Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum species sacrilegii distinguantur secundum res sacras Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod species sacrilegii non distinguantur secundum res sacras. Materialis enim diversitas non diversificat speciem, si sit eadem ratio formalis. Sed in violatione quarumcumque rerum sacrarum videtur esse eadem ratio formalis peccati, et quod non sit diversitas nisi materialis. Ergo per hoc non diversificantur sacrilegii species. Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby. Praeterea, non videtur esse possibile quod aliqua sint eiusdem speciei, et tamen specie differant. Sed homicidium et furtum et illicitus concubitus sunt diversae species peccatorum. Ergo non possunt convenire in una specie sacrilegii. Et ita videtur quod sacrilegii species distinguantur secundum diversas species aliorum peccatorum, et non secundum diversitatem rerum sacrarum. Obj. 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred things. Praeterea, inter res sacras connumerantur etiam personae sacrae. Si ergo una species sacrilegii esset qua violatur persona sacra, sequeretur quod omne peccatum quod persona sacra committit esset sacrilegium, quia per quodlibet peccatum violatur persona peccantis. Non ergo species sacrilegii accipiuntur secundum res sacras. Obj. 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things. Sed contra est quod actus et habitus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed res sacra est obiectum sacrilegii. Ut dictum est. Ergo species sacrilegii distinguuntur secundum differentiam rerum sacrarum. On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccatum sacrilegii in hoc consistit quod aliquis irreverenter se habet ad rem sacram. Debetur autem reverentia rei sacrae ratione sanctitatis. Et ideo secundum diversam rationem sanctitatis rerum sacrarum quibus irreverentia exhibetur, necesse est quod sacrilegii species distinguantur, et tanto sacrilegium est gravius quanto res sacra in quam peccatur maiorem obtinet sanctitatem. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the sin of sacrilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege. Attribuitur autem sanctitas et personis sacris, idest divino cultui dedicatis, et locis sacris, et rebus quibusdam aliis sacris. Sanctitas autem loci ordinatur ad sanctitatem hominis, qui in loco sacro cultum exhibet Deo, dicitur enim II Machab. V, non propter locum gentem, sed propter gentem dominus locum elegit. Et ideo gravius peccatum est sacrilegium quo peccatur contra personam sacram quam quo peccatur contra locum sacrum. Sunt tamen in utraque sacrilegii specie diversi gradus, secundum differentiam personarum et locorum sacrorum. Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written (2 Macc 5:19): God did not choose the people for the place’s sake, but the place for the people’s sake. Hence sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places. Similiter etiam et tertia species sacrilegii, quae circa alias res sacras committitur, diversos habet gradus, secundum differentiam sacrarum rerum. Inter quas summum locum obtinent ipsa sacramenta, quibus homo sanctificatur, quorum praecipuum est Eucharistiae sacramentum, quod continet ipsum Christum. Et ideo sacrilegium quod contra hoc sacramentum committitur gravissimum est inter omnia. Post sacramenta autem, secundum locum tenent vasa consecrata ad sacramentorum susceptionem; et ipsae imagines sacrae, et sanctorum reliquiae, in quibus quodammodo ipsae personae sanctorum venerantur vel dehonorantur. Deinde ea quae pertinent ad ornatum Ecclesiae et ministrorum. Deinde ea quae sunt deputata ad sustentationem ministrorum, sive sint mobilia sive immobilia. Quicumque autem contra quodcumque praedictorum peccat, crimen sacrilegii incurrit. In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est in omnibus praedictis eadem ratio sanctitatis. Et ideo differentia sacrarum rerum non solum est differentia materialis, sed formalis. Reply Obj. 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a material, but also a formal difference. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua duo secundum aliquid esse unius speciei, et secundum aliud diversarum, sicut Socrates et Plato conveniunt in specie animalis, differunt autem in specie colorati, si unus sit albus et alius niger. Et similiter etiam possibile est aliqua duo peccata differre specie secundum materiales actus, convenire autem in specie secundum unam rationem formalem sacrilegii, puta si quis sanctimonialem violaverit verberando, vel concumbendo. Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in one respect, and to different species in another respect. Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, animal, but differ in the species colored thing, if one be white and the other black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation. Ad tertium dicendum quod omne peccatum quod sacra persona committit, materialiter quidem et quasi per accidens est sacrilegium, unde Hieronymus dicit quod nugae in ore sacerdotis sacrilegium sunt vel blasphemia. Formaliter autem et proprie illud solum peccatum sacrae personae sacrilegium est quod agitur directe contra eius sanctitatem, puta si virgo Deo dicata fornicetur; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Reply Obj. 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome says that a trifle on a priest’s lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy. But formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to be said of other instances. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum poena sacrilegii debeat esse pecuniaria Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poena sacrilegii non debeat esse pecuniaria. Poena enim pecuniaria non solet imponi pro culpa criminali. Sed sacrilegium est culpa criminalis, unde capitali sententia punitur secundum leges civiles. Ergo sacrilegium non debet puniri poena pecuniaria. Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by capital sentence according to civil law. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. Praeterea, idem peccatum non debet duplici poena puniri, secundum illud Nahum I, non consurget duplex tribulatio. Sed poena sacrilegii est excommunicatio, maior quidem si violentia inferatur in personam sacram, vel si aliquis incendat vel frangat Ecclesiam; minor autem in aliis sacrilegiis. Ergo non debet sacrilegium puniri poena pecuniaria. Obj. 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, There shall not rise a double affliction. But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Thess. II, non fuimus aliquando in occasione avaritiae. Sed hoc videtur ad occasionem avaritiae pertinere quod poena pecuniaria exigatur pro violatione rei sacrae. Ergo non videtur talis poena esse conveniens sacrilegii. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess 2:5): Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness. But it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege. Sed contra est quod dicitur XVII, qu. IV, si quis contumax vel superbus fugitivum servum de atrio Ecclesiae per vim abstraxerit, nongentos solidos componat. Et ibidem postea dicitur, quisquis inventus fuerit reus sacrilegii, triginta libras argenti examinati purissimi componat. On the contrary, It is written: If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi: and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21): Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver. Respondeo dicendum quod in poenis infligendis duo sunt consideranda. Primo quidem, aequalitas, ad hoc quod poena sit iusta, ut scilicet in quo quis peccat, per hoc torqueatur, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Et hoc modo conveniens poena sacrilegi, qui sacris iniuriam infert est excommunicatio, per quam a sacris arcetur. Secundo autem consideratur utilitas, nam poenae quasi medicinae quaedam infliguntur, ut his territi homines a peccando desistant. Sacrilegus autem, qui sacra non reveretur, non sufficienter videtur a peccando arceri per hoc quod ei sacra interdicuntur, de quibus non curat. Et ideo secundum leges humanas adhibetur capitis poena; secundum vero Ecclesiae sententiam, quae mortem corporalem non infligit, adhibetur pecuniaria poena, ut saltem poenis temporalibus homines a sacrilegiis revocentur. I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and that by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be tormented (Wis 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Ecclesia corporalem mortem non infligit, sed loco eius infligit excommunicationem. Reply Obj. 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but excommunication in its stead. Ad secundum dicendum quod necesse est duas poenas adhiberi quando per unam non sufficienter revocatur aliquis a peccando. Et ideo oportuit, supra poenam excommunicationis, adhibere aliquam temporalem poenam, ad coercendum homines qui spiritualia contemnunt. Reply Obj. 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things. Ad tertium dicendum quod si pecunia exigeretur sine rationabili causa, hoc videretur ad occasionem avaritiae pertinere. Sed quando exigitur ad hominum correctionem, habet manifestam utilitatem. Et ideo non pertinet ad occasionem avaritiae. Reply Obj. 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the purpose of man’s correction, it has a manifest utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice. Quaestio 100 Question 100 De simonia Simony Deinde considerandum est de simonia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, quid sit simonia. (1) What is simony? Secundo, utrum liceat pro sacramentis pecuniam accipere. (2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments? Tertio, utrum liceat accipere pecuniam pro spiritualibus actibus. (3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions? Quarto, utrum liceat vendere ea quae sunt spiritualibus annexa. (4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals? Quinto, utrum solum munus a manu faciat simoniacum, an etiam munus a lingua et ab obsequio. (5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or remuneration by service? Sexto, de poena simoniaci. (6) Of the punishment of simony. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum simonia sit studiosa voluntas emendi et vendendi aliquid spirituale vel spirituali annexum Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod simonia non sit studiosa voluntas emendi et vendendi aliquid spirituale vel spirituali annexum. Simonia enim est haeresis quaedam, dicitur enim I, qu. I, tolerabilior est Macedonii, et eorum qui circa ipsum sunt sancti spiritus impugnatorum, impia haeresis quam simoniacorum. Illi enim creaturam, et servum Dei patris et filii, spiritum sanctum delirando fatentur, isti vero eundem spiritum sanctum efficiunt servum suum. Omnis enim dominus quod habet, si vult, vendit, sive servum, sive quid aliud eorum quae possidet. Sed infidelitas non consistit in voluntate, sed magis in intellectu, sicut et fides, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo simonia non debet per voluntatem definiri. Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i ): The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with him impugned the Holy Spirit, is more endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his possessions. But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above (Q. 10, A. 2). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will. Praeterea, studiose peccare est ex malitia peccare, quod est peccare in spiritum sanctum. Si ergo simonia est studiosa voluntas peccandi, sequitur quod semper sit peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Obj. 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore, if simony is an intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, nihil magis est spirituale quam regnum caelorum. Sed licet emere regnum caelorum, dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam homilia, regnum caelorum tantum valet quantum habes. Ergo non est simonia velle emere aliquid spirituale. Obj. 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says in a homily (v, in Ev.): The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you possess. Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something spiritual.