Respondeo dicendum quod passiones humanae possunt considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad speciem. Et sic non oportuit Christum omnem humanam passionem pati, quia multae passionum species sibi invicem contrariantur, sicut combustio in igne et submersio in aqua. Loquimur enim nunc de passionibus ab extrinseco illatis, quia passiones ab intrinseco causatas, sicut sunt aegritudines corporales, non decuit eum pati, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum genus, passus est omnem passionem humanam. Quod quidem potest considerari tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte hominum. Passus est enim aliquid et a gentilibus, et a Iudaeis; a masculis et feminis, ut patet de ancillis accusantibus Petrum. Passus est etiam a principibus, et a ministris eorum, et popularibus, secundum illud Psalmi, quare fremuerunt gentes, et populi meditati sunt inania? Astiterunt reges terrae, et principes convenerunt in unum, adversus dominum et adversus Christum eius. Passus est etiam a familiaribus et notis, sicut patet de Iuda eum prodente, et Petro ipsum negante. I answer that, Human sufferings may be considered under two aspects. First of all, specifically, and in this way it was not necessary for Christ to endure them all, since many are mutually exclusive, as burning and drowning; for we are dealing now with sufferings inflicted from without, since it was not beseeming for Him to endure those arising from within, such as bodily ailments, as already stated (Q. 14, A. 4). But, speaking generically, He did endure every human suffering. This admits of a threefold acceptance. First of all, on the part of men: for He endured something from Gentiles and from Jews; from men and from women, as is clear from the women servants who accused Peter. He suffered from the rulers, from their servants and from the mob, according to Ps. 2:1, 2: Why have the Gentiles raged, and the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord and against His Christ. He suffered from friends and acquaintances, as is manifest from Judas betraying and Peter denying Him. Alio modo patet idem ex parte eorum in quibus homo potest pati. Passus est enim Christus in suis amicis eum deserentibus; in fama per blasphemias contra eum dictas; in honore et gloria per irrisiones et contumelias ei illatas; in rebus per hoc quod etiam vestibus spoliatus est; in anima per tristitiam, taedium et timorem; in corpore per vulnera et flagella. Second, the same is evident on the part of the sufferings which a man can endure. For Christ suffered from friends abandoning Him; in His reputation, from the blasphemies hurled at Him; in His honor and glory, from the mockeries and the insults heaped upon Him; in things, for He was despoiled of His garments; in His soul, from sadness, weariness, and fear; in His body, from wounds and scourgings. Tertio potest considerari quantum ad corporis membra. Passus est enim Christus in capite pungentium spinarum coronam; in manibus et pedibus fixionem clavorum; in facie alapas et sputa; et in toto corpore flagella. Fuit etiam passus secundum omnem sensum corporeum, secundum tactum quidem, flagellatus et clavis confixus; secundum gustum, felle et aceto potatus; secundum olfactum, in loco fetido cadaverum mortuorum, qui dicitur Calvariae, appensus patibulo; secundum auditum, lacessitus vocibus blasphemantium et irridentium; secundum visum, videns matrem et discipulum quem diligebat flentes. Third, it may be considered with regard to His bodily members. In His head He suffered from the crown of piercing thorns; in His hands and feet, from the fastening of the nails; on His face from the blows and spittle; and from the lashes over His entire body. Moreover, He suffered in all His bodily senses: in touch, by being scourged and nailed; in taste, by being given vinegar and gall to drink; in smell, by being fastened to the gibbet in a place reeking with the stench of corpses, which is called Calvary; in hearing, by being tormented with the cries of blasphemers and scorners; in sight, by beholding the tears of His Mother and of the disciple whom He loved. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud Hilarii est intelligendum quantum ad omnia genera passionum, non autem quantum ad omnes species. Reply Obj. 1: Hilary’s words are to be understood as to all classes of sufferings, but not as to their kinds. Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo ibi attenditur, non quantum ad numerum passionum et gratiarum, sed quantum ad magnitudinem utriusque, quia sicut sublimatus est in donis gratiarum super alios, ita deiectus est infra alios per ignominiam passionis. Reply Obj. 2: The likeness is sustained, not as to the number of the sufferings and graces, but as to their greatness; for, as He was uplifted above others in gifts of graces, so was He lowered beneath others by the ignominy of His sufferings. Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum sufficientiam, una minima passio Christi suffecit ad redimendum genus humanum ab omnibus peccatis. Sed secundum convenientiam, sufficiens fuit quod pateretur omnia genera passionum, sicut iam dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: The very least one of Christ’s sufferings was sufficient of itself to redeem the human race from all sins; but as to fittingness, it sufficed that He should endure all classes of sufferings, as stated above. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum dolor passionis Christi fuerit maior omnibus aliis doloribus Whether the pain of Christ’s Passion was greater than all other pains? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor passionis Christi non fuerit maior omnibus aliis doloribus. Dolor enim patientis augetur secundum gravitatem et diuturnitatem passionis. Sed quidam martyres graviores passiones et diuturniores sustinuerunt quam Christus, sicut patet de Laurentio, qui est assatus in craticula; et de Vincentio, cuius carnes sunt ungulis ferreis laceratae. Ergo videtur quod dolor Christi patientis non fuerit maximus. Objection 1: It would seem that the pain of Christ’s Passion was not greater than all other pains. For the sufferer’s pain is increased by the sharpness and the duration of the suffering. But some of the martyrs endured sharper and more prolonged pains than Christ, as is seen in St. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St. Vincent, whose flesh was torn with iron pincers. Therefore it seems that the pain of the suffering Christ was not the greatest. Praeterea, virtus mentis est mitigativa doloris, in tantum quod Stoici posuerunt tristitiam in animo sapientis non cadere. Et Aristoteles posuit quod virtus moralis medium tenet in passionibus. Sed in Christo fuit perfectissima virtus mentis. Ergo videtur quod in Christo fuerit minimus dolor. Obj. 2: Further, strength of soul mitigates pain, so much so that the Stoics held there was no sadness in the soul of a wise man; and Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions. But Christ had most perfect strength of soul. Therefore it seems that the greatest pain did not exist in Christ. Praeterea, quanto aliquod patiens est magis sensibile, tanto maior sequitur dolor passionis. Sed anima est sensibilior quam corpus, cum corpus sentiat ex anima. Adam etiam in statu innocentiae videtur corpus sensibilius habuisse quam Christus, qui assumpsit corpus humanum cum naturalibus defectibus. Ergo videtur quod dolor animae patientis in Purgatorio vel in Inferno, vel etiam dolor Adae si passus fuisset, maior fuisset quam dolor passionis Christi. Obj. 3: Further, the more sensitive the sufferer is, the more acute will the pain be. But the soul is more sensitive than the body, since the body feels in virtue of the soul; also, Adam in the state of innocence seems to have had a body more sensitive than Christ had, who assumed a human body with its natural defects. Consequently, it seems that the pain of a sufferer in purgatory, or in hell, or even Adam’s pain, if he suffered at all, was greater than Christ’s in the Passion. Praeterea, maioris boni amissio causat maiorem dolorem. Sed peccator peccando amittit maius bonum quam Christus patiendo, quia vita gratiae est melior quam vita naturae. Christus etiam, qui amisit vitam post triduum resurrecturus, minus aliquid videtur amisisse quam illi qui amittunt vitam permansuri in morte. Ergo videtur quod dolor Christi non fuerit maximus dolor. Obj. 4: Further, the greater the good lost, the greater the pain. But by sinning the sinner loses a greater good than Christ did when suffering; since the life of grace is greater than the life of nature: also, Christ, who lost His life, but was to rise again after three days, seems to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide in death. Therefore it seems that Christ’s pain was not the greatest of all. Praeterea, innocentia patientis diminuit dolorem passionis. Sed Christus innocenter est passus, secundum illud Ierem. XI, ego autem quasi agnus mansuetus qui portatur ad victimam. Ergo videtur quod dolor passionis Christi non fuerit maximus. Obj. 5: Further, the victim’s innocence lessens the sting of his sufferings. But Christ died innocent, according to Jer. 9:19: I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim. Therefore it seems that the pain of Christ’s Passion was not the greatest. Praeterea, in his quae Christi sunt, nihil fuit superfluum. Sed minimus dolor Christi suffecisset ad finem salutis humanae, habuisset enim infinitam virtutem ex persona divina. Ergo superfluum fuisset assumere maximum dolorem. Obj. 6: Further, there was nothing superfluous in Christ’s conduct. But the slightest pain would have sufficed to secure man’s salvation, because from His Divine Person it would have had infinite virtue. Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the greatest of all pains. Sed contra est quod habetur Thren. I ex persona Christi, attendite, et videte si est dolor sicut dolor meus. On the contrary, It is written (Lam 1:12) on behalf of Christ’s Person: O all ye that pass by the way attend, and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de defectibus assumptis a Christo ageretur, in Christo patiente fuit verus dolor et sensibilis, qui causatur ex corporali nocivo; et dolor interior, qui causatur ex apprehensione alicuius nocivi, qui tristitia dicitur. Uterque autem dolor in Christo fuit maximus inter dolores praesentis vitae. Quod quidem contingit propter quatuor. Primo quidem, propter causas doloris. Nam doloris sensibilis causa fuit laesio corporalis. Quae acerbitatem habuit, tum propter generalitatem passionis, de qua dictum est, tum etiam ex genere passionis. Quia mors confixorum in cruce est acerbissima, quia configuntur in locis nervosis et maxime sensibilibus, scilicet in manibus et pedibus; et ipsum pondus corporis pendentis continue auget dolorem; et cum hoc etiam est doloris diuturnitas, quia non statim moriuntur, sicut hi qui sunt gladio interfecti. Doloris autem interioris causa fuit, primo quidem, omnia peccata humani generis, pro quibus satisfaciebat patiendo, unde ea quasi sibi adscribit, dicens in Psalmo, verba delictorum meorum. Secundo, specialiter casus Iudaeorum et aliorum in eius mortem delinquentium, et praecipue discipulorum, qui scandalum passi fuerant in Christi passione. Tertio etiam amissio vitae corporalis, quae naturaliter est horribilis humanae naturae. I answer that, As we have stated, when treating of the defects assumed by Christ (Q. 15, AA. 5, 6), there was true and sensible pain in the suffering Christ, which is caused by something hurtful to the body: also, there was internal pain, which is caused from the apprehension of something hurtful, and this is termed sadness. And in Christ each of these was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four causes. First of all, from the sources of His pain. For the cause of the sensitive pain was the wounding of His body; and this wounding had its bitterness, both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned (A. 5) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of the crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in nervous and highly sensitive parts—to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony, and besides this there is the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once like those slain by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was, first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to speak, to Himself, saying (Ps 21:2): The words of my sins. Second, especially the fall of the Jews and of the others who sinned in His death, chiefly of the apostles, who were scandalized at His Passion. Third, the loss of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to human nature. Secundo potest magnitudo considerari ex perceptibilitate patientis. Nam et secundum corpus erat optime complexionatus, cum corpus eius fuerit formatum miraculose operatione spiritus sancti, sicut et alia quae per miracula facta sunt, sunt aliis potiora, ut Chrysostomus dicit de vino in quod Christus aquam convertit in nuptiis. Et ideo in eo maxime viguit sensus tactus, ex cuius perceptione sequitur dolor. Anima etiam, secundum vires interiores, efficacissime apprehendit omnes causas tristitiae. The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, second, from the susceptibility of the sufferer as to both soul and body. For His body was endowed with a most perfect constitution, since it was fashioned miraculously by the operation of the Holy Spirit; just as some other things made by miracles are better than others, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine into which Christ changed the water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently, Christ’s sense of touch, the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most vehemently all the causes of sadness. Tertio magnitudo doloris Christi patientis potest considerari ex doloris puritate. Nam in aliis patientibus mitigatur tristitia interior, et etiam dolor exterior, ex aliqua consideratione rationis, per quandam derivationem seu redundantiam a superioribus viribus ad inferiores. Quod in Christo patiente non fuit, unicuique enim virium permisit agere quod est sibi proprium, sicut Damascenus dicit. Third, the magnitude of Christ’s suffering can be estimated from the singleness of His pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some consideration of reason, by some derivation or redundance from the higher powers into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering Christ, because He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its proper function, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii). Quarto potest considerari magnitudo doloris Christi patientis ex hoc quod passio illa et dolor a Christo fuerunt assumpta voluntarie, propter finem liberationis hominum a peccato. Et ideo tantam quantitatem doloris assumpsit quae esset proportionata magnitudini fructus qui inde sequebatur. Fourth, the magnitude of the pain of Christ’s suffering can be reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were accepted voluntarily, to the end of men’s deliverance from sin; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which resulted therefrom. Ex his igitur omnibus causis simul consideratis manifeste apparet quod dolor Christi fuit maximus. From all these causes weighed together, it follows that Christ’s pain was the very greatest. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex uno tantum praedictorum, scilicet ex laesione corporali, quae est causa sensibilis doloris. Sed ex aliis causis multo magis dolor Christi patientis augetur, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: This argument follows from only one of the considerations adduced—namely, from the bodily injury, which is the cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering Christ is much more intensified from other causes, as above stated. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus moralis aliter mitigat tristitiam interiorem, et aliter exteriorem dolorem sensibilem. Tristitiam enim interiorem diminuit directe, in ea medium constituendo sicut in propria materia. Medium autem in passionibus virtus moralis constituit, ut in secunda parte habitum est, non secundum quantitatem rei, sed secundum quantitatem proportionis, ut scilicet passio non excedat regulam rationis. Et quia Stoici reputabant quod nulla tristitia esset ad aliquid utilis, ideo credebant quod totaliter a ratione discordaret, et per consequens quod totaliter esset sapienti vitanda. Sed secundum rei veritatem, tristitia aliqua laudabilis est, ut Augustinus probat, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quando scilicet procedit ex sancto amore, ut puta cum aliquis tristatur de peccatis propriis vel alienis. Assumitur etiam ut utilis ad finem satisfactionis pro peccato, secundum illud II Cor. VII, quae secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur. Et ideo Christus, ut satisfaceret pro peccatis omnium hominum, assumpsit tristitiam maximam quantitate absoluta, non tamen excedentem regulam rationis. Dolorem autem exteriorem sensus virtus moralis directe non minuit, quia talis dolor non obedit rationi, sed sequitur corporis naturam. Diminuit tamen ipsum indirecte per redundantiam a superioribus viribus in inferiores. Quod in Christo non fuit, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: Moral virtue lessens interior sadness in one way, and outward sensitive pain in quite another; for it lessens interior sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being its proper matter, within limits. But, as was laid down in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 64, A. 2), moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions, not according to mathematical quantity, but according to quantity of proportion, so that the passion shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all sadness to be unprofitable, they accordingly believed it to be altogether discordant with reason, and consequently to be shunned altogether by a wise man. But in very truth some sadness is praiseworthy, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)—namely, when it flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is saddened over his own or others’ sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful means of satisfying for sins, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor 7:10): The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast unto salvation. And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quantity, yet not exceeding the rule of reason. But moral virtue does not lessen outward sensitive pain, because such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the nature of the body; yet it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the higher powers into the lower. But this did not happen in Christ’s case, as stated above (cf. Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 45, A. 2). Ad tertium dicendum quod dolor animae separatae patientis pertinet ad statum futurae damnationis, qui excedit omne malum huius vitae, sicut sanctorum gloria excedit omne bonum praesentis vitae. Unde, cum diximus Christi dolorem esse maximum, non comparamus ipsum dolori animae separatae. Corpus autem Adae pati non poterat, nisi peccaret et sic fieret mortale et passibile. Et minus doleret patiens quam corpus Christi, propter rationes praedictas. Ex quibus etiam apparet quod etiam si, per impossibile, ponatur quod Adam in statu innocentiae passus fuisset, minor fuisset eius dolor quam Christi. Reply Obj. 3: The pain of a suffering, separated soul belongs to the state of future condemnation, which exceeds every evil of this life, just as the glory of the saints surpasses every good of the present life. Accordingly, when we say that Christ’s pain was the greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated soul. But Adam’s body could not suffer, except he sinned; so that he would become mortal, and passible. And, though actually suffering, it would have felt less pain than Christ’s body, for the reasons already stated. From all this it is clear that even if Adam had suffered in the state of innocence, his pain would have been less than Christ’s. Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus non solum doluit pro amissione vitae corporalis propriae, sed etiam pro peccatis omnium aliorum. Qui dolor in Christo excessit omnem dolorem cuiuslibet contriti. Tum quia ex maiori sapientia et caritate processit, ex quibus dolor contritionis augetur. Tum etiam quia pro omnium peccatis simul doluit, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, vere dolores nostros ipse tulit. Vita autem corporalis Christi fuit tantae dignitatis, et praecipue propter divinitatem unitam, quod de eius amissione etiam ad horam, magis esset dolendum quam de amissione alterius hominis per quantumcumque tempus. Unde et philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod virtuosus plus diligit vitam suam quanto scit eam esse meliorem, et tamen eam exponit propter bonum virtutis. Et similiter Christus vitam suam maxime dilectam exposuit propter bonum caritatis, secundum illud Ierem. XII, dedi dilectam animam meam in manibus inimicorum eius. Reply Obj. 4: Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in Christ surpassed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the pang of contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for all sins, according to Isa. 53:4: Surely He hath carried our sorrows. But such was the dignity of Christ’s life in the body, especially on account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for one hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man’s life for howsoever long a time. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that the man of virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue’s sake. And in like fashion Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of charity, according to Jer. 12:7: I have given My dear soul into the hands of her enemies. Ad quintum dicendum quod innocentia patientis minuit dolorem passionis quantum ad numerum, quia, dum nocens patitur, dolet non solum de poena, sed etiam de culpa; innocens autem solum de poena. Qui tamen dolor in eo augetur ex innocentia, inquantum apprehendit nocumentum illatum ut magis indebitum. Unde etiam et alii magis sunt reprehensibiles si eis non compatiuntur, secundum illud Isaiae LVII, iustus autem perit, et non est qui recogitet in corde suo. Reply Obj. 5: The sufferer’s innocence does lessen numerically the pain of the suffering, since, when a guilty man suffers, he grieves not merely on account of the penalty, but also because of the crime, whereas the innocent man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain is more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that even others are more deserving of blame if they do not compassionate him, according to Isa. 57:1: The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart. Ad sextum dicendum quod Christus voluit genus humanum a peccatis liberare, non sola potestate, sed etiam iustitia. Et ideo non solum attendit quantam virtutem dolor eius haberet ex divinitate unita, sed etiam quantum dolor eius sufficeret secundum naturam humanam, ad tantam satisfactionem. Reply Obj. 6: Christ willed to deliver the human race from sins not merely by His power, but also according to justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh what great virtue His suffering would have from union with the Godhead, but also how much, according to His human nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum Christus fuerit passus secundum totam animam Whether Christ suffered in his whole soul? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Anima enim patitur, patiente corpore, per accidens, inquantum est corporis actus. Sed anima non est actus corporis secundum quamlibet partem eius, nam intellectus nullius corporis actus est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo videtur quod Christus non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. For the soul suffers indirectly when the body suffers, inasmuch as it is the act of the body. But the soul is not, as to its every part, the act of the body; because the intellect is the act of no body, as is said De Anima iii. Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. Praeterea, quaelibet potentia animae patitur a suo obiecto. Sed superioris partis rationis obiectum sunt rationes aeternae, quibus inspiciendis et consulendis intendit, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Ex rationibus autem aeternis nullum potuit Christus pati nocumentum, cum in nullo ei contrariarentur. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Obj. 2: Further, every power of the soul is passive in regard to its proper object. But the higher part of reason has for its object the eternal types, to the consideration and consultation of which it directs itself, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii). But Christ could suffer no hurt from the eternal types, since they are nowise opposed to Him. Therefore it seems that He did not suffer in His whole soul. Praeterea, quando passio sensibilis usque ad rationem pertingit, tunc dicitur completa passio. Quae in Christo non fuit, ut Hieronymus dicit, sed solum propassio. Unde et Dionysius dicit, in epistola ad Ioannem Evangelistam, quod passiones sibi illatas patiebatur secundum iudicare solum. Non ergo videtur quod Christus secundum totam animam pateretur. Obj. 3: Further, a sensitive passion is said to be complete when it comes into contact with the reason. But there was none such in Christ, but only pro-passions; as Jerome remarks on Matt. 26:37. Hence Dionysius says in a letter to John the Evangelist that He endured only mentally the sufferings inflicted upon Him. Consequently it does not seem that Christ suffered in His whole soul. Praeterea, passio dolorem causat. Sed in intellectu speculativo non est dolor, quia delectationi quae est ab eo quod est considerare, nulla tristitia opponitur, ut philosophus dicit, I Topic. Ergo videtur quod Christus non pateretur secundum totam animam. Obj. 4: Further, suffering causes pain: but there is no pain in the speculative intellect, because, as the Philosopher says (Topic. i), there is no sadness in opposition to the pleasure which comes of consideration. Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo dicitur, ex persona Christi, repleta est malis anima mea, Glossa, non vitiis, sed doloribus, quibus anima carni compatitur, vel malis, scilicet pereuntis populi, compatiendo. Non autem fuisset anima eius his malis repleta, si non secundum totam animam passus esset. Ergo Christus secundum totam animam passus est. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 87:4) on behalf of Christ: My soul is filled with evils: upon which the gloss adds: Not with vices, but with woes, whereby the soul suffers with the flesh; or with evils, viz. of a perishing people, by compassionating them. But His soul would not have been filled with these evils except He had suffered in His whole soul. Therefore Christ suffered in His entire soul. Respondeo dicendum quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Partes autem animae dicuntur potentiae eius. Sic ergo dicitur anima tota pati, inquantum patitur secundum suam essentiam, vel inquantum secundum omnes suas potentias patitur. Sed considerandum est quod aliqua potentia animae potest pati dupliciter. Uno modo, passione propria, quae quidem est secundum quod patitur a suo obiecto, sicut si visus patiatur ex superabundantia visibilis. Alio modo patitur aliqua potentia passione subiecti super quod fundatur, sicut visus patitur patiente sensu tactus in oculo, super quem fundatur visus; puta cum oculus pungitur, aut etiam distemperatur per calorem. I answer that, A whole is so termed with respect to its parts. But the parts of a soul are its faculties. So, then, the whole soul is said to suffer in so far as it is afflicted as to its essence, or as to all its faculties. But it must be borne in mind that a faculty of the soul can suffer in two ways: first of all, by its own passion; and this comes of its being afflicted by its proper object; thus, sight may suffer from superabundance of the visible object. In another way a faculty suffers by a passion in the subject on which it is based; as sight suffers when the sense of touch in the eye is affected, upon which the sense of sight rests, as, for instance, when the eye is pricked, or is disaffected by heat. Sic igitur dicendum quod, si intelligamus totam animam ratione suae essentiae, sic manifestum est totam animam Christi passam esse. Nam tota essentia animae coniungitur corpori ita quod tota est in toto, et tota in qualibet parte eius. Et ideo, corpore patiente et disposito ad separationem ab anima, tota anima patiebatur. Si vero intelligamus totam animam secundum omnes potentias eius, sic, loquendo de passionibus propriis potentiarum, patiebatur quidem secundum omnes vires inferiores, quia in singulis viribus inferioribus animae, quae circa temporalia operantur, inveniebatur aliquid quod erat causa doloris Christi, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Sed secundum hoc superior ratio non patiebatur in Christo ex parte sui obiecti, scilicet Dei, qui non erat animae Christi causa doloris, sed delectationis et gaudii. Secundum autem illum modum passionis quo potentia aliqua dicitur pati ex parte sui subiecti, sic omnes potentiae animae Christi patiebantur. Omnes enim potentiae animae Christi radicantur in essentia eius, ad quam perveniebat passio, passo corpore, cuius est actus. So, then, we say that if the soul be considered with respect to its essence, it is evident that Christ’s whole soul suffered. For the soul’s whole essence is allied with the body, so that it is entire in the whole body and in its every part. Consequently, when the body suffered and was disposed to separate from the soul, the entire soul suffered. But if we consider the whole soul according to its faculties, speaking thus of the proper passions of the faculties, He suffered indeed as to all His lower powers; because in all the soul’s lower powers, whose operations are but temporal, there was something to be found which was a source of woe to Christ, as is evident from what was said above (A. 6). But Christ’s higher reason did not suffer thereby on the part of its object, which is God, who was the cause, not of grief, but rather of delight and joy, to the soul of Christ. Nevertheless, all the powers of Christ’s soul did suffer according as any faculty is said to be affected as regards its subject, because all the faculties of Christ’s soul were rooted in its essence, to which suffering extended when the body, whose act it is, suffered. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet intellectus, secundum quod est potentia quaedam, non sit corporis actus; essentia tamen animae est corporis actus, in qua radicatur potentia intellectiva, ut in prima parte habitum est. Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellect as a faculty is not the act of the body, still the soul’s essence is the act of the body, and in it the intellective faculty is rooted, as was shown in the First Part, Q. 77, AA. 6, 8.