Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus, assumendo carnem, suam maiestatem non minuit, et per consequens non minuitur ratio reverentiae ad ipsum. Quae augetur per augmentum cognitionis ipsius. Ex hoc autem quod nobis appropinquare voluit per carnis assumptionem, magis nos ad se cognoscendum attraxit. Reply Obj. 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly drew us to know Him. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum si homo peccasset, nihilominus Deus incarnatus fuisset Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si homo non peccasset, nihilominus Deus incarnatus fuisset. Manente enim causa, manet effectus. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., alia multa sunt cogitanda in Christi incarnatione praeter absolutionem a peccato, de quibus dictum est. Ergo, etiam si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): Many other things are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution from sin; and these were discussed above (A. 2). Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Praeterea, ad omnipotentiam divinae virtutis pertinet ut opera sua perficiat, et se manifestet per aliquem infinitum effectum. Sed nulla pura creatura potest dici infinitus effectus, cum sit finita per suam essentiam. In solo autem opere incarnationis videtur praecipue manifestari infinitus effectus divinae potentiae, per hoc quod in infinitum distantia coniunguntur, inquantum factum est quod homo esset Deus. In quo etiam opere maxime videtur perfici universum, per hoc quod ultima creatura, scilicet homo, primo principio coniungitur, scilicet Deo. Ergo, etiam si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect. But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last creature—viz. man—is united to the first principle—viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Praeterea, humana natura per peccatum non est facta capacior gratiae. Sed post peccatum capax est gratiae unionis, quae est maxima gratia. Ergo, si homo non peccasset, humana natura huius gratiae capax fuisset. Nec Deus subtraxisset naturae humanae bonum cuius capax erat. Ergo, si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. Obj. 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Praeterea, praedestinatio Dei est aeterna. Sed dicitur, Rom. I, de Christo, quod praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute. Ergo etiam ante peccatum necessarium erat filium Dei incarnari, ad hoc quod Dei praedestinatio impleretur. Obj. 4: Further, God’s predestination is eternal. But it is said of Christ (Rom 1:4): Who was predestined the Son of God in power. Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become incarnate, in order to fulfill God’s predestination. Praeterea, incarnationis mysterium est primo homini revelatum, ut patet per hoc quod dixit, hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, etc., quod apostolus dicit esse magnum sacramentum in Christo et Ecclesia, ut patet Ephes. V. Sed homo non potuit esse praescius sui casus, eadem ratione qua nec Angelus, ut Augustinus probat, super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo, etiam si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. Obj. 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Gen. 2:23. This now is bone of my bones, etc. which the Apostle says is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and in the Church, as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels could not, as Augustine proves (Gen ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom., exponens illud quod habetur Luc. XIX, venit filius hominis quaerere et salvum facere quod perierat, si homo non peccasset, filius hominis non venisset. Et I ad Tim. I, super illud verbum, Christus venit in hunc mundum ut peccatores salvos faceret, dicit Glossa, nulla causa veniendi fuit Christo domino, nisi peccatores salvos facere. Tolle morbos, tolle vulnera, et nulla medicinae est causa. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Luke 19:10, For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost; Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would not have come. And on 1 Tim. 1:15, Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners, a gloss says, There was no cause of Christ’s coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine. Respondeo dicendum quod aliqui circa hoc diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt quod, etiam si homo non peccasset, Dei filius fuisset incarnatus. Alii vero contrarium asserunt. Quorum assertioni magis assentiendum videtur. I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to be given to this opinion. Ea enim quae ex sola Dei voluntate proveniunt, supra omne debitum creaturae, nobis innotescere non possunt nisi quatenus in sacra Scriptura traduntur, per quam divina voluntas innotescit. Unde, cum in sacra Scriptura ubique incarnationis ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur, convenientius dicitur incarnationis opus ordinatum esse a Deo in remedium peccati, ita quod, peccato non existente, incarnatio non fuisset. Quamvis potentia Dei ad hoc non limitetur, potuisset enim, etiam peccato non existente, Deus incarnari. For such things as spring from God’s will, and beyond the creature’s due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes aliae causae quae sunt assignatae, pertinent ad remedium peccati. Si enim homo non peccasset, perfusus fuisset lumine divinae sapientiae, et iustitiae rectitudine perfectus a Deo, ad omnia necessaria cognoscenda. Sed quia homo, deserto Deo, ad corporalia collapsus erat, conveniens fuit ut Deus, carne assumpta, etiam per corporalia ei salutis remedium exhiberet. Unde dicit Augustinus, super illud Ioan. I cap., verbum caro factum est, caro te obcaecaverat, caro te sanat, quoniam sic venit Christus ut de carne vitia carnis exstingueret. Reply Obj. 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on John 1:14, And the Word was made flesh, St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh. Ad secundum dicendum quod in ipso modo productionis rerum ex nihilo divina virtus infinita ostenditur. Ad perfectionem etiam universi sufficit quod naturali modo creatura ordinetur sic in Deum sicut in finem. Hoc autem excedit limites perfectionis naturae, ut creatura uniatur Deo in persona. Reply Obj. 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature. Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex capacitas attendi potest in humana natura. Una quidem secundum ordinem potentiae naturalis. Quae a Deo semper impletur, qui dat unicuique rei secundum suam capacitatem naturalem. Alia vero secundum ordinem divinae potentiae, cui omnis creatura obedit ad nutum. Et ad hoc pertinet ista capacitas. Non autem Deus omnem talem capacitatem naturae replet, alioquin, Deus non posset facere in creatura nisi quod facit; quod falsum est, ut in primo habitum est. Nihil autem prohibet ad aliquid maius humanam naturam productam esse post peccatum, Deus enim permittit mala fieri ut inde aliquid melius eliciat. Unde dicitur Rom. V, ubi abundavit iniquitas, superabundavit et gratia. Unde et in benedictione cerei paschalis dicitur, o felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem. Reply Obj. 3: A double capability may be remarked in human nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfill all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is false, as stated above (I, Q. 105, A. 6). But there is no reason why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom; hence it is written (Rom 5:20): Where sin abounded, grace did more abound. Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer! Ad quartum dicendum quod praedestinatio praesupponit praescientiam futurorum. Et ideo, sicut Deus praedestinat salutem alicuius hominis per orationem aliorum implendam, ita etiam praedestinavit opus incarnationis in remedium humani peccati. Reply Obj. 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin. Ad quintum dicendum quod nihil prohibet alicui revelari effectus cui non revelatur causa. Potuit ergo primo homini revelari incarnationis mysterium sine hoc quod esset praescius sui casus, non enim quicumque cognoscit effectum, cognoscit et causam. Reply Obj. 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum Deus principalius incarnatus fuerit in remedium actualium peccatorum quam in remedium originalis peccati Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than to take away original sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus principalius incarnatus fuerit in remedium actualium peccatorum quam in remedium originalis peccati. Quanto enim peccatum est gravius, tanto magis humanae saluti adversatur, propter quam Deus est incarnatus. Sed peccatum actuale est gravius quam originale peccatum, minima enim poena debetur originali peccato, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Iulianum. Ergo principalius incarnatio Christi ordinatur ad deletionem actualium peccatorum. Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the sin, the more it runs counter to man’s salvation, for which God became incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed to taking away actual sins. Praeterea, peccato originali non debetur poena sensus, sed solum poena damni, ut in secundo habitum est. Sed Christus venit pro satisfactione peccatorum poenam sensus pati in cruce, non autem poenam damni, quia nullum defectum habuit divinae visionis aut fruitionis. Ergo principalius venit ad deletionem peccati actualis quam originalis. Obj. 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but merely pain of loss, as has been shown (I-II, Q. 87, A. 5). But Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction for sins—and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away actual sin rather than original sin. Praeterea, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, in II de compunctione cordis, hic est affectus servi fidelis, ut beneficia domini sui quae communiter omnibus data sunt, quasi sibi soli praestita reputet, quasi enim de se solo loquens Paulus ita scribit, ad Galat. II, dilexit me, et tradidit semetipsum pro me. Sed propria peccata nostra sunt actualia, originale enim est commune peccatum. Ergo hunc affectum debemus habere, ut aestimemus eum principaliter propter actualia peccata venisse. Obj. 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 3): This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: ‘Christ . . . loved me and delivered Himself for me.’ But our individual sins are actual sins; for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins. Sed contra est quod Ioan. I dicitur, ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi. On the contrary, It is written (John 1:29): Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins of the world. Respondeo dicendum quod certum est Christum venisse in hunc mundum non solum ad delendum illud peccatum quod traductum est originaliter in posteros, sed etiam ad deletionem omnium peccatorum quae postmodum superaddita sunt, non quod omnia deleantur (quod est propter defectum hominum, qui Christo non inhaerent, secundum illud Ioan. III, venit lux in mundum, et dilexerunt homines magis tenebras quam lucem), sed quia ipse exhibuit quod sufficiens fuit ad omnem deletionem. Unde dicitur Rom. V, non sicut delictum, sic et donum, nam iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem. I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that all are taken away (and this is from men’s fault, inasmuch as they do not adhere to Christ, according to John 3:19: The light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light), but because He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is written (Rom 5:15–16): But not as the offense, so also the gift . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many offenses unto justification. Tanto autem principalius ad alicuius peccati deletionem Christus venit, quanto illud peccatum maius est. Dicitur autem maius aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, intensive, sicut est maior albedo quae est intensior. Et per hunc modum maius est peccatum actuale quam originale, quia plus habet de ratione voluntarii, ut in secundo dictum est. Alio modo dicitur aliquid maius extensive, sicut dicitur maior albedo quae est in maiori superficie. Et hoc modo peccatum originale, per quod totum genus humanum inficitur, est maius quolibet peccato actuali, quod est proprium singularis personae. Et quantum ad hoc, Christus principalius venit ad tollendum originale peccatum, inquantum bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ come to blot it out. But greater is said in two ways: in one way intensively, as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of the nature of voluntary, as has been shown (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1). In another way a thing is said to be greater extensively, as whiteness on a greater surface is said to be greater; and in this way original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as the good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an individual, as is said Ethic. i, 2. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensiva magnitudine peccati. Reply Obj. 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of sin. Ad secundum dicendum quod peccato originali in futura retributione non debetur poena sensus, poenalitates tamen quas sensibiliter in hac vita patimur, sicut famem, sitim, mortem et alia huiusmodi, ex peccato originali procedunt. Et ideo Christus, ut plene pro peccato originali satisfaceret, voluit sensibilem dolorem pati, ut mortem et alia huiusmodi in seipso consummaret. Reply Obj. 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst, death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and the like in Himself. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus ibidem inducit, verba illa dicebat apostolus, non quasi diminuere volens amplissima et per orbem terrarum diffusa Christi munera, sed ut pro omnibus se solum indicaret obnoxium. Quid enim interest si et aliis praestitit, cum quae tibi sunt praestita ita integra sunt et ita perfecta quasi nulli alii ex his aliquid fuerit praestitum? Ex hoc ergo quod aliquis debet sibi reputare beneficia Christi praestita esse, non debet existimare quod non sint praestita aliis. Et ideo non excluditur quin principalius venerit abolere peccatum totius naturae quam peccatum unius personae. Sed illud peccatum commune ita perfecte curatum est in unoquoque ac si in eo solo esset curatum. Et praeterea, propter unionem caritatis, totum quod omnibus est impensum, unusquisque debet sibi adscribere. Reply Obj. 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6): The Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ’s gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than yourself? And hence, although a man ought to account Christ’s gifts as given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by each one. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum conveniens fuisset Deum incarnari a principio humani generis Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conveniens fuisset Deum incarnari a principio humani generis. Incarnationis enim opus ex immensitate divinae caritatis processit, secundum illud Ephes. II, Deus, qui dives est in misericordia, propter nimiam caritatem suam qua dilexit nos, cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos in Christo. Sed caritas non tardat subvenire amico necessitatem patienti, secundum illud Prov. III, ne dicas amico tuo, vade et revertere, cras dabo tibi; cum statim possis dare. Ergo Deus incarnationis opus differre non debuit, sed statim a principio per suam incarnationem humano generi subvenire. Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to Eph. 2:4, 5: But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ. But charity does not tarry in bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to Prov. 3:28: Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give to thee, when thou canst give at present. Therefore God ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning. Praeterea, I Tim. I dicitur, Christus venit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere. Sed plures salvati fuissent si a principio humani generis Deus incarnatus fuisset, plurimi enim, ignorantes Deum, in suo peccato perierunt in diversis saeculis. Ergo convenientius fuisset quod a principio humani generis Deus incarnatus fuisset. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim 1:15): Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners. But more would have been saved had God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. Praeterea, opus gratiae non est minus ordinatum quam opus naturae. Sed natura initium sumit a perfectis, ut dicit Boetius, in libro de consolatione. Ergo opus gratiae debuit a principio esse perfectum. Sed in opere incarnationis consideratur perfectio gratiae, secundum illud, verbum caro factum est, et postea subditur, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Ergo Christus a principio humani generis debuit incarnari. Obj. 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to John 1:14: The Word was made flesh; and afterwards it is added: Full of grace and truth. Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. Sed contra est quod dicitur Galat. IV, at ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum, factum ex muliere, ubi dicit Glossa quod plenitudo temporis est quod praefinitum fuit a Deo patre quando mitteret filium suum. Sed Deus sua sapientia omnia definivit. Ergo convenientissimo tempore Deus est incarnatus. Et sic non fuit conveniens quod a principio humani generis Deus incarnaretur. On the contrary, It is written (Gal 4:4): But when the fullness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law: upon which a gloss says that the fullness of the time is when it was decreed by God the Father to send His Son. But God decreed everything by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum opus incarnationis principaliter ordinetur ad reparationem naturae humanae per peccati abolitionem manifestum est quod non fuit conveniens a principio humani generis, ante peccatum, Deum incarnatum fuisse, non enim datur medicina nisi iam infirmis. Unde ipse dominus dicit, Matth. IX, non est opus valentibus medicus, sed male habentibus, non enim veni vocare iustos, sed peccatores. I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is principally ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to the sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Matt 9:12, 13): They that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . . For I am not come to call the just, but sinners. Sed non etiam statim post peccatum conveniens fuit Deum incarnari. Primo quidem, propter conditionem humani peccati, quod ex superbia provenerat, unde eo modo erat homo liberandus ut, humiliatus, recognosceret se liberatore indigere. Unde super illud Galat. III, ordinata per Angelos in manu mediatoris, dicit Glossa, magno consilio factum est ut, post hominis casum, non illico Dei filius mitteretur. Reliquit enim Deus prius hominem in libertate arbitrii, in lege naturali, ut sic vires naturae suae cognosceret. Ubi cum deficeret, legem accepit. Qua data, invaluit morbus, non legis, sed naturae vitio, ut ita, cognita sua infirmitate, clamaret ad medicum, et gratiae quaereret auxilium. Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after sin. First, on account of the manner of man’s sin, which had come of pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the words in Gal. 3:19, Being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator, a gloss says: With great wisdom was it so ordered that the Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man’s fall. For first of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of his will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when he failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and beseech the aid of grace. Secundo, propter ordinem promotionis in bonum, secundum quem ab imperfecto ad perfectum proceditur. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod animale, deinde quod spirituale. Primus homo de terra, terrenus, secundus homo de caelo, caelestis. Second, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor 15:46, 47): Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly.