Respondeo dicendum quod in virtutibus quae adiunguntur alicui principali virtuti duo sunt consideranda, primo quidem, quod virtutes illae in aliquo cum principali virtute conveniant; secundo, quod in aliquo deficiant a perfecta ratione ipsius. Quia vero iustitia ad alterum est, ut ex supradictis patet, omnes virtutes quae ad alterum sunt possunt ratione convenientiae iustitiae annecti. Ratio vero iustitiae consistit in hoc quod alteri reddatur quod ei debetur secundum aequalitatem, ut ex supradictis patet. Dupliciter igitur aliqua virtus ad alterum existens a ratione iustitiae deficit, uno quidem modo, inquantum deficit a ratione aequalis; alio modo, inquantum deficit a ratione debiti. Sunt enim quaedam virtutes quae debitum quidem alteri reddunt, sed non possunt reddere aequale. Et primo quidem, quidquid ab homine Deo redditur, debitum est, non tamen potest esse aequale, ut scilicet tantum ei homo reddat quantum debet; secundum illud Psalm., quid retribuam domino pro omnibus quae retribuit mihi? Et secundum hoc adiungitur iustitiae religio, quae, ut Tullius dicit, superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caeremoniamque vel cultum affert. Secundo, parentibus non potest secundum aequalitatem recompensari quod eis debetur, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Et sic adiungitur iustitiae pietas, per quam, ut Tullius dicit, sanguine iunctis patriaeque benevolis officium et diligens tribuitur cultus. Tertio, non potest secundum aequale praemium recompensari ab homine virtuti, ut patet per philosophum, in IV Ethic. Et sic adiungitur iustitiae observantia, per quam, ut Tullius dicit, homines aliqua dignitate antecedentes quodam cultu et honore dignantur.
I answer that, Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above (Q. 58, A. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 11). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; second, by falling short of the aspect of due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me? In this respect religion is annexed to justice since, according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or worship to some superior nature that men call divine. Second, it is not possible to make to one’s parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus piety is annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man renders service and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his country. Third, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus observance is annexed to justice, consisting, according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53), in the deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth.
A ratione vero debiti iustitiae defectus potest attendi secundum quod est duplex debitum, scilicet morale et legale, unde et philosophus, in VIII Ethic., secundum hoc duplex iustum assignat. Debitum quidem legale est ad quod reddendum aliquis lege adstringitur, et tale debitum proprie attendit iustitia quae est principalis virtus. Debitum autem morale est quod aliquis debet ex honestate virtutis. Et quia debitum necessitatem importat, ideo tale debitum habet duplicem gradum. Quoddam enim est sic necessarium ut sine eo honestas morum conservari non possit, et hoc habet plus de ratione debiti. Et potest hoc debitum attendi ex parte ipsius debentis. Et sic ad hoc debitum pertinet quod homo talem se exhibeat alteri in verbis et factis qualis est. Et ita adiungitur iustitiae veritas, per quam, ut Tullius dicit, immutata ea quae sunt aut fuerunt aut futura sunt, dicuntur. Potest etiam attendi ex parte eius cui debetur, prout scilicet aliquis recompensat alicui secundum ea quae fecit. Quandoque quidem in bonis. Et sic adiungitur iustitiae gratia, in qua, ut Tullius dicit, amicitiarum et officiorum alterius memoria, remunerandi voluntas continetur alterius. Quandoque vero in malis. Et sic adiungitur iustitiae vindicatio, per quam, ut Tullius dicit, vis aut iniuria, et omnino quidquid obscurum est, defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsatur.
A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed truth, whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future things are told without perversion. It may also be considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what he has done—sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we have gratitude, which consists in recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)—and sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed revenge, whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), we resist force, injury or anything obscure by taking vengeance or by self-defense.
Aliud vero debitum est necessarium sicut conferens ad maiorem honestatem, sine quo tamen honestas conservari potest. Quod quidem debitum attendit liberalitas, affabilitas sive amicitia, et alia huiusmodi. Quae Tullius praetermittit in praedicta enumeratione, quia parum habent de ratione debiti.
There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This due is the concern of liberality, affability or friendship, or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in them.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vindicta quae fit auctoritate publicae potestatis secundum sententiam iudicis, pertinet ad iustitiam commutativam. Sed vindicta quam quis facit proprio motu, non tamen contra legem, vel quam quis a iudice requirit, pertinet ad virtutem iustitiae adiunctam.
