Ad tertium dicendum quod quia de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, peccatum per quod aliud punitur oportet esse magis manifestum, ut ex hoc homo sibi ipsi et aliis detestabilis reddatur, non autem oportet quod sit gravius. Et secundum hoc, peccatum contra naturam minus est quam peccatum idololatriae, sed quia est manifestius, ponitur quasi conveniens poena peccati idololatriae, ut scilicet, sicut homo per idololatriam pervertit ordinem divini honoris, ita per peccatum contra naturam propriae naturae confusibilem perversitatem patiatur.Reply Obj. 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature.Ad quartum dicendum quod haeresis Manichaeorum, etiam quantum ad genus peccati, gravior est quam peccatum aliorum idololatrarum, quia magis derogant divino honori, ponentes duos deos contrarios, et multa vana fabulosa de Deo fingentes. Secus autem est de aliis haereticis, qui unum Deum confitentur et eum solum colunt.Reply Obj. 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their belief in one God and worship Him alone.Ad quintum dicendum quod observatio legis tempore gratiae non est omnino aequalis idololatriae secundum genus peccati, sed paene aequalis, quia utrumque est species pestiferae superstitionis.Reply Obj. 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.Articulus 4Article 4Utrum causa idololatriae fuerit ex parte hominisWhether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod causa idololatriae non fuerit ex parte hominis. In homine enim nihil est nisi vel natura, vel virtus, vel culpa. Sed causa idololatriae non potuit esse ex parte naturae hominis, quin potius naturalis ratio hominis dictat quod sit unus Deus, et quod non sit mortuis cultus divinus exhibendus, neque rebus inanimatis. Similiter etiam nec idololatria habet causam in homine ex parte virtutis, quia non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, ut dicitur Matth. VII. Neque etiam ex parte culpae, quia, ut dicitur Sap. XIV, infandorum idolorum cultura omnis mali causa est, et initium et finis. Ergo idololatria non habet causam ex parte hominis.Objection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man’s nature, since rather does man’s natural reason dictate that there is one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in man on the part of virtue, since a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, according to Matt. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, the worship of abominable idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil. Therefore idolatry has no cause on the part of man.Praeterea, ea quae ex parte hominis causantur, omni tempore in hominibus inveniuntur. Non autem semper fuit idololatria, sed in secunda aetate legitur esse adinventa, vel a Nemrod, qui, ut dicitur, cogebat homines ignem adorare; vel a Nino, qui imaginem patris sui Beli adorari fecit. Apud Graecos autem, ut Isidorus refert, Prometheus primus simulacra hominum de luto finxit. Iudaei vero dicunt quod Ismael primus simulacra de luto fecit. Cessavit etiam in sexta aetate idololatria ex magna parte. Ergo idololatria non habuit causam ex parte hominis.Obj. 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated to have been originated either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, neque potuit primum, nisi illis, scilicet Daemonibus, docentibus, disci quid quisque illorum appetat, quid exhorreat, quo invitetur nomine, quo cogatur, unde magicae artes, earumque artifices extiterunt. Eadem autem ratio videtur esse de idololatria. Ergo idololatriae causa non est ex parte hominum.Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): It was not possible to learn, for the first time, except from their (i.e., the demons’) teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and their professors: and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XIV, supervacuitas hominum haec, scilicet idola, adinvenit in orbe terrarum.On the contrary, It is written (Wis 14:14): By the vanity of men they, i.e., idols, came into the world.Respondeo dicendum quod idololatriae est duplex causa. Una quidem dispositiva. Et haec fuit ex parte hominum. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex inordinatione affectus, prout scilicet homines aliquem hominem vel nimis amantes vel nimis venerantes, honorem divinum ei impenderunt. Et haec causa assignatur Sap. XIV, acerbo luctu dolens pater cito sibi rapti filii fecit imaginem; et illum qui tunc, quasi homo, mortuus fuerat, tanquam Deum colere coepit. Et ibidem etiam subditur quod homines, aut affectui aut regibus deservientes, incommunicabile nomen, scilicet divinitatis, lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt. Secundo, propter hoc quod homo naturaliter de repraesentatione delectatur, ut philosophus dicit, in poetria sua. Et ideo homines rudes a principio videntes per diligentiam artificum imagines hominum expressive factas, divinitatis cultum eis impenderunt. Unde dicitur Sap. XIII, si quis artifex faber de silva lignum rectum secuerit; et per scientiam suae artis figuret illud et assimilet imagini hominis, de substantia sua, et filiis