or deed, does not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply a special deformity in opposition to a special virtue. Scandalum autem activum potest accipi dupliciter, per se scilicet, et per accidens. Per accidens quidem, quando est praeter intentionem agentis, ut puta cum aliquis suo facto vel verbo inordinato non intendit alteri dare occasionem ruinae, sed solum suae satisfacere voluntati. Et sic etiam scandalum activum non est peccatum speciale, quia quod est per accidens non constituit speciem. On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways, directly and accidentally. The scandal is accidental when it is beside the agent’s intention, as when a man does not intend, by his inordinate deed or word, to occasion another’s spiritual downfall, but merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not a special sin, because a species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Per se autem est activum scandalum quando aliquis suo inordinato dicto vel facto intendit alium trahere ad peccatum. Et sic ex intentione specialis finis sortitur rationem specialis peccati, finis enim dat speciem in moralibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde sicut furtum est speciale peccatum, aut homicidium, propter speciale nocumentum proximi quod intenditur; ita etiam scandalum est speciale peccatum, propter hoc quod intenditur speciale proximi nocumentum. Et opponitur directe correctioni fraternae, in qua attenditur specialis nocumenti remotio. Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word or deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind of sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because moral actions take their species from their end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6). Hence, just as theft and murder are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention of doing a special injury to one’s neighbor: so too, scandal is a special kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to his neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, whereby a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne peccatum potest materialiter se habere ad scandalum activum. Sed formalem rationem specialis peccati potest habere ex intentione finis, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but it may derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended, as stated above. Ad secundum dicendum quod scandalum activum potest inveniri separatim ab aliis peccatis, ut puta cum aliquis proximum scandalizat facto quod de se non est peccatum, sed habet speciem mali. Reply Obj. 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other sins, as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a sin in itself, but has an appearance of evil. Ad tertium dicendum quod scandalum non habet rationem specialis peccati ex praedicta circumstantia, sed ex intentione finis, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end, as stated above. Articulus 4 Article 4