Utrum synesis sit virtus Whether synesis is a virtue? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod synesis non sit virtus. Virtutes enim non insunt nobis a natura, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed synesis inest aliquibus a natura, ut dicit philosophus, in VI Ethic. Ergo synesis non est virtus. Objection 1: It would seem that synesis is not a virtue. Virtues are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But synesis is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore synesis is not a virtue. Praeterea, synesis, ut in eodem libro dicitur, est solum iudicativa. Sed iudicium solum, sine praecepto, potest esse etiam in malis. Cum ergo virtus sit solum in bonis, videtur quod synesis non sit virtus. Obj. 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), synesis is nothing but a faculty of judging. But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it seems that synesis is not a virtue. Praeterea, nunquam est defectus in praecipiendo nisi sit aliquis defectus in iudicando, saltem in particulari operabili, in quo omnis malus errat. Si ergo synesis ponitur virtus ad bene iudicandum, videtur quod non sit necessaria alia virtus ad bene praecipiendum. Et ideo prudentia erit superflua, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo synesis est virtus. Obj. 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore synesis be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable. Therefore synesis is not a virtue. Sed contra, iudicium est perfectius quam consilium. Sed eubulia, quae est bene consiliativa, est virtus. Ergo multo magis synesis, quae est bene iudicativa, est virtus. On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But euboulia, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is synesis a virtue, as being good judgment. Respondeo dicendum quod synesis importat iudicium rectum non quidem circa speculabilia, sed circa particularia operabilia, circa quae etiam est prudentia. Unde secundum synesim dicuntur in Graeco aliqui syneti, idest sensati, vel eusyneti, idest homines boni sensus, sicut e contrario qui carent hac virtute dicuntur asyneti, idest insensati. I answer that, synesis signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of synesis are said to be synetoi, i.e., persons of sense, or eusynetoi, i.e., men of good sense, just as on the other hand, those who lack this virtue are called asynetoi, i.e., senseless. Oportet autem quod secundum differentiam actuum qui non reducuntur in eandem causam sit etiam diversitas virtutum. Manifestum est autem quod bonitas consilii et bonitas iudicii non reducuntur in eandem causam, multi enim sunt bene consiliativi qui tamen non sunt bene sensati, quasi recte iudicantes. Sicut etiam in speculativis aliqui sunt bene inquirentes, propter hoc quod ratio eorum prompta est ad discurrendum per diversa, quod videtur provenire ex dispositione imaginativae virtutis, quae de facili potest formare diversa phantasmata, et tamen huiusmodi quandoque non sunt boni iudicii, quod est propter defectum intellectus, qui maxime contingit ex mala dispositione communis sensus non bene iudicantis. Et ideo oportet praeter eubuliam esse aliam virtutem quae est bene iudicativa. Et haec dicitur synesis. Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides euboulia, for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called synesis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod rectum iudicium in hoc consistit quod vis cognoscitiva apprehendat rem aliquam secundum quod in se est. Quod quidem provenit ex recta dispositione virtutis apprehensivae, sicut in speculo, si fuerit bene dispositum, imprimuntur formae corporum secundum quod sunt; si vero fuerit speculum male dispositum, apparent ibi imagines distortae et prave se habentes. Quod autem virtus cognoscitiva sit bene disposita ad recipiendum res secundum quod sunt, contingit quidem radicaliter ex natura, consummative autem ex exercitio vel ex munere gratiae. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, directe ex parte ipsius cognoscitivae virtutis, puta quia non est imbuta pravis conceptionibus, sed veris et rectis, et hoc pertinet ad synesim secundum quod est specialis virtus. Alio modo, indirecte, ex bona dispositione appetitivae virtutis, ex qua sequitur quod homo bene iudicet de appetibilibus. Et sic bonum virtutis iudicium consequitur habitus virtutum moralium, sed circa fines, synesis autem est magis circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Reply Obj. 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to synesis which in this respect is a special virtue. Second indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is about the ends, whereas synesis is rather about the means. Ad secundum dicendum quod in malis potest quidem iudicium rectum esse in universali, sed in particulari agibili semper eorum iudicium corrumpitur, ut supra habitum est. Reply Obj. 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular matter of action, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13). Ad tertium dicendum quod contingit quandoque id quod bene iudicatum est differri, vel negligenter agi aut inordinate. Et ideo post virtutem quae est bene iudicativa necessaria est finalis virtus principalis quae sit bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentia. Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum gnome sit specialis virtus a synesi distincta Whether gnome is a special virtue distinct from synesis? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gnome non sit specialis virtus a synesi distincta. Quia secundum synesim dicitur aliquis bene iudicativus. Sed nullus potest dici bene iudicativus nisi in omnibus bene iudicet. Ergo synesis se extendit ad omnia diiudicanda. Non est ergo aliqua alia virtus bene iudicativa quae gnome vocatur. Objection 1: It would seem that gnome is not a special virtue distinct from synesis. For a man is said, in respect of synesis, to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore synesis extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good judgment called gnome. Praeterea, iudicium medium est inter consilium et praeceptum. Sed una tantum virtus est bene consiliativa, scilicet eubulia; et una tantum virtus est bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentia. Ergo una tantum est virtus bene iudicativa, scilicet synesis. Obj. 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. euboulia, and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. synesis. Praeterea, ea quae raro accidunt, in quibus oportet a communibus legibus discedere, videntur praecipue casualia esse, quorum non est ratio, ut dicitur in II Phys. Omnes autem virtutes intellectuales pertinent ad rationem rectam. Ergo circa praedicta non est aliqua virtus intellectualis. Obj. 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is no intellectual virtue about such matters. Sed contra est quod Philosophus determinat, in VI Ethic., gnomen esse specialem virtutem. On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that gnome is a special virtue. Respondeo dicendum quod habitus cognoscitivi distinguuntur secundum altiora vel inferiora principia, sicut sapientia in speculativis altiora principia considerat quam scientia, et ideo ab ea distinguitur. Et ita etiam oportet esse in activis. Manifestum est autem quod illa quae sunt praeter ordinem inferioris principii sive causae reducuntur quandoque in ordinem altioris principii, sicut monstruosi partus animalium sunt praeter ordinem virtutis activae in semine, tamen cadunt sub ordine altioris principii, scilicet caelestis corporis, vel ulterius providentiae divinae. Unde ille qui consideraret virtutem activam in semine non posset iudicium certum ferre de huiusmodi monstris, de quibus tamen potest iudicari secundum considerationem divinae providentiae. I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine Providence. Contingit autem quandoque aliquid esse faciendum praeter communes regulas agendorum, puta cum impugnatori patriae non est depositum reddendum, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Et ideo oportet de huiusmodi iudicare secundum aliqua altiora principia quam sint regulae communes, secundum quas iudicat synesis. Et secundum illa altiora principia exigitur altior virtus iudicativa, quae vocatur gnome, quae importat quandam perspicacitatem iudicii. Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one’s country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, according to which synesis judges: and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judgment, which is called gnome, and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod synesis est vere iudicativa de omnibus quae secundum communes regulas fiunt. Sed praeter communes regulas sunt quaedam alia diiudicanda, ut iam dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Synesis judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above. Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium debet sumi ex propriis principiis rei, inquisitio autem fit etiam per communia. Unde etiam in speculativis dialectica, quae est inquisitiva, procedit ex communibus, demonstrativa autem, quae est iudicativa, procedit ex propriis. Et ideo eubulia, ad quam pertinet inquisitio consilii, est una de omnibus, non autem synesis, quae est iudicativa. Praeceptum autem respicit in omnibus unam rationem boni. Et ideo etiam prudentia non est nisi una. Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence euboulia to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, but not so synesis whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa quae praeter communem cursum contingere possunt considerare pertinet ad solam providentiam divinam, sed inter homines ille qui est magis perspicax potest plura horum sua ratione diiudicare. Et ad hoc pertinet gnome, quae importat quandam perspicacitatem iudicii. Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things by his reason: this belongs to gnome, which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment. Quaestio 52 Question 52 De dono consilii The Gift of Counsel Deinde considerandum est de dono consilii, quod respondet prudentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum consilium debeat poni inter septem dona spiritus sancti. (1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit? Secundo, utrum donum consilii respondeat virtuti prudentiae. (2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence? Tertio, utrum donum consilii maneat in patria. (3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven? Quarto, utrum quinta beatitudo, quae est, beati misericordes, respondeat dono consilii. (4) Whether the fifth beatitude, Blessed are the merciful, etc. corresponds to the gift of counsel? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum consilium debeat poni inter dona Spiritus Sancti Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Spirit? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non debeat poni inter dona spiritus sancti. Dona enim spiritus sancti in adiutorium virtutum dantur; ut patet per Gregorium, in II Moral. Sed ad consiliandum homo sufficienter perficitur per virtutem prudentiae, vel etiam eubuliae, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo consilium non debet poni inter dona spiritus sancti. Objection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are given as a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue of prudence, or even of euboulia, as is evident from what has been said (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 51, AA. 1, 2). Therefore counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, haec videtur esse differentia inter septem dona spiritus sancti et gratias gratis datas, quod gratiae gratis datae non dantur omnibus, sed distribuuntur diversis; dona autem spiritus sancti dantur omnibus habentibus spiritum sanctum. Sed consilium videtur esse de his quae specialiter aliquibus a spiritu sancto dantur, secundum illud I Machab. II, ecce Simon, frater vester, ipse vir consilii est. Ergo consilium magis debet poni inter gratias gratis datas quam inter septem dona spiritus sancti. Obj. 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to all who have the Holy Spirit. But counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy Spirit specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65: Behold . . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel. Therefore counsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, Rom. VIII dicitur, qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt. Sed his qui ab alio aguntur non competit consilium. Cum igitur dona spiritus sancti maxime competant filiis Dei, qui acceperunt spiritum adoptionis filiorum, videtur quod consilium inter dona spiritus sancti poni non debeat. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Rom 8:14): Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. But counselling is not consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy Spirit are most befitting the children of God, who have received the spirit of adoption of sons, it would seem that counsel should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI dicitur, requiescet super eum spiritus consilii et fortitudinis. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 11:2): (The Spirit of the Lord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude. Respondeo dicendum quod dona spiritus sancti, ut supra dictum est, sunt quaedam dispositiones quibus anima redditur bene mobilis a spiritu sancto. Deus autem movet unumquodque secundum modum eius quod movetur, sicut creaturam corporalem movet per tempus et locum, creaturam autem spiritualem per tempus et non per locum, ut Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt. Est autem proprium rationali creaturae quod per inquisitionem rationis moveatur ad aliquid agendum, quae quidem inquisitio consilium dicitur. Et ideo Spiritus Sanctus per modum consilii creaturam rationalem movet. Et propter hoc consilium ponitur inter dona spiritus sancti. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Spirit. Now God moves everything according to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen ad lit. viii, 20, 22). Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Spirit is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia vel eubulia, sive sit acquisita sive infusa, dirigit hominem in inquisitione consilii secundum ea quae ratio comprehendere potest, unde homo per prudentiam vel eubuliam fit bene consilians vel sibi vel alii. Sed quia humana ratio non potest comprehendere singularia et contingentia quae occurrere possunt, fit quod cogitationes mortalium sunt timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae, ut dicitur Sap. IX. Et ideo indiget homo in inquisitione consilii dirigi a Deo, qui omnia comprehendit. Quod fit per donum consilii, per quod homo dirigitur quasi consilio a Deo accepto. Sicut etiam in rebus humanis qui sibi ipsis non sufficiunt in inquisitione consilii a sapientioribus consilium requirunt. Reply Obj. 1: Prudence or euboulia, whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel according to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or euboulia makes man take good counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which may occur, the result is that the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain (Wis 9:14). Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek counsel from those who are wiser.