et nuptiis, votum faciens, inquirit. Tertio, propter ignorantiam veri Dei, cuius excellentiam homines non considerantes, quibusdam creaturis, propter pulchritudinem seu virtutem, divinitatis cultum exhibuerunt. Unde dicitur Sap. XIII, neque, operibus attendentes, agnoverunt quis esset artifex. Sed aut ignem, aut spiritum, aut citatum aerem, aut gyrum stellarum, aut nimiam aquam, aut solem, aut lunam, rectores orbis terrarum, deos putaverunt.I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This cause is assigned (Wis 14:15): A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a god. The same passage goes on to say (Wis 14:21) that men serving either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name, i.e., of the Godhead, to stones and wood. Second, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written (Wis 13:11–17): If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his children, or his marriage. Third, on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis 13:1, 2): All men . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world.Alia autem causa idololatriae fuit consummativa, ex parte Daemonum, qui se colendos hominibus errantibus exhibuerunt in idolis, dando responsa et aliqua quae videbantur hominibus mirabilia faciendo. Unde et in Psalm. dicitur, omnes dii gentium Daemonia.The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous. Hence it is written (Ps 95:5): All the gods of the Gentiles are devils.Ad primum ergo dicendum quod causa dispositiva idololatriae fuit, ex parte hominis, naturae defectus vel per ignorantiam intellectus vel per deordinationem affectus, ut dictum est. Et hoc etiam ad culpam pertinet. Dicitur autem idololatria esse causa, initium et finis omnis peccati, quia non est aliquod genus peccati quod interdum idololatria non producat, vel expresse inducendo, per modum causae; vel occasionem praebendo, per modum initii; vel per modum finis, inquantum peccata aliqua assumebantur in cultum idolorum, sicut occisiones hominum et mutilationes membrorum, et alia huiusmodi. Et tamen aliqua peccata possunt idololatriam praecedere, quae ad ipsam hominem disponunt.Reply Obj. 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, insofar as certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.Ad secundum dicendum quod in prima aetate non fuit idololatria propter recentem memoriam creationis mundi, ex qua adhuc vigebat cognitio unius Dei in mente hominum. In sexta autem aetate idololatria est exclusa per doctrinam et virtutem Christi, qui de Diabolo triumphavit.Reply Obj. 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed over the devil.Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa consummativa idololatriae.Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of idolatry.Quaestio 95Question 95De superstitione divinativaSuperstition in DivinationsDeinde considerandum est de superstitione divinativa. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo.We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:Primo, utrum divinatio sit peccatum.(1) Whether divination is a sin?Secundo, utrum sit species superstitionis.(2) Whether it is a species of superstition?Tertio, de speciebus divinationis.(3) Of the species of divination;Quarto, de divinatione quae fit per Daemones.(4) Of divination by means of demons;Quinto, de divinatione quae fit per astra.(5) Of divination by the stars;Sexto, de divinatione quae fit per somnia.(6) Of divination by dreams;Septimo, de divinatione quae fit per auguria et alias huiusmodi observationes.(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;Octavo, de divinatione quae fit per sortes.(8) Of divination by lots.Articulus 1Article 1Utrum divinatio sit peccatumWhether divination is a sin?Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinatio non sit peccatum. Divinatio enim ab aliquo divino nominatur. Sed ea quae sunt divina magis ad sanctitatem pertinent quam ad peccatum. Ergo videtur quod divinatio non est peccatum.Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is derived from something divine: and things that are divine pertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arbit., quis audeat dicere disciplinam esse malum? Et iterum, nullo modo dixerim aliquam intelligentiam malam esse posse. Sed aliquae artes sunt divinativae, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de memoria. Videtur etiam ipsa divinatio ad aliquam intelligentiam veritatis pertinere. Ergo videtur quod divinatio non sit peccatum.Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): Who dares to say that learning is an evil? and again: I could nowise admit that intelligence can be an evil. But some arts are divinatory, as the Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.Praeterea, naturalis inclinatio non est ad aliquod malum, quia natura non inclinat nisi ad simile sibi. Sed ex naturali inclinatione homines sollicitantur praenoscere futuros eventus, quod pertinet ad divinationem. Ergo divinatio non est peccatum.Obj. 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore divination is not a sin.Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. XVIII, non sit qui Pythones consulat, neque divinos. Et in decretis, XXVI, qu. V, dicitur, qui divinationes expetunt, sub regulis quinquennii iaceant, secundum gradus poenitentiae definitos.On the contrary, It is written (Deut 18:10, 11): Neither let there be found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers: and it is stated in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a penance of five years’ duration, according to the fixed grades of penance.Respondeo dicendum quod in nomine divinationis intelligitur quaedam praenuntiatio futurorum. Futura autem dupliciter praenosci possunt, uno quidem modo, in suis causis; alio modo, in seipsis. Causae autem futurorum tripliciter se habent. Quaedam enim producunt ex necessitate et semper suos effectus. Et huiusmodi effectus futuri per certitudinem praenosci possunt et praenuntiari ex consideratione suarum causarum, sicut astrologi praenuntiant eclipses futuras. Quaedam vero causae producunt suos effectus non ex necessitate et semper, sed ut in pluribus, raro tamen deficiunt. Et per huiusmodi causas possunt praenosci futuri effectus, non quidem per certitudinem, sed per quandam coniecturam, sicut astrologi per considerationem stellarum quaedam praenoscere et praenuntiare possunt de pluviis et siccitatibus, et medici de sanitate vel morte. Quaedam vero causae sunt quae, si secundum se considerentur, se habent ad utrumlibet, quod praecipue videtur de potentiis rationalibus, quae se habent ad opposita, secundum philosophum. Et tales effectus, vel etiam si qui effectus ut in paucioribus casu accidunt ex naturalibus causis, per considerationem causarum praenosci non possunt, quia eorum causae non habent inclinationem determinatam ad huiusmodi effectus. Et ideo effectus huiusmodi praenosci non possunt nisi in seipsis considerentur. Homines autem in seipsis huiusmodi effectus considerare possunt solum dum sunt praesentes, sicut cum homo videt Socratem currere vel ambulare. Sed considerare huiusmodi in seipsis antequam fiant, est Dei proprium, qui solus in sua aeternitate videt ea quae futura sunt quasi praesentia, ut in primo habitum est, unde dicitur Isaiae XLI, annuntiate quae futura sunt in futurum, et sciemus quoniam dii estis vos. Si quis ergo huiusmodi futura praenoscere aut praenuntiare quocumque modo praesumpserit, nisi Deo revelante, manifeste usurpat sibi quod Dei est. Et ex hoc aliqui divini dicuntur, unde dicit Isidorus, in libro Etymol., divini dicti quasi Deo pleni, divinitate enim se plenos simulant, et astutia quadam fraudulentiae hominibus futura coniectant.I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, second in itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians, concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to the Philosopher. Such like effects, as also those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to produce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 57, A. 3; Q. 86, A. 4). Hence it is written (Isa 41:23): Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods. Therefore if anyone presume to foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever, except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): They are called divines, as though they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men.Divinatio ergo non dicitur si quis praenuntiet ea quae ex necessario eveniunt vel ut in pluribus, quae humana ratione praenosci possunt. Neque etiam si quis futura alia contingentia, Deo revelante, cognoscat, tunc enim non ipse divinat, idest, quod divinum est facit, sed magis quod divinum est suscipit. Tunc autem solum dicitur divinare quando sibi indebito modo usurpat praenuntiationem futurorum eventuum. Hoc autem constat esse peccatum. Unde divinatio semper est peccatum. Et propter hoc Hieronymus dicit, super Michaeam, quod divinatio semper in malam partem accipitur.Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then he does not divine, i.e., cause something divine, but rather receives something divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq. that divination is always taken in an evil sense.Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divinatio non dicitur ab ordinata participatione alicuius divini, sed ab indebita usurpatione, ut dictum est.Reply Obj. 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as stated above.Ad secundum dicendum quod artes quaedam sunt ad praecognoscendum futuros eventus qui ex necessitate vel frequenter proveniunt, quod ad divinationem non pertinet. Sed ad alios futuros eventus cognoscendos non sunt aliquae verae artes seu disciplinae, sed fallaces et vanae, ex deceptione Daemonum introductae; ut dicit Augustinus, in XXI de Civ. Dei.Reply Obj. 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil’s deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).Ad tertium dicendum quod homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad cognoscendum futura secundum modum humanum, non autem secundum indebitum divinationis modum.Reply Obj. 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future by human means, but not by the undue means of divination.