Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum naturalis sit homini possessio exteriorum rerum Whether it is natural for man to possess external things? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit naturalis homini possessio exteriorum rerum. Nullus enim debet sibi attribuere quod Dei est. Sed dominium omnium creaturarum est proprie Dei, secundum illud Psalm., domini est terra et cetera. Ergo non est naturalis homini rerum possessio. Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is God’s. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according to Ps. 23:1, The earth is the Lord’s, etc. Therefore it is not natural for man to possess external things. Praeterea, Basilius, exponens verbum divitis dicentis, Luc. XII, congregabo omnia quae nata sunt mihi et bona mea, dicit, dic mihi, quae tua? Unde ea sumens in vitam tulisti? Sed illa quae homo possidet naturaliter, potest aliquis convenienter dicere esse sua. Ergo homo non possidet naturaliter exteriora bona. Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Luke 12:18), I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my goods, says: Tell me: which are thine? where did you take them from and bring them into being? Now whatever man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not naturally possess external things. Praeterea, sicut Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Trin., dominus nomen est potestatis. Sed homo non habet potestatem super res exteriores, nihil enim potest circa earum naturam immutare. Ergo possessio exteriorum rerum non est homini naturalis. Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i ) dominion denotes power. But man has no power over external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalm., omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius, scilicet hominis. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 8:8): Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, namely, man. Respondeo dicendum quod res exterior potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, quantum ad eius naturam, quae non subiacet humanae potestati, sed solum divinae, cui omnia ad nutum obediunt. Alio modo, quantum ad usum ipsius rei. Et sic habet homo naturale dominium exteriorum rerum, quia per rationem et voluntatem potest uti rebus exterioribus ad suam utilitatem, quasi propter se factis; semper enim imperfectiora sunt propter perfectiora, ut supra habitum est. Et ex hac ratione philosophus probat, in I Polit., quod possessio rerum exteriorum est homini naturalis. Hoc autem naturale dominium super ceteras creaturas, quod competit homini secundum rationem, in qua imago Dei consistit, manifestatur in ipsa hominis creatione, Gen. I, ubi dicitur, faciamus hominem ad similitudinem et imaginem nostram, et praesit piscibus maris, et cetera. I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Second, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above (Q. 64, A. 1). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God’s image resides, is shown forth in man’s creation (Gen 1:26) by the words: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, etc. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus habet principale dominium omnium rerum. Et ipse secundum suam providentiam ordinavit res quasdam ad corporalem hominis sustentationem. Et propter hoc homo habet naturale rerum dominium quantum ad potestatem utendi ipsis. Reply Obj. 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the sustenance of man’s body. For this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as regards the power to make use of them. Ad secundum dicendum quod dives ille reprehenditur ex hoc quod putabat exteriora bona esse principaliter sua, quasi non accepisset ea ab alio, scilicet a Deo. Reply Obj. 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them from another, namely from God. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de dominio exteriorum rerum quantum ad naturas ipsarum, quod quidem dominium soli Deo convenit, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the dominion over external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God alone, as stated above. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum liceat alicui rem aliquam quasi propriam possidere Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat alicui rem aliquam quasi propriam possidere. Omne enim quod est contra ius naturale est illicitum. Sed secundum ius naturale omnia sunt communia, cui quidem communitati contrariatur possessionum proprietas. Ergo illicitum est cuilibet homini appropriare sibi aliquam rem exteriorem. Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now according to the natural law all things are common property: and the possession of property is contrary to this community of goods. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing to himself. Praeterea, Basilius dicit, exponens praedictum verbum divitis, sicut qui, praeveniens ad spectacula, prohiberet advenientes, sibi appropriando quod ad communem usum ordinatur; similes sunt divites qui communia, quae praeoccupaverunt, aestimant sua esse. Sed illicitum esset praecludere viam aliis ad potiendum communibus bonis. Ergo illicitum est appropriare sibi aliquam rem communem. Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted above (A. 1, Obj. 2), says: The rich who deem as their own property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use. Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in decretis, dist. XLVII, Can. sicut hi, proprium nemo dicat quod est commune. Appellat autem communes res exteriores, sicut patet ex his quae praemittit. Ergo videtur illicitum esse quod aliquis appropriet sibi aliquam rem exteriorem. Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says, and his words are quoted in the Decretals: Let no man call his own that which is common property: and by common he means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Haeres., apostolici dicuntur qui se hoc nomine arrogantissime vocaverunt, eo quod in suam communionem non acciperent utentes coniugibus, et res proprias possidentes, quales habet Catholica Ecclesia et monachos et clericos plurimos. Sed ideo isti haeretici sunt quoniam, se ab Ecclesia separantes, nullam spem putant eos habere qui utuntur his rebus, quibus ipsi carent. Est ergo erroneum dicere quod non liceat homini propria possidere. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): The ‘Apostolici’ are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic Church. Now the reason why these people are heretics was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property. Respondeo dicendum quod circa rem exteriorem duo competunt homini. Quorum unum est potestas procurandi et dispensandi. Et quantum ad hoc licitum est quod homo propria possideat. Et est etiam necessarium ad humanam vitam, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia magis sollicitus est unusquisque ad procurandum aliquid quod sibi soli competit quam aliquid quod est commune omnium vel multorum, quia unusquisque, laborem fugiens, relinquit alteri id quod pertinet ad commune; sicut accidit in multitudine ministrorum. Alio modo, quia ordinatius res humanae tractantur si singulis immineat propria cura alicuius rei procurandae, esset autem confusio si quilibet indistincte quaelibet procuraret. Tertio, quia per hoc magis pacificus status hominum conservatur, dum unusquisque re sua contentus est. Unde videmus quod inter eos qui communiter et ex indiviso aliquid possident, frequentius iurgia oriuntur. I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of servants. Second, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Third, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed. Aliud vero quod competit homini circa res exteriores est usus ipsarum. Et quantum ad hoc non debet homo habere res exteriores ut proprias, sed ut communes, ut scilicet de facili aliquis ea communicet in necessitates aliorum. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. ult., divitibus huius saeculi praecipe facile tribuere, communicare. The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim 6:17, 18): Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others, etc. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod communitas rerum attribuitur iuri naturali, non quia ius naturale dictet omnia esse possidenda communiter et nihil esse quasi proprium possidendum, sed quia secundum ius naturale non est distinctio possessionum, sed magis secundum humanum condictum, quod pertinet ad ius positivum, ut supra dictum est. Unde proprietas possessionum non est contra ius naturale; sed iuri naturali superadditur per adinventionem rationis humanae. Reply Obj. 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one’s own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as stated above (Q. 57, AA. 2, 3). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui, praeveniens ad spectacula, praepararet aliis viam, non illicite ageret, sed ex hoc illicite agit quod alios prohibet. Et similiter dives non illicite agit si, praeoccupans possessionem rei quae a principio erat communis, aliis communicat, peccat autem si alios ab usu illius rei indiscrete prohibeat. Unde Basilius ibidem dicit, cur tu abundas, ille vero mendicat, nisi ut tu bonae dispensationis merita consequaris, ille vero patientiae praemiis coronetur? Reply Obj. 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking possession of something which at first was common property, and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? Ad tertium dicendum quod cum dicit Ambrosius, nemo proprium dicat quod est commune, loquitur de proprietate quantum ad usum. Unde subdit, plus quam sufficeret sumptui, violenter obtentum est. Reply Obj. 3: When Ambrose says: Let no man call his own that which is common, he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds: He who spends too much is a robber. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum sit de ratione furti occulte accipere rem alienam Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another’s thing secretly? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione furti occulte accipere rem alienam. Illud enim quod diminuit peccatum non videtur ad rationem peccati pertinere. Sed in occulto peccare pertinet ad diminutionem peccati, sicut e contrario ad exaggerandum peccatum quorundam dicitur Isaiae III, peccatum suum quasi Sodoma praedicaverunt, nec absconderunt. Ergo non est de ratione furti occulta acceptio rei alienae. Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take another’s thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not, apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Isa 3:9): They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it. Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another’s thing secretly. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in decretis, dist. XLVII, neque minus est criminis habenti tollere quam, cum possis et abundas, indigentibus denegare. Ergo sicut furtum consistit in acceptione rei alienae, ita et in detentione ipsius. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says: and his words are embodied in the Decretals: It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off. Therefore just as theft consists in taking another’s thing, so does it consist in keeping it back. Praeterea, homo potest furtim ab alio accipere etiam quod suum est puta rem quam apud alium deposuit, vel quae est ab eo iniuste ablata. Non est ergo de ratione furti quod sit occulta acceptio rei alienae. Obj. 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another’s thing secretly. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., fur a furvo dictus est, idest a fusco, nam noctis utitur tempore. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): Fur (thief) is derived from furvus and so from fuscus (dark), because he takes advantage of the night. Respondeo dicendum quod ad rationem furti tria concurrunt. Quorum primum convenit sibi secundum quod contrariatur iustitiae, quae unicuique tribuit quod suum est. Et ex hoc competit ei quod usurpat alienum. Secundum vero pertinet ad rationem furti prout distinguitur a peccatis quae sunt contra personam, sicut ab homicidio et adulterio. Et secundum hoc competit furto quod sit circa rem possessam. Si quis enim accipiat id quod est alterius non quasi possessio, sed quasi pars, sicut si amputet membrum; vel sicut persona coniuncta, ut si auferat filiam vel uxorem, non habet proprie rationem furti. Tertia differentia est quae complet furti rationem, ut scilicet occulte usurpetur alienum. Et secundum hoc propria ratio furti est ut sit occulta acceptio rei alienae. I answer that, Three things combine together to constitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is another’s. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another’s not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly to theft that it consists in taking another’s thing secretly. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod occultatio quandoque quidem est causa peccati, puta cum quis utitur occultatione ad peccandum, sicut accidit in fraude et dolo. Et hoc modo non diminuit, sed constituit speciem peccati. Et ita est in furto. Alio modo occultatio est simplex circumstantia peccati. Et sic diminuit peccatum, tum quia est signum verecundiae; tum quia tollit scandalum. Reply Obj. 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal. Ad secundum dicendum quod detinere id quod alteri debetur eandem rationem nocumenti habet cum acceptione. Et ideo sub iniusta acceptione intelligitur etiam iniusta detentio. Reply Obj. 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention is included in an unjust taking. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est simpliciter unius, secundum quid esse alterius. Sicut res deposita est simpliciter quidem deponentis, sed est eius apud quem deponitur quantum ad custodiam. Et id quod est per rapinam ablatum est rapientis, non simpliciter, sed quantum ad detentionem. Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is the depositary’s, and the thing stolen is the thief’s, not simply, but as regards its custody. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum furtum et rapina sint peccata differentia specie Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod furtum et rapina non sint peccata differentia specie. Furtum enim et rapina differunt secundum occultum et manifestum, furtum enim importat occultam acceptionem, rapina vero violentam et manifestam. Sed in aliis generibus peccatorum occultum et manifestum non diversificant speciem. Ergo furtum et rapina non sunt peccata specie diversa. Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of different species. For theft and robbery differ as secret and manifest: because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. Therefore theft and robbery are not different species of sin. Praeterea, moralia recipiunt speciem a fine, ut supra dictum est. Sed furtum et rapina ordinantur ad eundem finem, scilicet ad habendum aliena. Ergo non differunt specie. Obj. 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). Now theft and robbery are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another’s property. Therefore they do not differ specifically. Praeterea, sicut rapitur aliquid ad possidendum, ita rapitur mulier ad delectandum, unde et Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod raptor dicitur corruptor, et rapta corrupta. Sed raptus dicitur sive mulier auferatur publice, sive occulte. Ergo et res possessa rapi dicitur sive occulte, sive publice rapiatur. Ergo non differunt furtum et rapina. Obj. 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that he who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted. Now it is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and robbery do not differ.