Utrum Beata Virgo debeat dici mater Dei
Whether the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of God?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beata virgo non debeat dici mater Dei. Non enim est dicendum circa divina mysteria nisi quod ex sacra Scriptura habetur. Sed nunquam in sacra Scriptura legitur quod sit mater aut genitrix Dei, sed quod sit mater Christi, aut mater pueri, ut patet Matth. I. Ergo non est dicendum quod beata virgo sit mater Dei.
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God. For in the Divine mysteries we should not make any assertion that is not taken from Holy Scripture. But we read nowhere in Holy Scripture that she is the mother or parent of God, but that she is the mother of Christ or of the Child, as may be seen from Matt. 1:18. Therefore we should not say that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God.
Praeterea, Christus dicitur Deus secundum divinam naturam. Sed divina natura non accepit initium essendi ex virgine. Ergo beata virgo non est dicenda mater Dei.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ is called God in respect of His Divine Nature. But the Divine Nature did not first originate from the Virgin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God.
Praeterea, hoc nomen Deus communiter praedicatur de patre et filio et spiritu sancto. Si ergo beata virgo est mater Dei, videtur sequi quod beata virgo sit mater patris et filii et spiritus sancti, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo beata virgo debet dici mater Dei.
Obj. 3: Further, the word God is predicated in common of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is Mother of God it seems to follow that she was the Mother of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which cannot be allowed. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called Mother of God.
Sed contra est quod in capitulis Cyrilli, approbatis in Ephesina synodo, legitur, si quis non confitetur Deum esse secundum veritatem Emmanuel, et propter hoc Dei genitricem sanctam virginem, genuit enim carnaliter carnem factam ex Deo verbum, anathema sit.
On the contrary, In the chapters of Cyril, approved in the Council of Ephesus (P. 1, Cap. xxvi), we read: If anyone confess not that the Emmanuel is truly God, and that for this reason the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God, since she begot of her flesh the Word of God made flesh, let him be anathema.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omne nomen significans in concreto naturam aliquam, potest supponere pro qualibet hypostasi illius naturae. Cum autem unio incarnationis sit facta in hypostasi, sicut supra dictum est, manifestum est quod hoc nomen Deus potest supponere pro hypostasi habente humanam naturam et divinam. Et ideo quidquid convenit divinae naturae et humanae, potest attribui illi personae, sive secundum quod pro ea supponit nomen significans divinam naturam; sive secundum quod pro ea supponit nomen significans humanam naturam. Concipi autem et nasci personae attribuitur et hypostasi secundum naturam illam in qua concipitur et nascitur. Cum igitur in ipso principio conceptionis fuerit humana natura assumpta a divina persona, sicut praedictum est, consequens est quod vere posset dici Deum esse conceptum et natum de virgine. Ex hoc autem dicitur aliqua mulier alicuius mater, quod eum concepit et genuit. Unde consequens est quod beata virgo vere dicatur mater Dei. Solum enim sic negari posset beatam virginem esse matrem Dei, si vel humanitas prius fuisset subiecta conceptioni et nativitati quam homo ille fuisset filius Dei, sicut Photinus posuit, vel humanitas non fuisset assumpta in unitatem personae vel hypostasis verbi Dei, sicut posuit Nestorius. Utrumque autem horum est erroneum. Unde haereticum est negare beatam virginem esse matrem Dei.
I answer that, As stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), every word that signifies a nature in the concrete can stand for any hypostasis of that nature. Now, since the union of the Incarnation took place in the hypostasis, as above stated (Q. 2, A. 3), it is manifest that this word God can stand for the hypostasis, having a human and a Divine nature. Therefore whatever belongs to the Divine and to the human nature can be attributed to that Person: both when a word is employed to stand for it, signifying the Divine Nature, and when a word is used signifying the human nature. Now, conception and birth are attributed to the person and hypostasis in respect of that nature in which it is conceived and born. Since, therefore, the human nature was taken by the Divine Person in the very beginning of the conception, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 3), it follows that it can be truly said that God was conceived and born of the Virgin. Now from this is a woman called a man’s mother, that she conceived him and gave birth to him. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly called the Mother of God. For the only way in which it could be denied that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God would be either if the humanity were first subject to conception and birth, before this man were the Son of God, as Photinus said; or if the humanity were not assumed unto unity of the Person or hypostasis of the Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. But both of these are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec fuit obiectio Nestorii. Quae quidem solvitur ex hoc quod, licet non inveniatur expresse in Scriptura dictum quod beata virgo sit mater Dei, invenitur tamen expresse in Scriptura quod Iesus Christus est verus Deus, ut patet I Ioan. ult.; et quod beata virgo est mater Iesu Christi, ut patet Matth. I. Unde sequitur ex necessitate ex verbis Scripturae quod sit mater Dei.
Reply Obj. 1: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is solved by saying that, although we do not find it said expressly in Scripture that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, yet we do find it expressly said in Scripture that Jesus Christ is true God, as may be seen 1 John 5:20, and that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of Jesus Christ, which is clearly expressed Matt. 1:18. Therefore, from the words of Scripture it follows of necessity that she is the Mother of God.
Dicitur etiam Rom. IX, quod ex Iudaeis est secundum carnem Christus, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Non autem est ex Iudaeis nisi mediante beata virgine. Unde ille qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula, est vere natus ex beata virgine sicut ex sua matre.
Again, it is written (Rom 9:5) that Christ is of the Jews according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever. But He is not of the Jews except through the Blessed Virgin. Therefore He who is above all things, God blessed for ever, is truly born of the Blessed Virgin as of His Mother.
Ad secundum dicendum quod illa est obiectio Nestorii. Sed Cyrillus, in quadam epistola contra Nestorium, eam solvit sic dicens, sicut hominis anima cum proprio corpore nascitur, et tanquam unum reputatur; et si voluerit dicere quispiam quia est genitrix carnis, non tamen et animae genitrix, nimis superflue loquitur, tale aliquid gestum percipimus in generatione Christi. Natum est enim ex Dei patris substantia Dei verbum, quia vero carnem assumpsit, necesse est confiteri quia natum est secundum carnem ex muliere. Dicendum est ergo quod beata virgo dicitur mater Dei, non quia sit mater divinitatis, sed quia personae habentis divinitatem et humanitatem est mater secundum humanitatem.
Reply Obj. 2: This was an argument of Nestorius. But Cyril, in a letter against Nestorius, answers it thus: Just as when a man’s soul is born with its body, they are considered as one being: and if anyone wish to say that the mother of the flesh is not the mother of the soul, he says too much. Something like this may be perceived in the generation of Christ. For the Word of God was born of the substance of God the Father: but because He took flesh, we must of necessity confess that in the flesh He was born of a woman. Consequently we must say that the Blessed Virgin is called the Mother of God, not as though she were the Mother of the Godhead, but because she is the mother, according to His human nature, of the Person who has both the divine and the human nature.
Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, quamvis sit commune tribus personis, tamen quandoque supponit pro sola persona patris, quandoque pro sola persona filii vel spiritus sancti, ut supra habitum est. Et ita, cum dicitur, beata virgo est mater Dei hoc nomen Deus supponit pro sola persona filii incarnata.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the name God is common to the three Persons, yet sometimes it stands for the Person of the Father alone, sometimes only for the Person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1; First Part, Q. 39, A. 4). So that when we say, The Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, this word God stands only for the incarnate Person of the Son.
Utrum in Christo sint duae filiationes
Whether there are two filiations in Christ?
Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo sint duae filiationes. Nativitas enim est causa filiationis. Sed in Christo sunt duae nativitates. Ergo etiam in Christo sunt duae filiationes.
Objection 1: It would seem that there are two filiations in Christ. For nativity is the cause of filiation. But in Christ there are two nativities. Therefore in Christ there are also two filiations.
Praeterea, filiatio, qua quis dicitur filius alicuius ut matris vel patris, dependet aliqualiter ab ipso, quia esse relationis est ad aliud aliqualiter se habere; unde et, interempto uno relativorum, interimitur aliud. Sed filiatio aeterna, qua Christus est filius Dei patris, non dependet a matre, quia nullum aeternum dependet a temporali. Ergo Christus non est filius matris filiatione aeterna. Aut ergo nullo modo est filius eius, quod est contra praedicta, aut oportet quod sit filius eius quadam alia filiatione temporali. Sunt ergo in Christo duae filiationes.
Obj. 2: Further, filiation, which is said of a man as being the son of someone, his father or his mother, depends, in a way, on him: because the very being of a relation consists in being referred to another; wherefore if one of two relatives be destroyed, the other is destroyed also. But the eternal filiation by which Christ is the Son of God the Father depends not on His Mother, because nothing eternal depends on what is temporal. Therefore Christ is not His Mother’s Son by temporal filiation. Either, therefore, He is not her Son at all, which is in contradiction to what has been said above (AA. 3, 4), or He must needs be her Son by some other temporal filiation. Therefore in Christ there are two filiations.
Praeterea, unum relativorum ponitur in definitione alterius, ex quo patet quod unum relativorum specificatur ex alio. Sed unum et idem non potest esse in diversis speciebus. Ergo impossibile videtur quod una et eadem relatio terminetur ad extrema omnino diversa. Sed Christus dicitur filius patris aeterni, et matris temporalis, qui sunt termini omnino diversi. Ergo videtur quod non possit eadem relatione Christus dici filius patris et matris. Sunt ergo in Christo duae filiationes.
Obj. 3: Further, one of two relatives enters the definition of the other; hence it is clear that of two relatives, one is specified from the other. But one and the same cannot be in diverse species. Therefore it seems impossible that one and the same relation be referred to extremes which are altogether diverse. But Christ is said to be the Son of the Eternal Father and a temporal mother, who are terms altogether diverse. Therefore it seems that Christ cannot, by the same relation, be called the Son of the Father and of His Mother. Therefore in Christ there are two filiations.
Sed contra est quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, ea quae sunt naturae, multiplicantur in Christo, non autem ea quae sunt personae. Sed filiatio maxime pertinet ad personam, est enim proprietas personalis, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Ergo in Christo est una tantum filiatio.
On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), things pertaining to the nature are multiple in Christ; but not those things that pertain to the Person. But filiation belongs especially to the Person, since it is a personal property, as appears from what was said in the First Part (Q. 32, A. 3; Q. 40, A. 2). Therefore there is but one filiation in Christ.
Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones. Quidam enim, attendentes ad causam filiationis, quae est nativitas, ponunt in Christo duas filiationes, sicut et duas nativitates. Alii vero, attendentes ad subiectum filiationis, quod est persona vel hypostasis, ponunt in Christo tantum unam filiationem, sicut et unam hypostasim vel personam. Unitas enim relationis vel eius pluralitas non attenditur secundum terminos, sed secundum causam vel subiectum. Si enim secundum terminos attenditur, oporteret quod quilibet homo in se duas filiationes haberet, unam qua refertur ad patrem, et aliam qua refertur ad matrem. Sed recte consideranti apparet eadem relatione referri unumquemque ad suum patrem et matrem, propter unitatem causae. Eadem enim nativitate homo nascitur ex patre et matre, unde eadem relatione ad utrumque refertur. Et eadem ratio est de magistro qui docet multos discipulos eadem doctrina; et de domino qui gubernat diversos subiectos eadem potestate. Si vero sint diversae causae specie differentes, ex consequenti videntur relationes specie differre. Unde nihil prohibet plures tales relationes eidem inesse. Sicut, si aliquis est aliquorum magister in grammatica et aliorum in logica, alia est ratio magisterii utriusque, et ideo diversis relationibus unus et idem homo potest esse magister vel diversorum vel eorundem secundum diversas doctrinas. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis habet relationem ad plures secundum diversas causas, eiusdem tamen speciei, sicut cum aliquis est pater diversorum filiorum secundum diversos generationis actus. Unde paternitas non potest specie differre, cum actus generationum sint iidem specie. Et quia plures formae eiusdem speciei non possunt simul inesse eidem subiecto, non est possibile quod sint plures paternitates in eo qui est pater plurium filiorum generatione naturali. Secus autem esset si esset pater unius generatione naturali, et alterius per adoptionem.
I answer that, opinions differ on this question. For some, considering only the cause of filiation, which is nativity, put two filiations in Christ, just as there are two nativities. On the contrary, others, considering only the subject of filiation, which is the person or hypostasis, put only one filiation in Christ, just as there is but one hypostasis or person. Because the unity or plurality of a relation is considered in respect, not of its terms, but of its cause or of its subject. For if it were considered in respect of its terms, every man would of necessity have in himself two filiations—one in reference to his father, and another in reference to his mother. But if we consider the question aright, we shall see that every man bears but one relation to both his father and his mother, on account of the unity of the cause thereof. For man is born by one birth of both father and mother: whence he bears but one relation to both. The same is said of one master who teaches many disciples the same doctrine, and of one lord who governs many subjects by the same power. But if there be various causes specifically diverse, it seems that in consequence the relations differ in species: wherefore nothing hinders several such relations being in the same subject. Thus if a man teach grammar to some and logic to others, his teaching is of a different kind in one case and in the other; and therefore one and the same man may have different relations as the master of different disciples, or of the same disciples in regard to diverse doctrines. Sometimes, however, it happens that a man bears a relation to several in respect of various causes, but of the same species: thus a father may have several sons by several acts of generation. Wherefore the paternity cannot differ specifically, since the acts of generation are specifically the same. And because several forms of the same species cannot at the same time be in the same subject, it is impossible for several paternities to be in a man who is the father of several sons by natural generation. But it would not be so were he the father of one son by natural generation and of another by adoption.
Manifestum est autem quod non una et eadem nativitate Christus est natus ex patre ab aeterno, et ex matre ex tempore. Nec nativitas est unius speciei. Unde, quantum ad hoc, oporteret dicere in Christo esse diversas filiationes, unam temporalem et aliam aeternam. Sed quia subiectum filiationis non est natura aut pars naturae, sed solum persona vel hypostasis; in Christo autem non est hypostasis vel persona nisi aeterna, non potest in Christo esse aliqua filiatio nisi quae sit in hypostasi aeterna. Omnis autem relatio quae ex tempore de Deo dicitur, non ponit in ipso Deo aeterno aliquid secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum, sicut in prima parte habitum est. Et ideo filiatio qua Christus refertur ad matrem, non potest esse realis relatio, sed solum secundum rationem.
Now, it is manifest that Christ was not born by one and the same nativity, of the Father from eternity, and of His Mother in time: indeed, these two nativities differ specifically. Wherefore, as to this, we must say that there are various filiations, one temporal and the other eternal. Since, however, the subject of filiation is neither the nature nor part of the nature, but the person or hypostasis alone; and since in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person than the eternal, there can be no other filiation in Christ but that which is in the eternal hypostasis. Now, every relation which is predicated of God from time does not put something real in the eternal God, but only something according to our way of thinking, as we have said in the First Part (Q. 13, A. 7). Therefore the filiation by which Christ is referred to His Mother cannot be a real relation, but only a relation of reason.
Et sic quantum ad aliquid utraque opinio verum dicit. Nam si attendamus ad perfectas rationes filiationis, oportet dicere duas filiationes, secundum dualitatem nativitatum. Si autem attendamus ad subiectum filiationis, quod non potest esse nisi suppositum aeternum, non potest in Christo esse realiter nisi filiatio aeterna. Dicitur tamen relative filius ad matrem relatione quae cointelligitur relationi maternitatis ad Christum. Sicut Deus dicitur dominus relatione quae cointelligitur reali relationi qua creatura subiicitur Deo. Et quamvis relatio dominii non sit realis in Deo, tamen realiter est dominus, ex reali subiectione creaturae ad ipsum. Et similiter Christus dicitur realiter filius virginis matris ex relatione reali maternitatis ad Christum.
Consequently each opinion is true to a certain extent. For if we consider the adequate causes of filiation, we must needs say that there are two filiations in respect of the twofold nativity. But if we consider the subject of filiation, which can only be the eternal suppositum, then no other than the eternal filiation in Christ is a real relation. Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to His Mother, because it is implied in the relation of motherhood to Christ. Thus God is called Lord by a relation which is implied in the real relation by which the creature is subject to God. And although lordship is not a real relation in God, yet is He really Lord through the real subjection of the creature to Him. In the same way Christ is really the Son of the Virgin Mother through the real relation of her motherhood to Christ.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nativitas temporalis causaret in Christo temporalem filiationem realem, si esset ibi subiectum huiusmodi filiationis capax. Quod quidem esse non potest, ipsum enim suppositum aeternum non potest esse susceptivum relationis temporalis, ut dictum est. Nec etiam potest dici quod sit susceptivum filiationis temporalis ratione humanae naturae, sicut etiam et temporalis nativitatis, quia oporteret naturam humanam aliqualiter esse subiectam filiationi, sicut est aliqualiter subiecta nativitati; cum enim Aethiops dicitur albus ratione dentis, oportet quod dens Aethiopis sit albedinis subiectum. Natura autem humana nullo modo potest esse subiectum filiationis, quia haec relatio directe respicit personam.
Reply Obj. 1: Temporal nativity would cause a real temporal filiation in Christ if there were in Him a subject capable of such filiation. But this cannot be; since the eternal suppositum cannot be receptive of a temporal relation, as stated above. Nor can it be said that it is receptive of temporal filiation by reason of the human nature, just as it is receptive of the temporal nativity; because human nature would need in some way to be the subject of filiation, just as in a way it is the subject of nativity; for since an Ethiopian is said to be white by reason of his teeth, it must be that his teeth are the subject of whiteness. But human nature can nowise be the subject of filiation, because this relation regards directly the person.
Ad secundum dicendum quod filiatio aeterna non dependet a matre temporali, sed huic filiationi aeternae cointelligitur quidam respectus temporalis dependens a matre, secundum quem Christus dicitur filius matris.
Reply Obj. 2: Eternal filiation does not depend on a temporal mother, but together with this eternal filiation we understand a certain temporal relation dependent on the mother, in respect of which relation Christ is called the Son of His Mother.
Ad tertium dicendum quod unum et ens se consequuntur, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Et ideo, sicut contingit quod in uno extremorum relatio sit quoddam ens, in alio autem non sit ens, sed ratio tantum, sicut de scibili et scientia philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., ita etiam contingit quod ex parte unius extremi est una relatio, ex parte autem alterius extremi sunt multae relationes. Sicut in hominibus ex parte parentum invenitur duplex relatio, una paternitatis et alia maternitatis, quae sunt specie differentes, propter hoc quod alia ratione pater, et alia mater est generationis principium (si vero essent plures eadem ratione principium unius actionis, puta cum multi simul trahunt navem, in omnibus esset una et eadem relatio), ex parte autem prolis est una sola filiatio secundum rem, sed duplex secundum rationem, inquantum correspondet utrique relationi parentum secundum duos respectus intellectus. Et sic etiam quantum ad aliquid in Christo est tantum una filiatio realis, quae respicit patrem aeternum, est tamen ibi alius respectus temporalis, qui respicit matrem temporalem.
Reply Obj. 3: One and being are mutually consequent, as is said Metaph. iv. Therefore, just as it happens that in one of the extremes of a relation there is something real, whereas in the other there is not something real, but merely a certain aspect, as the Philosopher observes of knowledge and the thing known; so also it happens that on the part of one extreme there is one relation, whereas on the part of the other there are many. Thus in man on the part of his parents there is a twofold relation, the one of paternity, the other of motherhood, which are specifically diverse, inasmuch as the father is the principle of generation in one way, and the mother in another (whereas if many be the principle of one action and in the same way—for instance, if many together draw a ship along—there would be one and the same relation in all of them); but on the part of the child there is but one filiation in reality, though there be two in aspect, corresponding to the two relations in the parents, as considered by the intellect. And thus in one way there is only one real filiation in Christ, which is in respect of the Eternal Father: yet there is another temporal relation in regard to His temporal mother.
Utrum Christus fuerit natus sine dolore matris
Whether Christ was born without his Mother suffering?
Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit natus sine dolore matris. Sicut enim mors hominum subsecuta est ex peccato primorum parentum, secundum illud Gen. II, quacumque die comederitis, morte moriemini; ita etiam dolor partus, secundum illud Gen. III, in dolore paries filios. Sed Christus mortem subire voluit. Ergo videtur quod pari ratione eius partus esse debuerit cum dolore.
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born without His Mother suffering. For just as man’s death was a result of the sin of our first parents, according to Gen. 2:17: In what day soever ye shall eat, ye shall die; so were the pains of childbirth, according to Gen. 3:16: In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children. But Christ was willing to undergo death. Therefore for the same reason it seems that His birth should have been with pain.
Praeterea, finis proportionatur principio. Sed finis vitae Christi fuit cum dolore, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, vere dolores nostros ipse tulit. Ergo videtur quod etiam in sua nativitate fuerit dolor partus.
Obj. 2: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But Christ ended His life in pain, according to Isa. 53:4: Surely . . . He hath carried our sorrows. Therefore it seems that His nativity was not without the pains of childbirth.
Praeterea, in libro de ortu salvatoris narratur quod ad Christi nativitatem obstetrices occurrerunt, quae videntur necessariae parienti propter dolorem. Ergo videtur quod beata virgo peperit cum dolore.
Obj. 3: Further, in the book on the birth of our Savior it is related that midwives were present at Christ’s birth; and they would be wanted by reason of the mother’s suffering pain. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin suffered pain in giving birth to her Child.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de nativitate, alloquens virginem matrem, nec in conceptione, inquit, inventa es sine pudore, nec in partu inventa es cum dolore.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Serm. de Nativ.), addressing himself to the Virgin-Mother: In conceiving thou wast all pure, in giving birth thou wast without pain.
Respondeo dicendum quod dolor parientis causatur ex apertione meatuum per quos proles egreditur. Dictum est autem supra quod Christus est egressus ex clauso utero matris, et sic nulla apertio meatuum ibi fuit. Et propter hoc in illo partu nullus fuit dolor, sicut nec aliqua corruptio, sed fuit ibi maxima iucunditas, ex hoc quod homo Deus natus est in mundum, secundum illud Isaiae XXXV, germinans germinabit sicut lilium, et exultabit laetabunda et laudans.
I answer that, The pains of childbirth are caused by the infant opening the passage from the womb. Now it has been said above (Q. 28, A. 2, Replies to objections), that Christ came forth from the closed womb of His Mother, and, consequently, without opening the passage. Consequently there was no pain in that birth, as neither was there any corruption; on the contrary, there was much joy therein for that God-Man was born into the world, according to Isa. 35:1, 2: Like the lily, it shall bud forth and blossom, and shall rejoice with joy and praise.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dolor partus consequitur in muliere commixtionem virilem. Unde Gen. III, postquam dictum est, in dolore paries, subditur, et sub viri potestate eris. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, in sermone de assumptione beatae virginis, ab hac sententia excipitur virgo mater Dei, quae, quia sine peccati colluvione et sine virilis admixtionis detrimento Christum suscepit, sine dolore genuit, sine integritatis violatione, pudore virginitatis integra permansit. Christus autem mortem suscepit spontanea voluntate, ut pro nobis satisfaceret, non quasi ex necessitate illius sententiae, quia ipse mortis debitor non erat.
Reply Obj. 1: The pains of childbirth in the woman follow from the mingling of the sexes. Wherefore (Gen 3:16) after the words, in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children, the following are added: and thou shalt be under thy husband’s power. But, as Augustine says (Serm. de Assumpt. B. Virg.,), from this sentence we must exclude the Virgin-Mother of God; who, because she conceived Christ without the defilement of sin, and without the stain of sexual mingling, therefore did she bring Him forth without pain, without violation of her virginal integrity, without detriment to the purity of her maidenhood. Christ, indeed, suffered death, but through His own spontaneous desire, in order to atone for us, not as a necessary result of that sentence, for He was not a debtor unto death.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Christus moriendo destruxit mortem nostram, ita suo dolore nos a doloribus liberavit, et ita mori voluit cum dolore. Sed dolor parientis matris non pertinebat ad Christum, qui pro peccatis nostris satisfacere veniebat. Et ideo non oportuit quod mater eius pareret cum dolore.
Reply Obj. 2: As by His death Christ destroyed our death, so by His pains He freed us from our pains; and so He wished to die a painful death. But the mother’s pains in childbirth did not concern Christ, who came to atone for our sins. And therefore there was no need for His Mother to suffer in giving birth.
Ad tertium dicendum quod Luc. II dicitur quod beata virgo ipsamet puerum, quem pepererat, pannis involvit et posuit in praesepio. Et ex hoc ostenditur narratio huius libri, qui est apocryphus, esse falsa. Unde Hieronymus dicit, contra Helvidium, nulla ibi obstetrix, nulla muliercularum sedulitas intercessit. Et mater et obstetrix fuit. Pannis, inquit, involvit infantem, et posuit in praesepio. Quae sententia apocryphorum deliramenta convincit.
Reply Obj. 3: We are told (Luke 2:7) that the Blessed Virgin herself wrapped up in swaddling clothes the Child whom she had brought forth, and laid Him in a manger. Consequently the narrative of this book, which is apocryphal, is untrue. Wherefore Jerome says (Adv. Helvid. iv): No midwife was there, no officious women interfered. She was both mother and midwife. ‘With swaddling clothes,’ says he, ‘she wrapped up the child, and laid Him in a manger.’ These words prove the falseness of the apocryphal ravings.
Utrum Christus debuit in Bethlehem nasci
Whether Christ should have been born in Bethlehem?
Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuit in Bethlehem nasci. Dicitur enim Isaiae II, de Sion exibit lex, et verbum domini de Ierusalem. Sed Christus est vere verbum Dei. Ergo de Ierusalem debuit prodire in mundum.
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born in Bethlehem. For it is written (Isa 2:3): The law shall come forth from Zion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem. But Christ is truly the Word of God. Therefore He should have come into the world at Jerusalem.