Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum oratio sit actus religionis Whether prayer is an act of religion? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod oratio non sit actus religionis. Religio enim, cum sit pars iustitiae, est in voluntate sicut in subiecto. Sed oratio pertinet ad partem intellectivam, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo oratio non videtur esse actus religionis, sed doni intellectus, per quod mens ascendit in Deum. Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion. Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God. Praeterea, actus latriae cadit sub necessitate praecepti. Sed oratio non videtur cadere sub necessitate praecepti, sed ex mera voluntate procedere, cum nihil aliud sit quam volitorum petitio. Ergo oratio non videtur esse religionis actus. Obj. 2: Further, the act of latria falls under a necessity of precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of religion. Praeterea, ad religionem pertinere videtur ut quis divinae naturae cultum caeremoniamque afferat. Sed oratio non videtur aliquid Deo afferre, sed magis aliquid obtinendum ab eo petere. Ergo oratio non est religionis actus. Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one offers worship and ceremonial rites to the Godhead. But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to ask to obtain something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalm., dirigatur oratio mea sicut incensum in conspectu tuo, ubi dicit Glossa quod in huius figuram, in veteri lege incensum dicebatur offerri in odorem suavem domino. Sed hoc pertinet ad religionem. Ergo oratio est religionis actus. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 140:2): Let my prayer be directed as incense in Thy sight: and a gloss on the passage says that it was to signify this that under the Old Law incense was said to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord. Now this belongs to religion. Therefore prayer is an act of religion. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad religionem proprie pertinet reverentiam et honorem Deo exhibere. Et ideo omnia illa per quae Deo reverentia exhibetur pertinent ad religionem. Per orationem autem homo Deo reverentiam exhibet, inquantum scilicet se ei subiicit, et profitetur orando se eo indigere sicut auctore suorum bonorum. Unde manifestum est quod oratio est proprie religionis actus. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4), it belongs properly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things through which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man shows reverence to God by means of prayer, insofar as he subjects himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an act of religion. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas movet alias potentias animae in suum finem, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo religio, quae est in voluntate, ordinat actus aliarum potentiarum ad Dei reverentiam. Inter alias autem potentias animae, intellectus altior est et voluntati propinquior. Et ideo post devotionem, quae pertinet ad ipsam voluntatem, oratio, quae pertinet ad partem intellectivam, est praecipua inter actus religionis, per quam religio intellectum hominis movet in Deum. Reply Obj. 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, as stated above (Q. 82, A. 1, ad 1), and therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of God. Now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion directs man’s intellect to God. Ad secundum dicendum quod non solum petere quae desideramus, sed etiam recte aliquid desiderare sub praecepto cadit. Sed desiderare quidem cadit sub praecepto caritatis, petere autem sub praecepto religionis. Quod quidem praeceptum ponitur Matth. VII, ubi dicitur, petite, et accipietis. Reply Obj. 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Matt. 7:7, where it is said: Ask and ye shall receive. Ad tertium dicendum quod orando tradit homo mentem suam Deo, quam ei per reverentiam subiicit et quodammodo praesentat, ut patet ex auctoritate Dionysii prius inducta. Et ideo sicut mens humana praeeminet exterioribus vel corporalibus membris, vel exterioribus rebus quae ad Dei servitium applicantur, ita etiam oratio praeeminet aliis actibus religionis. Reply Obj. 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A. 1, Obj. 2). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether bodily members, or those external things that are employed for God’s service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum solus Deus debeat orari Whether we ought to pray to God alone? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod solus Deus debeat orari. Oratio enim est actus religionis, ut dictum est. Sed solus Deus est religione colendus. Ergo solus Deus est orandus. Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer is an act of religion, as stated above (A. 3). But God alone is to be worshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone. Praeterea, frustra porrigitur oratio ad eum qui orationem non cognoscit. Sed solius Dei est orationem cognoscere. Tum quia plerumque oratio magis agitur interiori actu, quem solus Deus cognoscit, quam voce, secundum illud quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIV, orabo spiritu, orabo et mente. Tum etiam quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agant vivi, etiam eorum filii. Ergo oratio non est nisi Deo porrigenda. Obj. 