Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli dicuntur filii Dei filiatione adoptionis, non quia ipsis primo conveniat, sed quia ipsi primo adoptionem filiorum receperunt. Reply Obj. 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the first to receive the adoption of sons. Ad tertium dicendum quod adoptio non est proprium consequens naturam, sed consequens gratiam, cuius natura rationalis est capax. Et ideo non oportet quod omni rationali creaturae conveniat, sed quod omnis rationalis creatura sit capax adoptionis. Reply Obj. 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature, but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature must needs be capable of adoption. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum Christus, secundum quod homo sit filius Dei adoptivus Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo sit filius Dei adoptivus. Dicit enim Hilarius, de Christo loquens, potestatis dignitas non amittitur dum carnis humanitas adoptatur. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est filius adoptivus. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: The dignity of power is not forfeited when carnal humanity is adopted. Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., quod eadem gratia ille homo est Christus, qua gratia ab initio fidei quicumque homo est Christianus. Sed alii homines sunt Christiani per gratiam adoptionis. Ergo et ille homo est Christus per adoptionem. Et ita videtur esse filius adoptivus. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that by the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man is a Christian. But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption. Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would seem to be an adopted son. Praeterea, Christus, secundum quod homo, est servus. Sed dignius est esse filium adoptivum quam servum. Ergo multo magis Christus, secundum quod homo, est filius adoptivus. Obj. 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Incarnat., adoptivum filium non dicimus filium esse natura, sed eum dicimus natura esse filium qui verus est filius. Christus autem verus et naturalis est filius Dei, secundum illud I Ioan. ult., ut simus in vero filio eius, Iesu Christo. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non est filius adoptivus. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): We do not call an adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son. But Christ is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 John 5:20: That we may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ. Therefore Christ, as Man, is not an adopted Son. Respondeo dicendum quod filiatio proprie convenit hypostasi vel personae, non autem naturae, unde in prima parte dictum est quod filiatio est proprietas personalis. In Christo autem non est alia persona vel hypostasis quam increata, cui convenit esse filium per naturam. Dictum est autem supra quod filiatio adoptionis est participata similitudo filiationis naturalis. Non autem dicitur aliquid participative quod per se dicitur. Et ideo Christus, qui est filius Dei naturalis, nullo modo potest dici filius adoptivus. I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person, not to the nature; whence in the First Part (Q. 32, A. 3) we have stated that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature to be the Son. But it has been said above (A. 1, ad 2), that the sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially. Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called an adopted Son. Secundum autem illos qui ponunt in Christo duas personas, vel duas hypostases, seu duo supposita, nihil rationabiliter prohibet Christum hominem dici filium adoptivum. But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted Son of God. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut filiatio non proprie convenit naturae, ita nec adoptio. Et ideo, cum dicitur quod carnis humanitas adoptatur, impropria est locutio, et accipitur ibi adoptio pro unione humanae naturae ad personam filii. Reply Obj. 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that carnal humanity is adopted, the expression is improper, and adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of the Son. Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo illa Augustini est intelligenda quantum ad principium, quia scilicet, sicut sine meritis habet quilibet homo ut sit Christianus, ita ille homo sine meritis habuit ut esset Christus. Est tamen differentia quantum ad terminum, quia scilicet Christus per gratiam unionis est filius naturalis; alius autem per gratiam habitualem est filius adoptivus. Gratia autem habitualis in Christo non facit de nonfilio filium adoptivum, sed est quidam effectus filiationis in anima Christi, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Reply Obj. 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to John 1:14: We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. Ad tertium dicendum quod esse creaturam, et etiam servitus vel subiectio ad Deum, non solum respicit personam, sed etiam naturam, quod non potest dici de filiatione. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Reply Obj. 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold. Quaestio 24 Question 24 De praedestinatione Christi The Predestination of Christ Deinde considerandum est de praedestinatione Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sit praedestinatus. (1) Whether Christ was predestined? Secundo, utrum sit praedestinatus secundum quod homo. (2) Whether He was predestined as man? Tertio, utrum eius praedestinatio sit exemplar praedestinationis nostrae. (3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours? Quarto, utrum sit causa praedestinationis nostrae. (4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Christo conveniat praedestinatum esse Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestined? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo non conveniat praedestinatum esse. Terminus enim cuiuslibet praedestinationis videtur esse adoptio filiorum, secundum illud Ephes. I, praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum. Sed Christo non convenit esse filium adoptivum, ut dictum est. Ergo Christo non convenit praedestinatum esse. Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be predestined. For the term of anyone’s predestination seems to be the adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: Who hath predestined us unto the adoption of children. But it is not befitting to Christ to be an adopted Son, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Therefore it is not fitting that Christ be predestined. Praeterea, in Christo duo est considerare, scilicet naturam humanam, et personam. Sed non potest dici quod Christus est praedestinatus ratione naturae humanae, quia haec est falsa, humana natura est filius Dei. Similiter etiam neque ratione personae, quia illa persona non habet ex gratia quod sit filius Dei, sed ex natura; praedestinatio autem est eorum quae sunt ex gratia, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo Christus non est praedestinatus filius Dei. Obj. 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is predestined by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is false—The human nature is Son of God. In like manner neither by reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace, but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as stated in the First Part, Q. 23, AA. 2, 5. Therefore Christ was not predestined to be the Son of God. Praeterea, sicut illud quod est factum non semper fuit, ita et illud quod fuit praedestinatum, eo quod praedestinatio antecessionem quandam importat. Sed, quia Christus semper fuit Deus et filius Dei, non proprie dicitur quod homo ille sit factus filius Dei. Ergo, pari ratione, non debet dici quod Christus sit praedestinatus filius Dei. Obj. 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always, so also that which was predestined; since predestination implies a certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of God, it cannot be said that that Man was made the Son of God. Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was predestined the Son of God. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. I, de Christo loquens, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute. On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom 1:4): Who was predestined the Son of God in power. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt, praedestinatio, proprie accepta, est quaedam divina praeordinatio ab aeterno de his quae per gratiam Dei sunt fienda in tempore. Est autem hoc in tempore factum per gratiam unionis a Deo, ut homo esset Deus et Deus esset homo. Nec potest dici quod Deus ab aeterno non praeordinaverit hoc se facturum in tempore, quia sequeretur quod divinae menti aliquid accideret de novo. Et oportet dicere quod ipsa unio naturarum in persona Christi cadat sub aeterna Dei praedestinatione. Et ratione huius Christus dicitur esse praedestinatus. I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the First Part (Q. 23, AA. 1, 2), predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man, is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do this in time: since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For this reason do we say that Christ was predestined. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de praedestinatione qua nos praedestinamur ut simus filii adoptivi. Sicut autem Christus singulari modo prae aliis est Dei filius naturalis, ita quodam singulari modo est praedestinatus. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination by which we are predestined to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a singular manner is He predestined. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Glossa Rom. I, quidam dixerunt praedestinationem illam intelligendam esse de natura, non de persona, quia scilicet humanae naturae facta est haec gratia ut uniretur filio Dei in unitate personae. Reply Obj. 2: As a gloss says on Rom. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to the nature and not to the Person—that is to say, that on human nature was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of Person. Sed secundum hoc locutio apostoli est impropria, propter duo. Primo quidem, ratione communi. Non enim dicimus naturam alicuius praedestinari, sed personam, quia praedestinari est dirigi in salutem, quod quidem est suppositi agentis propter beatitudinis finem. Secundo, ratione speciali. Quia esse filium Dei non convenit humanae naturae, est enim haec falsa, natura humana est filius Dei. Nisi forte quis velit sic exponere, extorta expositione, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute, idest, praedestinatum est ut humana natura uniretur filio Dei in persona. But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person’s nature, but of his person, as being predestined: because to be predestined is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Second, for a special reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for this proposition is false: The human nature is the Son of God: unless one were to force from it such an exposition as: Who was predestined the Son of God in power—that is, It was predestined that the Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person. Relinquitur ergo quod praedestinatio attribuatur personae Christi, non quidem secundum se, vel secundum quod subsistit in divina natura; sed secundum quod subsistit in humana natura. Unde, cum praedixisset apostolus, qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem, subiunxit, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute, ut daret intelligere quod, secundum hoc quod est factus ex semine David secundum carnem, est praedestinatus filius Dei in virtute. Quamvis enim sit naturale illi personae secundum se consideratae quod sit filius Dei in virtute, non tamen est ei naturale secundum naturam humanam, secundum quam hoc sibi competit per gratiam unionis. Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not, indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying, Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh, added, Who was predestined the Son of God in power: so as to give us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David according to the flesh, He was predestined the Son of God in power. For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the grace of union. Ad tertium dicendum quod Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., dicit hanc esse litteram apostoli, qui destinatus est filius Dei in virtute, ita quod non designetur aliqua antecessio. Et sic nihil habet difficultatis. Alii vero antecessionem quae designatur in hoc participio praedestinatus, referunt, non ad id quod est esse filius Dei, sed ad eius manifestationem, secundum illum consuetum modum loquendi in Scripturis quo res dicuntur fieri quando innotescunt, ut sit sensus quod Christus praedestinatus est manifestari filius Dei. Sed sic non proprie praedestinatio accipitur. Nam aliquis dicitur proprie praedestinari secundum quod dirigitur in finem beatitudinis. Beatitudo autem Christi non dependet ex nostra cognitione. Reply Obj. 3: Origen commenting on Rom. 1:4 says that the true reading of this passage of the Apostle is: Who was destined to be the Son of God in power; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the participle predestined, not to the fact of being the Son of God, but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when they are made known; so that the sense would be—Christ was predestined to be made known as the Son of God. But this is an improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said to be predestined by reason of his being directed to the end of beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge thereof. Et ideo melius dicendum est quod illa antecessio quam importat hoc participium praedestinatus, non refertur ad personam secundum seipsam, sed ratione humanae naturae, quia scilicet persona illa etsi ab aeterno fuerit filius Dei, hoc tamen non fuit semper, quod subsistens in natura humana fuerit filius Dei. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., praedestinatus est Iesus ut qui futurus erat secundum carnem filius David, esset tamen in virtute filius Dei. It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the participle predestined is to be referred to the Person not in Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): Jesus was predestined, so that He Who according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be nevertheless Son of God in power. Et est considerandum quod, licet hoc participium praedestinatus importet antecessionem, sicut et hoc participium factus, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam fieri pertinet ad ipsam rem secundum quod in se est, praedestinari autem pertinet ad aliquem secundum quod est in apprehensione alicuius praeordinantis. Id autem quod subest alicui formae vel naturae secundum rem, potest apprehendi vel prout est sub forma illa, vel etiam absolute. Et quia absolute non convenit personae Christi quod incoeperit esse filius Dei, convenit autem ei secundum quod intelligitur vel apprehenditur ut in natura humana existens, quia scilicet hoc aliquando incoepit esse quod in natura humana existens esset filius Dei, ideo magis est haec vera, Christus est praedestinatus filius Dei, quam ista, Christus est factus filius Dei. Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle predestined, just as this participle made, implies antecedence, yet there is a difference. For to be made belongs to the thing in itself: whereas to be predestined belongs to someone as being in the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the subject of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature, because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition—Christ was predestined the Son of God—is truer than this—Christ was made the Son of God. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum haec sit falsa, ‘Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei’ Whether this proposition is false: “Christ as man was predestined to be the Son of God”?