Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum sanctorum reliquiae sint adorandae Whether any kind of worship is due to the relics of the saints? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sanctorum reliquiae nullo modo sint adorandae. Non enim est aliquid faciendum quod possit esse erroris occasio. Sed adorare mortuorum reliquias videtur ad errorem gentilium pertinere, qui mortuis hominibus honorificentiam impendebant. Ergo non sunt sanctorum reliquiae honorandae. Objection 1: It would seem that the relics of the saints are not to be worshiped at all. For we should avoid doing what may be the occasion of error. But to worship the relics of the dead seems to savor of the error of the Gentiles, who gave honor to dead men. Therefore the relics of the saints are not to be honored. Praeterea, stultum videtur rem insensibilem venerari. Sed sanctorum reliquiae sunt insensibiles. Ergo stultum est eas venerari. Obj. 2: Further, it seems absurd to venerate what is insensible. But the relics of the saints are insensible. Therefore it is absurd to venerate them. Praeterea, corpus mortuum non est eiusdem speciei cum corpore vivo, et per consequens non videtur esse numero idem. Ergo videtur quod post mortem alicuius sancti, corpus eius non sit adorandum. Obj. 3: Further, a dead body is not of the same species as a living body: consequently it does not seem to be identical with it. Therefore, after a saint’s death, it seems that his body should not be worshiped. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Ecclesiast. Dogmat., sanctorum corpora, et praecipue beatorum martyrum reliquias, ac si Christi membra, sincerissime adoranda (scilicet, credimus). Et postea subdit, si quis contra hanc sententiam velit esse, non Christianus, sed Eunomianus et Vigilantius creditur. On the contrary, It is written (De Eccles. Dogm. xl): We believe that the bodies of the saints, above all the relics of the blessed martyrs, as being the members of Christ, should be worshiped in all sincerity: and further on: If anyone holds a contrary opinion, he is not accounted a Christian, but a follower of Eunomius and Vigilantius. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei, si paterna vestis et anulus, ac si quid huiusmodi est, tanto carius est posteris quanto erga parentes est maior affectus, nullo modo ipsa spernenda sunt corpora, quae utique multo familiarius atque coniunctius quam quaelibet indumenta gestamus, haec enim ad ipsam naturam hominis pertinent. Ex quo patet quod qui habet affectum ad aliquem, etiam ipsa quae de ipso post mortem relinquuntur veneratur, non solum corpus aut partes corporis eius, sed etiam aliqua exteriora, puta vestes et similia. Manifestum est autem quod sanctos Dei in veneratione debemus habere, tanquam membra Christi, Dei filios et amicos, et intercessores, nostros. Et ideo eorum reliquias qualescumque honore congruo in eorum memoriam venerari debemus, et praecipue eorum corpora, quae fuerunt templum spiritus sancti, et organa spiritus sancti in eis habitantis et operantis, et sunt corpori Christi configuranda per gloriam resurrectionis. Unde et ipse Deus huiusmodi reliquias convenienter honorat, in eorum praesentia miracula faciendo. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): If a father’s coat or ring, or anything else of that kind, is so much more cherished by his children, as love for one’s parents is greater, in no way are the bodies themselves to be despised, which are much more intimately and closely united to us than any garment; for they belong to man’s very nature. It is clear from this that he who has a certain affection for anyone, venerates whatever of his is left after his death, not only his body and the parts thereof, but even external things, such as his clothes, and such like. Now it is manifest that we should show honor to the saints of God, as being members of Christ, the children and friends of God, and our intercessors. Wherefore in memory of them we ought to honor any relics of theirs in a fitting manner: principally their bodies, which were temples, and organs of the Holy Spirit dwelling and operating in them, and are destined to be likened to the body of Christ by the glory of the Resurrection. Hence God Himself fittingly honors such relics by working miracles at their presence. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec fuit ratio Vigilantii, cuius verba introducit Hieronymus in libro quem contra eum scripsit, dicentis, prope ritum gentilium videmus sub praetextu religionis introductum, pulvisculum nescio quem in modico vasculo, pretioso linteamine circumdatum, osculantes adorant. Contra quem Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Riparium, nos, non dico martyrum reliquias, sed nec solem nec lunam nec Angelos adoramus, scilicet adoratione latriae. Honoramus autem reliquias martyrum, ut eum cuius sunt martyres adoremus, honoramus servos, ut honor servorum redundet ad dominum. Sic ergo honorando reliquias sanctorum non incidimus in errorem gentilium, qui cultum latriae mortuis hominibus exhibebant. Reply Obj. 1: This was the argument of Vigilantius, whose words are quoted by Jerome in the book he wrote against him (ch. ii) as follows: We see something like a pagan rite introduced under pretext of religion; they worship with kisses I know not what tiny heap of dust in a mean vase surrounded with precious linen. To him Jerome replies (Ep. ad Ripar. cix): We do not adore, I will not say the relics of the martyrs, but either the sun or the moon or even the angels—that is to say, with the worship of latria. But we honor the martyrs’ relics, so that thereby we give honor to Him Whose martyrs they are: we honor the servants, that the honor shown to them may reflect on their Master. Consequently, by honoring the martyrs’ relics we do not fall into the error of the Gentiles, who gave the worship of latria to dead men. Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus insensibile non adoramus propter seipsum, sed propter animam, quae ei fuit unita, quae nunc fruitur Deo; et propter Deum, cuius fuerunt ministri. Reply Obj. 2: We worship that insensible body, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the soul, which was once united thereto, and now enjoys God; and for God’s sake, whose ministers the saints were. Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus mortuum alicuius sancti non est idem numero quod primo fuerit dum viveret, propter diversitatem formae, quae est anima, est tamen idem identitate materiae, quae est iterum suae formae unienda. Reply Obj. 3: The dead body of a saint is not identical with that which the saint had during life, on account of the difference of form, viz. the soul: but it is the same by identity of matter, which is destined to be reunited to its form. Quaestio 26 Question 26 De hoc quod Christus dicitur mediator Dei et hominum Christ as Called the Mediator of God and Man Deinde considerandum est de hoc quod Christus dicitur mediator Dei et hominum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. We have now to consider how Christ is called the Mediator of God and man, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum esse mediatorem Dei et hominum sit proprium Christo. (1) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man? Secundo, utrum hoc conveniat ei secundum humanam naturam. (2) Whether this belongs to Him by reason of His human nature? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum esse mediatorem Dei et hominum sit proprium Christo Whether it is proper to Christ to be the mediator of God and man? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse mediatorem Dei et hominum non sit proprium Christo. Sacerdos enim et propheta videtur esse mediator inter Deum et homines, secundum illud Deut. V, ego illo tempore sequester et medius fui inter vos et Deum. Sed esse prophetam et sacerdotem non est proprium Christo. Ergo nec etiam esse mediatorem. Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man. For a priest and a prophet seem to be mediators between God and man, according to Deut. 5:5: I was the mediator and stood between God and you at that time. But it is not proper to Christ to be a priest and a prophet. Neither, therefore, is it proper to Him to be Mediator. Praeterea, illud quod convenit Angelis bonis et malis, non potest dici esse proprium Christo. Sed esse medium inter Deum et homines convenit Angelis bonis, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Convenit etiam Angelis malis, idest Daemonibus, habent enim quaedam communia cum Deo, scilicet immortalitatem; quaedam autem habent communia cum hominibus, scilicet quod sunt animo passivi, et per consequens miseri; ut patet per Augustinum, in Lib. IX de Civ. Dei. Ergo esse mediatorem Dei et hominum non est proprium Christo. Obj. 2: Further, that which is fitting to angels, both good and bad, cannot be said to be proper to Christ. But to be between God and man is fitting to the good angels, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). It is also fitting to the bad angels—that is, the demons: for they have something in common with God—namely, immortality; and something they have in common with men—namely, passibility of soul and consequently unhappiness; as appears from what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 13, 15). Therefore it is not proper to Christ to be a Mediator of God and man. Praeterea, ad officium mediatoris pertinet interpellare ad unum eorum inter quos est mediator, pro altero. Sed Spiritus Sanctus, sicut dicitur Rom. VIII, interpellat pro nobis ad Deum gemitibus inenarrabilibus. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus est mediator inter Deum et homines. Ergo non est proprium Christo. Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the office of Mediator to beseech one of those, between whom he mediates, for the other. But the Holy Spirit, as it is written (Rom 8:26), asketh God for us with unspeakable groanings. Therefore the Holy Spirit is a Mediator between God and man. Therefore this is not proper to Christ. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Tim. II, unus est mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus. On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim 2:5): There is . . . one Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus. Respondeo dicendum quod mediatoris officium proprie est coniungere eos inter quos est mediator, nam extrema uniuntur in medio. Unire autem homines Deo perfective quidem convenit Christo, per quem homines reconciliantur Deo, secundum illud II Cor. V, Deus erat in Christo mundum reconcilians sibi. Et ideo solus Christus est perfectus Dei et hominum mediator, inquantum per suam mortem humanum genus Deo reconciliavit. Unde, cum apostolus dixisset, mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus, subiunxit, qui dedit semetipsum redemptionem pro omnibus. I answer that, Properly speaking, the office of a mediator is to join together and unite those between whom he mediates: for extremes are united in the mean (medio). Now to unite men to God perfectively belongs to Christ, through Whom men are reconciled to God, according to 2 Cor. 5:19: God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself. And, consequently, Christ alone is the perfect Mediator of God and men, inasmuch as, by His death, He reconciled the human race to God. Hence the Apostle, after saying, Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus, added: Who gave Himself a redemption for all. Nihil tamen prohibet aliquos alios secundum quid dici mediatores inter Deum et hominem, prout scilicet cooperantur ad unionem hominum cum Deo dispositive vel ministerialiter. However, nothing hinders certain others from being called mediators, in some respect, between God and man, forasmuch as they cooperate in uniting men to God, dispositively or ministerially. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prophetae et sacerdotes veteris legis dicti sunt mediatores inter Deum et homines dispositive et ministerialiter, inquantum scilicet praenuntiabant et praefigurabant verum et perfectum Dei et hominum mediatorem. Sacerdotes vero novae legis possunt dici mediatores Dei et hominum inquantum sunt ministri veri mediatoris, vice ipsius salutaria sacramenta hominibus exhibentes. Reply Obj. 1: The prophets and priests of the Old Law were called mediators between God and man, dispositively and ministerially: inasmuch as they foretold and foreshadowed the true and perfect Mediator of God and men. As to the priests of the New Law, they may be called mediators of God and men, inasmuch as they are the ministers of the true Mediator by administering, in His stead, the saving sacraments to men. Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli boni, ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei, non recte possunt dici mediatores inter Deum et homines. Cum enim utrumque habeant cum Deo, et beatitudinem et immortalitatem, nihil autem horum cum hominibus miseris et mortalibus, quomodo non potius remoti sunt ab hominibus, Deoque coniuncti, quam inter utrosque medii constituti? Dionysius tamen dicit eos esse medios, quia, secundum gradum naturae, sunt infra Deum et supra homines constituti. Et mediatoris officium exercent, non quidem principaliter et perfective, sed ministerialiter et dispositive, unde Matth. IV dicitur quod accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant ei, scilicet Christo. Daemones autem habent quidem cum Deo immortalitatem, cum hominibus vero miseriam. Ad hoc ergo se interponit medius Daemon immortalis et miser, ut ad immortalitatem beatam transire non sinat, sed perducat ad miseriam immortalem. Unde est sicut malus medius, qui