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one’s prayer, both because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God alone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor 14:15), I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding: and again because, as Augustine says (De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children, are doing. Therefore we ought to pray to God alone. Praeterea, si aliquibus sanctis orationem porrigimus, hoc non est nisi inquantum sunt Deo coniuncti. Sed quidam in hoc mundo viventes, vel etiam in Purgatorio existentes, sunt multum Deo coniuncti per gratiam. Ad eos autem non porrigitur oratio. Ergo nec ad sanctos qui sunt in Paradiso debemus orationem porrigere. Obj. 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace, and yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the saints who are in Paradise. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob V, voca, si est qui tibi respondeat, et ad aliquem sanctorum convertere. On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1), Call . . . if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints. Respondeo dicendum quod oratio porrigitur alicui dupliciter, uno modo, quasi per ipsum implenda; alio modo, sicut per ipsum impetranda. Primo quidem modo soli Deo orationem porrigimus, quia omnes orationes nostrae ordinari debent ad gratiam et gloriam consequendam, quae solus Deus dat, secundum illud Psalm., gratiam et gloriam dabit dominus. Sed secundo modo orationem porrigimus sanctis Angelis et hominibus, non ut per eos Deus nostras petitiones cognoscat, sed ut eorum precibus et meritis orationes nostrae sortiantur effectum. Et ideo dicitur Apoc. VIII quod ascendit fumus aromatum, idest orationes sanctorum, de manu Angeli coram domino. Et hoc etiam patet ex ipso modo quo Ecclesia utitur in orando. Nam a sancta Trinitate petimus ut nostri misereatur, ab aliis autem sanctis quibuscumque petimus ut orent pro nobis. I answer that, Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as to be fulfilled by him, second, as to be obtained through him. In the first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone gives, according to Ps. 83:12, The Lord will give grace and glory. But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels or men, not that God may through them know our petitions, but that our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written (Rev 8:4) that the smoke of the incense, namely the prayers of the saints ascended up before God. This is also clear from the very style employed by the Church in praying: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity to have mercy on us, while we ask any of the saints to pray for us. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illi soli impendimus orando religionis cultum a quo quaerimus obtinere quod oramus, quia in hoc protestamur eum bonorum nostrorum auctorem, non autem eis quos requirimus quasi interpellatores nostros apud Deum. Reply Obj. 1: To Him alone do we offer religious worship when praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those whom we call upon as our advocates in God’s presence. Ad secundum dicendum quod mortui ea quae in hoc mundo aguntur, considerata eorum naturali conditione, non cognoscunt, et praecipue interiores motus cordis. Sed beatis, ut Gregorius dicit, in XII Moral., in verbo manifestatur illud quod decet eos cognoscere de eis quae circa nos aguntur, etiam quantum ad interiores motus cordis. Maxime autem eorum excellentiam decet ut cognoscant petitiones ad eos factas vel voce vel corde. Et ideo petitiones quas ad eos dirigimus, Deo manifestante, cognoscunt. Reply Obj. 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. xii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, is made known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their exalted position that they should know the petitions we make to them by word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to them are known to them through Divine manifestation. Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui sunt in hoc mundo aut in Purgatorio, nondum fruuntur visione verbi, ut possint cognoscere ea quae nos cogitamus vel dicimus. Et ideo eorum suffragia non imploramus orando, sed a vivis petimus colloquendo. Reply Obj. 3: Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them, but ask it of the living by speaking to them. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum in oratione nihil determinate a Deo petere debeamus Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in oratione nihil determinate a Deo petere debeamus. Quia, ut Damascenus dicit, oratio est petitio decentium a Deo. Unde inefficax est oratio per quam petitur id quod non expedit, secundum illud Iac. IV, petitis et non accipitis, eo quod male petatis. Sed sicut dicitur Rom. VIII. Nam quid oremus sicut oportet, nescimus. Ergo non debemus aliquid orando determinate petere. Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), to pray is to ask becoming things of God; wherefore it is useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, You ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss. Now according to Rom. 8:26, we know not what we should pray for as we ought. Therefore we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray. Praeterea, quicumque aliquid determinate ab alio petit, nititur voluntatem ipsius inclinare ad faciendum id quod ipse vult. Non autem ad hoc tendere debemus ut Deus velit quod nos volumus, sed magis ut nos velimus quod Deus vult, ut dicit Glossa, super illud Psalm., exultate, iusti, in domino. Ergo non debemus aliquid determinatum a Deo petere. Obj. 2: Further, those who ask another person for something definite strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the contrary, we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps. 32:1, Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just. Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite when we pray. Praeterea, mala a Deo petenda non sunt, ad bona autem Deus ipse nos invitat. Frustra autem ab aliquo petitur ad quod accipiendum invitatur. Ergo non est determinate aliquid a Deo in oratione petendum. Obj. 3: Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers. Sed contra est quod dominus, Matth. VI et Luc. XI, docuit discipulos determinate petere ea quae continentur in petitionibus orationis dominicae. On the contrary, our Lord (Matt 6 and Luke 11) taught His disciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of the Lord’s Prayer. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut maximus Valerius refert, Socrates nihil ultra petendum a diis immortalibus arbitrabatur quam ut bona tribuerent, quia hi demum scirent quid unicuique esset utile; nos autem plerumque id votis expetere quod non impetrasse melius foret. Quae quidem sententia aliqualiter vera est, quantum ad illa quae possunt malum eventum habere, quibus etiam homo potest male et bene uti, sicut divitiae, quae, ut ibidem dicitur, multis exitio fuere; honores, qui complures pessumdederunt; regna, quorum exitus saepe miserabiles cernuntur; splendida coniugia, quae nonnunquam funditus domos evertunt. Sunt tamen quaedam bona quibus homo male uti non potest, quae scilicet malum eventum habere non possunt. Haec autem sunt quibus beatificamur et quibus beatitudinem meremur. Quae quidem sancti orando absolute petunt, secundum illud, ostende faciem tuam, et salvi erimus; et iterum, deduc me in semitam mandatorum tuorum. I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus, Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods for nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because they at any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain. This opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which may have an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as riches, by which, as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2), many have come to an evil end; honors, which have ruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family. Nevertheless there are certain goods which man cannot ill use, because they cannot have an evil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it: and these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as in Ps. 79:4, Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved, and again in Ps. 118:35, Lead me into the path of Thy commandments. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet homo ex se scire non possit quid orare debeat, spiritus tamen, ut ibidem dicitur, in hoc adiuvat infirmitatem nostram quod, inspirando nobis sancta desideria, recte postulare nos facit. Unde dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, quod veros adoratores adorare oportet in spiritu et veritate. Reply Obj. 1: Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to pray for, the Spirit, as stated in the same passage, helpeth our infirmity, since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask for what is right. Hence our Lord said (John 4:24) that true adorers must adore . . . in spirit and in truth. Ad secundum dicendum quod cum orando petimus aliqua quae pertinent ad nostram salutem, conformamus voluntatem nostram voluntati Dei, de quo dicitur, I ad Tim. II, quod vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Reply Obj. 2: When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our salvation, we conform our will to God’s, of Whom it is written (1 Tim 2:4) that He will have all men to be saved. Ad tertium dicendum quod sic ad bona Deus nos invitat quod ad ea non passibus corporis, sed piis desideriis et devotis orationibus accedamus. Reply Obj. 3: God so invites us to take good things, that we may approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires and devout prayers. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum homo debeat temporalia petere a Deo orando Whether man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non debeat temporalia petere a Deo orando. Quae enim orando petimus, quaerimus. Sed temporalia non debemus quaerere, dicitur enim Matth. VI, primum quaerite regnum Dei et iustitiam eius, et haec omnia adiicientur vobis, scilicet temporalia; quae non quaerenda dicit, sed adiicienda quaesitis. Ergo temporalia non sunt in oratione a Deo petenda. Objection 1: It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we should not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Matt 6:33): Seek ye . . . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things shall be added unto you, that is to say, temporal things, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in prayer. Praeterea, nullus petit nisi ea de quibus est sollicitus. Sed de temporalibus sollicitudinem habere non debemus, secundum quod dicitur Matth. VI, nolite solliciti esse animae vestrae, quid manducetis. Ergo temporalia petere orando non debemus. Obj. 2: Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things, according to the saying of Matt. 6:25, Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat. Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when we pray. Praeterea, per orationem nostram mens debet elevari in Deum. Sed petendo temporalia descendit ad ea quae infra se sunt, contra id quod apostolus dicebat, II ad Cor. IV, non contemplantibus nobis quae videntur, sed quae non videntur, quae enim videntur, temporalia sunt; quae autem non videntur, aeterna. Ergo non debet homo temporalia in oratione a Deo petere. Obj. 3: Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor 4:18), While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. Therefore man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays. Praeterea, homo non debet petere a Deo nisi bona et utilia. Sed quandoque temporalia habita sunt nociva, non solum spiritualiter, sed etiam temporaliter. Ergo non sunt a Deo in oratione petenda. Obj. 4: Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense. Therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers.