Quaestio 61 Question 61 De partibus iustitiae The Parts of Justice Deinde considerandum est de partibus iustitiae. Et primo, de partibus subiectivis, quae sunt species iustitiae, scilicet distributiva et commutativa; secundo, de partibus quasi integralibus; tertio, de partibus quasi potentialibus, scilicet de virtutibus adiunctis. Circa primum occurrit duplex consideratio, prima, de ipsis iustitiae partibus; secunda, de vitiis oppositis. Et quia restitutio videtur esse actus commutativae iustitiae, primo considerandum est de distinctione iustitiae commutativae et distributivae, secundo, de restitutione. We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts, which are the species of justice, i.e., distributive and commutative justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts, i.e., the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive justice; (2) restitution. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sint duae species iustitiae, iustitia distributiva et commutativa. (1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and commutative? Secundo, utrum eodem modo in eis medium accipiatur. (2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way? Tertio, utrum sit earum uniformis vel multiplex materia. (3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold? Quarto, utrum secundum aliquam earum specierum iustum sit idem quod contrapassum. (4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as counter-passion? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum convenienter ponatur duae species iustitiae, iustita distributiva et commutativa Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, as commutative and distributive? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur duae species iustitiae, iustitia distributiva et commutativa. Non enim potest esse iustitiae species quod multitudini nocet, cum iustitia ad bonum commune ordinetur. Sed distribuere bona communia in multos nocet bono communi multitudinis, tum quia exhauriuntur opes communes; tum etiam quia mores hominum corrumpuntur; dicit enim Tullius, in libro de Offic., fit deterior qui accipit, et ad idem semper expectandum paratior. Ergo distributio non pertinet ad aliquam iustitiae speciem. Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many, both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15): He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that he will receive again. Therefore distribution does not belong to any species of justice. Praeterea, iustitiae actus est reddere unicuique quod suum est, ut supra habitum est. Sed in distributione non redditur alicui quod suum erat, sed de novo appropriatur sibi id quod erat commune. Ergo hoc ad iustitiam non pertinet. Obj. 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is his own, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 2). But when things are distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not pertain to justice. Praeterea, iustitia non solum est in principe, sed etiam in subiectis, ut supra habitum est. Sed distribuere semper pertinet ad principem. Ergo distributiva non pertinet ad iustitiam. Obj. 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in the subject, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 6). But it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to justice. Praeterea, distributivum iustum est bonorum communium, ut dicitur in V Ethic. sed communia pertinent ad iustitiam legalem. Ergo iustitia distributiva non est species iustitiae particularis, sed iustitiae legalis. Obj. 4: Further, Distributive justice regards common goods (Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal justice. Praeterea, unum et multa non diversificant speciem virtutis. Sed iustitia commutativa consistit in hoc quod aliquid redditur uni; iustitia vero distributiva in hoc quod aliquid datur multis. Ergo non sunt diversae species iustitiae. Obj. 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in V Ethic., ponit duas partes iustitiae, et dicit quod una est directiva in distributionibus, alia in commutationibus. On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says (Ethic. v, 2) that one directs distributions, the other, commutations. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iustitia particularis ordinatur ad aliquam privatam personam, quae comparatur ad communitatem sicut pars ad totum. Potest autem ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi. Unus quidem partis ad partem, cui similis est ordo unius privatae personae ad aliam. Et hunc ordinem dirigit commutativa iustitia, quae consistit in his quae mutuo fiunt inter duas personas ad invicem. Alius ordo attenditur totius ad partes, et huic ordini assimilatur ordo eius quod est commune ad singulas personas. Quem quidem ordinem dirigit iustitia distributiva, quae est distributiva communium secundum proportionalitatem. Et ideo duae sunt iustitiae species, scilicet commutativa et distributiva. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 7, 8), particular justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community in relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive and commutative. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut in largitionibus privatarum personarum commendatur moderatio, effusio vero culpatur; ita etiam in distributione communium bonorum est moderatio servanda, in quo dirigit iustitia distributiva. Reply Obj. 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein distributive justice directs. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut pars et totum quodammodo sunt idem, ita id quod est totius quodammodo est partis. Et ita cum ex bonis communibus aliquid in singulos distribuitur, quilibet aliquo modo recipit quod suum est. Reply Obj. 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his own. Ad tertium dicendum quod actus distributionis quae est communium bonorum pertinet solum ad praesidentem communibus bonis, sed tamen iustitia distributiva est et in subditis, quibus distribuitur, inquantum scilicet sunt contenti iusta distributione. Quamvis etiam distributio quandoque fiat bonorum communium non quidem civitati, sed uni familiae, quorum distributio fieri potest auctoritate alicuius privatae personae. Reply Obj. 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are distributed insofar as they are contented by a just distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state but to the members of a family, and such distribution can be made by authority of a private individual. Ad quartum dicendum quod motus accipiunt speciem a termino ad quem. Et ideo ad iustitiam legalem pertinet ordinare ea quae sunt privatarum personarum in bonum commune, sed ordinare e converso bonum commune ad personas particulares per distributionem est iustitiae particularis. Reply Obj. 4: Movement takes its species from the term whereunto. Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to particular individuals by way of distribution. Ad quintum dicendum quod iustitia distributiva et commutativa non solum distinguuntur secundum unum et multa, sed secundum diversam rationem debiti, alio enim modo debetur alicui id quod est commune, alio modo id quod est proprium. Reply Obj. 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of different kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual in one way, and his personal property in another way. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum medium eodem modo accipiatur in iustitia distributiva et commutativa Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in commutative justice? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod medium eodem modo accipiatur in iustitia distributiva et commutativa. Utraque enim sub iustitia particulari continetur, ut dictum est. Sed in omnibus temperantiae vel fortitudinis partibus accipitur uno modo medium. Ergo etiam eodem modo est accipiendum medium in iustitia distributiva et commutativa. Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above (A. 1). Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way in both distributive and commutative justice. Praeterea, forma virtutis moralis in medio consistit quod secundum rationem determinatur. Cum ergo unius virtutis sit una forma, videtur quod in utraque sit eodem modo medium accipiendum. Obj. 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the same. Praeterea, in iustitia distributiva accipitur medium attendendo diversam dignitatem personarum. Sed dignitas personarum attenditur etiam in commutativa iustitia, sicut in punitionibus, plus enim punitur qui percussit principem quam qui percussit privatam personam. Ergo eodem modo accipitur medium in utraque iustitia. Obj. 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person’s deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed in the same way in both kinds of justice. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod in iustitia distributiva accipitur medium secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, in commutativa autem secundum arithmeticam. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the mean in distributive justice is observed according to geometrical proportion, whereas in commutative justice it follows arithmetical proportion. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, in distributiva iustitia datur aliquid alicui privatae personae inquantum id quod est totius est debitum parti. Quod quidem tanto maius est quanto ipsa pars maiorem principalitatem habet in toto. Et ideo in distributiva iustitia tanto plus alicui de bonis communibus datur quanto illa persona maiorem principalitatem habet in communitate. Quae quidem principalitas in aristocratica communitate attenditur secundum virtutem, in oligarchica secundum divitias, in democratica secundum libertatem, et in aliis aliter. Et ideo in iustitia distributiva non accipitur medium secundum aequalitatem rei ad rem, sed secundum proportionem rerum ad personas, ut scilicet, sicut una persona excedit aliam, ita etiam res quae datur uni personae excedit rem quae datur alii. Et ideo dicit philosophus quod tale medium est secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, in qua attenditur aequale non secundum quantitatem, sed secundum proportionem. Sicut si dicamus quod sicut se habent sex ad quatuor, ita se habent tria ad duo, quia utrobique est sesquialtera proportio, in qua maius habet totum minus et mediam partem eius, non autem est aequalitas excessus secundum quantitatem, quia sex excedunt quatuor in duobus, tria vero excedunt duo in uno. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), in distributive justice something is given to a private individual, insofar as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the mean in the latter case follows geometrical proportion, wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1½; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1. Sed in commutationibus redditur aliquid alicui singulari personae propter rem eius quae accepta est, ut maxime patet in emptione et venditione, in quibus primo invenitur ratio commutationis. Et ideo oportet adaequare rem rei, ut quanto iste plus habet quam suum sit de eo quod est alterius, tantundem restituat ei cuius est. Et sic fit aequalitas secundum arithmeticam medietatem, quae attenditur secundum parem quantitatis excessum, sicut quinque est medium inter sex et quatuor, in unitate enim excedit et exceditur. Si ergo a principio uterque habebat quinque, et unus eorum accepit unum de eo quod est alterius; unus, scilicet accipiens, habebit sex, et alii relinquentur quatuor. Erit ergo iustitia si uterque reducatur ad medium, ut accipiatur unum ab eo qui habet sex, et detur ei qui habet quatuor, sic enim uterque habebit quinque, quod est medium. On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according to the arithmetical mean which is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and one of them receives 1 out of the other’s belongings, the one that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which is the mean. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in aliis virtutibus moralibus accipitur medium secundum rationem, et non secundum rem. Sed in iustitia accipitur medium rei, et ideo secundum diversitatem rerum diversimode medium accipitur. Reply Obj. 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things. Ad secundum dicendum quod generalis forma iustitiae est aequalitas, in qua convenit iustitia distributiva cum commutativa. In una tamen invenitur aequalitas secundum proportionalitatem geometricam, in alia secundum arithmeticam. Reply Obj. 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find equality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find equality of arithmetical proportion. Ad tertium dicendum quod in actionibus et passionibus conditio personae facit ad quantitatem rei, maior enim est iniuria si percutiatur princeps quam si percutiatur privata persona. Et ita conditio personae in distributiva iustitia attenditur secundum se, in commutativa autem secundum quod per hoc diversificatur res. Reply Obj. 3: In actions and passions a person’s station affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person’s station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is considered insofar as it causes a diversity of things. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum materia utriusque iustitiae sit diversa Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia utriusque iustitiae non sit diversa. Diversitas enim materiae facit diversitatem virtutis, ut patet in temperantia et fortitudine. Si igitur distributivae iustitiae et commutativae sit diversa materia, videtur quod non contineantur sub una virtute, scilicet sub iustitia. Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.