Respondeo dicendum quod Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus non propter ipsum, qui in seipso est gloria plenus, cui nihil a creatura adiici potest, sed propter nos, quia videlicet per hoc quod Deum reveremur et honoramus, mens nostra ei subiicitur, et in hoc eius perfectio consistit; quaelibet enim res perficitur per hoc quod subditur suo superiori, sicut corpus per hoc quod vivificatur ab anima, et aer per hoc quod illuminatur a sole. Mens autem humana indiget ad hoc quod coniungatur Deo, sensibilium manuductione, quia invisibilia per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, ut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. Et ideo in divino cultu necesse est aliquibus corporalibus uti, ut eis, quasi signis quibusdam, mens hominis excitetur ad spirituales actus, quibus Deo coniungitur. Et ideo religio habet quidem interiores actus quasi principales et per se ad religionem pertinentes, exteriores vero actus quasi secundarios, et ad interiores actus ordinatos. I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible world, since invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, as the Apostle says (Rom 1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man’s mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus loquitur quantum ad id quod est principale et per se intentum in cultu divino. Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi exteriora non exhibentur Deo quasi his indigeat, secundum illud Psalm., numquid manducabo carnes taurorum, aut sanguinem hircorum potabo? Sed exhibentur Deo tanquam signa quaedam interiorum et spiritualium operum, quae per se Deus acceptat. Unde Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, idest sacrum signum, est. Reply Obj. 2: These external things are offered to God, not as though He stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats? but as signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice. Ad tertium dicendum quod idololatrae deridentur ex hoc quod ea quae ad homines pertinent idolis exhibebant non tanquam signa excitantia eos ad aliqua spiritualia, sed tanquam per se eis accepta. Et praecipue quia erant vana et turpia. Reply Obj. 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum religio sit idem sanctitati Whether religion is the same as sanctity? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non sit idem sanctitati. Religio enim est quaedam specialis virtus, ut habitum est. Sanctitas autem dicitur esse generalis virtus, est enim faciens fideles et servantes ea quae ad Deum sunt iusta, ut Andronicus dicit. Ergo sanctitas non est idem religioni. Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity. Religion is a special virtue, as stated above (A. 4): whereas sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfill our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion. Praeterea, sanctitas munditiam importare videtur, dicit enim Dionysius, XII cap. de Div. Nom., quod sanctitas est ab omni immunditia libera et perfecta et omnino immaculata munditia. Munditia autem maxime videtur pertinere ad temperantiam, quae turpitudines corporales excludit. Cum igitur religio ad iustitiam pertineat, videtur quod sanctitas non sit idem religioni. Obj. 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that sanctity is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity. Now purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem that sanctity is not the same as religion. Praeterea, ea quae dividuntur ex opposito non sunt idem. Sed in quadam enumeratione partium iustitiae sanctitas condividitur religioni, ut supra habitum est. Ergo sanctitas non est idem quod religio. Obj. 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above (Q. 80, ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. I, serviamus illi in sanctitate et iustitia. Sed servire Deo pertinet ad religionem, ut supra habitum est. Ergo religio est idem sanctitati. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 1:74, 75): That . . . we may serve Him . . . in holiness and justice. Now, to serve God belongs to religion, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3, ad 2). Therefore religion is the same as sanctity. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen sanctitatis duo videtur importare. Uno quidem modo, munditiam, et huic significationi competit nomen Graecum, dicitur enim agios quasi sine terra. Alio modo importat firmitatem, unde apud antiquos sancta dicebantur quae legibus erant munita ut violari non deberent; unde et dicitur esse aliquid sancitum quia est lege firmatum. Potest etiam secundum Latinos hoc nomen sanctus ad munditiam pertinere, ut intelligatur sanctus quasi sanguine tinctus, eo quod antiquitus illi qui purificari volebant sanguine hostiae tingebantur, ut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol. Et utraque significatio competit, ut sanctitas attribuatur his quae divino cultui applicantur, ita quod non solum homines, sed etiam templum et vasa et alia huiusmodi sanctificari dicantur ex hoc quod cultui divino applicantur. Munditia enim necessaria est ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur. Quia mens humana inquinatur ex hoc quod inferioribus rebus immergitur, sicut quaelibet res ex immixtione peioris sordescit, ut argentum ex immixtione plumbi. Oportet autem quod mens ab inferioribus rebus abstrahatur, ad hoc quod supremae rei possit coniungi. Et ideo mens sine munditia Deo applicari non potest. Unde ad Heb. ult. dicitur, pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum. Firmitas etiam exigitur ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur. Applicatur enim ei sicut ultimo fini et primo principio, huiusmodi autem oportet maxime immobilia esse. Unde dicebat apostolus, Rom. VIII, certus sum quod neque mors neque vita separabit me a caritate Dei. I answer that, The word sanctity seems to have two significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the Greek, for hagios means unsoiled. In another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term sancta was applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred (sancitum) when it is ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word sanctus may be connected with purity, if it be resolved into sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim’s blood, according to Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Heb 12:14): Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. Again, firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom 8:38, 39): I am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me from the love of God. Sic igitur sanctitas dicitur per quam mens hominis seipsam et suos actus applicat Deo. Unde non differt a religione secundum essentiam, sed solum ratione. Nam religio dicitur secundum quod exhibet Deo debitum famulatum in his quae pertinent specialiter ad cultum divinum, sicut in sacrificiis, oblationibus et aliis huiusmodi, sanctitas autem dicitur secundum quod homo non solum haec, sed aliarum virtutum opera refert in Deum, vel secundum quod homo se disponit per bona opera ad cultum divinum. Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sanctitas est quaedam specialis virtus secundum essentiam, et secundum hoc est quodammodo eadem religioni. Habet autem quandam generalitatem, secundum quod omnes virtutum actus per imperium ordinat in bonum divinum, sicut et iustitia legalis dicitur generalis virtus, inquantum ordinat omnium virtutum actus in bonum commune. Reply Obj. 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it has a certain generality, insofar as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to be a general virtue, insofar as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Ad secundum dicendum quod temperantia munditiam quidem operatur, non tamen ita quod habeat rationem sanctitatis nisi referatur in Deum. Unde de ipsa virginitate dicit Augustinus, in libro de virginitate, quod non quia virginitas est, sed quia Deo dicata est, honoratur. Reply Obj. 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that it is honored not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God. Ad tertium dicendum quod sanctitas distincta est a religione propter differentiam praedictam, non quia differat re, sed ratione tantum, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not really but logically. Quaestio 82 Question 82 De devotione Devotion Deinde considerandum est de actibus religionis. Et primo, de actibus interioribus, qui, secundum praedicta, sunt principaliores; secundo, de actibus exterioribus, qui sunt secundarii. Interiores autem actus religionis videntur esse devotio et oratio. Primo ergo de devotione agendum est; secundo, de oratione. We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts; second, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer. Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum devotio sit specialis actus. (1) Whether devotion is a special act? Secundo, utrum sit actus religionis. (2) Whether it is an act of religion? Tertio, de causa devotionis. (3) Of the cause of devotion? Quarto, de eius effectu. (4) Of its effect? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum devotio sit specialis actus Whether devotion is a special act? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod devotio non sit specialis actus. Illud enim quod pertinet ad modum aliorum actuum non videtur esse specialis actus. Sed devotio videtur pertinere ad modum aliorum actuum, dicitur enim II Paral. XXIX, obtulit universa multitudo hostias et laudes et holocausta mente devota. Ergo devotio non est specialis actus. Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Chr 29:31): All the multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout mind. Therefore devotion is not a special act. Praeterea, nullus specialis actus invenitur in diversis generibus actuum. Sed devotio invenitur in diversis generibus actuum, scilicet in actibus corporalibus et etiam in spiritualibus, dicitur enim aliquis et devote meditari et devote genu flectere. Ergo devotio non est specialis actus. Obj. 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely, corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special act. Praeterea, omnis actus specialis aut est appetitivae aut cognoscitivae virtutis. Sed devotio neutri earum appropriatur, ut patet discurrenti per singulas species actuum utriusque partis, quae supra enumeratae sunt. Ergo devotio non est specialis actus. Obj. 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive or to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either faculty, as enumerated above (I, QQ. 78, seqq.; I-II, Q. 23, A. 4). Therefore devotion is not a special act. Sed contra est quod actibus meremur, ut supra habitum est. Sed devotio habet specialem rationem merendi. Ergo devotio est specialis actus. On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (I-II, Q. 21, AA. 34). But devotion has a special reason for merit. Therefore devotion is a special act. Respondeo dicendum quod devotio dicitur a devovendo, unde devoti dicuntur qui seipsos quodammodo Deo devovent, ut ei se totaliter subdant. Propter quod et olim apud gentiles devoti dicebantur qui seipsos idolis devovebant in mortem pro sui salute exercitus, sicut de duobus Deciis Titus Livius narrat. Unde devotio nihil aliud esse videtur quam voluntas quaedam prompte tradendi se ad ea quae pertinent ad Dei famulatum. Unde Exod. XXXV dicitur quod multitudo filiorum Israel obtulit mente promptissima atque devota primitias domino. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas prompte faciendi quod ad Dei servitium pertinet est quidam specialis actus. Unde devotio est specialis actus voluntatis. I answer that, Devotion is derived from devote ; wherefore those persons are said to be devout who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject themselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it is written (Exod 35:20, 21) that the multitude of the children of Israel . . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind. Now it is evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of God is a special kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod movens imponit modum motui mobilis. Voluntas autem movet alias vires animae ad suos actus, et voluntas secundum quod est finis, movet seipsam ad ea quae sunt ad finem, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo, cum devotio sit actus voluntatis hominis offerentis seipsum Deo ad ei serviendum, qui est ultimus finis, consequens est quod devotio imponat modum humanis actibus, sive sint ipsius voluntatis circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sive etiam sint aliarum potentiarum quae a voluntate moventur. Reply Obj. 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, and the will, insofar as it regards the end, moves both itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 3). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that are moved by the will. Ad secundum dicendum quod devotio invenitur in diversis generibus actuum non sicut species illorum generum, sed sicut motio moventis invenitur virtute in motibus mobilium. Reply Obj. 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found virtually in the movements of the things moved. Ad tertium dicendum quod devotio est actus appetitivae partis animae, et est quidam motus voluntatis, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul, and is a movement of the will, as stated above. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum devotio sit actus religionis Whether devotion is an act of religion? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod devotio non sit actus religionis. Devotio enim, ut dictum est, ad hoc pertinet quod aliquis Deo se tradat. Sed hoc maxime fit per caritatem, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., divinus amor extasim facit, non sinens amantes sui ipsorum esse, sed eorum quae amant. Ergo devotio magis est actus caritatis quam religionis. Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion. Devotion, as stated above (A. 1), consists in giving oneself up to God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved. Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.