Reply Obj. 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in accordance with a judge’s sentence, belongs to commutative justice: whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Macrobius videtur attendisse ad duas partes integrales iustitiae, scilicet declinare a malo, ad quod pertinet innocentia; et facere bonum, ad quod pertinent sex alia. Quorum duo videntur pertinere ad aequales, scilicet amicitia in exteriori convictu, et concordia interius. Duo vero pertinent ad superiores, pietas ad parentes, et religio ad Deum. Duo vero ad inferiores, scilicet affectus, inquantum placent bona eorum; et humanitas, per quam subvenitur eorum defectibus. Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., quod humanus dicitur aliquis quia habeat circa hominem amorem et miserationis affectum, unde humanitas dicta est qua nos invicem tuemur. Et secundum hoc amicitia sumitur prout ordinat exteriorem convictum, sicut de ea philosophus tractat in IV Ethic. Potest etiam amicitia sumi secundum quod proprie respicit affectum, prout determinatur a philosopho in VIII et in IX Ethic. Et sic ad amicitiam pertinent tria, scilicet benevolentia, quae hic dicitur affectus; et concordia; et beneficentia, quae hic vocatur humanitas. Haec autem Tullius praetermisit, quia parum habent de ratione debiti, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral parts of justice, namely, declining from evil, to which innocence belongs, and doing good, to which the six others belong. Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, friendship in the external conduct and concord internally; two regard our relations toward superiors, namely, piety to parents, and religion to God; while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely, condescension, insofar as their good pleases us, and humanity, whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be humane, through having a feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one another. In this sense friendship is understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. Friendship may also be taken as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in Ethic. viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to friendship, namely, benevolence which is here called affection; concord, and beneficence which is here called humanity. These three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.
Ad tertium dicendum quod obedientia includitur in observantia, quam Tullius ponit, nam praecellentibus personis debetur et reverentia honoris et obedientia. Fides autem, per quam fiunt dicta, includitur in veritate, quantum ad observantiam promissorum. Veritas autem in plus se habet, ut infra patebit. Disciplina autem non debetur ex debito necessitatis, quia inferiori non est aliquis obligatus, inquantum est inferior (potest tamen aliquis superiori obligari ut inferioribus provideat, secundum illud Matth. XXIV, fidelis servus et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam). Et ideo a Tullio praetermittitur. Potest autem contineri sub humanitate, quam Macrobius ponit. Aequitas vero sub epieikeia, vel amicitia.
Reply Obj. 3: Obedience is included in observance, which Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to persons who excel. Faithfulness whereby a man’s acts agree with his words, is contained in truthfulness as to the observance of one’s promises: yet truthfulness covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on (Q. 109, AA. 1, 3). Discipline is not due as a necessary duty, because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors, according to Matt. 24:45, A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family: and for this reason it is omitted by Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity under epieikeia or under friendship.
Ad quartum dicendum quod in illa enumeratione ponuntur quaedam pertinentia ad veram iustitiam. Ad particularem quidem, bona commutatio, de qua dicit quod est habitus in commutationibus aequalitatem custodiens. Ad legalem autem iustitiam, quantum ad ea quae communiter sunt observanda, ponitur legispositiva, quae, ut ipse dicit, est scientia commutationum politicarum ad communitatem relatarum. Quantum vero ad ea quae quandoque particulariter agenda occurrunt praeter communes leges, ponitur eugnomosyna, quasi bona gnome, quae est in talibus directiva, ut supra habitum est in tractatu de prudentia. Et ideo dicit de ea quod est voluntaria iustificatio, quia scilicet ex proprio arbitrio id quod iustum est homo secundum eam servat, non secundum legem scriptam. Attribuuntur autem haec duo prudentiae secundum directionem, iustitiae vero secundum executionem. Eusebia vero dicitur quasi bonus cultus. Unde est idem quod religio. Ideo de ea dicit quod est scientia Dei famulatus (et loquitur secundum modum quo Socrates dicebat omnes virtutes esse scientias). Et ad idem reducitur sanctitas, ut post dicetur. Eucharistia autem est idem quod bona gratia, quam Tullius ponit, sicut et vindicativam. Benignitas autem videtur esse idem cum affectu, quem ponit Macrobius. Unde et Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod benignus est vir sponte ad benefaciendum paratus, et dulcis ad eloquium. Et ipse Andronicus dicit quod benignitas est habitus voluntarie benefactivus. Liberalitas autem videtur ad humanitatem pertinere.
Reply Obj. 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice. To particular justice belongs justice of exchange, which he describes as the habit of observing equality in commutations. To legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes legislative justice, which he describes as the science of political commutations relating to the community. As regards things which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions common sense or good judgment, which is our guide in such like matters, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 4) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that it is a voluntary justification, because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the written law. These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their executor. Eusebeia (piety) means good worship and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of the service of God (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that ‘all the virtues are sciences’): and holiness comes to the same, as we shall state further on (Q. 81, A. 8). Eucharistia (gratitude) means good thanksgiving, and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good, and is of gentle speech: and Andronicus too says that kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence. Liberality would seem to pertain to humanity.
Ad quintum dicendum quod epieikeia non adiungitur iustitiae particulari, sed legali. Et videtur esse idem cum ea quae dicta est eugnomosyna.
Reply Obj. 5: Epieikeia is annexed, not to particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of eugnomosyne (common sense).
Deinde considerandum est de singulis praedictarum virtutum, quantum ad praesentem intentionem pertinet. Et primo considerandum est de religione; secundo, de pietate; tertio, de observantia; quarto, de gratia; quinto, de vindicta; sexto, de veritate; septimo, de amicitia; octavo, de liberalitate; nono, de epieikeia. De aliis autem hic enumeratis supra dictum est, partim in tractatu de caritate, scilicet de concordia et aliis huiusmodi; partim in hoc tractatu de iustitia, sicut de bona commutatione et innocentia; de legispositiva autem in tractatu de prudentia.
We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, insofar as our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8) liberality, (9) epieikeia. Of the other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. Of legislative justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.
Circa religionem vero tria consideranda occurrunt, primo quidem, de ipsa religione secundum se; secundo, de actibus eius; tertio, de vitiis oppositis.
Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.
Circa primum quaeruntur octo.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum religio consistat tantum in ordine ad Deum.
(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?
Secundo, utrum religio sit virtus.
(2) Whether religion is a virtue?
Tertio, utrum religio sit una virtus.
(3) Whether religion is one virtue?
Quarto, utrum religio sit specialis virtus.
(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?
Quinto, utrum religio sit virtus theologica.
(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?
Sexto, utrum religio sit praeferenda aliis virtutibus moralibus.
(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
Septimo, utrum religio habeat exteriores actus.
(7) Whether religion has any external actions?
Octavo, utrum religio sit eadem sanctitati.
(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?
Utrum religio ordinet hominem solum ad Deum
Whether religion directs man to God alone?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non ordinet hominem solum ad Deum. Dicitur enim Iac. I, religio munda et immaculata apud Deum et patrem haec est, visitare pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum, et immaculatum se custodire ab hoc saeculo. Sed visitare pupillos et viduas dicitur secundum ordinem ad proximum, quod autem dicit immaculatum se custodire ab hoc saeculo, pertinet ad ordinem quo ordinatur homo in seipso. Ergo religio non solum dicitur in ordine ad Deum.
Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It is written (Jas 1:27): Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world. Now to visit the fatherless and widows indicates an order between oneself and one’s neighbor, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to God alone.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, quia Latina loquendi consuetudine, non imperitorum, verum etiam doctissimorum, cognationibus humanis atque affinitatibus et quibuscumque necessitudinibus dicitur exhibenda religio; non eo vocabulo vitatur ambiguum cum de cultu deitatis vertitur quaestio, ut fidenter dicere valeamus religionem non esse nisi cultum Dei. Ergo religio dicitur non solum in ordine ad Deum, sed etiam in ordine ad propinquos.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of God. Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.
Praeterea, ad religionem videtur latria pertinere. Latria autem interpretatur servitus, ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei. Servire autem debemus non solum Deo, sed etiam proximis, secundum illud Gal. V, per caritatem spiritus servite invicem. Ergo religio importat etiam ordinem ad proximum.
Obj. 3: Further, seemingly latria pertains to religion. Now latria signifies servitude, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor, according to Gal. 5:13, By charity of the spirit serve one another. Therefore religion includes a relation to one’s neighbor also.
Praeterea, ad religionem pertinet cultus. Sed homo dicitur non solum colere Deum, sed etiam proximum, secundum illud Catonis, cole parentes. Ergo etiam religio nos ordinat ad proximum, et non solum ad Deum.
Obj. 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of Cato, Worship thy parents. Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to God.
Praeterea, omnes in statu salutis existentes Deo sunt subiecti. Non autem dicuntur religiosi omnes qui sunt in statu salutis, sed solum illi qui quibusdam votis et observantiis et ad obediendum aliquibus hominibus se adstringunt. Ergo religio non videtur importare ordinem subiectionis hominis ad Deum.
Obj. 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.
Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, II Rhet., quod religio est quae superioris naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caeremoniamque affert.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., religiosus, ut ait Cicero, a religione appellatus, qui retractat et tanquam relegit ea quae ad cultum divinum pertinent. Et sic religio videtur dicta a religendo ea quae sunt divini cultus, quia huiusmodi sunt frequenter in corde revolvenda, secundum illud Prov. III, in omnibus viis tuis cogita illum. Quamvis etiam possit intelligi religio ex hoc dicta quod Deum reeligere debemus, quem amiseramus negligentes, sicut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Vel potest intelligi religio a religando dicta, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., religet nos religio uni omnipotenti Deo. Sive autem religio dicatur a frequenti lectione, sive ex iterata electione eius quod negligenter amissum est, sive a religatione, religio proprie importat ordinem ad Deum. Ipse enim est cui principaliter alligari debemus, tanquam indeficienti principio; ad quem etiam nostra electio assidue dirigi debet, sicut in ultimum finem; quem etiam negligenter peccando amittimus, et credendo et fidem protestando recuperare debemus.
I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from religio, because he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again (relegit), the things which pertain to the worship of God, so that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, In all thy ways think on Him. According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect. Or again, religion may be derived from religare (to bind together), wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): May religion bind us to the one Almighty God. However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod religio habet duplices actus. Quosdam quidem proprios et immediatos, quos elicit, per quos homo ordinatur ad solum Deum, sicut sacrificare, adorare et alia huiusmodi. Alios autem actus habet quos producit mediantibus virtutibus quibus imperat, ordinans eos in divinam reverentiam, quia scilicet virtus ad quam pertinet finis, imperat virtutibus ad quas pertinent ea quae sunt ad finem. Et secundum hoc actus religionis per modum imperii ponitur esse visitare pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum, quod est actus elicitus a misericordia, immaculatum autem custodire se ab hoc saeculo imperative quidem est religionis, elicitive autem temperantiae vel alicuius huiusmodi virtutis.
Reply Obj. 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and to keep oneself unspotted from this world is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting.
Ad secundum dicendum quod religio refertur ad ea quae exhibentur cognationibus humanis, extenso nomine religionis, non autem secundum quod religio proprie dicitur. Unde Augustinus, parum ante verba inducta, praemittit, religio distinctius non quemlibet, sed Dei cultum significare videtur.
Reply Obj. 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one’s human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, Augustine says: In a stricter sense religion seems to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God.
Ad tertium dicendum quod cum servus dicatur ad dominum, necesse est quod ubi est propria et specialis ratio dominii, ibi sit specialis et propria ratio servitutis. Manifestum est autem quod dominium convenit Deo secundum propriam et singularem quandam rationem, quia scilicet ipse omnia fecit, et quia summum in omnibus rebus obtinet principatum. Et ideo specialis ratio servitutis ei debetur. Et talis servitus nomine latriae designatur apud Graecos. Et ideo ad religionem proprie pertinet.
Reply Obj. 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as latria in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion.
Ad quartum dicendum quod colere dicimus homines quos honorificatione, vel recordatione, vel praesentia frequentamus. Et etiam aliqua quae nobis subiecta sunt coli a nobis dicuntur, sicut agricolae dicuntur ex eo quod colunt agros, et incolae dicuntur ex eo quod colunt loca quae inhabitant. Quia tamen specialis honor debetur Deo, tanquam primo omnium principio, etiam specialis ratio cultus ei debetur, quae Graeco nomine vocatur eusebia vel theosebia, ut patet per Augustinum, X de Civ. Dei.
Reply Obj. 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to cultivate a man’s memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer (agricola) is one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant (incola) is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is Eusebeia or Theosebeia, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
Ad quintum dicendum quod quamvis religiosi dici possint communiter omnes qui Deum colunt, specialiter tamen religiosi dicuntur qui totam vitam suam divino cultui dedicant, a mundanis negotiis se abstrahentes. Sicut etiam contemplativi dicuntur non qui contemplantur, sed qui contemplationi totam vitam suam deputant. Huiusmodi autem non se subiiciunt homini propter hominem sed propter Deum, secundum illud apostoli, Gal. IV, sicut Angelum Dei excepistis me, sicut Christum Iesum.
Reply Obj. 5: Although the name religious may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term contemplative is applied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man’s sake but for God’s sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal 4:14), You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus.