Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod ira per vitium excaecat oculum mentis; ira vero per zelum ipsum turbat. Sed in Christo mentis oculus non fuit neque excaecatus neque turbatus. Ergo in Christo non fuit ira per vitium, nec ira per zelum. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that anger that comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal disturbs it. Now the mind’s eye in Christ was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor zealous anger. Sed contra est quod Ioan. II dicitur de eo esse impletum quod in Psalmo legitur, zelus domus tuae comedit me. On the contrary, It is written (John 2:17) that the words of Ps. 68:10, the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up, were fulfilled in Him. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, ira est effectus tristitiae. Ex tristitia enim alicui illata consequitur in eo, circa sensitivam partem, appetitus repellendi illatam iniuriam vel sibi vel aliis. Et sic ira est passio composita ex tristitia et appetitu vindictae. Dictum est autem quod in Christo tristitia esse potuit. Appetitus etiam vindictae quandoque est cum peccato, quando scilicet aliquis vindictam quaerit sibi absque ordine rationis. Et sic ira in Christo esse non potuit, hoc enim dicitur ira per vitium. Quandoque vero talis appetitus est sine peccato, immo est laudabilis, puta cum aliquis appetit vindictam secundum ordinem iustitiae. Et hoc vocatur ira per zelum, dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan., quod zelo domus Dei comeditur qui omnia perversa quae videt cupit emendare; et, si emendare non possit, tolerat et gemit. Et talis ira fuit in Christo. I answer that, As was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 46, A. 3, ad 3, and II-II, Q. 158, A. 2, ad 3), anger is an effect of sorrow. For when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there arises within him a desire of the sensitive appetite to repel this injury brought upon himself or others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of revenge. Now it was said (A. 6) that sorrow could be in Christ. As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with sin, i.e., when anyone seeks revenge beyond the order of reason: and in this way anger could not be in Christ, for this kind of anger is sinful. Sometimes, however, this desire is without sin—nay, is praiseworthy, e.g., when anyone seeks revenge according to justice, and this is zealous anger. For Augustine says (on John 2:17) that he is eaten up by zeal for the house of God, who seeks to better whatever He sees to be evil in it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs. Such was the anger that was in Christ. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, in V Moral., ira dupliciter se habet in homine. Quandoque enim praevenit rationem, et trahit eam secum ad operandum. Et tunc proprie ira dicitur operari, nam operatio attribuitur principali agenti. Et secundum hoc intelligitur quod ira viri iustitiam Dei non operatur. Quandoque vero ira sequitur rationem, et est quasi instrumentum ipsius. Et tunc operatio, quae est iustitiae, non attribuitur irae, sed rationi. Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v), anger is in man in two ways—sometimes it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate, and in this way it is properly said to work, for operations are attributed to the principal agent. It is in this way that we must understand that the anger of man worketh not the justice of God. Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed to anger but to reason. Ad secundum dicendum quod ira quae transgreditur ordinem rationis mansuetudini opponitur, non autem ira quae est moderata, ad medium reducta per rationem. Nam mansuetudo medium tenet in ira. Reply Obj. 2: It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of reason that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is controlled and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness holds the mean in anger. Ad tertium dicendum quod in nobis, secundum naturalem ordinem, potentiae animae mutuo se impediunt, ita scilicet quod, cum unius potentiae operatio fuerit intensa, alterius operatio debilitetur. Et ex hoc procedit quod motus irae etiam si sit secundum rationem moderatus, utcumque impedit oculum animae contemplantis. Sed in Christo, per moderationem divinae virtutis, unicuique potentiae permittebatur agere quod erat ei proprium, ita quod una potentia ex alia non impediebatur. Et ideo, sicut delectatio mentis contemplantis non impediebat tristitiam vel dolorem inferioris partis, ita etiam e converso passiones inferioris partis in nullo impediebant actum rationis. Reply Obj. 3: In us the natural order is that the soul’s powers mutually impede each other, i.e., if the operation of one power is intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason why any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason, dims the mind’s eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ, by control of the Divine power, every faculty was allowed to do what was proper to it, and one power was not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the inferior part no-wise impeded the act of reason. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum Christus fuerit simul viator et comprehensor Whether Christ was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit simul viator et comprehensor. Viatori enim competit moveri ad finem beatitudinis, comprehensori autem competit in fine quiescere. Sed non potest simul eidem convenire quod moveatur ad finem, et quod quiescat in fine. Ergo non potuit simul esse quod Christus esset viator et comprehensor. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once wayfarer and comprehensor. Praeterea, moveri ad beatitudinem, aut eam obtinere, non competit homini secundum corpus, sed secundum animam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Dioscorum, quod ad inferiorem naturam, quae est corpus, redundat ab anima non beatitudo, quae propria est fruentis et intelligentis. Sed Christus, licet haberet corpus passibile, tamen secundum mentem plene Deo fruebatur. Non ergo Christus fuit viator, sed purus comprehensor. Obj. 2: Further, to tend to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not pertain to man’s body, but to his soul; hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii) that upon the inferior nature, which is the body, there overflows, not indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as enjoy and understand, the fullness of health, i.e., the vigor of incorruption. Now although Christ had a passible body, He fully enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor. Praeterea, sancti, quorum animae sunt in caelo et corpora in sepulcris, fruuntur quidem beatitudine secundum animam, quamvis eorum corpora morti subiaceant, et tamen non dicuntur viatores, sed solum comprehensores. Ergo, pari ratione, licet corpus Christi fuerit mortale, quia tamen mens eius Deo fruebatur, videtur quod fuerit purus comprehensor, et nullo modo viator. Obj. 3: Further, the Saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude in their souls, although their bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that Christ was a pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind enjoyed God although His body was mortal. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XIV, quasi colonus futurus es in terra, et quasi viator declinans ad manendum. On the contrary, It is written (Jer 14:8): Why wilt Thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge? Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis dicitur viator ex eo quod tendit in beatitudinem, comprehensor autem dicitur ex hoc quod iam beatitudinem obtinet, secundum illud I Cor. IX, sic currite ut comprehendatis; et Philipp. III, sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam. Hominis autem beatitudo perfecta consistit in anima et corpore, ut in secunda parte habitum est, in anima quidem, quantum ad id quod est ei proprium, secundum quod mens videt et fruitur Deo; in corpore vero, secundum quod corpus resurget spirituale, et in virtute et in gloria et in incorruptione, ut dicitur I Cor. XV. Christus autem, ante passionem, secundum mentem plene videbat Deum, et sic habebat beatitudinem quantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Sed quantum ad alia deerat ei beatitudo, quia et anima eius erat passibilis, et corpus passibile et mortale, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo simul erat comprehensor, inquantum habebat beatitudinem animae propriam, et simul viator, inquantum tendebat in beatitudinem secundum id quod ei de beatitudine deerat. I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beatitude, and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude, according to 1 Cor. 9:24: So run that you may comprehend; and Phil. 3:12: I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend. Now man’s perfect beatitude consists in both soul and body, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 4, A. 6). In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, inasmuch as the body will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption, as is written 1 Cor. 15:42. Now before His passion Christ’s mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude as far as it regards what is proper to the soul; but beatitude was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear from the above (A. 4; Q. 14, AA. 1, 2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the beatitude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch as He was tending to beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His beatitude. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod impossibile est moveri ad finem et quiescere in fine secundum idem. Sed secundum diversa nihil prohibet hoc, sicut aliquis homo simul est sciens quantum ad ea quae iam novit, et addiscens quantum ad ea quae nondum novit. Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible to be moving towards the end and resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against this under a different respect—as when a man is at once acquainted with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he does not know. Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo principaliter et proprie consistit in anima secundum mentem, secundario tamen, et quasi instrumentaliter, requiruntur ad beatitudinem corporis bona; sicut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod exteriora bona organice deserviunt beatitudini. Reply Obj. 2: Beatitude principally and properly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beatitude; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), that exterior goods minister organically to beatitude. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de animabus sanctorum defunctorum et de Christo, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia animae sanctorum non sunt passibiles, sicut fuit anima Christi. Secundo, quia corpora non agunt aliquid per quod in beatitudinem tendant, sicut Christus, secundum corporis passiones, in beatitudinem tendebat quantum ad gloriam corporis. Reply Obj. 3: There is no parity between the soul of a saint and of Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are not passible, as Christ’s soul was; second, because their bodies do nothing by which they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily sufferings tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body. Quaestio 16 Question 16 De Christo secundum esse et fieri Christ in His Being and Becoming Deinde considerandum est de his quae consequuntur unionem. Et primo, quantum ad ea quae conveniunt Christo secundum se; secundo, de his quae conveniunt Christo per comparationem ad Deum patrem; tertio, de his quae conveniunt Christo quantum ad nos. We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to what belongs to Christ in Himself; second, as to what belongs to Christ in relation with His Father; third, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to us. Circa primum duplex consideratio occurrit, primo quidem, de his quae conveniunt Christo secundum esse et fieri; secundo, de his quae conveniunt Christo secundum rationem unitatis. Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: Primo, utrum haec sit vera, Deus est homo. (1) Whether this is true: God is man? Secundo, utrum haec sit vera, homo est Deus. (2) Whether this is true: Man is God? Tertio, utrum Christus possit dici homo dominicus. (3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man? Quarto, utrum ea quae conveniunt filio hominis, possint praedicari de filio Dei, et e converso. (4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son of God, and conversely? Quinto, utrum ea quae conveniunt filio hominis, possint praedicari de divina natura; et de humana ea quae conveniunt filio Dei. (5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature? Sexto, utrum haec sit vera, filius Dei factus est homo. (6) Whether this is true: The Son of God was made man? Septimo, utrum haec sit vera, homo factus est Deus. (7) Whether this is true: Man became God? Octavo, utrum haec sit vera, Christus est creatura. (8) Whether this is true: Christ is a creature? Nono, utrum haec sit vera, iste homo, demonstrato Christo, incoepit esse, vel, fuerit semper. (9) Whether this is true: This man, pointing out Christ, began to be? or always was? Decimo, utrum haec sit vera, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura. (10) Whether this is true: Christ as man is a creature? Undecimo, utrum haec sit vera, Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus. (11) Whether this is true: Christ as man is God? Duodecimo, utrum haec sit vera, Christus, secundum quod homo, est hypostasis vel persona. (12) Whether this is true: Christ as man is a hypostasis or person? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum haec sit vera, ‘Deus est homo’ Whether this is true: “God is man”? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit falsa, Deus est homo. Omnis enim propositio affirmativa in materia aliqua remota est falsa. Sed haec propositio, Deus est homo, est in materia remota, quia formae significatae per subiectum et praedicatum sunt maxime distantes. Cum ergo praedicta propositio sit affirmativa, videtur quod sit falsa. Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: God is man. For every affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this proposition, God is man, is on remote matter, since the forms signified by the subject and predicate are most widely apart. Therefore, since the aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would seem to be false.