separat amicos. Reply Obj. 2: The good angels, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 13), cannot rightly be called mediators between God and men. For since, in common with God, they have both beatitude and immortality, and none of these things in common with unhappy and mortal man, how much rather are they not aloof from men and akin to God, than established between them? Dionysius, however, says that they do occupy a middle place, because, in the order of nature, they are established below God and above man. Moreover, they fulfill the office of mediator, not indeed principally and perfectively, but ministerially and dispositively: whence (Matt 4:11) it is said that angels came and ministered unto Him—namely, Christ. As to the demons, it is true that they have immortality in common with God, and unhappiness in common with men. Hence for this purpose does the immortal and unhappy demon intervene, in order that he may hinder men from passing to a happy immortality, and may allure them to an unhappy immortality. Whence he is like an evil mediator, who separates friends. Christus autem habuit cum Deo communem beatitudinem, cum hominibus autem mortalitatem. Et ideo ad hoc se interposuit medium ut, mortalitate transacta, ex mortuis faceret immortales, quod in se resurgendo monstravit; et ex miseris beatos efficeret, unde nunquam ipse discessit. Et ideo ipse est bonus mediator, qui reconciliat inimicos. But Christ had beatitude in common with God, mortality in common with men. Hence for this purpose did He intervene, that having fulfilled the span of His mortality, He might from dead men make immortal—which He showed in Himself by rising again; and that He might confer beatitude on those who were deprived of it—for which reason He never forsook us. Wherefore He is the good Mediator, Who reconciles enemies (De Civ. Dei xv). Ad tertium dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus, cum sit per omnia Deo aequalis, non potest dici medius vel mediator inter Deum et homines, sed solus Christus, qui, licet secundum divinitatem aequalis sit patri, tamen secundum humanitatem minor est patre, ut dictum est. Unde, super illud Galat. III, Christus est mediator, dicit Glossa, non pater vel Spiritus Sanctus. Dicitur autem Spiritus Sanctus interpellare pro nobis, quia ipse interpellare nos facit. Reply Obj. 3: Since the Holy Spirit is in everything equal to God, He cannot be said to be between, or a Mediator of, God and men: but Christ alone, Who, though equal to the Father in His Godhead, yet is less than the Father in His human nature, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1). Hence on Gal. 3:20, Christ is a Mediator, the gloss says: Not the Father nor the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, however, is said to ask for us, because He makes us ask. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum Christus sit mediator Dei et hominum secundum quod homo Whether Christ, as man, is the mediator of God and men? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit mediator Dei et hominum secundum quod homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro contra Felicianum, una est Christi persona, ne sit non unus Christus, non una substantia; ne, mediatoris dispensatione submota, aut Dei tantum aut hominis dicatur filius. Sed non est Dei et hominis filius secundum quod homo, sed simul secundum quod Deus et homo. Ergo neque dicendum est quod sit mediator Dei et hominum solum secundum quod homo. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not, as man, the Mediator of God and men. For Augustine says (Contra Felic. x): One is the Person of Christ: lest there be not one Christ, not one substance; lest, the office of Mediator being denied, He be called the Son either of God alone, or merely the Son of a man. But He is the Son of God and man, not as man, but as at the same time God and man. Therefore neither should we say that, as man alone, He is Mediator of God and man. Praeterea, sicut Christus, inquantum est Deus, convenit cum patre et spiritu sancto, ita, inquantum est homo, convenit cum hominibus. Sed propter hoc quod, inquantum est Deus, convenit cum patre et spiritu sancto, non potest dici mediator inquantum est Deus, quia super illud I Tim. II, mediator Dei et hominum, dicit Glossa, inquantum est verbum, non medius est, quia aequalis est Deo, et Deus apud Deum, et simul unus Deus. Ergo nec etiam inquantum homo, potest dici mediator, propter convenientiam quam cum hominibus habet. Obj. 2: Further, just as Christ, as God, has a common nature with the Father and the Holy Spirit; so, as man, He has a common nature with men. But for the reason that, as God, He has the same nature as the Father and the Holy Spirit, He cannot be called Mediator, as God: for on 1 Tim. 2:5, Mediator of God and man, a gloss says: As the Word, He is not a Mediator, because He is equal to God, and God ‘with God,’ and at the same time one God. Therefore neither, as man, can He be called Mediator, on account of His having the same nature as men. Praeterea, Christus dicitur mediator inquantum reconciliavit nos Deo, quod quidem fecit auferendo peccatum, quod nos separabat a Deo. Sed auferre peccatum convenit Christo non inquantum est homo, sed inquantum est Deus. Ergo Christus, inquantum est homo, non est mediator, sed inquantum est Deus. Obj. 3: Further, Christ is called Mediator, inasmuch as He reconciled us to God: and this He did by taking away sin, which separated us from God. But to take away sin belongs to Christ, not as man, but as God. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, not as man, but as God. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Lib. IX, de Civ. Dei, non ob hoc est mediator Christus, quia est verbum. Maxime quippe immortale et maxime beatum verbum longe a mortalibus miseris. Sed mediator est secundum quod homo. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 15): Not because He is the Word, is Christ Mediator, since He Who is supremely immortal and supremely happy is far from us unhappy mortals; but He is Mediator, as man. Respondeo dicendum quod in mediatore duo possumus considerare, primo quidem, rationem medii; secundo, officium coniungendi. Est autem de ratione medii quod distet ab utroque extremorum, coniungit autem mediator per hoc quod ea quae unius sunt, defert ad alterum. Neutrum autem horum potest convenire Christo secundum quod Deus, sed solum secundum quod homo. Nam secundum quod Deus, non differt a patre et spiritu sancto in natura et potestate dominii, nec etiam pater et Spiritus Sanctus aliquid habent quod non sit filii, ut sic possit id quod est patris vel spiritus sancti, quasi quod est aliorum, ad alios deferre. Sed utrumque convenit ei inquantum est homo. Quia, secundum quod est homo, distat et a Deo in natura, et ab hominibus in dignitate et gratiae et gloriae. Inquantum etiam est homo, competit ei coniungere homines Deo, praecepta et dona hominibus exhibendo, et pro hominibus ad Deum satisfaciendo et interpellando. Et ideo verissime dicitur mediator secundum quod homo. I answer that, We may consider two things in a mediator: first, that he is a mean; second, that he unites others. Now it is of the nature of a mean to be distant from each extreme: while it unites by communicating to one that which belongs to the other. Now neither of these can be applied to Christ as God, but only as man. For, as God, He does not differ from the Father and the Holy Spirit in nature and power of dominion: nor have the Father and the Holy Spirit anything that the Son has not, so that He be able to communicate to others something belonging to the Father or the Holy Spirit, as though it were belonging to others than Himself. But both can be applied to Him as man. Because, as man, He is distant both from God, by nature, and from man by dignity of both grace and glory. Again, it belongs to Him, as man, to unite men to God, by communicating to men both precepts and gifts, and by offering satisfaction and prayers to God for men. And therefore He is most truly called Mediator, as man. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si subtrahatur divina natura a Christo, subtrahitur per consequens ab eo singularis plenitudo gratiarum, quae convenit ei inquantum est unigenitus a patre, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Ex qua quidem plenitudine habet ut sit super omnes homines constitutus, et propinquius ad Deum accedens. Reply Obj. 1: If we take the Divine Nature from Christ, we consequently take from Him the singular fullness of grace, which belongs to Him as the Only-begotten of the Father, as it is written (John 1:14). From which fullness it resulted that He was established over all men, and approached nearer to God. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod Deus, est per omnia aequalis patri. Sed etiam in humana natura excedit alios homines. Et ideo, secundum quod homo, potest esse mediator, non autem secundum quod Deus. Reply Obj. 2: Christ, as God, is in all things equal to the Father. But even in the human nature He is above all men. Therefore, as man, He can be Mediator, but not as God.