Quaestio 47 Question 47 De prudentia secundum se Prudence, Considered in Itself Consequenter, post virtutes theologicas, primo considerandum est, circa virtutes cardinales, de prudentia. Et primo, de prudentia secundum se; secundo, de partibus eius; tertio, de dono ei correspondente; quarto, de vitiis oppositis; quinto, de praeceptis ad hoc pertinentibus. After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider prudence in itself; second, its parts; third, the corresponding gift; fourth, the contrary vices; fifth, the precepts concerning prudence. Circa primum quaeruntur sexdecim. Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry: Primo, utrum prudentia sit in voluntate, vel in ratione. (1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason? Secundo, si est in ratione, utrum in practica tantum, vel etiam in speculativa. (2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in the speculative reason? Tertio, utrum sit cognoscitiva singularium. (3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars? Quarto, utrum sit virtus. (4) Whether it is virtue? Quinto, utrum sit virtus specialis. (5) Whether it is a special virtue? Sexto, utrum praestituat finem virtutibus moralibus. (6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues? Septimo, utrum constituat medium in eis. (7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues? Octavo, utrum praecipere sit proprius actus eius. (8) Whether its proper act is command? Nono, utrum sollicitudo vel vigilantia pertineat ad prudentiam. (9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence? Decimo, utrum prudentia se extendat ad regimen multitudinis. (10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many? Undecimo, utrum prudentia quae est respectu boni proprii sit eadem specie cum ea quae se extendit ad bonum commune (11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same in species as that which regards the common good? duodecimo, utrum prudentia sit in subditis, an solum in principibus. (12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers? Tertiodecimo, utrum inveniatur in malis. (13) Whether prudence is in the wicked? Quartodecimo, utrum inveniatur in omnibus bonis. (14) Whether prudence is in all good men? Quintodecimo, utrum insit nobis a natura. (15) Whether prudence is in us naturally? Sextodecimo, utrum perdatur per oblivionem. (16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum prudentia sit in vi cognoscitiva, an in appetitiva Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit in vi cognoscitiva, sed in appetitiva. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., prudentia est amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter eligens. Sed amor non est in cognoscitiva, sed in appetitiva. Ergo prudentia est in vi appetitiva. Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder. Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty. Praeterea, sicut ex praedicta definitione apparet, ad prudentiam pertinet eligere sagaciter. Sed electio est actus appetitivae virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo prudentia non est in vi cognoscitiva, sed in appetitiva. Obj. 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to prudence to choose wisely. But choice is an act of the appetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Therefore prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod in arte quidem volens peccans eligibilior est, circa prudentiam autem, minus, quemadmodum et circa virtutes. Sed virtutes morales, de quibus ibi loquitur, sunt in parte appetitiva, ars autem in ratione. Ergo prudentia magis est in parte appetitiva quam in ratione. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse. Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than in the rational faculty. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., prudentia est cognitio rerum appetendarum et fugiendarum. On the contrary, Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 61): Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., prudens dicitur quasi porro videns, perspicax enim est, et incertorum videt casus. Visio autem non est virtutis appetitivae, sed cognoscitivae. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia directe pertinet ad vim cognoscitivam. Non autem ad vim sensitivam, quia per eam cognoscuntur solum ea quae praesto sunt et sensibus offeruntur. Cognoscere autem futura ex praesentibus vel praeteritis, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, proprie rationis est, quia hoc per quandam collationem agitur. Unde relinquitur quod prudentia proprie sit in ratione. I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties. Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas movet omnes potentias ad suos actus. Primus autem actus appetitivae virtutis est amor, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur prudentia dicitur esse amor non quidem essentialiter, sed inquantum amor movet ad actum prudentiae. Unde et postea subdit Augustinus quod prudentia est amor bene discernens ea quibus adiuvetur ad tendendum in Deum ab his quibus impediri potest. Dicitur autem amor discernere, inquantum movet rationem ad discernendum. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4) the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty is love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but insofar as love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in tending to God. Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason to discern. Ad secundum dicendum quod prudens considerat ea quae sunt procul inquantum ordinantur ad adiuvandum vel impediendum ea quae sunt praesentialiter agenda. Unde patet quod ea quae considerat prudentia ordinantur ad alia sicut ad finem. Eorum autem quae sunt ad finem est consilium in ratione et electio in appetitu. Quorum duorum consilium magis proprie pertinet ad prudentiam, dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod prudens est bene consiliativus. Sed quia electio praesupponit consilium, est enim appetitus praeconsiliati, ut dicitur in III Ethic.; ideo etiam eligere potest attribui prudentiae consequenter, inquantum scilicet electionem per consilium dirigit. Reply Obj. 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, insofar as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5, 7, 9) that a prudent man takes good counsel. But as choice presupposes counsel, since it is the desire for what has been already counselled (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel. Ad tertium dicendum quod laus prudentiae non consistit in sola consideratione, sed in applicatione ad opus, quod est finis practicae rationis. Et ideo si in hoc defectus accidat, maxime est contrarium prudentiae, quia sicut finis est potissimus in unoquoque, ita et defectus qui est circa finem est pessimus. Unde ibidem philosophus subdit quod prudentia non est solum cum ratione, sicut ars, habet enim, ut dictum est, applicationem ad opus, quod fit per voluntatem. Reply Obj. 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is something more than a merely rational habit, such as art is, since, as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4) it includes application to action, which application is an act of the will. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum prudentia solum pertineat ad rationem practicam, an etiam ad speculativam Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the speculative reason? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non solum pertineat ad rationem practicam, sed etiam ad speculativam. Dicitur enim Prov. X, sapientia est viro prudentia. Sed sapientia principalius consistit in contemplatione. Ergo et prudentia. Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Prov 10:23): Wisdom is prudence to a man. Now wisdom consists chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de officiis, prudentia in veri investigatione versatur, et scientiae plenioris infundit cupiditatem. Sed hoc pertinet ad rationem speculativam. Ergo prudentia consistit etiam in ratione speculativa. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of fuller knowledge. Now this belongs to the speculative reason. Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason. Praeterea, in eadem parte animae ponitur a Philosopho ars et prudentia; ut patet in VI Ethic. Sed ars non solum invenitur practica, sed etiam speculativa, ut patet in artibus liberalibus. Ergo etiam prudentia invenitur et practica et speculativa. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence also is both practical and speculative. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Sed hoc non pertinet nisi ad rationem practicam. Ergo prudentia non est nisi in ratione practica. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.