Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum haereticus qui discredit unum articulum fidei possit habere fidem informem de aliis articulis Whether a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith can have lifeless faith in the other articles? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod haereticus qui discredit unum articulum fidei possit habere fidem informem de aliis articulis. Non enim intellectus naturalis haeretici est potentior quam intellectus catholici. Sed intellectus catholici indiget adiuvari, ad credendum quemcumque articulum fidei, dono fidei. Ergo videtur quod nec haeretici aliquos articulos credere possint sine dono fidei informis. Objection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a catholic. Now a catholic’s intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of lifeless faith. Praeterea, sicut sub fide continentur multi articuli fidei, ita sub una scientia, puta geometria, continentur multae conclusiones. Sed homo aliquis potest habere scientiam geometriae circa quasdam geometricas conclusiones, aliis ignoratis. Ergo homo aliquis potest habere fidem de aliquibus articulis fidei, alios non credendo. Obj. 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some articles of faith without believing the others. Praeterea, sicut homo obedit Deo ad credendum articulos fidei, ita etiam ad servanda mandata legis. Sed homo potest esse obediens circa quaedam mandata et non circa alia. Ergo potest habere fidem circa quosdam articulos et non circa alios. Obj. 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can believe some articles, and disbelieve others. Sed contra, sicut peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati, ita discredere unum articulum contrariatur fidei. Sed caritas non remanet in homine post unum peccatum mortale. Ergo neque fides postquam discredit unum articulum fidei. On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves one article. Respondeo dicendum quod haereticus qui discredit unum articulum fidei non habet habitum fidei neque formatae neque informis. I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith. Cuius ratio est quia species cuiuslibet habitus dependet ex formali ratione obiecti, qua sublata, species habitus remanere non potest. Formale autem obiectum fidei est veritas prima secundum quod manifestatur in Scripturis sacris et doctrina Ecclesiae. Unde quicumque non inhaeret, sicut infallibili et divinae regulae, doctrinae Ecclesiae, quae procedit ex veritate prima in Scripturis sacris manifestata, ille non habet habitum fidei, sed ea quae sunt fidei alio modo tenet quam per fidem. Sicut si aliquis teneat mente aliquam conclusionem non cognoscens medium illius demonstrationis, manifestum est quod non habet eius scientiam, sed opinionem solum. Manifestum est autem quod ille qui inhaeret doctrinae Ecclesiae tanquam infallibili regulae, omnibus assentit quae Ecclesia docet. Alioquin, si de his quae Ecclesia docet quae vult tenet et quae vult non tenet, non iam inhaeret Ecclesiae doctrinae sicut infallibili regulae, sed propriae voluntati. Et sic manifestum est quod haereticus qui pertinaciter discredit unum articulum non est paratus sequi in omnibus doctrinam Ecclesiae (si enim non pertinaciter, iam non est haereticus, sed solum errans). Unde manifestum est quod talis haereticus circa unum articulum fidem non habet de aliis articulis, sed opinionem quandam secundum propriam voluntatem. The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod alios articulos fidei, de quibus haereticus non errat, non tenet eo modo sicut tenet eos fidelis, scilicet simpliciter inhaerendo primae veritati, ad quod indiget homo adiuvari per habitum fidei, sed tenet ea quae sunt fidei propria voluntate et iudicio. Reply Obj. 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment. Ad secundum dicendum quod in diversis conclusionibus unius scientiae sunt diversa media per quae probantur, quorum unum potest cognosci sine alio. Et ideo homo potest scire quasdam conclusiones unius scientiae, ignoratis aliis. Sed omnibus articulis fidei inhaeret fides propter unum medium, scilicet propter veritatem primam propositam nobis in Scripturis secundum doctrinam Ecclesiae intellectis sane. Et ideo qui ab hoc medio decidit totaliter fide caret. Reply Obj. 2: The various conclusions of a science have their respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith. Ad tertium dicendum quod diversa praecepta legis possunt referri vel ad diversa motiva proxima, et sic unum sine alio servari potest. Vel ad unum motivum primum, quod est perfecte obedire Deo, a quo decidit quicumque unum praeceptum transgreditur, secundum illud Iac. II, qui offendit in uno factus est omnium reus. Reply Obj. 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment, according to James 2:10: Whosoever shall . . . offend in one point is become guilty of all. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum fides possit esse maior in uno quam in alio Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides non possit esse maior in uno quam in alio. Quantitas enim habitus attenditur secundum obiecta. Sed quicumque habet fidem credit omnia quae sunt fidei, quia qui deficit ab uno totaliter amittit fidem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod fides non possit esse maior in uno quam in alio. Objection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its object. Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another. Praeterea, ea quae sunt in summo non recipiunt magis neque minus. Sed ratio fidei est in summo, requiritur enim ad fidem quod homo inhaereat primae veritati super omnia. Ergo fides non recipit magis et minus. Obj. 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme cannot be more or less. Now faith consists in something supreme, because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things. Therefore faith cannot be more or less. Praeterea, ita se habet fides in cognitione gratuita sicut intellectus principiorum in cognitione naturali, eo quod articuli fidei sunt prima principia gratuitae cognitionis, ut ex dictis patet. Sed intellectus principiorum aequaliter invenitur in omnibus hominibus. Ergo et fides aequaliter invenitur in omnibus fidelibus. Obj. 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 7). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree by all the faithful. Sed contra, ubicumque invenitur parvum et magnum, ibi invenitur maius et minus. Sed in fide invenitur magnum et parvum, dicit enim dominus Petro, Matth. XIV, modicae fidei, quare dubitasti? Et mulieri dixit, Matth. XV, mulier, magna est fides tua. Ergo fides potest esse maior in uno quam in alio. On the contrary, Wherever we find great and little, there we find more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our Lord said to Peter (Matt 14:31): O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt? And to the woman he said (Matt 15: 28): O woman, great is thy faith! Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quantitas habitus ex duobus attendi potest, uno modo, ex obiecto; alio modo, secundum participationem subiecti. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 112, A. 4), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of view: first, on the part of the object; second, on the part of its participation by the subject. Obiectum autem fidei potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum formalem rationem; alio modo, secundum ea quae materialiter credenda proponuntur. Formale autem obiectum fidei est unum et simplex scilicet veritas prima, ut supra dictum est. Unde ex hac parte fides non diversificatur in credentibus, sed est una specie in omnibus, ut supra dictum est. Sed ea quae materialiter credenda proponuntur sunt plura, et possunt accipi vel magis vel minus explicite. Et secundum hoc potest unus homo plura explicite credere quam alius. Et sic in uno potest esse maior fides secundum maiorem fidei explicationem. Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of its formal aspect; second, in respect of the material object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more explicit. Si vero consideretur fides secundum participationem subiecti, hoc contingit dupliciter. Nam actus fidei procedit et ex intellectu et ex voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Potest ergo fides in aliquo dici maior uno modo ex parte intellectus, propter maiorem certitudinem et firmitatem, alio modo ex parte voluntatis, propter maiorem promptitudinem seu devotionem vel confidentiam. If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2; Q. 4, A. 2). Consequently a man’s faith may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui pertinaciter discredit aliquid eorum quae sub fide continentur non habet habitum fidei, quem tamen habet ille qui non explicite omnia credit, sed paratus est omnia credere. Et secundum hoc ex parte obiecti unus habet maiorem fidem quam alius, inquantum plura explicite credit, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of the object, insofar as he believes more things, as stated above. Ad secundum dicendum quod de ratione fidei est ut veritas prima omnibus praeferatur. Sed tamen eorum qui eam omnibus praeferunt quidam certius et devotius se ei subiiciunt quam alii. Et secundum hoc fides est maior in uno quam in alio. Reply Obj. 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater in one than in another. Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus principiorum consequitur ipsam naturam humanam, quae aequaliter in omnibus invenitur. Sed fides consequitur donum gratiae, quod non est aequaliter in omnibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde non est eadem ratio. Reply Obj. 3: The understanding of principles results from man’s very nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above (I-II, Q. 112, A. 4). Hence the comparison fails. Et tamen secundum maiorem capacitatem intellectus, unus magis cognoscit virtutem principiorum quam alius. Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to another, according to the greater capacity of intellect. Quaestio 6 Question 6 De causa fidei The Cause of Faith Deinde considerandum est de causa fidei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum fides sit homini infusa a Deo. (1) Whether faith is infused into man by God? Secundo, utrum fides informis sit donum. (2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum fides sit homini infusa a Deo Whether faith is infused into man by God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides non sit homini infusa a Deo. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIV de Trin., quod per scientiam gignitur in nobis fides, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur. Sed ea quae per scientiam in nobis gignuntur magis videntur acquisita esse quam infusa. Ergo fides non videtur in nobis esse ex infusione divina. Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it. Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion. Praeterea, illud ad quod homo pertingit audiendo et videndo videtur esse ab homine acquisitum. Sed homo pertingit ad credendum et videndo miracula et audiendo fidei doctrinam, dicitur enim Ioan. IV, cognovit pater quia illa hora erat in qua dixit ei Iesus, filius tuus vivit, et credidit ipse et domus eius tota; et Rom. X dicitur quod fides est ex auditu. Ergo fides habetur ab homine tanquam acquisita. Obj. 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (John 4:53): The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house; and (Rom 10:17) it is said that faith is through hearing. Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it. Praeterea, illud quod consistit in hominis voluntate ab homine potest acquiri. Sed fides consistit in credentium voluntate, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praed. Sanct. Ergo fides potest esse ab homine acquisita. Obj. 3: Further, that which depends on a man’s will can be acquired by him. But faith depends on the believer’s will, according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Ephes. II, gratia estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis, ne quis glorietur, Dei enim donum est. On the contrary, It is written (Eph 2:8, 9): By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory . . . for it is the gift of God. Respondeo dicendum quod ad fidem duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut homini credibilia proponantur, quod requiritur ad hoc quod homo aliquid explicite credat. Aliud autem quod ad fidem requiritur est assensus credentis ad ea quae proponuntur. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, necesse est quod fides sit a Deo. Ea enim quae sunt fidei excedunt rationem humanam, unde non cadunt in contemplatione hominis nisi Deo revelante. Sed quibusdam quidem revelantur immediate a Deo, sicut sunt revelata apostolis et prophetis, quibusdam autem proponuntur a Deo mittente fidei praedicatores, secundum illud Rom. X, quomodo praedicabunt nisi mittantur? I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man’s knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: How shall they preach, unless they be sent?