Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oblatio sacrificii fit ad aliquid significandum. Significat autem sacrificium quod offertur exterius, interius spirituale sacrificium, quo anima seipsam offert Deo, secundum illud Psalm., sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, exteriores actus religionis ad interiores ordinantur. Anima autem se offert Deo in sacrificium sicut principio suae creationis et sicut fini suae beatificationis. Secundum autem veram fidem solus Deus est creator animarum nostrarum, ut in primo habitum est. In solo etiam eo animae nostrae beatitudo consistit, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo sicut soli Deo summo debemus sacrificium spirituale offerre, ita etiam soli ei debemus offerre exteriora sacrificia, sicut etiam, orantes atque laudantes, ad eum dirigimus significantes voces cui res ipsas in corde quas significamus, offerimus, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Hoc etiam videmus in omni republica observari, quod summum rectorem aliquo signo singulari honorant, quod cuicumque alteri deferretur, esset crimen laesae maiestatis. Et ideo in lege divina statuitur poena mortis his qui divinum honorem aliis exhibent.
I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a sacrifice is offered in order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is offered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby the soul offers itself to God according to Ps. 50:19, A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit, since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 7; Q. 84, A. 2), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to the true faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in the First Part (QQ. 90, A. 3; 118, A. 2), while in Him alone the beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 8; Q. 3, AA. 1, 7, 8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward sacrifices to Him alone: even so in our prayers and praises we proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the things which we designate thereby, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to show the sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if this be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in the Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer Divine honor to another than God.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nomen divinitatis communicatur aliquibus non per aequalitatem, sed per participationem. Et ideo nec aequalis honor eis debetur.
Reply Obj. 1: The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is equal honor due to them.
Ad secundum dicendum quod in oblatione sacrificii non pensatur pretium occisi pecoris, sed significatio, qua hoc fit in honorem summi rectoris totius universi. Unde, sicut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei, Daemones non cadaverinis nidoribus, sed divinis honoribus gaudent.
Reply Obj. 2: The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done in honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), the demons rejoice, not in the stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, VIII de Civ. Dei, non constituimus martyribus templa, sacerdotia, quoniam non ipsi, sed Deus eorum nobis est Deus. Unde sacerdos non dicit, offero tibi sacrificium, Petre, vel Paule. Sed Deo de illorum victoriis gratias agimus, et nos ad imitationem eorum adhortamur.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), we do not raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but their God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their triumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them.
Utrum oblatio sacrificii sit specialis actus virtutis
Whether the offering of sacrifice is a special act of virtue?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod oblatio sacrificii non sit specialis actus virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo. Sed omne opus bonum non est specialis actus alicuius determinatae virtutis. Ergo oblatio sacrificii non est specialis actus determinatae virtutis.
Objection 1: It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): A true sacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy fellowship. But not every good work is a special act of some definite virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue.
Praeterea, maceratio corporis quae fit per ieiunium, pertinet ad abstinentiam; quae autem fit per continentiam, pertinet ad castitatem; quae autem est in martyrio, pertinet ad fortitudinem. Quae omnia videntur comprehendi sub sacrificii oblatione, secundum illud Rom. XII, exhibeatis corpora vestra hostiam viventem. Dicit etiam apostolus, ad Heb. ult., beneficentiae et communionis nolite oblivisci, talibus enim hostiis promeretur Deus, beneficentia autem et communio pertinent ad caritatem, misericordiam et liberalitatem. Ergo sacrificii oblatio non est specialis actus determinatae virtutis.
Obj. 2: Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the offering of sacrifice, according to Rom. 12:1, Present your bodies a living sacrifice. Again the Apostle says (Heb 13:16): Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained. Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do good and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue.
Praeterea, sacrificium videtur quod Deo exhibetur. Sed multa sunt quae Deo exhibentur, sicut devotio, oratio, decimae, primitiae, oblationes et holocausta. Ergo sacrificium non videtur esse aliquis specialis actus determinatae virtutis.
Obj. 3: Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God. Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes, first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not appear to be a special act of a definite virtue.
Sed contra est quod in lege specialia praecepta de sacrificiis dantur, ut patet in principio Levitici.
On the contrary, The law contains special precepts about sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, quando actus unius virtutis ordinatur ad finem alterius virtutis, participat quodammodo speciem eius, sicut cum quis furatur ut fornicetur, ipsum furtum accipit quodammodo fornicationis deformitatem, ita quod si etiam alias non esset peccatum, ex hoc iam peccatum esset quod ad fornicationem ordinatur. Sic igitur sacrificium est quidam specialis actus laudem habens ex hoc quod in divinam reverentiam fit. Propter quod ad determinatam virtutem pertinet, scilicet ad religionem. Contingit autem etiam ea quae secundum alias virtutes fiunt, in divinam reverentiam ordinari, puta cum aliquis eleemosynam facit de rebus propriis propter Deum, vel cum aliquis proprium corpus alicui afflictioni subiicit propter divinam reverentiam. Et secundum hoc etiam actus aliarum virtutum sacrificia dici possunt. Sunt tamen quidam actus qui non habent ex alio laudem nisi quia fiunt propter reverentiam divinam. Et isti actus proprie sacrificia dicuntur, et pertinent ad virtutem religionis.
I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), where an act of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it partakes somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to commit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of fornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it would be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of God, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God’s sake, or when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence for God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving of praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts are properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod Deo quadam spirituali societate volumus inhaerere, ad divinam reverentiam pertinet. Et ideo cuiuscumque virtutis actus rationem sacrificii accipit ex hoc quod agitur ut sancta societate Deo inhaereamus.
Reply Obj. 1: The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently the act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.
Ad secundum dicendum quod triplex est hominis bonum. Primum quidem est bonum animae, quod Deo offertur interiori quodam sacrificio per devotionem et orationem et alios huiusmodi interiores actus. Et hoc est principale sacrificium. Secundum est bonum corporis, quod Deo quodammodo offertur per martyrium, et abstinentiam seu continentiam. Tertium est bonum exteriorum rerum, de quo sacrificium offertur Deo, directe quidem, quando immediate res nostras Deo offerimus; mediate autem, quando eas communicamus proximis propter Deum.
Reply Obj. 2: Man’s good is threefold. There is first his soul’s good which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion, prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal sacrifice. The second is his body’s good, which is, so to speak, offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third is the good which consists of external things: and of these we offer a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for God’s sake.
Ad tertium dicendum quod sacrificia proprie dicuntur quando circa res Deo oblatas aliquid fit, sicut quod animalia occidebantur, quod panis frangitur et comeditur et benedicitur. Et hoc ipsum nomen sonat, nam sacrificium dicitur ex hoc quod homo facit aliquid sacrum. Oblatio autem directe dicitur cum Deo aliquid offertur, etiam si nihil circa ipsum fiat, sicut dicuntur offerri denarii vel panes in altari, circa quos nihil fit. Unde omne sacrificium est oblatio, sed non convertitur. Primitiae autem oblationes sunt, quia Deo offerebantur, ut legitur Deut. XXVI, non autem sunt sacrificia, quia nihil sacrum circa eas fiebat. Decimae autem, proprie loquendo, non sunt neque sacrificia neque oblationes, quia non immediate Deo, sed ministris divini cultus exhibentur.
Reply Obj. 3: A sacrifice, properly speaking, requires that something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance animals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The very word signifies this, since sacrifice is so called because a man does something sacred (facit sacrum). On the other hand an oblation is properly the offering of something to God even if nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at the altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not conversely. First-fruits are oblations, because they were offered to God, according to Deut. 26, but they are not a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. Tithes, however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, properly speaking, because they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship.
Utrum omnes teneantur ad sacrificia offerenda
Whether all are bound to offer sacrifices?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes teneantur ad sacrificia offerenda. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. III, quaecumque lex loquitur, his qui sunt in lege loquitur. Sed lex de sacrificiis non fuit omnibus data, sed soli populo Hebraeorum. Ergo non omnes ad sacrificia tenebantur.
Objection 1: It would seem that all are not bound to offer sacrifices. The Apostle says (Rom 3:19): What things soever the Law speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law. Now the law of sacrifices was not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices.
Praeterea, sacrificia Deo offeruntur ad aliquid significandum. Sed non est omnium huiusmodi significationes intelligere. Ergo non omnes tenentur ad sacrificia offerenda.
Obj. 2: Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.
Praeterea, ex hoc sacerdotes dicuntur quod Deo sacrificium offerunt. Sed non omnes sunt sacerdotes. Ergo non omnes tenentur ad sacrificia offerenda.
Obj. 3: Further, priests are so called because they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.
Sed contra est quod sacrificium offerre est de lege naturae, ut supra habitum est. Ad ea autem quae sunt legis naturae omnes tenentur. Ergo omnes tenentur ad sacrificium Deo offerendum.
On the contrary, The offering of sacrifices is of the natural law, as stated above (A. 1). Now all are bound to do that which is of the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God.
Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est sacrificium, sicut dictum est. Quorum primum et principale est sacrificium interius, ad quod omnes tenentur, omnes enim tenentur Deo devotam mentem offerre. Aliud autem est sacrificium exterius. Quod in duo dividitur. Nam quoddam est quod ex hoc solum laudem habet quod Deo aliquid exterius offertur in protestationem divinae subiectionis. Et ad hoc aliter tenentur illi qui sunt sub lege nova vel veteri, aliter illi qui non sunt sub lege. Nam illi qui sunt sub lege, tenentur ad determinata sacrificia offerenda secundum legis praecepta. Illi vero qui non erant sub lege, tenebantur ad aliqua exterius facienda in honorem divinum, secundum condecentiam ad eos inter quos habitabant, non autem determinate ad haec vel ad illa. Aliud vero est exterius sacrificium quando actus exteriores aliarum virtutum in divinam reverentiam assumuntur. Quorum quidam cadunt sub praecepto, ad quos omnes tenentur, quidam vero sunt supererogationis, ad quos non omnes tenentur.
I answer that, Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above (A. 2). The first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other is the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered to God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New or the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those who are under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices according to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God’s honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to this or that action. The other outward sacrifice is when the outward actions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God; some of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound, while others are works of supererogation, and to these all are not bound.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad illa determinata sacrificia quae in lege erant praecepta, non omnes tenebantur, tenebantur tamen ad aliqua sacrificia interiora vel exteriora, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 1: All were not bound to offer those particular sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to some sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above.
Ad secundum dicendum quod quamvis non omnes sciant explicite virtutem sacrificiorum, sciunt tamen implicite, sicut et habent fidem implicitam, ut supra habitum est.
Reply Obj. 2: Though all do not know explicitly the power of the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit faith, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 6, 7).
Ad tertium dicendum quod sacerdotes offerunt sacrificia quae sunt specialiter ordinata ad cultum divinum, non solum pro se, sed etiam pro aliis. Quaedam vero sunt alia sacrificia quae quilibet potest pro se Deo offerre, ut ex supradictis patet.
Reply Obj. 3: The priests offer those sacrifices which are specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but also for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can offer to God for himself as explained above (AA. 2, 3).
De oblationibus et primitiis
Oblations and First-Fruits
Deinde considerandum est de oblationibus et primitiis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum aliquae oblationes sint de necessitate praecepti.
(1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept?
Secundo, quibus oblationes debeantur.
(2) To whom are oblations due?
Tertio, de quibus rebus fieri debeant.
(3) of what things they should be made?
Quarto, specialiter de oblationibus primitiarum, utrum ad eas homines ex necessitate teneantur.
(4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer them?
Utrum homines teneantur ad oblationes ex necessitate praecepti
Whether men are under a necessity of precept to make oblations?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non teneantur ad oblationes ex necessitate praecepti. Non enim homines tempore Evangelii tenentur ad observanda caeremonialia praecepta veteris legis, ut supra habitum est. Sed oblationes offerre ponitur inter caeremonialia praecepta veteris legis, dicitur enim Exod. XXIII, tribus vicibus per singulos annos mihi festa celebrabitis, et postea subditur, non apparebis in conspectu meo vacuus. Ergo ad oblationes non tenentur nunc homines ex necessitate praecepti.
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make oblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, AA. 3, 4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since it is written (Exod 23:14): Three times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me, and further on (Exod 23:15): Thou shalt not appear empty before Me. Therefore men are not now under a necessity of precept to make oblations.
Praeterea, oblationes, antequam fiant, in voluntate hominis consistunt, ut videtur per hoc quod dominus dicit, Matth. V, si offers munus tuum ad altare, quasi hoc arbitrio offerentium relinquatur. Postquam autem oblationes sunt factae, non restat locus iterato eas offerendi. Ergo nullo modo aliquis ex necessitate praecepti ad oblationes tenetur.
Obj. 2: Further, before they are made, oblations depend on man’s will, as appears from our Lord’s saying (Matt 5:23), If . . . thou offer thy gift at the altar, as though this were left to the choice of the offerer: and when once oblations have been made, there is no way of offering them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a necessity of precept to make oblations.
Praeterea, quicumque aliquid tenetur reddere Ecclesiae, si non reddat, potest ad id compelli per subtractionem ecclesiasticorum sacramentorum. Sed illicitum videtur his qui offerre noluerint ecclesiastica sacramenta denegare, secundum illud decretum sextae synodi quod habetur I, qu. I, nullus qui sacram communionem dispensat, a percipiente gratiam aliquid exigat, si vero exegerit, deponatur. Ergo non tenentur homines ex necessitate ad oblationes.
Obj. 3: Further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the Church, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being deprived of the Church’s sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to refuse the sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make oblations according to a decree of the sixth council: Let none who dispense Holy Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything let them be deposed. Therefore it is not necessary that men should make oblations.