Respondeo dicendum quod causa devotionis extrinseca et principalis Deus est; de quo dicit Ambrosius, super Luc., quod Deus quos dignatur vocat, et quem vult religiosum facit, et si voluisset, Samaritanos ex indevotis devotos fecisset. Causa autem intrinseca ex parte nostra, oportet quod sit meditatio seu contemplatio. Dictum est enim quod devotio est quidam voluntatis actus ad hoc quod homo prompte se tradat ad divinum obsequium. Omnis autem actus voluntatis ex aliqua consideratione procedit, eo quod bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, unde et Augustinus dicit, in libro de Trin., quod voluntas oritur ex intelligentia. Et ideo necesse est quod meditatio sit devotionis causa, inquantum scilicet per meditationem homo concipit quod se tradat divino obsequio. Ad quod quidem inducit duplex consideratio. Una quidem quae est ex parte divinae bonitatis et beneficiorum ipsius, secundum illud Psalm., mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est, ponere in domino Deo spem meam. Et haec consideratio excitat dilectionem, quae est proxima devotionis causa. Alia vero est ex parte hominis considerantis suos defectus, ex quibus indiget ut Deo innitatur, secundum illud Psalm., levavi oculos meos in montes, unde veniet auxilium mihi. Auxilium meum a domino, qui fecit caelum et terram. Et haec consideratio excludit praesumptionem, per quam aliquis impeditur ne Deo se subiiciat, dum suae virtuti innititur. I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of Whom Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:55, says that God calls whom He deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout. But the intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or contemplation. For it was stated above (A. 1) that devotion is an act of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some consideration, since the object of the will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that the will arises from the intelligence. Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of devotion, insofar as through meditation man conceives the thought of surrendering himself to God’s service. Indeed a twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration of God’s goodness and loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, It is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God: and this consideration wakens love which is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that of man’s own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on God, according to Ps. 120:1, 2, I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth; and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His strength. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consideratio eorum quae nata sunt dilectionem Dei excitare, devotionem causant. Consideratio vero quorumcumque ad hoc non pertinentium, sed ab his mentem distrahentium, impedit devotionem. Reply Obj. 1: The consideration of such things as are of a nature to awaken our love of God, causes devotion; whereas the consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such things is a hindrance to devotion. Ad secundum dicendum quod ea quae sunt divinitatis sunt secundum se maxime excitantia dilectionem, et per consequens devotionem, quia Deus est super omnia diligendus. Sed ex debilitate mentis humanae est quod sicut indiget manuduci ad cognitionem divinorum, ita ad dilectionem, per aliqua sensibilia nobis nota. Inter quae praecipuum est humanitas Christi, secundum quod in praefatione dicitur, ut dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, per hunc in invisibilium amorem rapiamur. Et ideo ea quae pertinent ad Christi humanitatem, per modum cuiusdam manuductionis, maxime devotionem excitant, cum tamen devotio principaliter circa ea quae sunt divinitatis consistat. Reply Obj. 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the strongest incentive to love and consequently to devotion, because God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words of the Preface, that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of things invisible. Wherefore matters relating to Christ’s humanity are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead. Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia, et quidquid aliud ad magnitudinem pertinet, occasio est quod homo confidat de seipso, et ideo non totaliter se Deo tradat. Et inde est quod huiusmodi quandoque occasionaliter devotionem impediunt, et in simplicibus et mulieribus devotio abundat, elationem comprimendo. Si tamen scientiam, et quamcumque aliam perfectionem, homo perfecte Deo subdat, ex hoc ipso devotio augetur. Reply Obj. 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender himself to God. The result is that such like things sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is increased. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum laetitia sit devotionis effectus Whether joy is an effect of devotion? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod laetitia non sit devotionis effectus. Quia, ut dictum est, passio Christi praecipue ad devotionem excitat. Sed ex eius consideratione consequitur in anima quaedam afflictio, secundum illud Thren. III, recordare paupertatis meae, absinthii et fellis, quod pertinet ad passionem; et subditur, memoria memor ero, et tabescet in me anima mea. Ergo delectatio, sive gaudium, non est devotionis effectus. Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), Christ’s Passion is the chief incentive to devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the soul, according to Lam. 3:19, Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood and the gall, which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam 3:20) it is said: I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall languish within me. Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of devotion. Praeterea, devotio praecipue consistit in interiori sacrificio spiritus. Sed in Psalm. dicitur, sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus. Ergo afflictio magis est devotionis effectus quam iucunditas sive gaudium. Obj. 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice of the spirit. But it is written (Ps 50:19): A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit. Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion rather than gladness or joy. Praeterea, Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, in libro de homine, quod sicut risus procedit ex gaudio, ita lacrimae et gemitus sunt signa tristitiae. Sed ex devotione contingit quod aliqui prorumpant in lacrimas. Ergo laetitia, vel gaudium, non est devotionis effectus. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) that just as laughter proceeds from joy, so tears and groans are signs of sorrow. But devotion makes some people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of devotion. Sed contra est quod in collecta dicitur, quos ieiunia votiva castigant, ipsa quoque devotio sancta laetificet. On the contrary, We say in the Collect: That we who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a holy devotion. Respondeo dicendum quod devotio per se quidem et principaliter spiritualem laetitiam mentis causat, ex consequenti autem et per accidens causat tristitiam. Dictum est enim quod devotio ex duplici consideratione procedit. Principaliter quidem ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, quia ista consideratio pertinet quasi ad terminum motus voluntatis tradentis se Deo. Et ex ista consideratione per se quidem sequitur delectatio, secundum illud Psalm., memor fui Dei, et delectatus sum, sed per accidens haec consideratio tristitiam quandam causat in his qui nondum plene Deo fruuntur, secundum illud Psalm., sitivit anima mea ad Deum vivum, et postea sequitur, fuerunt mihi lacrimae meae, etc. Secundario vero causatur devotio, ut dictum est, ex consideratione propriorum defectuum, nam haec consideratio pertinet ad terminum a quo homo per motum voluntatis devotae recedit, ut scilicet non in se existat, sed Deo se subdat. Haec autem consideratio e converso se habet ad primam. Nam per se quidem nata est tristitiam causare, recogitando proprios defectus, per accidens autem laetitiam, scilicet propter spem divinae subventionis. Et sic patet quod ad devotionem primo et per se consequitur delectatio, secundario autem et per accidens tristitia quae est secundum Deum. I answer that, The direct and principal effect of devotion is the spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and indirect effect. For it has been stated (A. 3) that devotion is caused by a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of God’s goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it were, of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and the direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps. 76:4, I remembered God, and was delighted; but accidentally this consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy God fully, according to Ps. 41:3, My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God, and afterwards it is said (Ps 41:4): My tears have been my bread, etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated (A. 3), by the consideration of one’s own failings; for this consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in himself, but subjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency to the first: for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly (when one thinks over one’s own failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident that the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary and accidental effect is that sorrow which is according to God. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in consideratione passionis Christi est aliquid quod contristet, scilicet defectus humanus, propter quem tollendum Christum pati oportuit, et est aliquid quod laetificet, scilicet Dei erga nos benignitas, quae nobis de tali liberatione providit. Reply Obj. 1: In the consideration of Christ’s Passion there is something that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal of which made it necessary for Christ to suffer; and there is something that causes joy, namely, God’s loving-kindness to us in giving us such a deliverance. Ad secundum dicendum quod spiritus qui ex una parte contribulatur propter praesentis vitae defectus, ex alia parte condelectatur ex consideratione divinae bonitatis et ex spe divini auxilii. Reply Obj. 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is rejoiced, by the consideration of God’s goodness, and by the hope of the Divine help. Ad tertium dicendum quod lacrimae prorumpunt non solum ex tristitia, sed etiam ex quadam affectus teneritudine, praecipue cum consideratur aliquid delectabile cum permixtione alicuius tristabilis; sicut solent homines lacrimari ex pietatis affectu cum recuperant filios vel caros amicos quos aestimaverant se perdidisse. Et per hunc modum lacrimae ex devotione procedunt. Reply Obj. 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one considers something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way tears arise from devotion. Quaestio 83 Question 83 De oratione Prayer Deinde considerandum est de oratione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem et septem. We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen points of inquiry: Primo, utrum oratio sit actus appetitivae virtutis vel cognitivae. (1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power? Secundo, utrum conveniens sit orare. (2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God? Tertio, utrum oratio sit actus religionis. (3) Whether prayer is an act of religion? Quarto, utrum solus Deus sit orandus. (4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone? Quinto, utrum in oratione sit aliquid determinate petendum. (5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray? Sexto, utrum orando debeamus temporalia petere. (6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray? Septimo, utrum pro aliis orare debeamus. (7) Whether we ought to pray for others? Octavo, utrum debeamus orare pro inimicis. (8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies? Nono, de septem petitionibus orationis dominicae. (9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer; Decimo, utrum orare sit proprium rationalis creaturae. (10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature? Undecimo, utrum sancti in patria orent pro nobis. (11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us? Duodecimo, utrum, oratio debeat esse vocalis. (12) Whether prayer should be vocal? Tertiodecimo, utrum attentio requiratur ad orationem. (13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer? Quartodecimo, utrum oratio debeat esse diuturna. (14) Whether prayer should last a long time? Quintodecimo, utrum oratio sit efficax ad impetrandum quod petitur. (15) Whether prayer is meritorious? Sextodecimo, utrum sit meritoria. (16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? Septimodecimo, de speciebus orationis. (17) of the different kinds of prayer. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum oratio sit actus appetitivae virtutis Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power?